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Abstract 
This thesis explores the application and development of the contested concept of 
quality in four National Health Service acute hospital Trusts: Marketown, Fishtown, 
Castletown and Shiptown. It shows how quality can be conceptualised along two 
theoretical planes: the colloquial (or common-sense) and the technical; the focus for 
this thesis is on this second, technical, level in which quality can be observed as a 
distinct set of activities - quality has been operationalised. Quality is shown to be 
explicitly linked to a process of managerialization which has impacted upon public 
services extensively in the past fifteen years. As part of this process, quality is 
associated with attempts to recast power relations between groups with a stake in the 
provision of services and consequently the operationalisation of quality. These groups 
include professionals, managers and consumers. The thesis represents a snapshot of 
these attempts to shift power using the language and techniques of quality, and the 
reactions to these attempts from 'stakeholders'. It presents stakeholder groups as 
'constituencies of interest' bound by, amongst other things, organisational culture. 
These ties are explored using multiple sources of data (Q-method, interviews, 
observations and documents), within a case-study methodological framework. 
The thesis concludes that, whilst the conventional organisational cultures of 
managerialism, professionalism and consumerism provide useful analytical levers, 
they are far from the only influence in forming constituencies of interest. Categories 
such as hierarchical position, market role and insider-outsider status and the power 
and interests associated with these categories are just as influential. Consequently, 
policy makers are asked to recognise the complex impact of factors such as power, 
interest and culture, on the operationalisation of quality in services, and to recognise 
the multi-dimensional nature of the conflicts promoted by this complexity. 
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CHAPTER ONE: QUALITY AND THE NHS - AN 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept, and associated language, of quality has become a major preoccupation 
with policy makers and service providers alike in the National Health Service (NHS) 
over the past fifteen years. At a macro level, the use of the term quality has become a 
pervasive feature of almost every significant NHS policy development in the last 
seven years. It is now firmly established in the rhetorical toolkit of politicians wishing 
to comment on the NHS and the services it provides. 
In the micro policy arena of service provision, quality is now a substantive component 
of the work of every NHS Trust. Almost all Trusts are engaged in various forms of 
quality assurance; quality initiatives; and quality management. Many staff are 
employed in 'quality directorates' professional groups have been linked to the concept 
through 'directorates of nursing and quality' in Trusts. Quality has also entered the 
core financial business of transactions between Trusts and their purchasers in the form 
of quality specifications attached to contracts. 
Despite the incursions the concept has made into the work of the NHS, quality itself 
remains an elusive and slippery concept. It is often ill-defined, if it is defined at all; 
and its meteoric rise in the NHS is something which deserves further critical scrutiny. 
As Pollitt pointed out in 1990: 
'Everyone is infavour of quality. To seasoned political observers this alone is enough 
to make it an object ofsuspicion. Like performance and efficiency, quality is a danger 
of meaning all things to all men (and women). Like performance and efficiency, it is a 
term open to subtle abuse. ' I 
This thesis takes as its starting point the need to address the suspicions of observers 
such as Pollitt and to look at the 'subtle abuses' which quality endures in NHS 
provider Trusts. In order to look at these abuses one must first take a conceptual 'fix' 
on the subject under investigation. Taking such a fix is not easy because quality can 
often mean 'all things to all men (and women)'. It is necessary then to be clear exactly 
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what is referred to in the thesis to when it uses the term of quality. This introductory 
chapter seeks to fulfil this task and in doing so to outline the scope of the thesis by 
highlighting some of the salient questions which arise from an examination of the 
literature on the conceptual nature of quality. 
Towards A Taxonomy Of Quality In The NHS 
The notion that quality can have a variety of meanings is a factor acknowledged by 
both theoreticians and policy makers. The National Health Service Executive (NHSE) 
itself acknowledges that, 'The term quality is obviously open to interpretation'. 2 
The Colloquial Sense of Quality 
One option for the analyst seeking to explain how 'quality' has become so potent a 
force in NHS rhetoric and policy is to postulate that when quality is referred to in the 
NHS and when quality is spoken about in our day to day lives, we are talking about 
two separate (yet intertwined) entities. Having put forward a typology of quality 
revolving around the diverse formal definitions in use in public services James 3 
asserts that quality occupies two distinct linguistic and conceptual arenas: the 
(everyday' and the 'expert'. These two terms can be recast as the colloquial and the 
technical in order to better represent the views of other theorists who make a similar 
distinction, such as Pfeffer and Coote 4, who refer to the everyday sense of quality as 
the 'traditional' meaning. 
James argues that the everyday or colloquial use and meaning of quality has a number 
of defining features: 
* 'Quality' can be used to refer to mean 'high quality'. For example, when talking 
of quality clothing or quality fittings. Pfeffer and Coote 5 make a similar point 
when they argue that the label of quality when used in this sense conveys prestige 
or positional advantage. 
II 
* Quality is understood as both a relative and subjective term. In other words, 
quality can, quite naturally, mean different things to different people but all 
meanings can be acceptable. 
* People seem to employ, naturally, a number of criteria in individual definitions of 
what counts as quality. James uses the example of people asked to classify roses 
according to level of quality. They used criteria such as stem length, fragrance and 
colour to reach a judgement of quality. 
That when using quality in an everyday sense people have no problem in pulling 
together these three strands in order to make a judgement. 
For James, the judgement of quality is not based solely on subjective-objective 
criteria such as fragrance or length of stem, but with reference to 'softer' variables 
such as who sent the roses in the first instance and their implied significance to the 
recipient. She suggests that this is lost when quality enters the organisational 
[management] domain. Quality is often reduced to a simplistic reductionist argument 
of subjectivity versus objectivity. Or in her words, 'either quality seems to be about 
. )6 everything or it is about checklists, when in reality it is about both 
Quality in this sense is inherently subjective and simply implies a 'degree of 
excellence' 7 in the object it is applied to. Quality is something that can be a 
characteristic of people or products, but when used at this level is vague and open to 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the term carries enough weight to imply a value 
judgement. When something is said to possess 'quality' this always has the impact of 
portraying the object or person in a positive light. When a product is sold to you on 
the basis of its 'quality' it is appealing to something subjective which you hold in high 
regard. 
Pfeffer and Coote call this meaning of quality the 'traditional' approach; their analysis 
derives not from the characteristics of activities labelled under the umbrella term of 
quality, but fTom a ftinctional analysis of what quality is used for. As stated earlier, for 
Pfeffer and Coote, quality is used to 'convey prestige and positional advantage'. 
Quality in this sense has some definite advantages for anyone using the term. It is 
readily understood by people, and almost everyone will assume that the service or 
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product labelled with the tag of quality will be superior in some way to others. In a 
public sector context this characteristic can prove problematic. Within free markets 
the consumption of quality products confers status on the consumer (witness the 
marketing strategies of Rolex watches). In the NHS however, consumption of the 
NHS product is not commonly seen as a status enhancing process. Indeed as Pfeffer 
and Coote 8 point out it may be positively stigmatising and disabling. In the NHS the 
status is conferred on the provider as opposed to the consumer. Because of this they 
argue that the idea of traditional quality has no relevance to welfare. 
Pfeffer and Coote's contention of quality's irrelevance to the production of NHS 
services can be countered, however, by a recognition that the colloquial use and 
meaning of quality can have a profound influence on services. Like mud, 'quality' (or 
rather the status it implies) sticks. So significant changes to services such as 
organisational de-structuring, skill mix, and the questioning of the effectiveness of 
clinical practice, can all be justified under the banner of quality. Often in a more 
precise, technical, guise such as Total Quality Management. The organisations 
involved can remain secure in the knowledge that the more easily appreciable 
colloquial meaning will remain as a reference point for the public and workforce to 
fall back on. As Pfeffer and Coote point out: 
f activities which take place in the name of quality may indeed improve mattersfor the 
public. But even when they don't the quality message remains. '9 
In relation to other areas of public service, in the 1989 research review of universities 
by the University Grants Committee quality was not explicitly defined 'because it was 
assumed that the panels would recognise quality when they saw itlo. The colloquial 
meaning of the term quality has also found favour within the NHS. One of the case 
sites in this study had as its organisational logo, 'Partners in Quality Care'. They had 
also instituted a district-wide training programme which had been used extensively in 
the marketing of their services called 'Foundationsfor Quality'. One might argue that 
in these cases quality was simply a rhetorical device used to confer status upon the 
Trust. There was no need to demonstrate the substance behind these phrases as each 
served to imply that their Trust was of a higher calibre than their competitors. 
13 
The views of Pirsig' 1 relate to quality in this sense when he states, albeit from a more 
abstract perspective, that, 'even though quality cannot be defined, you know what it 
is'. In later works he refines his arguments somewhat to talk of the relative nature of 
quality judgements. A judgement of quality, for Pirsig, is made with reference to 
static and dynamic values. Static values are those values which individuals know and 
are comfortable with (like James' rose stem-length and fragrance, or politeness and 
safe environments in NHS Trusts). Dynamic values on the other hand are those which 
are new,, challenging, and desirable to the individual (for example, the idea of external 
monitoring of clinical practice to managers in NHS Trusts). Quality is seen as a 
function of these complementary and cyclical values. Dynamic values arise as an 
evolutionary response to frequency of contact with static values - people get used to 
them. The idea of quality is then constantly changing as people get used to the status 
quo and seek changes. 
This view of an evolutionary, common-sense, relative and yet indefinable concept 
raises interesting questions in relation to the NHS. If quality cannot be defined, and 
yet is recognisable, how will all stakeholders in public services know it exists? If all 
groups will recognise it, then will they do so to different degrees in response to their 
different desires from services? How will services demonstrate it in an era of 
managed competition between providers? How can something that is indefinable act 
as the basis for organisational behaviour and change? The colloquial meaning of 
quality can never do anything other than appeal to each individual's internalised sense 
of what quality means to them. Because of this, it poses a severe problem to the 
manager or policy maker seeking to institute change towards a goal of 'quality' in 
groups of people involved in the delivery of care. The answer to these dilemmas can 
be found in the technical mode of usage and meaning of quality. For quality to form 
the basis for organisational action it has to be made meaningful to lots of people, it 
has to be operationalised - this is the domain of technical quality. 
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The Technical Sense of Quality 
Whilst the colloquial sense of quality has been shown to have its uses in NHS services 
and policy, it is not quality in this sense which forms the basis of corporate action. 
Quality when used as the basis for strategy, initiatives, planning, action and 
monitoring occupies a different conceptual sphere. Quality begins to take on a more 
technocratic feel in the language used to describe it and the means taken to achieve it. 
Quality in this technical sense has to overcome the inability of common-sense 
(colloquial) ideas of quality to be anything other than internalised and subjective. 
It is at this level that most of the definitions emerge from the operational literature 
attached to quality. Perhaps unsurprisingly there are very few pieces of work dealing 
with the conceptual nature of quality in the colloquial sense but hundreds of texts 
promising to help organisations achieve technical quality. The definition of which is 
usually dealt with in a cursory paragraph or two at the beginning of the book. Quality 
in this sense is, somewhat paradoxically, easier to capture and to categorise. 
There are three main ways of piecing together the multifarious strands of the quality 
manuals and technical approaches to its actualisation. One approach is to eschew a 
definition at all and simply list those activities which are done under the label of 
quality and let the reader make up their own mind. This is a tactic which the NHSE 
have used to promote the implementation of quality in the NHS. This approach has 
the obvious advantage for policy makers that they are not aligning themselves with 
too narrow a definition which might prove contestable. The approach can be seen 
quite clearly in this example. 
'the term quality is obviously open to interpretation. By way of clarification the work 
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A second approach, adopted by Pfeffer and Coote and others, is to ask, what use is 
quality put to in the public service arena and what can be inferred from this about its 
meaning? This begins to recognise that quality is both contested and can have 
different meanings according to the uses to which it is put. 
A third, and potentially more useful analytical device, is to look at the organisational 
groups allied with particular operational forms of quality. From the patterns that 
emerge one can infer something about the links between quality definition and the 
broader sets of values held by those groups (remember quality as a judgement of static 
and dynamic values). Proponents of this last approach have included pollitt13, pollitt 
and Harrison 14 , 
Gaster 15 
, and 
Alazewski and Manthorpel 6. 
The second and third approaches have the advantage of 'grounding' their analysis in 
the real world context of the NHS. With all the politics, interest group dynamics, 
contested meanings, and 'subtle abuses' that this context offers. 
Taking Pfeffer and Coote's functional analysis first they classify quality as having 
five uses and meanings: 
Traditional quality: used to confer status and positional advantage. This is discussed 
in the colloquial sense in the previous section 
Scientific or expert quality: to conform to standards determined by experts 
Managerial or excellence approach: to measure customer satisfaction in pursuit of 
market advantage 
The consumerist approach: used to empower the customer 
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The democratic approach: this isn't strictly an approach to quality observed in British 
welfare services. It is a normative recommendation of the way they would like to see 
the concept of quality shaped in public services in the future. Because of this 
normative characteristic I shall not be including it in this taxonomy. 
Scientific Quality 
Within this approach quality is the logical end product of conforming to standards 
which are deemed acceptable within boundaries established by expert opinion. Either 
within organisations or within the knowledge bases of organisational groups (for 
example, professional opinion as typified by the Royal Colleges). Quality is based on 
progress towards achieving pre-specified standards representing that which is deemed 
desirable in service or group activity by the services or groups themselves. 
Within the technical sub-domain of 'scientific' quality there are two further 
distinctions which can be made: the universal and the relativist. 
Universal Scientific Quality 
Quality along these lines is reached when standards are met which are seen as 
necessary for all producers or service providers. An example here is the development 
of public sector league tables based on standards contained in the various Citizens 
Charter derivatives such as the Patients Charter. The Conservative government of 
1995 made it clear that: 
'[The Patients] Charter has had an enormous impact on improving the quality of 
[NHS] services. Of course things sometimes go wrong and the Charter makes clear 
the standards that ought to be reached. 17 
Within the universal approach services are deemed to have achieved quality on the 
basis of their progress towards fulfilling finite standards-based criteria. Once achieved 
they are heralded as examples of 'high quality' services for others. This process often 
involves using language such as 'best practice'. An example of this type of approach 
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can be seen in the NHSE's use of service exemplars based on progress towards 
18 Charter standards in a guide to quality in the NHS 
Relativist Scientific Quality 
An alternative to the universal approach which is based on standards applicable to all 
services regardless of context or purpose is to adopt a relative stance and base the 
standards to be achieved on specific functional goals. Relative scientific quality differs 
from the universal approach in that, instead of seeking to develop standards based on 
universally accepted criteria it aims to base standards on the task the product or service is 
designed to perform' 9. The tasks of services alter over time and according to need, hence 
the term 'relativist'. This approach is sanctioned by organisations such as the British 
Standards Institute (BSI) who view quality as the: 
'Totality offeatures and characteristics ofa product or service that bears on its ability to 
satisfy a given need. '20 
The BSI surnmarise this approach as 'fitness for purpose' 21 .A relativist approach 
acknowledges that it is sometimes difficult to separate the service product from the 
service provider, and therefore a judgement of 'quality' is made on the basis of the 
objectives which a particular service is designed to achieve. In this approach, therefore, 
each service provider makes its goals explicit, possibly in the form of a'mission' 
statement and associated criteria. Performance is judged against whether or not these 
goals are reached. This relativist strand to the standards approach has been termed by 
other commentators the 'managerialist' approaCh22 . Although as shall be demonstrated 
by Chapter Five this term fails to capture the other for m-s of operationalised quality 
which have found a place within the ideological confines of Managerialism. 
An extension to this view, rather than a separate branch of the quality debate is to argue 
that quality is a composite or function of standards achieved at different points in the 
production of health care. This is the approach adopted by Donabedian23 who suggests 
that quality is a function of standards achieved in the input, process and outcome 
components of health care delivery. Donabedian's views have been particularly 
is 
influential in shaping many of the discussions on quality assurance among groups in 
the NHS. All of the case sites used in this thesis referred to his ideas in the structuring 
of their quality strategies. 
It is easy to imagine services finding quality as 'conformity to standards' an attractive 
option; particularly if they set the standards themselves. Part of the problem with the 
'scientific' approach to quality is that it encourages unilateralism, or a focus on the 
inputs into services rather than the outputs as users experience them. They often call 
upon traditions and techniques that are professional and paternalistic. They have 
-14 relied heavily (if not exclusively) on a single perspective, -. A definition of quality as 
conformity to standards can act to reinforce the dissonance between public and 
provider perceptions of quality hypothesised by JameS25 . As Pfeffer and Coote 
highlight, '... bed occupancy rates ... are of no 
interest to a patient worried about how 
)26 s/he will cope on returning home from hospital 
The Excellence Approach 
The implication of the criticisms of scientific quality is that definitions need to be 
realigned in order to encompass a consumer perspective. This consumer perspective is 
addressed through the excellence approach to defining quality. Quality in this 
approach is a measure of customer satisfaction. The theoretical development of the 
'excellence' approach took place after World War II as a reaction to some of the 
failings of the old scientific quality approaches associated with commercial 
management techniques advocated by Taylor, Ford and the idea of Scientific 
Management. 
The initial defining features of the excellence approach were characterised and shaped 
by 'quality gurus' such as Deming27 , Juran 
28 and Feigenbaum 29 in the 1950s. Their 
message was a basic one. Quality is the 'delighting' of the customer by producing 
products with, 'a predictable degree of uniformity and dependability, at low cost and 
suited to the market' 30 . Each of these 'gurus' sought to combine a new customer focus 
with detailed 'scientific' techniques using statistical methods to counteract variation 
in the products produced. Moreover, they advocated the extension of quality 
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techniques to all sections of the organisation not just manufacturing departments. 
Their global message was that quality is a product of top-down commitment to 
customer satisfaction in organisations. 
The Japanese from the late 1950s - 1970s introduced the notion that statistics-based 
improvement can only go so far in satisfying consumers within cost boundaries and 
that there should be more immediate links between statistical techniques and the 
production process. Shing03 1 highlights the essential message by asserting that the 
best way for organisations to meet customer expectations is: 
( to stop the process whenever a defect occurs, define the cause andprevent the 
recurring source of the defect. 32 
This raises obvious questions in relation to the NHS as the 'process' of health care 
delivery is hardly amenable to constant stop-start production. The ethics of this are 
challenging to say the least and to attribute cause and effect requires in-depth 
knowledge of the aetiology behind health care interventions and effects. This is 
knowledge which is, at best patchy, and in relation to some branches of health care 
almost non-existent. 
Neither of these two groups of theorists could be said to have exerted a massive 
influence on the characteristics of the current emphasis on quality in the NHS. The 
next wave of 'new western' commentators, however, have made more significant 
contributions. Crosby's ideas of quality as 'conformance to the requirements which 
the company itseýf has establishedfor its products based directly on its customers' 
needs 03 have influenced many in the NHS. Not least, one case site (Marketown), who 
adopted the Crosby approach as its underlying theoretical framework for achieving 
quality. Other contributors such as Peters 34 implicitly stress the idea of quality as the 
end result of a culture of customer responsiveness within the organisation. The picture 
had moved from a top-down managerially imposed vision of quality in organisations 
in the 1950s, to a shared vision of quality shaped by corporate culture, and led (but 
not dictated) by management in the 1980s. 
20 
Pursuing quality as customer satisfaction to further the organisationis share of the 
market or profits is, in welfare state terins, a relatively new idea. The advent of the 
quasi-market in the NHS has meant that, theoretically at least, consumer judgements 
of quality and alterations in market share for providers can co-exist. The excellence 
approach, however, does not view consumers as an active entity. Within the 
excellence approach their views are countenanced and acted upon if the organisation 
decides it will be in its interests to do so. 
Consumerist Quality 
Whilst the excellence approach sees quality 'as the end result of providers' desires to 
satisfy customers, the consumerist approach sees quality as the desire of customers to 
be satisfied , 35 . This 
has been an influential approach to quality over the past seven 
years. The difference between excellence and a consumerist approaches to quality is 
that it is always in the best interests of the provider to satisfy the demands of the 
consumer. The consumerist approach, as Pfeffer and Coote point out: 
f casts the consumer in an active role and seeks to increase their power to the point 
where they - as 'Sovereign consumers- hold sway over the decision-making of the 
providers. 36 
McGrath 37 suggests that quality along such lines has, at its core, ideas of a public 
service orientation: doingfor rather than to the public; characterised by choice, 
relevance, sensitivity to complaints, easily accessible 'user friendly' information, 
advocacy, and closeness to the customer through decentralised structures. 
Many of the constituent parts of consumerist quality mirror the characteristics of the 
excellence approach. They differ, however, in the means taken to promote the ends of 
customer satisfaction and in the end points associated with each definition of quality. 
Customer satisfaction for market gain is the defining feature of the excellence 
approach; whilst customer satisfaction within consumerist quality is seen as a moral 
good in its own right. 
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Values, Means And Ends: Inferring About Quality From Organisational 
Groupings And Alliances 
Thus far the chapter has outlined two domains of quality: the colloquial and the 
technical. These have been derived from a functional analysis of the term centering 
around the question, what are the uses and meanings attached to quality? It has used 
headings generated by Pfeffer and Coote as the basis for the derivation of three sub- 
headings: scientific (standards-based) quality; excellence-based quality; and 
consumerist quality. This functional approach, and Pfeffer and Coote's work in 
particular, has influenced a number of writers on NHS quality 38 . 
Pfeffer and Coote's important work, however, fails to go beyond anything other than 
a general recognition of the pluralistic context in which 'quality' operates in the NHS. 
Without a real appreciation of the ways in which quality is defined and perceived by 
different groups of stakeholders then arguments constructed along these lines will 
always be limited in their application to the NHS. 
The problem with outlining technical quality in a way that doesn't take into account 
the influential role of group agency in deciding quality, is that it ignores the social 
context within which quality must operate within services. The functional approach 
offered by Pfeffer and Coote only alludes to the role of individuals and groups in 
deciding what quality is; as in this example, where they highlight the role of quality in 
political conflict but not what that conflict looks like: 
'Quality continues to be used as though it were something we all unquestioningly 
javour, rather as we all condemn sin. In truth, no such consensus exists; nor is quality 
something thatfloats above politics. Once it is applied to the provision of we4fare 
services, it becomes inextricably bound up with the political battles that are being 
fought on that terrain. 39 
What is required then from a study led by research questions essentially concerned 
with the dynamics of operationali sing quality in the NHS is an empirically derived 
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outline of what the "political battles' being fought on NHS terrain might look like 
where 'quality' is concemed. 
Other commentators take the contested notion of quality further and suggest an active 
influencing role by social groups in the definition of the concept. James recognises 
that: 
'it is no longerpossible to separate the social construction of qualityfrom the 
political agenda of the market in public we4fare. 40 
Likewise Alazewski and Manthorpe suggest that the relativist approach to scientific 
quality also has a pluralistic component to it. They suggest that services have 
attempted to define quality (and operationalise it in the form of standards) with 
reference to the multiple interests that exist within organisations: 
C 
... any weýfare service 
has a variety of stakeholders and these stakeholders will have 
different aims and objectives, will use different standards to evaluate the service, and 
will therefore have different definitions of quality. In this approach any definition of 
quality must start with the aims of different participants and the ways in which the 
productive process satisfies these different aims. 
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Pollift takes this argument finther by recognising, not just that NHS stakeholders and 
quality are linked, but that quality in the N-HS has separated into three distinct strands. 
Quality for Pollitt has been: 
t 
... quickly 
divided up along 'tribal'lines ... thus it would not 
be an exaggeration to say 
that, in terms of the dominantplayers actually involved, there are actually three 
possible species of quality abroad in the NHS in the early 1990s. ' 
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He terms these three separate strands medical quality, service quality and user's 
experienced quality. The importance of Pollitt's model is that, perhaps for the first 
time in relation to the NES, the definition of quality is seen to have fon-nal and 
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informal links to broader sets of values, occupational boundaries and group politics 
within services. Moreover, Pollitt hypothesises about the ways in which those links 
are operationalised: 
* Medical quality: the definition of medical quality 'remains a professional and 
highly technical exercise conducted exclusively by doctors 44 . Evidence for this 
dimension for Pollitt comes in the form of the Conservative government's 
concession of 'the principle that the quality of medical work can only be reviewed 
by a doctor's peers' 45 . Specifically that only doctors should conduct audit; its 
main purpose should be educational and developmental, not regulatory or 
judgmental, and standards should be set locally by participating doctors. 
9 Service quality: these are those 'aspects of providing health care services which 
remain once 'doctors' business has been artificially extracted'. Within the NHS 
discussions of service quality tend to be dominated by the providers themselves, 
and especially by nurses and managers. 
* User's experienced quality: is the type of quality of which currently least is 
known. These are the aspects of the hospital experience that patients feel are 
important and classify as within the remit of quality. 
There are some gaps in Pollitt (and later Pollitt and Harrison's) analysis however. 
Both neglect the role as stakeholders of 'professional consumers'. These groups 
include advocacy and quasi-advocacy groups within services. Examples here include 
Community Health Councils (CHCs) and Service User Groups who often form a 
central component in Trusts' user representation and quality activity (as they did in 
three of this study's case sites). Their three-fold taxonomy of quality based on 
stakeholder involvement in operationalising quality falls short by not including these 
key groups. 
Moreover, their analysis paints a picture of distinct, delimited, links (based on 
involvement) between stakeholder groups and the types of quality in services. 
Specifically, medical quality and doctors; service quality and nurses and managers; 
user's experienced quality and patients. However, in reality there is some evidence to 
suggest that such boundaries are more flexible, or at least have shifted since the late 
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1980s and Pollitt's original analysis. For example, Pollitt feels that much of the 
activity that nurses carry out in the name of quality such as nursing audits (an 
operationalised form of scientific quality) are best placed under the banner of service 
quality; largely due to the involvement of management in the process of determining 
quality. However, when evidence derived from Nursing's own professional body is 
examined then it is clear that the approach to defining quality they recommend has 
clear similarities with a 'medical' approach to defining quality. This example from the 
Royal College of Nursing's Dynamic Standard Setting System 46 (DySSSy) illustrates: 
'DySSSy, however, addresses specifically problems that are identified by 
practitioners, who are, after all, in the best position to know about the quality of their 
care. This is where the strength ofDySSSy lies. 47 
This quote from an RCN training manual says something about the values 
underpinning the development group's view of quality. It implies that nurses have the 
---"WARM 
only really legitimate claims to judge quality in care and that this recognition is a 
strength of the system for assuring quality that they are advocating. It also gives a fair 
degree of control to nurses over the limitations of this examination by restricting 
quality improvement to those areas which nurses themselves identify. This idea of 
control is developed within the document as a justification for why nurses should be 
interested in quality: 
'Why bother with quality? ... political reasons. 
Ifyou do not think about the quality of 
your service and the standardyou want to work to, someone else Will!, 
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6 there are a number ofgood reasons (for adopting DySSSy) ... the standards are owned 
and controlled by the practitioners who set them. A9 
In relation to medicine the links between the values underpinning the various 
definitions of quality and the ways in which groups scrutinise quality messages for 
correlation with their own ideologies can be found in this quote from one physician: 
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'I certainly agree that there is a greater needfor commitment in the search for quality 
from administrative groups but I would argue that clinicians are constantly striving, 
admittedly with varying degrees ofsuccess, for continuous improvement. Of the 
fourteen points outlined by W. Edwards Deming who revolutionised industrial output 
in post-war Japan, some already exist within a clinician's philosophy and some are 
not particularly appropriate. 50 
The link between quality and stakeholder-group values represents one possible 
framework from which to add empirical weight to claims of 'subtle abuse' which 
Pollitt identifies in relation to quality in the NHS. Moreover, it offers a useful starting 
point in identifying the role of quality in some of the 'political battles' on NHS terrain 
which Pfeffer and Coote speak of. The possible links may also go some way towards 
illuminating the social construction process behind the definition of quality in its real 
world NHS context which Alazewski, Manthorpe and James highlight. 
The link between quality and political values is no more evident than in the 
professional literature. This quote from the British Medical Journal shows how ideas 
of technical quality can be used to further a professional group's authority on NHS 
'turf and fend off attacks from those not suitably qualified to judge their role in 
healthcare (i. e. those not part of the group): 
'If clinicians can accept quality management concepts as central to their professional 
ethos and regulatory structures this could help them to maintain their professional 
authority andprotect them and their patients from imposed decisions based on 
inadequate understanding of health care costs and benefits 51 
Perhaps Gaster's analysis of the links between quality and organisational. values and 
the stakeholders who promote those values is the most lucid: 
'The question of values covers not onl how quality is defined in an organisation, but y 
how it is interpreted and, most important of all, how it is implemented. This is 
demonstrated through, for example, how staff and consumers are consulted, who gets 
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listened to, the style of leadership and other culturalfactors. Values are the starting 
pointfor the whole quality debate. 52 
The Scope Of The Thesis 
Firstly the analysis presented thus far has shown that: 
Quality is a contested term and concept. At the level of expert and everyday 
language (i. e. quality within the NHS and quality in everyday life) the term is 
somehow used differently. This split is not restricted to internal-external NHS 
boundaries as quality is also a contested concept within the NHS itself 
One can hypothesise that quality operates in two conceptual and linguistic arenas 
the colloquial and the technical. This would account for the apparent dissonance 
between everyday and expert ideas of quality. Moreover, the two arenas share 
subtle links. For example, quality can be used in one sense to reinforce the other; 
an example being we have a quality management programme in place ergo we can 
justify the logo 'Partners in Quality Care' (Castletown's logo). 
Quality does not operate in some value-free vacuum. In the NHS various 
stakeholder groups exist, each with different goals and objectives. Each of these 
groups appears to align themselves with particular approaches to quality. 
One means of exploring this alignment is to hypothesise that quality has the 
potential to be used as a means of furthering group goals and objectives. For 
example, professional autonomy or the influence of management over 
professional-clinical work. 
What the analyses presented thus far lack is any real empirical grounding. Almost all 
of the literature exploring the conceptual nature of quality is largely hypothetical. It is 
based on theoretical ideas derived from global overviews of the NHS quality scene. 
These rarely draw on data derived from sound methodological exploration of the 
concept's role in the real world context of services themselves. There are some 
notable exceptions, such as Kogan and Joss's evaluation of the implementation of 
Total Quality Management in the NHS53 , 
but these are something of a rarity. This 
presents a considerable challenge for the researcher seeking to explore the role and 
development of quality in the NHS- 
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Because of the lack of empirically derived work to draw on the overall approach upon 
which this thesis is based is primarily an exploratory one; and one in which original 
empirical data plays a large part. It seeks to consider some of the arguments and 
hypotheses derived from the literature on quality in the light of data derived from 
service settings. 
This consideration is guided by a series of questions which relate to this discussion of 
the conceptual characteristics of NHS quality. These present themselves as footholds 
from which to begin the exploration of quality in the NHS - 
9 How well does an explanation of colloquial and technical quality 'fit' with the real 
world picture of NHS services, what alternative explanations can be derived from 
an exploration of this 'fit'? 
How is the concept of quality operationalised in the NHS? 
What role, if any, is there for the argument that stakeholder groups align 
themselves with particular approaches to quality? 
9 Are groups defined simply on the basis of their role or occupational allegiance in 
services e. g. nurses, doctors, managers or consumer representatives or are there 
more subtle ways of being a 'stakeholder' in quality? 
* What form, if any, does the link between quality, its operationalisation, and 
stakeholder group values take in NHS services? 
The boundaries (scope) of this thesis then are set by the propositions that arise during 
the exploration of the questions presented above. The scope of the thesis is definitely 
not concerned with which approach to quality is 'best'. Or even whether some new 
and singular definition can be arrived at by a dedicated and 'objective' researcher. It 
is about how a unifon-nly positive term such as quality has been interpreted and used 
in the NHS and the organisational processes and motivations behind that 
interpretation. 
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The Structure Of The Thesis 
The thesis is structured around the exploratory questions outlined above. Chapter Two 
charts the development and operationalisation of quality as an idea within NHS policy 
within the last twenty years. It demonstrates how quality has gained an increasing 
foothold within policy and service structures as a new fonn of NHS industry 
employing people in diverse and distinctive roles. Moreover, it outlines some of the 
alliances that have been formed on the national stage between groups and some of the 
apparent allegiances that exist between groups and nationally sponsored means of 
promoting technical quality. 
Chapter Three discusses the methodological problematic related to the exploration of 
quality within the scope of the thesis. It outlines a stakeholder-analytical multiple case 
site methodology as an 'appropriate' means of exploring the central questions. It 
suggests a method of gaining a conceptual purchase on the shared subjectivies of 
stakeholders with regard to the operationalised 'face' of quality in services (known as 
Q-methodology). Moreover, it argues for the need to cross reference (triangulate) this 
technique with, contextually sensitive, qualitative, methods of data collection and 
analysis. 
Chapter Four provides contextual information on the case sites and the 'officially' 
sanctioned structures and processes relating to the concept of quality in each of them. 
This chapter is intended to give the reader enough depth and contextual information to 
allow them to relate the findings presented in the thesis to their own settings and 
interests. The chapter also enables the reader to cross reference the findings of 
Chapters Six and Seven to the settings from which they were derived. 
The idea that the operationalisation of quality in services has strong ideological 
connections is developed further in Chapter Five when a taxonomy of technical 
quality, based on the hypothetical links between interventions based on technical 
quality (suchas clinical audit and Total Quality Management) and broader sets of 
values of professionalism, managerialism and consumerism is presented. This chapter 
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argues that quality can be seen to be linked to the political battles between groups in 
services on the basis of its role in impacting on the structural interests of such groups. 
Chapter Six explores the results of the Q findings in the four sites in relation to the 
taxonomy of technical quality previously developed and attempts to explain some of 
the patterns and 'anomalies' that emerged from the exercise. 
Chapter Seven proposes a matrix for understanding and explaining the conflict that 
surrounds the actualisation of quality at service level. In doing so the key areas of 
value differentiation of values between gToups are presented. The matrix is firmly 
anchored in empirical data, and derives from a cross-case analysis of the qualitative 
data collected in the four sites. 
Chapter Eight presents the conclusion and in doing so revisits some of the 
propositions presented in earlier chapters in the light of the empirical data and 
attempts to tease out some of the relevant policy implications. In particular, the 
attempt by the new Labour government to build pro fessional-managenal co-operation 
into service structures through the concept of 'clinical governance' is related to 
recommendations regarding the operationalisation of quality at service level. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to clarify exactly what the thesis means when it refers to 
quality. It is no easy task as the debate is still relatively ill-defined in the literature 
with no 'gold standard' or accepted reference points with which to structure the 
discussion. Because the concept is so disputed and the debate marked by severe 
cleavages, not just of arguments about what quality is, but also how best to make 
sense of the huge numbers of initiatives or activities carried out in the name of 
quality, the thesis aligns itself with a view of quality as a derivative of the activities 
and agency of individuals and groups. 
From this discussion of the conceptual nature of quality it is clear that an examination 
of the operationalisation of quality must take on board not just the issues of explicit 
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definitions used but also the implicit definitions which underpin activity carried out 
under the banner of quality as Pollitt points out: 
'Operational indicators of quality ftequen tly offer strong pointers to the particular 
definitions of quality which underlie them. 54 
Expressed alternatively this phrase might read, 'quality has a face; namely, its 
operationalised characteristics and the values which are promoted by these. However, 
just as meaningful are the groupings of individuals around particular quality activities. 
This thesis explores both of these features of the quality issue in British health 
services and attempts to explain the roles and uses to which quality is subjected. 
Essentially the scope of the thesis can be represented as a model: (see figl) 
figl: The Conceptual Arena of Quality in Services: the scope of the thesis 
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fig I: The Conceptual Arena of Quality in Services: the scope of the thesis 
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CHAPTER TWO: QUALITY - THE POLICY CONTEXT 
The introductory chapter highlighted the twin linguistic and conceptual levels which the term 
quality occupies. The first of these, the colloquial, represents quality's role as a rhetorical 
device for use in policy development and implementation. For example: 
'Our ambition isfor a high-quality, integrated health service which is organised and run 
around the health needs of individual patients, rather than the convenience of the system or 
institution. An NHS which, where appropriate, brings services to people, balancing, for each 
individual, the desire to provide care at home or in the local community with the need to 
provide care which is safe, high quality and cost effective. " 
The second, technical, level constitutes the conceptual and operational foundation for taking 
quality beyond the vague rhetoric and inherent subjectivity of the colloquial usage. It 
invariably involves some form of critical scrutiny and possibly change to the processes and 
structures of service delivery. An example of the use of quality in this technical sense can be 
seen in the previously quoted White Paper: 
'Whatever the setting of care ... quality in this wider sense can only 
be achieved through 
systematic setting ofstandards, careful scrutiny ofperformance, and effective management 
including action to make improvements ifstandards are not met. 2 
This chapter presents an overview of the development of quality in its colloquial and 
technical senses in the NHS. In doing so the chapter seeks to place the findings of the 
empirical investigation of quality within NHS organisations detailed later in a broader policy 
context. The chapter argues that quality has to be seen as part of a broader series of trends 
occurring in welfare provision since the early 1980s. Moreover, in developing this argument 
it is contended that these trends have a common thread which binds them together in the form 
of the ideas and occupational grouping of 'management'. As part of this linkage the 
contention is put forward that quality constitutes a component in a meta-policy narrative of 
managerialization. This meta-narrative is outlined explicitly by Clark et a13 and features 
strongly in much of the social policy literature on quality's role in welfare provision since 
1979. 
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Quality And The Managerial ization Of Welfare 
Quite clearly the welfare state is not the same entity it was 19 years ago; the processes and 
structures of the post-war consensus-based welfare state have changed significantly. The key 
characteristics of this change at the level of the welfare state include: 
9 The growing influence of 'the market' as a model for service delivery. The NHS has seen 
its structural components divided up into a quasi-market of 'providers' and 'purchasers' 
and with the development of the quasi-market has come the paraphernalia that 
accompanies commercial markets: contracts, competitive tendering and the recasting of 
service users as 'consumers'. These trends have been accompanied by a market-based 
tendency to exploit the language and techniques of quality. 
9 As part of this quasi-market, NHS services have been able to take advantage of the 
pluralistic nature of the 'mixed' economy of service provision and purchasing that the 
centre has promoted. Consequently, the boundaries between agencies involved in 
delivering healthcare have become more flexible. These flexible boundaries are often 
justified with reference to the positive impact they will have on quality (of both service 
and 'quality of life'). 
e The creation of devolved, decentrallsed and flatter decision making structures aimed at 
more responsive and efficient services; these in turn will impact positively on 'quality' 
e Attempts to forge a more flexible and mobile labour force through which to deliver the 
new 4responsive) services via complex processes of de-skilling and re-skilling. The 
assumption being the same level of quality at less cost. 
* The replacement of traditional forms of accountability (such as political and bureau- 
professional) with transparent, easily visible, performance indicators, service standards, 
renewable contracts and systems of incentives or sanctions such as performance related 
pay. Such systems often include quality standards and assurance techniques. 
Whilst not always capturing the link between quality and any specific theoretical framework, 
the analyses of the concept of quality which forni the basis of this review when viewed en 
masse reinforce the message that quality and the above broader developments in the changing 
face of welfare are linked. 
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The thread which provides this linkage is managerialism, and its adherents - the new public 
managers: 
e Managers charged with pursuing value for money in services - quality representing the 
value component in this equation 
* Management at the forefront of the transition to the new customer responsiveness in 
services and a recognition of user's rights as citizens. Quality as the vehicle for this 
transition in the form of the Patients Charter and more recently the growth in Patient 
Representatives. 
9 Management as the preachers of the 'New Public Management' gospel; with its emphasis 
on measurement, accountability, budgetary control and 'excellence'. 
* Management as a politically- sanctioned challenge to professional dominance in services. 
The thesis shall show how responsibility for the majority of NHS activity purporting to 
promote and maintain quality falls squarely at the managerial door in organisations. And even 
where areas of the organisation are defacto exempted from managerial interference, as was 
the case with medical audit, then still the language and imagery of managerialism are present 
in the centrally-backed policy messages. In the case of audit, for example, these included the 
message that practice should adhere to standards, be measurable, and more transparent (even 
if only to the professional groups concerned). 
Management, both as a cultural force in organisations, and as a distinct organisational. group, 
constitute both the policy message (witness Griffiths' assertion that better quality 
management equals better quality services), and the medium through which the changes 
outlined above have been implemented. Though the importance of this thread is much more 
significant than just using management as the vehicle for introducing a new NHS version of 
quality. As Clarke et al argue: 
'It is notjust the appointment of managers or the adoption ofprivate sector management 
discourses and techniques. "at is takingplace ... is a 
deeper ideological process of 
managerialization which is transforming relationships ofpower, culture, control and 
accountability.. [managerialization] constitutes the means through which the structure and 
culture ofpublic services are being recast. In doing so it seeks to introduce new orientations, 
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remodels existing relations ofpower and affect how and where social policy choices are 
made. '4 
The language and techniques of quality play a central role in managerialization and as such 
are implicated in the struggles which accompany the process. As Newman and Clarke 
highlight: 
'The 'hollow' language ofManagerialism [of which quality is apart] is open to contestation 
by different interests. Statements about making services more effective or improving their 
quality open up spacesfor different groups or alliances to give such words particular 
inflections ... professional definitions of quality or effectiveness will rarely be the same as 
political ones. Neither is likely to be the same as those ofservice recipients, although both 
professionals and managers may wish to 'SPeak'for users ... it 
has also created afield of 
conflict in which new routes to legitimate claims have been opened up. 5 
The ideas and language of quality are quite clearly not restricted solely to the field of health 
care. Quality has become a prominent term in both public and commercial sectors as well as 
the service and manufacturing industries. Within the public sector alone, the parlance and 
techniques of quality have permeated education, social services and the police. As Cameron- 
Jones suggests: 
'The lexicon and style of educational discussion seem to have entered a new oratorical Phase 
in which everywhere, the key terms are 'excellence', 'better', 'quality ', 'reform'and 
( competence. 6 
Given these factors it makes little sense to approach the analysis of themes relating to quality 
in the NHS without drawing on some of the arguments derived from the examination of 
quality's role in welfare change more generally. In examining the evidence of policy 
documents and the analytic commentaries of other researchers it is clear that there are four 
main linkages between quality and the changing face of welfare provision generally. These 
can be summarised as: 
e The economic catalyst: quality has played a key role in the attempted economic 'reigning 
back' of welfare expenditure sought by successive governments. Quality is also a vital 
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means of justifying policies which have at their core cost-containnient and simultaneously 
reassuring the electorate as to their impact. It also constitutes one 'process' by which the 
end goal of cost-containiment is sought. 
9 The rise of the consumer: quality has been a prominent vehicle for the development of 
ideas of consumerism in public services. 
* The coming of management: quality is a core component in the managerial toolkit of 
control and has been a central strand of the introduction of ideas and processes of 
cmanagement' more generally. 
9 the quasi-market as the settingfor delivering services: Quality is linked to the 
development of contracts between purchasers and providers and is supposed to be a 
priority in the commissioning process itself 
9 the professional response: quality has played a key role in professional reactions to the 
rise of management (and managers). Quality also constitutes a powerful tool for 
professionals to deploy as a strategy for combating the challenges to power and autonomy 
that consumerism and economic scrutiny represent. 
The Economic Imperative 
Many commentators 78 argue that a concern with quality emerged as a result of the economic 
realisation that the high growth rates of input moneys and manpower that had characterised 
the NHS in the early 1970s could not, or would not, be maintained by a Conservative 
Government during the 1980s. The modest financial growth rates of the early 1980s were not 
enough to maintain existing levels of service, particularly given the rates of technological and 
demographic change. It was within this context that issues of quality soon arose. 
Quality (or rather the interplay between its colloquial and technical senses) represents both 
the means to structural and process-based change to the NHS; but crucially it is also the 
mechanism for reassuring the public about these changes. In the face of economic decisions 
which threaten to challenge people's experiences of services it offers policy makers an 
attractive option. One which can simultaneously help control the constituent components of 
services (who spend money) and at the same time reassure the electorate as to the stability of 
NHS 'quality' (in its colloquial, always positive, sense). 
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As early as 1982 quality and cost-containment were beginning to enjoy something of a 
symbiotic relationship in official policy documentation. In relation to the development and 
linking of (costly) information systems in the NHS, Korner used the linkage as a powerful 
rationale: 
[IT would help]'... ensure quality, contain costs and secure access to those who need it. Or to 
put it more simply to provide a good servicefor as many people as need it at least cost. ' 9 
The introduction of General Management in 1983 also reinforced the bond between the twin 
tenets of cost and quality in the form of 'value for money'. Certainly, in attempting to negate 
some of the differences between management in the commercial and public sectors Griffiths 
himself linked quality and cost contaim-nent explicitly through the vehicleof management: 
'They [general managers] are concerned with levels of service, quality ofproduct, meeting 
budgets, cost improvement, productivity, motivating and rewarding staff, research and 
development, and the long term viability of the undertaking. '10 
This theme was continued through to the blueprint for the current NHS. In Workingfor 
Patients (WFP) government placed the issues of quality and value for money side-by-side as 
one of its key proposals: 
'To ensure that all concerned with delivering services to the patient make the best use of the 
resources available to them quality of service and valuefor money will be more rigorously 
audited. '11 
The only explicit tool for promoting quality in the technical sense in Workingfor Patients 
was Medical Audit. A process defined as the: 
,... systematic critical analysis of the quality of medical care, including theprocedures used 
for diagnosis and treatment, the use of resources and the resulting outcomefor the 
patient. 
12 
The term medical audit itself represents something of an etymological linkage between NHS 
quality and the world of financial control; the term audit being more commonly associated 
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with the role of accountancy. The thesis examines the idea of auditing professional work in 
more detail in Chapter Five; for now, however, the point is that medical audit (as the 
predominant mode of assuring 'quality' in a clinician's work) was firmly linked by 
government to the need to balance professional activity and value for money. Or as they 
expressed it: 
'the professional responsibilities and rewards of the individual consultant; and the 
responsibility of managers to ensure that the money availablefor hospitals buys the best 
possible servicefor patients. 13 
The majority of the proposals in WFP were concerned with the establishment of a 'quasi- 
market' in health care where funding arrangements would be based-on contractual 
relationships between providers and purchasers. Within this quasi-market purchasers could, 
theoretically at least, 'shop around' for those services which best met their requirements. 
However, this led to concerns that it would be the cheapest services which were awarded 
contracts in the climate of cost containment prevalent at the time. The government sought to 
use quality as one device to reassure concerned political and service stakeholders as to the 
rationale behind the new arrangements and to dissuade purchasers from simply purchasing 
the cheapest service options: 
'thefunding arrangements outlined ... will steer resources towards those consultants 
best able 
to provide a good quality service and treat more patients. 14 
and that contracts, as the means by which the market was to operate: 
,... will need to spell out clearly what is required of each hospital in terms of the price, quality 
and nature ofservice to be provided. 15 
As the NHS entered the 1990s the Department of Health actively began to promote specific 
techniques to reinforce the continuing rhetorical use of quality and to try and get beyond the 
'limited' techniques of audit. Quality needed to be more transparent and corporate in scope if 
it was to have any use as a means of control. To this end a series of Total Quality 
Management pilot sites were funded in NHS hospitals across the country (two of which were 
case sites in this study: Fishtown and Marketown). It is not entirely clear why Total Quality 
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Management should have been the adopted model but the idea of TQM seems to fit nicely 
with the meta-narrative of welfare reform that was emerging in the NHS. The liriking of 
quality to the issue of value for money, however, was still paramount. Joss and Kogan point 
out the similarities 
NHS changes 
strengthening top management at each 
unit and involving doctors in management 
of services 
TQM Principles 
Corporate approaches to planning, 
especially planningfor quality - working 
towards common understandings and 
definitions 
valuefor money 
greater patientfocus, including more 
information, more choice and more 
involvement 16 
continuous improvement through 
systematic measurement 
putting the customer at the centre of 
process improvement 
By the time the Conservative government published its final White Paper on the acute sector 
in November 1996 the language of quality had moved from a vaguely reassuring rhetorical 
device to something altogether more substantive. However, the link between this new, 
definitive, version of quality and value for money was still firmly at the forefront of 
Departmental thinking: 
'the term quality is used in the widest sense, embracing the values of equity, efficiency 
and responsiveness ... it encompasses: the effectiveness of treatment in terms of outcome 
for the patient 
9 the skill, care and continuity with which the service is delivered 
the accessibility of the service, in terms of distance, time, physical access, language and 
understanding 
the delivery of the service, covering the environments of care, and the courtesy and 
efficiency of the administrative arrangements. 
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Underpinning this definition of quality is a commitment to using resources to best effect and 
getting it rightfirst time. 17 
Using quality as the rhetorical device through which Government could pursue the more 
contentious philosophies of cost-containment and efficiency was only one strand of the 
relationship between quality and NHS policy. Another source of ideas was the emerging 
pressure to acknowledge the primacy of the service recipient in relation to the delivery of 
public services; linguistically this meant recasting patients as consumers. 
The Rise of the 'Consumer: Quality as the Vehicle for Macro-level Consumerism 
The recasting of patients into 'consumers' is part of a reaction to perceived rising 
expectations and assertiveness in individuals and groups in relation to health care 19. Or as 
Shaw expresses it: 
'Consumerism: public pressure, endorsed by government policy, for involving the users in 
making choices about their own care but also services in general. 18 
Just as the etymological links between quality and economics outlined previously have 
developed at macro-policy level so the discourses of consumerism and quality in policy have 
become intertwined. The official picture is one suggesting that 'quality' has been used as a 
form of rhetorical end-point for consumerist strategies of involvement or choice. However, 
just as convincing, is an alternative scenario suggesting that the language of consumerism has 
been adopted as a tactic by interest groups in the NHS for gaining the moral high ground in 
some of the power struggles that have accompanied the reforins: including the debate on 
quality. 
Almost all occupational group cultures have at their core a belief in the virtue of representing 
the user's voice in services. Professionalism has as its raison d'itre the idea of the altruistic 
public service ethic and the placing of the patients interests before their own. Managerialism 
(or more specifically 'new' managerialism) has at its centre the belief in meeting customer 
requirements. Those in services whose statutory role is to represent the user's voice in the 
system such as CHCs, or who represent independent advocates, rely on the legitimacy of their 
claims to be able to speak for the users for their existence. If one adopts the language of 
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advocacy and representation then it makes claims of legitimacy and credibility that much 
easier to justify. As Williamson puts it: 
'Every group of dominant interest holders tries to persuade other people that their interests 
are synergistic with its own; that is a crucial way it seeks to sustain its power 119 . 
Each stakeholder group, including the developers of macro-level policy, have a vested 
interest in being seen to be synergistic with the consumer population's wants and needs, at 
least if it wishes to retain its stake in services. Again this theme is explored in more detail in 
Chapter Five but for now the aim is to demonstrate how the language and rhetoric of 
consumerism has become entwined with the language and policy documentation of quality in 
the NUS. 
Quality and the 'New Public Service Orientation' 
In many ways Griffiths represents the starting point for the imperative to operationalise 
technical quality. But just as importantly, Griffiths heralded the introduction of a new 
'customer focus' in the NHS with the recommendation that services should: 
i ascertain how well the service is being delivered at local level by obtaining the experiences 
andperceptions ofpatients and the community. These can be obtained by the Community 
Health Councils and by other methods, including market research, the experience of General 
Practice and the Community Health Services. 20 
Moreover, the same services should: 
t respond directly to this information 
act on it in formulating policy 
monitor performance against it 
promote realistic public and professional perceptions of what the NHS can and should 
provide as the best possible service within the resources available. '21 
Harrison's 22 research in the late 1980s into the impact of General Management suggests that 
the political context in which it was intToduced, 'militated against an imaginative and 
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purposeful consumer orientation emerging in the NHS'. However, perhaps of more interest to 
this discussion is the fact that, even at this early stage in the introduction of the general 
management role, issues of quality and consumerism were being pulled together at the micro 
policy level. As Harrison points out: 
'Our own study revealed 'quality'and consumerism to be concepts pigeon-holed with a 
particularpost in the organisation (usually held by a senior nurse) rather than something 
which had entered the mainstream of organisational culture. 23 
Strong and Robinson 24 also concluded, along similarly pessimistic lines, that the new 
consumer orientation, and in particular the emphasis on quality promoted as part of the 
general management agenda, was no more than a political gesture with little real meaning. 
Despite the marginal nature of the relationship at the micro-level, quality and the links with 
consumerist ideas and rhetoric continued through to Workingfor Patients. The White Paper 
was replete with consumerist images. Quality and consumerism were linguistically 
interconnected in many sections. For example, in relation to NHS Trusts: 
d ".. 1 he Government believes that seýflgovernmentjbr hospitals will encourage a stronger sense 
of local ownership andpride, building on the enormousfund ofgoodwill that exists in local 
communities ... it will encourage 
local initiative and greater competition. All this in turn will 
ensure a better dealfor the public, improving the choice and quality of the services offered 
and the efficiency with which those services are delivered. 25 
Not withstanding the undoubtedly 'consumerist' images conjured up by Workingfor Patients, 
the emphasis was on the extension of 'choice' and information, rather than 'voice' in the 
system. Harrison labels this particular trait 'Conservative consumerism' and in the immediate 
aftermath of Workingfor Patients questioned the level of consumer empowerment attached to 
the reforms: 
'Closer scrutiny of the proposals raises doubts about the extent to which patients can expect 
to benefit in terms of choice and qualityfrom the major shifts proposed in relationships 
between consumers, purchasers andproviders. The White Paper's approach to consumerism 
43 
emphasises providing information to consumers rather than obtaining itfrom them. As such 
the approach is firmly paternalistic. 26, 
Quality-Right? 
There was little emphasis on that brand of consumerism which stresses the legally 
enforceable rights of consumers by virtue of their rights as citizens. By 1992 however, the 
rhetorical boundaries of policy in relation to consumers and quality had been broadened to 
encompass some of these criticisms. As part of John Major's Governmental tenn the NHS 
saw the imposition of a series of rights and expectations for consumers in the form of the 
'Patients Charter'. The Charter was seen as: 
'The cornerstone of our attempts to provide a quality service to patients. It is a compulsory 
subjectfor al1purchasers and represents the minimum level of measurable quality 
performance demanded of all providers. 27 
The Charter is claimed to be helping the NHS to: 
listen to and act on people's views and needs 
set clear standards ofservice 
provide services which meet those standards. 28 
However, even with the series of sixteen 'rights' contained within the Charter the amount of 
sway which consumers as individuals can reasonably exercise is still severely restricted. The 
area of influence for consumers is overwhelmingly non-clinical and even where clinical areas 
are involved then the right is still dependent on professional opinion. For example, you have 
the right to: 
'be referred to a consultant acceptable to you, when your GP thinks it is necessary, and to be 
referredfor a second opinion ifyou and your GP agree this is desirable. ' 
i receive advice in an emergency, and treatment ifyour dentist considers it necessary. 29 
Such 'rights' are a far cry from the wholesale shift of power away from the providers of 
services that the rhetoric would seem to imply. The legal status of the Patients Charter rights 
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are still unclear so as a mechanism for empowerment of the general population its role 
appears limited. However, the Charter was not the only means through which government 
were pursuing the goal of user input into the NHS; the newly formed service commissioning 
function seemed to offer an ideal chance to involve users and their representatives in the 
purchasing of services. 
Quality and The Electoral Voice 
During 1993 the National Health Service Management Executive (NHSME) launched its local 
voices 30 initiative with the intention of building user representation into the purchasing process. 
User involvement was seen as 'an essential tool in creating good quality and cost-effective 
services'31 . This was an interesting development; not least as the NHS has had a well 
established means of gaining the user perspective on services in place for some years in the 
form of Community Health Councils. However, CHCs have been criticised on a number of 
fronts. 
First, representing the views of groups of consumers is a notoriously fickle process. As Levitt 
and Wall point out: 
'questions of management and health are of relatively little interest to the general public when 
compared to issues relating to illness andpersonal experiences' 32 . 
Often interest and understanding of complex healthcare issues depends heavily upon input from 
media sources; this in turn is very often inadequate. Therefore, before CHCs can begin to 
represent user's views they must firstly provide information in order to educate and raise the 
awareness of the public; an onerous task for CHCs who may only possess two full time 
members of staff. 
Second, CHCs possess little in the way of power within health services. Their ability to secure 
outcomes in services is limited and they are almost wholly dependent upon the agency of 
others. Initially CHCs had the right to ask for and receive information; to attend DHA 
meetings; to visit NHS premises; to be consulted about development plans, hospital closures or 
changes of use; give evidence to official committees; and utilise the support of M-P's and the 
press to put forward their views 
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. Taken as a whole, these rights amount to quite considerable 
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input into health service planning and evaluation procedures but they are not the same as 
having a measure of managerial authority or responsibilityand therefore cannot be taken as 
indicative of real power in services. 
Post- 1990 a limited role for CHCs was assured but their influence has become more focused. 
Their automatic right to consultation has been removed in relation to substantial changes to 
services or buildings. They do however retain a right of access to self-governing Trusts 34 . 
As 
user representatives and/or service evaluators their future role would appear to be anything but 
secure; an assertion borne out by Rigge 35 who highlights the use of market research techniques 
and local radio by District Health Authorities as a means of soliciting user views. Both these 
mechanisms could be viewed as a means of bypassing the traditional consultative role of the 
Community Health Council. 
One of the reasons for the failure of this community participation model in general, and CHCs 
specifically, is the perceived inability of representatives to bypass the views of organised 
pressure groups with their own interest-based agendas. Consequently, there is a difficulty in 
putting forward, alternative, truly representative, views grounded in the community perspective 
as a whole. The apparent rationality attached to decision making in the NHS, the inability of 
groups to offer viable service alternatives for local policy makers to decide upon, and their 
reliance upon 'trickle-fed' information passed to them from providers and purchasers all amount 
to serious obstacles for any representative group to overcome. Perhaps because of these 
perceived failings, policy has promoted managers as the conduit through which the user voice 
flows into NHS services. 
The Coming of Management 
This role as consumer champion in services is linked to the development of a new management 
culture and workforce. A transition promoted by policy and drawing on management science 
and the commercial sector for many of its ideas and practices. Part of this new management 
culture, variously described as 'Post-Fordist' 
3637 or 'New Public Management ý38 , and 
operationalised in health policy through the General Management fimction, is a central concern 
with ideas of quality and customer consciousness. The thesis talks more of the central concerns, 
values and ideology attached to management Chapter Five but for now it is necessary to show 
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how quality, this new staff cadre, and its influence on the workings of the NHS and its 
multifarious occupational groups, are linked at the level of official policy. 
The Griffiths report of 1983 made explicit the theme that the new breed of General Manager 
should assume responsibility for quality in services. Indeed one of the main themes of its 
implementation was the formation and growth of a whole new breed of managers with specific 
(or at the very least, combined) responsibility for nothing else but activity labouring under the 
banner of quality. This change occurred at every level in provider organisations; through the 
creation of executive level Directors of Nursing and Quality down to Quality Managers, 
Quality Advisors, and more recently, Patient Representatives. This latter initiative again 
reinforcing the link between quality and consumerism. In effect, at all levels of the NHS policy 
structure, a whole new group of people (mainly managers) with a firin stakehold in the concept 
of quality has been created. Brooks argues that the first generation of these managers were 
largely unsuccessful in getting 'the quality movement's' messages in to local NHS services: 
'The early history of QA managers, who were often misguidedly expected to shoulder 
responsibilityfor managing quality issues was largely one offrustration andpowerlessness as 
they struggled without the necessary skills or support. ' 39 
The linking of quality and the General management function was further strengthened through 
Workingfor Patients and assured through three mechanisms: 
e Contracting: the contract was the primary means by which quality would be assured in the 
new internal market. As has been shown, contracts were expected to spell out clearly the 
price quality and nature of services to be provided. The skills and functions of contract 
negotiation and drafting were clearly managerial, at least in the early days of the new quasi- 
market. 
Managerial Financial Incentives: ' erformance related contracts of employment will P 
[similarly] provide strong incentivesfor hospital managers to improve the quantity and 
quality of the services on offer. 40 
Consequently managers now had a direct financial interest in seeing that quality was 
pursued in their services. 
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0 Medical Audit: at first glance it may appear strange including medical audit as one means 
of reinforcing the link between management and quality. Particularly as some authors have 
pointed out that audit essentially constitutes a professional tool for control over what they 
themselves class as quality. Yet others point to the policy assumption on the part of the 
Department of Health (DoH) that audit constituted a means of increasing medical 
accountability. However, it was management who were given the responsibility for 
ensuring audit frameworks were in place and achieving results. Specifically, four 
'fundamental principles' the government subscribed to relate to the issue of managerial 
responsibility: 
0 the overallform of audit should be agreed locally between the profession and 
management, which itseý(needs to know that an effective system of medical audit is in 
place and that the work of each medical team is reviewed at regular andfrequent 
intervals to be agreed locally. 
e the results of medical audit in respect of individual patients and doctors must remain 
confidential at all times. However, the general results need to be made available to 
local management so that they may be able to satisfy themselves that appropriate 
remedial action is taken where audit results may revealproblems. 
0 where necessary management must be able to initiate an independent audit. This may 
take theform of externalpeer review or a joint professional and managerial appraisal 
of a particular service. 
9 while the practice of medical audit is essentially a professional matter, management too 
has significant responsibilityfor seeing that resources are used in the most effective 
way, and will therefore need to ensure that an effective system of medical audit is in 
place. 
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So despite limitations on their role in the processes of quality across the whole of the new 
corporate providers the responsibility for ensuring it was there at all rested firmly with the 
new managerial cadre. 
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Developing 'Corporate' Approaches to Quality 
During 1989/90 the Department [of Health] took its stance on technical quality up another 
notch by sponsoring 17 Total Quality Management demonstration sites. This was a direct 
attempt to reinforce the NHSME's exhortation that District Health Authorities (DHAs) 
develop systematic and continuing quality review experience, including provisions to monitor 
all aspects of quality of patient care including outcomes 42 . Some of these were specific 
projects concerned with unilateral 'quality improvement or assurance' but a number were 
funded on the basis of their attempts to introduce Total Quality Management. Chapter Five 
explores the links between managerial thought and TQM but for now it is sufficient to outline 
some of the key characteristics of the programmes and how they 'dovetailed' with existing 
themes within NES policy. It has already been seen how Joss and Kogan 43 isolate the 
similarities between TQM and NHS policy in relation to 'Value for Money' but there were 
two other vital points of contact between quality , NES policy generally, and management. 
Namely, the development of the manager as corporate lead and the incorporation of all 
groups in the development and implementation of corporate strategy in services. 
The Manager as Corporate Lead 
The prime characteristic of TQM approaches to operationalising quality is that they are 
managerially-led. Almost every text dealing with the normative principles of Total Quality 
Management suggests at some point that the key to its successful implementation is the 
development of a management organisational culture 44 . The idea of organisational culture is 
unpacked more fully in Chapter Five, but essentially TQM has at its core a belief in the virtues 
of management; both as a distinct set of ideas and values and as an organisational grouping. 
This belief in management as the natural leaders within the NHS's corporate bodies is one of 
the strongest themes to emerge from policy relating to the NHS during the 1980s and 1990s; 
and one which has enormous implications for the operationalisation of quality at the level of the 
organisation. Specifically, the development of managers within the service represents an 
attempt to redefine power relations away from the bureau-professional dominance of the past. 
Quality, as part of this shift, may well be viewed (particularly by those who stand to lose 
power) as just another device through which power can be wrestled away from specific groups 
of dominant interest holders. Consequently, as in any form of negotiation which involves 
49 
potential winners and losers, the skills of pragmatism and concession are pushed to the fore. 
Certainly, in seeking to promote the idea of medical audit for clinicians the early language used 
to introduce it to the clinical professions was carefully chosen so as to avoid highlighting the 
hidden concept of external accountability. 
Permeation through Incorporation. 
However, positioning managers at the helm in services is obviously not a sufficient intervention 
in itself to encourage a management culture. Other non-managers have to be exposed to, and 
subscribe to, managerial values and ideas. Pursuant to this end the governments have 
successively sought to involve clinicians in management. TQM represents another strand of 
this theme. A vital characteristic of Total Quality Management is that it should permeate all 
levels of the organisation and include all staff groups and functions in the organisation 45 . There 
is an important distinction to be made here however. This relates to the difference between 
managers (as a distinct occupational group in the NHS) and management as the ideas 
associated with this group but which have also influenced and made in-roads into other staff 
groups and their work. This is an important distinction as it will be argued in Chapter Five that 
quality's role in management (as part of the managerialization of welfare) has been of 
potentially more influence on the work of organisations as a whole than the simple association 
of quality techniques with the work of managers. Indeed, the link between quality and 
managers may actually be detrimental to the efforts of policy makers at both macro and micro 
levels to encourage changes in the power relations within NHS Trusts. The association between 
technical quality and managers was certainly a feature of the interviews carried out with 
professionals and consumer representatives in the case sites, and if government remains 
committed to promoting the use of quality techniques and language then the link which some 
groups make between quality, managers, and loss of status, fteedom and ultimately power is 
something which must be addressed. 
As already alluded to, simply giving managers responsibility for 'quality' was not the only 
strategy pursued in the drive to link the concepts of cost-containment and accountability. 
Government had already sought to develop ideas of management (and the emphasis on 
technical quality that this implies) in the work of other NHS staff groups (primarily 
professionals) through other strategies; most notably the development of cost centre-based 
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systems relating to the costs of clinical resources through the Resource Management Initiative 
and the extension of this principle to the formation of Clinical Directorates and Clinical 
Director positions for doctors. One of the earliest pilots of the Clinical Directorate structure 
and Clinical Director role was at Guys Hospital where the aim was to: 
( reconcile clinicalfteedom with management authority and accountability ... the consultants 
agreed to accept a system that sought to equate power with responsibility. In return for the 
freedom to manage their own affairs, they had to accept responsibilityfor thefinancial 
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consequences. 
Harrison and Pollitt 47 suggest that the raison d'etre of clinical directorates is managerial 
control over both doctors and other health professionals. The vehicle for this control being 
the incorporation of professionals into new managerial roles which have managerial 
parameters such as limited budgets. These act to constrain action and shape values towards a 
more 'managerial' agenda, including a concern for technical quality. 
Walby and Greenwe1148 suggest that such a strategy was an attempt to shape the discourse of 
clinical decision making. As they point out, clinicians have always controlled the distribution 
of resources in the NHS. But they have done it from within a framework of decision making 
which articulated choices in a medical terminology of need and clinical science. The vision of 
this policy of incorporation via budgetary control and a sense of freedom from bureaucratic 
interference was an increasing salience of financial matters in clinical decision making. 
Consequently priorities and decisions would be articulated in a language which managers 
could readily understand and challenge. By implication, this shift also includes greater 
transparency (and ergo accountability) in relation to clinical work. 
Harrison and Pollitt go on to suggest that the developing prominence of 'quality' in the NHS 
is itself part of the broader strategy of incorporation: 
'if incorporation is a strategyfor involving professional producer groups in sharing 
managerial responsibilities with the state then the most profound level of such a strategy is 
the creation of shared meanings ... the newprominence 
(and new meanings) given to quality 
can be regarded aspart of a highly political process. It is therefore pertinent to enquire who 
is pressingfor increased attention to quality and how that qualiýy is defined. '49 
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Certainly the TQM message is one of incorporation and involvement of all groups in 
services: 
'TQM is an approach to improving the effectiveness andflexibility of a business as a whole. 
It is essentially a way of organising and involving the whole organisation, every department, 
every activity, every single person at every level. For an organisation to be truly effective, 
every part of it must workproperly together, recognising that every person and every activity 
affects, and is in turn affected by, others. 50 
Moreover, the link between TQM and control, especially managerial control, is also explicit 
in the writings of TQM gurus such as Crosby: 
'Quality management is a systematic way ofguaranteeing that organised activities happen 
the way they are planned. It is a management discipline concerned with preventing problems 
from occurring by creating the attitudes and controls that make prevention possible. 51 
The message of incorporation of all groups through quality is one which was clearly present 
in guidance issued by the NHSME in 1993. Whilst not explicitly dealing with Total Quality 
Management (preferring instead to couch the message in terms of an 'organisational-wide 
approach to quality') the main themes of TQM were still present and the language strongly 
6 managerial' in tone. The Guidance suggested that a Trust quality strategy may be best 
promoted through: 
commitment to quality and leadershipfrom the chief executive 
qualityforming an integralpart of both corporate objectives and individual staff 
objectives, and both reflecting the organisation'S business 
10 the presence of an organisation-wide quality management programme incorporating 
training in the use Of quality tools and teehniques 
0 all staff having access to training to enable them to develop and make best use of their 
skills as part Of an effective human resource strategy 
0 high quality care achieved through teamwork andpartnership with integrated working 
involving every member of the organisation 
52 
9 effective communications both within the organisation and between it and other bodies 52 
By 1996 and the publication of the White Paper, A Service With Ambition the association 
between quality and incorporation of clinicians into a managerial agenda of measurement, 
consumer voice and clinical decisions was firmly established and backed up by high level 
clinical involvement at the Department of Health in the form of the Chief Nursing and 
Medical Officers. The message was clear, quality is something that involves clinicians and 
managers and the politicised process of establishing shared meanings should be a priority for 
services: 
'Quality 
... should be the driving consideration in clinical decision making and in priority 
setting, and the basis on which the NHS manages and measures its performance. It is a 
matter which lies at the heart of the management process in every health authority, NHS 
Trust andfamily practice. It needs to be addressed by clinicians and managers, working 
together to establish a common language and shared objectives. 53 
The document drove quality firmly into the domain of clinical work and attempted to pull 
together issues which until now had been on the margins of policy documentation and 
implicit rather than explicit; these included the links between outcome, treatment and 
commissioning. More importantly, it also opened the door for managers to question the 
usefulness of professionally-dominated areas of national strategy. For example, whether 
clinical effectiveness data (of which audit is a component) was useful to them or not: 
'Further work to ensure that quality is always central to the management andperformance of 
the NHS needs to address: 
how the measurement of quality and outcome across a range of clinical treatments and 
methods of service provision can be improved 
0 how to use patients' experiences to monitor and improve the quality of care, particularly 
i. n relation to accessibility, continuity and co-ordination 
0 ivhether current work on clinical effectiveness data to improve clinical practice meets the 
needs of clinicians, managers andpatients 
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* how greater emphasis can be given to considerations of quality and outcome in decisions 
taken on priorities and the commissioning of care 
how measures of health outcome can become central to assessing the performance of 
health authorities and NHS Trusts 54 
These messages reinforcing the link between managerial responsibility, incorporation of 
professionals into management, and the issue of quality-led change were also promoted by 
those not directly involved in the hierarchical management of the NHS. An example being 
the Audit Commission, a body with no line-managerial power over the bulk of managers in 
the NHS but who represent the managerial expression of evaluation in relation to NHS 
services and as such are tremendously influential in shaping service agendas at a local level. 
'Chief executives and senior managers are clearly responsible; and should be held 
accountable, for the day-to-day running of their trust: But they must also create a climate in 
which change can occur, so that the trust can adapt to changes in its operating environment 
and bring about improvements in quality and efficiency. In order to establish such a climate, 
managers should set a limited agenda of key areas where they need to ensure success. This 
willprobably include: 
0 devolution of decision making and control of resources (to business units i. e. clinical 
directorates) 
0 involving professionals in management, and 
0 ensuring that quality and audit programmes result inaction to improve processes and 
outcomes 
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The Professional Response 
If the macro-policy themes presented thus far were accepted by all groups in the NHS as the 
only source of priorities for service action then the transition to a managerial culture would 
have been much easier. However, for professional groups the 'official line' of DoH- 
sponsored policy represents only one part of the clinical practice equation. Doctors and 
nurses work within the codes of ethics and norms which bind them as a professional group, as 
well as within the framework of policy passed down the managerial hierarchy and derived 
from the DOH. Moreover, at the macro-level, the changes heralded by the trends of 
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consumerism and economic scrutiny represent a considerable challenge to professional power 
bases in the NHS as a whole. The respective Royal CollegeS56 57 were not slow to recognise 
this and swiftly sought to establish a voice in the quality debate. As early as the mid 1980s 
the professions were beginning to make use of the rhetoric and techniques of quality at a 
national level. Moreover, the medical, nursing and therapy professions, have been quick to 
involve themselves in designing and adapting tools for assuring quality in their respective 
professions. 
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Pollitt argues that the growth in management (as a group) was a factor in the development of 
quality; a theme picked up by many authors. However his argument goes farther in that he 
recognises that it was not simply the growth in managers per se that led to the rise in 
prominence of quality. Rather, it was the 'struggle for the medical domain' which the growth 
in managers and the general management role represented which prompted efforts to 
operationalise the term by the professionS59 . As part of this struggle Pollitt suggests that 
professions have taken it upon themselves to develop their own initiatives marketed under the 
banner of quality. The reasons behind this sudden concern with quality by the professions are 
summarised as: 
'A genuine, altruistic desirefor seýf-improvement is undoubtedly one [motive]. Another is to 
protect the integrity of existing services againstfinancial economies, actual or anticipated. 
Yet another is as a pre-emptive move, to ward off quality audits of any kindfrom outsiders. 60 
Shaw also picks up on this 'defensive' trait on the part of the professions. Some of the key 
forces driving quality for him are the: 
( clinical professions determination to retain the initiative in the evaluation of clinical 
practice and training, and to demonstrate effective seýflregulation in theface ofgrowing 
management demandsfOr accountability. 61 
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In later works Pollitt outlines what this struggle might look like: 
'One way of understanding the current to-ings andfro-ings over quality is to view them as a 
strugglefor control, very much including control of the meanings of the terms and labels 
used to describe and define quality. 62 
Certainly policy has acted, on occasions, to reinforce the message that professional quality is 
aprofessional matter. In Workingfor Patients the message was unambiguous: 
'The Government's approach is basedfirmly on the principle that the quality of medical work 
can only be reviewed by a doctors peers. 63 
In relation to lay involvement in scrutinising the ýquality of medical work the DOH clearly 
maintained a professional boundary around the issue of critical examination - at least in the 
early days of the reforms: 
'the Department has always indicated that, given the sensitivities of the medical profession 
on the establishment o medical audit committees, there was no immediate prospect of CHCs ýf 
- or indeed any layperson - being involved in the process 
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The development of medical audit was an example of official policy being 'softened' in order 
to accommodate powerful interests. The conventional use of audit (in the managerial world) 
is as a formal tool for control and monitoring of resources by financial mechanisms. As such 
it is often linked to sanctions and direct intervention by outside parties. This clearly has not 
been the case in relation to medical audit. It was removed from any formal punitive system of 
control right at the onset. Moreover, the emphasis in medical audit is that it should be 
educational as opposed to punitive. External sanctions on practitioners who fall short of 
quality standards are not expected by participants. Expressed alternatively, audit seems to 
reinforce the message that the autonomy professionals enjoy relative to other members of 
organisational groups in the NHS is also extended to the area of quality definition and 
assurance. 
By 1993, having established medical or unidisciplinary audit as the professional mechanism 
of choice for assuring quality in services, official policy had begun to try and encourage a 
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greater link between the professions involved and some of the other 'managerially-led' 
quality initiatives that were going in Trusts. One route to these ends was the reworking of 
medical audit principles into a broader, multidisciplinary, framework of clinical audit. DHAs 
were instructed to concentrate on funding clinical audit which addressed the priorities of all 
groups including management and users of serviceS65. Malb Y66 suggests that the transition to 
clinical audit from medical audit represents a component of the 'New Public Management' in 
that it is being heralded under the banner of quality and has a sense of the primacy of the 
cconsumer' through its emphasis on public accountability. This may well be the case but it is 
far from certain that the professions' stranglehold on the audit agenda has been relaxed. Even 
where consumers are allowed into the process of audit it would appear that there are 
'limitations' on their role. In discussing the 'role of users in achieving a quality service' 
Hopkins and colleagues from the Royal College of Physicians suggest that: 
'Users of health services must also be the pre-eminent arbiters ofgood quality practice in 
some areas in which they, and only they, can determine goodpractice ... relief of 
pain ... courtesy ... communication ... personal circumstance and choice... 'hotel' 
standards ... continuity and co-ordinated care. 
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In relation to issues of 'technical competence in clinical practice': 
'It is difficultfor users of health services to be competent in judging the quality of the more 
technical aspects of medical care 68 
Certainly in the empirical evidence collected from the case sites in later chapters it is clear 
that the issue of 'outsider' involvement in audit projects is an emotive one. Moreover, it is 
possible to hypothesise, given the absence of any recent evaluation of how the shift to clinical 
audit is performing, that whilst the initial impetus for audit may have been as a part of the 
'New Public Management' the reality at service level is of a professionally-dominated 
technique which happens to slot nicely into the current rhetorical framework of 'quality'. As 
one Audit facilitator in the Northern Region put it: 
'Yes, I think in the early days wejust had to let them do the things that interested them as 
consultantsjust to get them on board. But now its that much harder trying to get them to do 
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projects which comefrom the Health Authority or the [Trust] board. So I suppose in that 
sense we did make a rodfor our own backs. 69 
Again, the links between occupational groups, their shared values, and the development of 
quality in services come under more intense scrutiny in the chapters to follow. For now the 
aim of this section has been to highlight that policy on quality at the macro level is not some 
stand alone 'technical' process divorced from the political arena. Quality differs according to 
the power of the NHS group involved. Indeed Harrison and Pollitt argue that the focus of 
audit (namely a professionally defined and highly technical judgement of quality) actually 
justifies the label of medical qualltY70 (see Chapter One, page 23 for further discussion). 
NHS Policy And Quality: Some Concluding Observations? 
The introduction of the language and techniques of quality have formed an integral part of a 
broader process of the managerialization of welfare provision. This process has at its core the 
ideas associated with managerialism and the consequent recasting of power relations away 
from dominant bureau-professionals and in favour of the end-users of services. This process 
casts managers as the 'champions' of the service user by virtue of their ideological 
commitment to the customer, and their logical place as the operators of the new welfare 
quasi-markets. 
The quality debate has reflected the development and progress of the managerialization 
project itself The vague calls for services to develop quality using the colloquial sense 
(which is inherently subjective and open to interpretation) have changed to central 
exhortations for services to adopt and adapt formal quality techniques. These techniques 
unlike the simple colloquial usage of quality, and like the process of managerialization itself, 
involve the creation of winners and losers. Choosing between providers on the basis of 
technical quality necessarily involves making judgements about that quality. In an era of 
limited financial resources this means that services and the groups involved in them will be 
pitted against each other and their interests consequently threatened. 
One can see therefore how both the term quality and the activities which represent its 
operational face in services are attractive targets for manipulation by those parties who stand 
to gain and lose the most. Perhaps because of this attractiveness the concept of quality has not 
58 
been applied unproblernatically to services through official policy. It has been shown how the 
professional response to the threat quality poses to their power base has included the subtle 
manipulation of the medical audit agenda to allow for all-important characteristics of 
professional power to continue - autonomy, lack of extemal regulation and the sanctity of 
professional knowledge. 
At the level of macro-NHS policy the quality debate represents a struggle between competing 
groups for control of a term which, if utilised effectively, is a powerful source of legitimacy 
in services and with the electorate. This chapter has outlined some of the characteristics of 
this struggle when viewed from the level of macro-NHS policies. The focus for the thesis, 
however, is on the face of these struggles at the micro-policy level of individual Trusts. In 
outlining the policy development of quality over the last twenty years the chapter has shown 
how quality goes far beyond the simple technical application of a series of systems with 
distinct apolitical goals. The Quality debate involves powerful group interests shaping a 
concept which has become part of the language and 'armouries' of the various cultures in the 
NHS. It is to the nature of such interests and the links with cultural groups in the NES that 
the thesis now turns. 
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CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS ADDRESSING THE 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMATIC. 
This chapter outlines an appropriate methodology for the exploration of the theoretical 
propositions advanced thus far in the thesis. Namely, that: 
* Quality is shaped through social action in the form of participation in the design and 
implementation of 'quality' activity. Quality then is socially constructed and a 
product of the attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviour of the people who play a part in 
its construction. 
* These quality activities are delineated and contested along 'N-HS-tribal' lines: the 
professions, management and consumer representatives. The allegiance of these 
'tribes' to the various strands of quality activity that exist in services is based on a 
sense of 'synergy' between their shared values (as a group) and the values promoted 
by the activities themselves. For example, professional techniques of audit involve 
closure, autonomy and formal accountability to one's peers as well as the 
organisation: characteristics of professional work generally. 
o The contested nature of quality in the NHS, can be seen as symptomatic of quality's 
role as a group resource in broader political battles within services. Particularly in 
areas such as the attempted introduction of new cultural values (as in the case of 
managerialism), the redistribution of power between groups and the control of 
working practices. These political battles necessarily create winners and losers whose 
interests are threatened or enhanced accordingly. 
In presenting a methodology to explore some of the questions that arise from these 
propositions the chapter seeks to strike a balance between four key elements to 
understanding the social action, upon which quality depends for its actualisation. The 
balance to be achieved is between explanation versus understanding and holism versus 
individualism. The chapter represents a strategy for data collection and analysis that 
concentrates on the four 'cells' that necessarily fonn the focus of organisational research 
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if the four key elements above are viewed as matrix (see fig 2). The four cells which the 
strategy focuses on are the areas of systems, choice, culture and subjectivity'. 
The approach adopted as a means of framing research efforts in these four areas is a 
multiple-site, embedded unit of analysis case study design. Within this methodology 
stakeholder analysiS2 constitutes the set of organising principles for the collection and 
analysis of data. 
The chapter first discusses the essential methodological problematic I faced as a 
researcher in this study; namely, the question of analysing social action in people with a 
stake or interest in quality in acute NHS trusts. It then outlines the proposed case study 
design and structure, before going on to address the central theoretical postulates behind 
stakeholder analysis and the reasons why it is an appropriate organising principle for this 
study. 
The specifics of data collection in the fonn of participant observation (with the observer 
as participant), depth interview, and documentary analysis are presented alongside a 
discussion of the hermeneutic spiral approach used to analyse this qualitative data. The 
design of the case studies used mixed quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection and the holistic logic behind this is discussed. The structure and form of 
stakeholder perceptions is further complemented by the use of Q-methodology (see page 
82 for an outline) and its central aim of mapping shared subjectivities using statistical 
techniques. The principles and techniques of Q-methodology are outlined before a 
discussion of some of the ethical challenges arising from the study. 
On Analysing Social Action 
Quality, is dependent on social action on the part of individuals within organisations if it 
is to be realised and made tangible in services. How one best approaches the analysis of 
this social action that constitutes the actualisation of quality constitutes the essential 
problematic in this thesis. Hollis proposes a four fold-matrix to analysing social action 
(see fig 2). None of the individual cells constitute the singular solution to the problematic, 
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but when taken together offer a framework for both explaining and understanding social 
action. For Holliss any approach to understanding social action has to address the analytic 
priorities of holism/structure Vs individualism, and explanation Vs understanding3 . The 
matrix which emerges from these priorities has in its cells the emphasis which different 





Rational choices Subjective Meanings 
Fig 2: A Matrixfor Analysing Social Action 4 
If it is accepted that each cell in the matrix has something to offer, then it is clear that 
simply concentrating on organisational culture at the expense of the individual meanings 
which people attach to quality activity would be inadequate. Similarly simply examining 
the choices people make in their actions at the expense of the structures and systems 
within which they operate would constitute an incomplete approach. In short any research 
strategy adopted must generate data fit for the purposes of generating theory relating to 
each of these elements if it is to understand adequately and explain the social action 
which underpins the actualisation of quality. With this proviso in mind the strategy 
adopted for the research is a case study design, or more specifically a multi-site, multi- 
method stakeholder design. 
The Case Study Design 
A case study can be defined as: 
i an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 




The thesis has already argued that quality activity cannot be divorced from the contextual 
factors that impact upon it (see Chapters One and Two). Furthermore, it will show that 
theory pertaining to organisations is characterised by 'conceptual anarchy' (see Chapter 
Five). But what unites all theory is the idea that individuals have an interest or 'stake' in 
any organisational phenomenon. Particularly when that phenomenon is tied to the 
concepts of power, resource and work - as quality is. Stakeholder actualisation of quality, 
as part of a social policy of encouraging 'quality' in NHS Trusts, is dependent on social 
action by individuals with a 'stake' in those Trusts. Social action in turn is dependent on 
individual perceptions of social reality, and the power dynamic within which individuals 
are located. As Atkin and colleagues express it: 
'Different stakeholder perceptions may conflict and evaluation must recognise different 
interests and their perceptions ofsocial reality. Furthermore, because interpretations Of 
social reality occur within a power dynamic, some accounts have greater authority than 
others. Put more simply, this approach is a reminder thatpolicy is not simply a reflection 
of the activities of health professionals, but represents the context in which their activities 
are interpreted and acted upon. 6 
There are several reasons why alternative approaches to examining social action are not 
appropriate for this study. A quasi-experimental approach which proceeded from the 
basis of simply testing the theoretical delineation of the professional-managerial- 
consumerist typology outlined thus far would be inappropriate. Experiments, by 
necessity, seek to divorce the phenomenon from its operational context in order that the 
researcher be able to better 'control' the variables involved. Obviously, the researcher in 
this case has no control whatsoever over the operations of a large acute NHS trust and the 
groups involved in its services. Attempting such a design, therefore, would be somewhat 
foolhardy. 
Although the rationale for the multiple-site design can be seen as analogous to the 
(replication' logic involved in experimentation, it does not depend as heavily on formal, 
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pre specified hypothesis or statements of the relationship between elements of the 
phenomenon 7. Any formal hypotheses developed would require a sound empirically 
derived knowledge base if they were to have any form of validity attached: this 
knowledge base is lacking. poll, tt, S8 initial typology of medical-service and user's 
experienced is only developed from general observations of the NHS quality 'scene' 
rather than a detailed piece of research, or an examination of others' work conducted in 
the setting to which it applies. Much of what passes for theory in relation to quality has 
'been invented in the abstract by conceptual specialists'9. This characteristic of the 
quality debate not only makes practical application of theory difficult but also negates the 
use of a hypethetico-deductive approach to theory generation as encouraged by quasi- 
experimentation. 
One question that may be posed is 'if the study is concerned with people's values and 
attitudes around the issue of quality activity why not just do an attitudinal survey? ' But 
again the requirements for adequacy in survey research design are not met in the case of 
this study. Part of the rationale for rejecting the survey is the same as that of the quasi- 
experimental reasons outlined above. Namely, that the knowledge base associated with 
the phenomenon does not support the generation of valid instruments (hypotheses in 
experiments). The typology of quality activities outlined thus far is at the 'tentative' end 
of a theoretical continuum. Simply developing a series of scales of 'managerial' 
'professional' and 'consumerist' approaches and then surveying individuals' associations 
with these perspectives simply risks introducing even greater chances for error in any 
conclusions drawn. Given the lack of empirical 'weight' behind the theory any emergent 
relationships might just as easily be due to serendipity or chance rather than actual 
association or difference. Moreover, a survey, whilst managing to grasp some of the 
impact of context is too limiting in the breadth of its analysis. Given the lack of quality- 
specific empirical material to draw on the research would need a hugely extensive 
questionnaire, observational or interview schedule if the study was to capture all the 
possible factors impacting on the actualisation of quality in the workplace and the views 
which people hold regarding the phenomenon. This would be wholly inappropriate and 
would probably have generated a very poor (and therefore unusable) sample of responses. 
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Given the social nature then of the construction of quality in NHS services, the 
phenomenon of quality activity and the service context in which it occurs cannot be 
separated. For this reason the case study design has several advantages; it: 
* Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
* Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulatingjashion, or divergefor theoretically explainable reasons, and as 
another result 
* Benefitsfrom the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysislo 
Case study constitutes a distinctive research strategy and promotes specific approaches to 
data collection and analysis; a feature that all such strategic methods share. What the case 
study method offers is opportunities for what Lincoln and Gubal 1 term 'naturalistic 
inquiry'. This approach to research has at its core a number of characteristics which 
equate with the conceptualisation of the case study deployed in this study. For Lincoln 
and Guba the primary characteristics of this naturalistic approach centre on issues such as 
sensitivity and flexibility in reporting, design and analysis; a preference for methods 
which reflect these values (usually qualitative though not exclusively so); inductive 
approaches to analysis; and a desire to ground this analysis in the data as well as 
generalisation through a linkage with the readers own tacit knowledge of similar 
situations 12 . 
Such a detailed, sensitive and multi-faceted approach lends itself to the study of the 
actualisation of quality. For quality, according to Patten: 
'... has to do with detail, with the subtle and unique things that make a difference beyond 
the points on a standardised scale. Quality descriptions provide the detail to explain what 
the lives of two different peoples are like, one of whom responded that he or she had a 
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'highly'satisfactory experience, the other of whom responded that he or she had an 
I extremely'satisfying experience. This is not a question of interval versus ordinal 
scaling, but one of meanings. What do programs mean to participants? What is the 
quality of their experience? Answers to such questions require detailed, in-depth, and 
holistic descriptions that represent people in their own terms and that get close enough to 
the situation being studied to understandfirsthand the nuances of quality. '13 
Selecting The Cases 
The theoretical importance of a case comes when its results are set against knowledge of 
its background 14 
. This 
background information is presented in Chapter Four. Cases were 
selected on the basis of a screening pro-forma sent to all acute NHS Trusts in Northern 
and Yorkshire Region. The pTO-forma asked Trusts to detail their quality strategies, the 
techniques in place, how long they have been in place and details of the groups involved 
and the nature of their involvement. Cases were then selected based on differences in the 
groups identified as involved in quality activity; the length of time that defined, 
coordinated, quality activity had been a feature of Trust corporate activity; the nature of 
group involvement and in two cases due to their geographical similarity and the fact that 
they shared the same corporate purchaser. These two sites (Fishtown and Shiptown) 
offered special theoretical interest due to their similarities of context in service provision. 
The aim of the case-sampling procedure was to expose theoretical propositions to the 
widest possible set of conditions and the Trusts selected respresented these conditions. 
However, whilst providing the necessary breadth for robust theory development they 
were in no way atypical from the overall picture painted by the pro-formas received. 
Three of the four sites were either actively committed to a formal Total Quality 
Management (excellence/cultural 15 ) approach to quality (Marketown and Fishtown), or 
had developed their own 'TQM-like' model based on past experiences with the 
'excellence' approach to quality (Castletown). Shiptown was committed to a standards- 
based 'scientific' 16 emphasis in its quality strategy and for this reason was picked as it 
offered a theoretically different context with which to aid theory contrasting and 
development. Each of the sites had varying degrees of 'external' involvement from 
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CHCs, user groups or local voluntary organisations in the activities and planning and 
evaluation of its quality strategy. 
A Strategy For Data Collection: Case Study And Stakeholder Analysis 
Whilst case study methodology constitutes a form or organising strategy for research, and 
one in which the virtues of flexibility, depth and richness are associated with the analytic 
process, it is necessary to get beyond this level and address questions of data collection 
and analysis if an adequate balance is to be struck between holism, individualism, 
explanation and understanding. Specifically, at an early stage in the development of 
strategy it was necessary to ask 'what will count as dataT 'Where should it come fromT 
and 'how should it be usedT 
The study's theoretical base has at its core (see Chapter Five) the notion of stakeholding - 
that people have an interest, or stake, in the way quality is actuallsed in services. Chapter 
Five argues that the actualisation of quality is linked to issues of power, resource, 
structure and the organisation of work. For these reasons it is a concept which people 
wish to influence in order to help secure their interests in these areas. 
In order to explore this argument one of the study's primary tasks in each of the case 
sites was to identify who these stakeholders were as a first. step, in identifying their 
relationship to the manifestation of quality in their Trusts. This was not always an easy 
task as much of the manipulation and shaping of the quality-agenda took place away from 
officially sanctioned fora such as quality committees or user-consultation groups, making 
identification difficult. In order to both recognise the importance of individuals, allow for 
the possibility of alliances between individuals not based simply on occupational role, 
and as a means of remaining systematic in the data collection and analysis stages, the 
17 framework adopted was Stakeholder Analysis 
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This approach to the identification and elucidation of theory specific to stakeholders 
aligns itself to a number of key philosophical propositions: 
* That reality is too some extent subjective - different stakeholders experience the 
nominally 'same phenomenon differently, and this is not perversity. Investigations 
themselves have stakeholders and social contexts, and are not neutral or value-free in 
the problems they address, the ways theyframe them, the data and interpretations 
they select. 
Situations are not necessarily manifestations o single purposes andplans, but may f 
be created by the interaction of multiple purposes and multiple agendasfor achieving 
them. 
9 The post-structuralist rather than structuralist view of the generation of behaviour. 
That is, that much/all of behaviour is the manifestation of cultural software that 
actors have internalised, rather than hardware of a basic structure of human 
personality as afixed reality across people and over time' 8. 
Stakeholder analysis is simply a broad organising principle for research which does not 
have a particularly coherent base in any specific epistemological or ontological world 
view, but it is sympathetic to the theoretical stance on quality adopted in this thesis. 
Namely that as it manifests itself in services, the concept is bound to a constructionist 
(rather than realist) and pluralist (rather than unitary) reality' 
9. 
Stakeholder analysis has five stages in its framework: 
a The identification of the phenomenon of interest, the research questions, and the 
general research approach (inductive, deductive, comparative). The phenomenon 
(quality) has already been outlined and the broad research questions already 
expressed in the introductory chapter. The general research approach adopted was 
inductive in character: 
The deduction of a likely set of initial stakeholders, the collection of initial data and 
the identification of other stakeholders. 
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9 Collection of fuller data and the construction of a multidimensional database and the 
filling in of this until complete enough for analysis. 
Analysis of data in order to address the research question. 
Writing up and presentation of conclusions addressing questions of stakeholder 
audience and how and why to reach them. 
The initial stakeholders in each of the sites are outlined by Chapter Four and the 
multidimensional analytical database forms the basis for Chapter Seven and the 
discussion of the qualitative findings across the sites. 
Access Arrangements 
In all of the sites access was surprisingly easy, with active support and encouragement 
offered from senior management. However, each of the Trusts wished to be kept 
informed of which senior clinical staff were to be interviewed. In Marketown access to 
senior medical staff was arranged through the 'Matron' of the Trust as she felt that this 
would be more a more successful approach. As a tactic for securing interviews and 
access, however, it was not that successful with most of the medical staff refusing to be 
interviewed. Having interviewed the medical director of the Trust his help was sought in 
securing interviews with colleagues with markedly better results. Only one of the 
consultants approached after the Medical Director's intervention would not be 
interviewed. Subsequently, senior medical staff were used to 'introduce' the researcher 
to colleagues as a strategy for securing interviews. It was not clear whether the initial 
reluctance of medical staff was due to a cultural strategy of non-compliance due to an 
C outsider' (a senior nurse) making the introductions. It was, however, undoubtedly easier 
to get interviews when an 'insider' made the initial approach on the researcher's behalf 
Each of the Trusts made it a proviso of the research that the results of the study were fed 
back to the participants. It was made clear to them that the study was exploratory, 
concerned with organisational politics, and not of the comparative 'which approach is 
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best' type. It was also made clear that the results would be anonymised and no case sites 
or individuals would be identifiable. This anonymity was vital as many of the 
respondents made it clear that they feared repercussions if they could be identified from 
either their Q-sorts (the ways in which they sorted the theoretical statements presented as 
part of Q-methodology (see pages 83-88 for details) or interview quotes. Although, 
interestingly, this concern appeared less common amongst senior medical staff who on 
more than one occasion stated that they had few qualms about the issue of anonymity. In 
one case stating that: 
( nobody gives a toss about the quality people in this place so why should they worry ifI 
express an opinion? ' (General Surgeon: Fishtown) 
It was made clear to the sites at the outset that the local purchasers and CHCs would be 
approached for interview. Only in Marketown did this present a problem; the Trust were 
not keen to involve the CHC as the two organisations had what one manager called a 
'history of bad blood' between senior managers and the Chief Officer. Eventually in 
Marketown a compromise was reached with only the Q-sorting component of the Trust's 
report being sent to the CHC. A situation which the CHC accepted as necessary if the 
research was to be completed. 
On Multiple Methods Of Data Collection 
The primary units of analysis in the case sites were the organisations as a whole but 
analysis also occurred at the level of meetings, small groups, and individuals. This 
'embedded 520 design entailed multiple strategies for data collection. These included in- 
depth qualitative interviewing, observation, documentary analysis and Q-methodological 
investigation. These multiple strategies were intended to examine the perceptions and 
actions associated with the actualisation of quality from different perspectives; thereby 
promoting an expanded data set and deeper understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation 2 1. Each of the elements of the strategy was designed to examine particular, 
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but different, aspects of the same reality 22 . Advocates of multiple methods of gathering 
data on the same phenomenon (between method triangulation) suggest a number of 
reasons why triangulation is of benefit to the researcher, but most centre on the benefits 
to a study's validity of such an approach. As Brewer and Hunter point out: 
'Triangulated measurement tries to pinpoint the values of a phenomenon more accurately 
by sighting on itfrom different methodological viewpoints. To be useful, a measuring 
instrument must both give consistent results and measure the phenomenon that it 
purports to measure. When two reliable instruments yield conflicting results, then the 
validity of each is cast into doubt. When thefindings of different methods agree, we are 
more confident. 
23 
However, such 'testing' of the validity of each method was not the primary aim of this 
research, Analysing the processes and attitudes associated with quality from multiple 
sources of, data in this study is more akin to the deeper levels of knowledge and 
exploration alluded to by Walker: 
'Triangulation can add qualification to research that would otherwise be accepted 
uncritically ... and 
(methods) can also complement each other when the survey provides a 
contextfor the qualitative work which in turn permits commentary on the survey 
findings. 24 
In this study each method of data collection is intended to add to, and complement, each 
other along the lines of what Robson terms the 'complementary purposes model -)25 . At the 
level of design this means that each method is designed to address a different research 
question. So for example, Q-methodological exploration addresses the question: 
'91'hatform if any do shared subjectivity's take in relation to perceptions of quality 
activity amongst stakeholders in NHS services? ' 
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Another example can be found in the way that participant-observation (with the 
researcher as participant-ob server) at meetings and in quality fora addresses the 
questions: 
Wat is the relationship between people's expressions of views on quality activity in 
interviews, and their actions in key settings to do with quality activity? ' 
'how do the structural elements of a Trust's quality strategy act to shape the concept's 
actualisation in services? ' 
At the level of analysis this means that the Q-methodological exploration of shared 
subjectivity's provides a context for the elucidation of theory derived from the interview 
data. This in turn informs the observational material. Such 'compounding' of sources of 
data to arrive at a faller, more holistic, level of understanding is not without its dilemmas 
however. As Hammersly and Atkinson point out: 
'The aggregation of dataftom different sources will [not] unproblematically add up to 
produce a more complete picture. 26 
It is symptomatic of the complementary purposes model that divergence is almost always 
a feature of research carried out this way 27 . However, whilst posing a problem, the 
characteristic remains useful. If the data appears to throw up contradictory accounts and 
these contradictions can be accounted for theoretically, then not only can the theory be 
considered more robust, but an agenda for further empirical exploration is also 
established. This logic is analogous to the replication logic of the multiple case site 
design itself. The aim of such design is theoretical explanation of any convergence or 
divergence between cases. Where cases do not 'fit' the theory developed then the theory 
2 
must be modified and further testing carried Out 
8. Certainly in this study there were 
contradictory results and divergence between and within case sites, these have been 
highlighted and addressed in Chapter Seven. 
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Data Collection: The Specifics 
Both case site methodology and stakeholder analysis constitute broad, yet complementary, 
organising strategies for data collection. They both favour a 'naturalistic' research design 
but neither is particularly prescriptive about how data is to be collected within this set of 
principles. This flexibility, whilst an advantage, means that careful questions of suitability 
for specific data collection techniques must be addressed. The adoption of an inductive 
approach to theory construction means the data collection and theory development processes 
occur concurrently. Consequently, the data collection strategies must be broad enough to 
yield rich and varied data, yet also practical enough to enable the theory to develop and 
move on within the permitted time scale. They must also enable me to 'revisit' stakeholders 
and the data generated as many times as necessary in order to refine the theory. With these 
requirements in mind several strategies to data collection were employed. 
Organisational Literature And Documentation 
Organisational literature can give valuable clues and insight into the definition of quality 
purportedly employed by units, the values attached to the organisation's view on quality, and 
the weighting attached to the various groups involved around the concept. The reasons why 
it is such a useful source of data are explained by Forster: 
'-documentary records constitute a rich source of insights into different employee and 
group interpretations of organizational life, because they are one of the principal by- 
products ofthe interactions and communication of individuals and groups, at all levels, in 
organizations. ' 29 
Moreover, it acts as a source for comparison with other data sources. Documents are a 
useful way of cross-referencing the interviews of people with their written accounts.; and 
can also assist in the interpretation of informants' rewriting of history in later verbal 
accounts of events around quality activity development 
30 
. In this study there were no hard 
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and fast rules as to what would count as documentary data in each of the sites as it was not 
possible to develop ideas of the forms of documentation relating to quality in each of the 
sites prior to immersion. The starting point for most of the sites were copies of the quality 
strategy (where they existed); however, by the end of the fieldwork documentation in the 
form of committee meetings, training manuals, private memos, working papers and internal 
and external reports had all been scrutinised. 
Participant Observation 
Jorgenson argues that this is a suitable strategy for data collection in research problems 
where, 'there are important differences between the views of insiders as opposed to 
outsiders 31 . The tentative theoretical typology deployed thus far can be seen to have an 
insider-outsider dimension. Within the delineated picture of quality professional and 
managerial approaches are associated with the status of organisational 'insider' whereas 
consumerist approaches are accessible to those 'outside' the organisation's managerial and 
professional stakeholders. Indeed, to attain consumerist quality, the views of 'outsiders' are 
actively encouraged as a criteria for successful implementation. 
Participant observation can also be seen as an appropriate data collection tactic where 'the 
phenomenon is somehow obscured from the view of outsiders 32 . Again the literature 
suggests that quality activities, particularly in the sphere of 'professional' activity, is often 
obscured from lay scrutiny. This is a criticism that has been labelled at medical audit 
strategies in particular. A point which relates to Jorgenson'scriteria that the method is 
suitable where 'the phenomenon is hidden from the public view'33 . He also goes on to 
suggest that participant observation as a strategy is most appropriate where certain minimal 
conditions are present: 
* the research problem is concerned with human meanings and interactions viewedfrom 
the insider's perspective; 
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the phenomenon o investigation is observable within an everyday life situation or f 
setting; 
the researcher is able to gain access to an appropriate setting; 
the phenomenon is sufficiently limited in size and location to be studied as a case 
study 
questions are appropriatefor case study 
the research problem can be addressed by qualitative data gathered by direct 
observation and other means pertinent to thefield setting. 34 
Quality, as has been argued, is dependent for its actualisation on the meanings and 
interpretations that 'insiders' attach to the concept and the techniques used to promote it. if 
one takes the stance, as this study did, that quality activities represent the observable 'face' 
of the concept, then participant observation is an eminently appropriate strategy for 
collecting data on the fora and meetings which form the backbone of such activities. 
The style of participant observation adopted in this study is of the participant as observer 
model described by Robson 35 . The researcher's status as an observer was made clear 
to 
members of the groups at the onset. This had the advantage that, as an observer, I could 
legitimately probe areas of the meeting that were not understood or followed and also revisit 
aspects of the meetings in interviews with key stakeholders. However, it also meant that it 
was extremely likely that the research presence had an impact on the behaviour of the 
meetings themselves. This behavioural effect was minimised by attending more than one of 
the same fora. So. for example, whilst nine Quality Improvement Team meetings in 
Marketown were attended, they were from only three specialities. This meant that the 
research presence became a fairly familiar faces at the meetings and the trust of the 
participants increased. In the meetings which involved users or their representatives, it was 
more difficult as the researcher was neither one of the 'insiders' from the Trust, or one of the 
4 outside' lay group. The research presence as an 'objective' researcher was still made clear 
to the groups (such as the community fora in Marketown and the Quality fora in 
Castletown) but it was clear that at least some of the members saw the researcher as part of 
the Trust's staff. 
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The role of outsider (which the researcher represented) carried several advantages and 
disadvantages. The advantages included the ability to overview a scene, noting major and 
distinctive features, relationships, patterns, processes and events. It also provided access to 
the phenomena of interest; considerable freedom to concentrate on the research; was readily 
assumed and took little adjustment to the researcher's self image. Furthermore because 
access and presence was negotiated with the organisation itself it raised relatively few 
ethical dilemmas. 
The flip-side of these advantages was that the research role was hardly ever'natural', and in 
this sense constituted an obtrusion and in some cases was accompanied by a sense of 
imposition on the setting; with the potential effects on observed behaviour that this intrusion 
implies. The two techniques used to minimise these effects were, as stated previously, time 
and rapport. Repeated presence at the same fora over an extended time-scale was used; thus 
making it more likely that the people observed perceived the research role as non- 
threatening and existence at fora for granted. Rapport was promoted through the judicious 
use of conversation and the maximisation of the opportunities afforded by casual interaction 
away from the phenomena being observed. Every opportunity to mix with participants c off 
duty' was taken up. These included lunch with medical staff, coffee bar conversation and 
even attendance at one Director of Nursing's barbecue party! This not only served to add a 
more human face to the research presence but also generated useful data on contexts such as 
local politics and personalities which would not have been raised in the formal settings of 
quality fora and committees. The question of researcher impact is discussed more generally 
later in the chapter (see page 92). 
Depth interviewing 
The aim of using depth interviewing as a means of gathering data was to generate material 
that could be used to give a picture of respondent's perceptions and also as a source for 
comparison with the data generated by participant observation, documentary and Q analysis. 
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By using a hermeneutic approach (see page 78) to analysing the qualitative data patterns, 
encounters and reactions were both grounded and presented in the respondent's terms, using 
their language, their frames of reference and their constructs. This comparison between 
observed events and respondent's perceptions serves to add to the richness of the data 
available and therefore to the validity of the theory developed. There was however a degree 
of structure to the interviews. This was inevitable for as Walker points out: 
'There is no such thing as presuppositionless research. In preparingfor interviews 
researchers will have, and should have, some broad questions in mind 36 
These 'broad questions' are evident in this study and consequently constituted a loose 
framework or structure for the interviews. A level of structure was necessary to maintain the 
study's focus on issues of quality activity in services and the relationship with the 
respondent's broader experiences, values and perceptions. Atkin and Lunt, in their study of 
nurse, GP and managerial perceptions of the role of practice nurses found that maintaining a 
focus on practice nursing when interviewing the different groups involved was difficult: 
,... a study concerned with the role ofpractice nurses required that the 'depthof the 
interview should be aboutpractice nursing. This, however, was rarely where the 'depth'in 
either the general practitioner's or manager's account occurred ... there was, therefore, a 
constant tension in the interview as we attempted to lead the respondents back to the areas 
relevant to the aims of the research 37 
Preliminary interviews carried out by myself with nurses, doctors and managers, revealed 
that, while a relatively unstructured approach was useful in identifying areas of primary 
concern to the respondents, the picture was occasionally confused. At times the answers to 
the questions did not seem to relate to experiences or conceptualisations around quality 
activity. Atkin and Lun t38 suggest that such difficulties can, in some cases, be attributed to 
the separate frames of reference used by researcher and respondent. Based on these 
examples one of the justifications for adopting a loose framework based around the research 
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questions was to promote sufficient specificity and focus in the answers to questions, but at 
the same time not to exclude respondents' own perspectives and constructs. 
With this in mind topic guides were used as guides for questioning and modified as a 
response to observation-based data and the initial interviews. One of the key findings from 
the preliminary interviews carried out was as each respondent's answers were provisionally 
analysed and incorporated into the questions used in the interviews that followed, the data 
became richer and the interviews more fruitful. Although the extent to which this was to do 
with improved question construction or simply better technique acquired as part of the 
researcher's experiential learning curve is debatable. Interviews lasted on average around an 
hour. They were usually conducted in settings in which the interviewee was comfortable 
(usually an office or side ward) but occasionally took place in an individual's home when 
they did not wish the Trust to know they had been interviewed. 
Analysing The Qualitative Data: The Hermeneutic Approach 
Analysis of documentary, observational and interview data all followed a similar pattern; 
one that was sympathetic to the notion of interests and social action deployed thus far in the 
thesis. At the core of this approach was hermeneutic interpretation39 40 - Hermeneutics takes 
as its starting point the contention that all human interaction is based on meaning-laden, 
negotiated interaction involving self presentation, secrecy, 'front', and political 
gamesmanship 41 . This 
behaviour is conditioned by the awareness individuals have of the 
situations in which they participate. So, the meanings which people attribute to these 
situations, rather than casual variables', become the basic units of researchý2 . The 
basic 
process revolves around a henneneutic spiral process of understanding and involved seven 
stages aimed at fostering an 'emic' (from within) style of understanding of the themes and 
meanings associated with stakeholder participation in quality activity. 
The first stage was understanding the meanings of individual documents, meetings or 
interviews. This stage focused on gleaming the 'taken for granted' assumptions and view 
points (frameworks of meaning) of respondents or document authors from the data source. 
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So in this study common frameworks of meaning included, amongst others, issues of power 
relationships and communication. As typified by these sources of evidence: 
'A medical auditproject will normally be led by a senior consultant in the team involved 43 
'The Quality Improvement Team is responsiblefor disseminating information on quality 
back to the clinical departments. ' 44 
From these general issues, themes and sub-themes (or 'clusters of meaning') emerged. For 
example, in Castletown (as in all the sites) there was a distinction between the power 
relationships in medical as opposed to clinical audit. Clinical audit was not necessarily led 
by a clinician whereas medical audit always was. 
When these themes were triangulated with data from the other methods clusters of themes 
began to emerge. For example the broad issue of power relations, and the theme of 
leadership as an expression of this, had linkages to the perceived 'power' of the audit 
projects. Medical staff tended towards seeing clinical audits as less successful change 
agents, whilst nurses and therapists (the less powerful) group perceived them as more so. 
What this triangulation achieves is the dovetailing of the individual frame of meaning 
(power relations) with the wider contexts in which it exists: for example, the quality 
strategies in place, formal quality structures and inter-group politics. 
From this point it was possible to compare these clusters of meaning with the study's 
research questions. However, it is at this point that questions of reliability and validity of 
data arose. Specifically, how could the validity of documents, interviews and meetings 
observed be assured? Alternatively, were they representative of the varieties of meaning 
around the issue of quality activity in Trusts? The research took as a starting point Glaser 
and Strauss' notion of theoretical saturation45. At the point where documents, interviews and 
observation ceased to reveal any new frameworks of meaning or insight into the research 
questions then this was the point at which the data was re-contextualised and the picture 
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analysed as a whole (the aim of hermeneutic method is seeing and understanding the whole 
through its constituent parts). 
Moreover, employing a stakeholder methodology meant that 'coverage' of stakeholders 
proceeded in a similar manner. The network of stakeholders within the Trust was mapped 
by asking interviewees to name other people involved in quality activity in their areas or 
those in other areas they thought should be interviewed. When no new names were added to 
the list of stakeholders then the network was assumed to be complete. References to 
individuals made in fora, or indeed other relevant meetings, were also recorded and 
followed up. 
A further check on the validity of the analysis was through discussing the analytic matrix 
and findings with key members of the team responsible for the quality strategy. The analysis 
of interviews and broad themes within them were also fed-back to interviewees wherever 
possible in order for them to add to, or question, any of the interpretations by the researcher. 
As new and theoretically significant clusters of meaning emerged then these were discussed 
with the people who's 'world-views' influenced the shape of quality in the Trusts. Where 
areas of divergence between the researcher" s interpretations of themes within data and theirs 
occurred these were discussed and explored and interpretations adjusted where necessary. 
This was not wholly satisfactory, as in some cases it may have been in their interests to 
reject some elements of the analysis. One solution would have been to have a second 
researcher as an arbiter. However, the opportunity for immersing another researcher in the 
data and asking them to confirm or reject the analytical conclusions of the textual, interview 
or observational material used as representative was not present in such a limited study. 
Mixing Qualitative And Quantitative Techniques: Q Methodology As A 
Sympathetic Paradigm 
Strauss and Corbin suggest that quantitative and qualitative techniques can be incorporated 
as long as the researcher is aware of the limitations in doing so. First, they point out that the 
researcher must be clear about the uses and purposes to which the quantitative component 
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will be put. The purpose of the quantitative component in this study was, as has already been 
stated, to contribute to the richness and depth of the data surrounding the phenomenon of 
quality in services. Thereby adding to the breadth of theory by feeding-back into the theory 
construction process itself 
In taking this approach the associated complexities and need for caution were 
acknowledged. However, the potential quality of the data and resultant theory acted as 
mitigating factors for the required rigorousness, and possible pit-falls, attached to the 
proposed strategy. There are also other reasons for combining the two apparently 
incompatible paradigms. 
Tactical Advantages 
A qualitative-quantitative mix can facilitate easier access to research sites for case-stud 6. 
Although equally convincing is the argument that richer qualitative data could prove more 
interesting to organisations. By mixing the two the study effectively 'hedged its bets' and 
maximised its chances for successful access. This did not mean that methodological 
questions of rigour and appropriateness were abandoned in favour of pragmatic questions of 
access. Merely, that this was a factor taken into consideration in the overall design of the 
research. 
The second tactical advantage attached to mixed methods is that an understanding of the 
workings, attitudes and 'politics' of an organisation can be enhanced by initial exposure as a 
qualitative researcher. This in turn enhances the success of the quantitative componen t47 
This understanding can be used to ensure that questions are framed in such a way as to 
maximise response. Judgements can also made about likely sources of staff resistance and 
modifications to survey and administration made accordingly: for example, self 
administered versus structured interview. It is also feasible that as a rapport develops 
between researcher and key groups as a result of the researcher's role in qualitative data 
collection then resistance to a quantitative strategy will be potentially reduced. Certainly the 
ability to contextualise the Q-findings was enhanced by exposure to the case sites during the 
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qualitative phases of the study. The importance of contextual factors such as the quality 
structures in place, local politics and cultures were more easily incorporated into the 
analysis. 
Q-Methodology: An Outline 
A Q-methodological approach 48 49 5051 was used for the quantitative element of theory 
construction. This was selected for a number of reasons. The primary reason centres, both 
on the appropriateness of Q methodology and the limitations of conventional quantitative R- 
based methods 52 . In conventional approaches to the measurement of perceptions and 
attitudes (for example, through the use of Likert scaling) the element of 'self reference' and 
subjectivity which the qualitative methodology will have sought to retain is, to a degree, 
lost. Categories and items for inclusion are constructed deductively based on the 
interpretation of qualitative results and ultimately reflect some of the biases and value 
judgements of the researcher. Q methodology combats this tendency by retaining seýf 
reference and subjectivity as the core goals of the approach. The methodology manages to 
retain the respondents subjectivity as the focus by foregoing the pre-conceived structures of 
conventional quantitative attitude/survey methods. 
The key axiom behind the methodology is that: 
f 
... only subjective opinions are at issue in 
Q, and although they are typically unprovable, 
they can nevertheless be shown to have structure andform... [Q techniques make] thisform 
53 
y manifestfor the purposes of observation and stud . 
The primary reason then for adopting Q as a means of complementing the qualitative data is 
that it enables the 'mapping' of opinions or values In a 'scientific' and rigorous manner (as a 
conventional scale would also do). But does so in a way which extends the ai-Tns of the 
qualitative approach rather than opposes them: the framework of self-reference remains the 
focus. 
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The other reason centres on the issue of practicability. Q involves developing strong 
statement or issue samples and is designed with small 'person-samples' in mind. As 
McKeown and Thomas point out: 
Q-method is biased towards small-person samples and single case-studies, a preference in 
keeping with the behaviourist dictum that it is more informative to study one subjectfor 
I'000 hours than 1000 subjectsfor one hour .. Q, injact, is a method of andfor the single 
, 54 case. 
Because of the methodology's lack of reliance on large W samples for valid and reliable 
results it is a more practical route for this study, with its limited budget and time scale. The 
fact that the method is designed to be utilised in case-studies concerned with issues of 
subjective opinion or values makes the arguments for its adoption even more compelling. 
The focus for Q is subjectivity, or as Brown puts its: 
4 
... subjectivity is always anchored in seýflreference, that is, the person's internalframe of 
reference, but this does not render it inaccessible to rigorous examination. Nor does it serve 
to reify the seýf in any metaphysical or phenomenological sense. Seý'Ireferent subjectivity of 
this sort, on the contrary is pure behaviour ... it is at issue anytime an individual remarks, it 
seems to me ... or in my opinion. In speaking thus an individual is saying something 
meanineul aboutpersonal experience ... what 
Q-methodology provides is a systematic 
means to examine and reach understandings about such experience. 55 
Q-Method: The Stages 
Q involves four main stages: 
1) Construction of a 'Q - sample': a sampled set of stimuli (commonly statements) 
which will enable the respondent to model his or her viewpoints on a given topic. 
2) Q- sorting: the modelling stage, involving the systematic sorting of the 
statements so they portray an accurate 'ranked'picture of the respondent's views. 
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3) Data analysis: 
correlation of persons (a key difference from conventional methods) 
factor analysis of the resultant NxN matrix 
isolation of components of factors in order to enable interpretation. 
4) Interpretation: 'in terms of consensual and divergent subjectivity, with attention 
given to the relevance of such patterns to existing or emerging theories and 
propositions. ' 
The Q-Sample 
For the purposes of this study the Q-sample, or the set of statements used to model opinion, 
was naturalistic and inductive in design. This means that the statements themselves were 
drawn directly from the qualitative data. Decisions to include them in the sample or not were 
made on the basis of the hermeneutic approach to analysing the qualitative data in each site 
and the research questions. 
The framework that emerged from Marketown (the first site) and which was carried through 
to the other sites (where the themes still remained) is presented in fig 3: 
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MAIN EFFECTS LEVELS 
A. Direction a) positive b) negative 
B. Focus d) professional e) managerial 
consumer 
C. Themes g) definition h) evaluation i) activity 
preference j) structure k) information 
1) leadership m) markets n) conflict o) 
control 
Q-sample = (main effects)(replications) 
((A)(B)(C))(2) 
((A)(B)(C)) (m) = ((2)(3)(9)) (2) = 108 [54 in 3 
later sites]. 
fig 3: ne Q-sample matrix. 
A set of statements drawn from the qualitative data was constructed which reflected this 
framework in each site. So a statement such as: 
Professionals (nurses and doctors) know quality when they see it. That ,s why it should be 
left to them to define what it is. '(Q-sarnple Castletown) 
would represent an (a, d, g) orientation. A statement such as: 
'a lot of what I do, as a professional, is unmeasurable along quality lines. Quality initiatives 
don't always recognise this and consequently a lot ofprofessionals see them as irrelevant. ' 
would represent a (b, d, g) orientation. 
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Each element of the sample frame should ideally have a number of replications, or 
statements expressed in different ways in order to allow for the possible varieties of 
expression that could exist. The number of statements required for the sample can then be 
computed from the formula: 
Q-sample (Q) = (main effects) (replications) 
Q= (A)(B)(C) (m) 
However, it was clear that the 108 statement Q-sample generated in Marketown using two 
replications was excessively large. Whilst coverage of the issues around quality activity was 
excellent it took nearly an hour (and in some cases longer) to complete. A number of 
respondents commented on this and it was felt that losing the second replication. was the 
only solution if breadth was to continue to be a feature of the sample. Consequently, in 
Fishtown, Shiptown and Castletown 54 statements were used. The Q-samples for each site 
are presented in the appendix - tables 2: a-d. 
The Q-Sort 
This stage involved the systematic, rank-based sorting of the statements by the respondents 
in order to represent their views on quality activity. The subjects were presented with a 
continuum defined by a condition of instruction. The continuum ranged from -5 to +5 and 
the condition of instruction in this case was: 
'Sort the statements according to those which are most like yourposition (+5) to those 
which are most unlike yourposition (-5). ' 
Each point in the continuum has a limited number of spaces and the subjects were asked to 
repeat the process until all the statements are placed in the available spaces. In this way a 
picture of the respondent's views emerged which equates to a nonnal distribution 
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For the purposes of data analysis each statement's number is recorded and given a value 
according to its position in the distribution. So those under -5 would receive a score of I 
those under -4 would receive a score of 2 and so on up till those under +5, who would 
receive a score of 11. This translates into a data matrix of Q-Sort scores xn (where n 
number of people taking part). The Q-sorts for each person can then be correlated and factor 
analysed in order to discover groupings of opinion among the respondents (the results of this 
process are enclosed in the appendix - tables I: a-d). 
Once factors are established the difference between Q and conventional R methodology 
becomes clear. In Q methodology the variables are the people conducting the Q-sorts and 
not the Q-sample statements (as they would be in conventional R methods). Therefore, by 
looking at the factor loadings of each subject it is possible to determine a significant 
association with a given factor. Respondents who are significantly associated with a given 
factor are assumed to share a common perspective. The factor loading represents the degree 
of association between the person's Q-sort and the underlying composite set of values 
reflected in the factor. The key point here is summed up by Mckeown and Thomas: 
'thepresence ofseveral orthogonal (independent) factors is evidence ofdifferent points of 
view in the person-sample. An individual's positive loading on afactor indicates his or her 
shared subjectivity with others on thatfactor; negative loadings on the other hand, are signs 
ofa rejection of thefactor's perspective. ' 56 
Factor analysis was of the principle components type and factors extracted were those with 
an Eigenvalue of greater than 1.0. Statistical advice was provided by the Department of 
Computer Science at the University of York and analysis carried out using SPSS for 
Windows v6.0. 
The content of factors was initially explored by examining the composition of the groups 
who defined each factor; although, as Chapter Six shows this was largely inconclusive. They 
were then explored in greater depth by examining and converting the factor scores for each 
statement in the Q-samples. A factor score (a weighted Z-score) can be converted into the 
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original integer format (-5 to +5) through computation thus allowing the picture of statement 
scores to be examined individually. In this way a picture of factor opinion on each statement 
can be constructed. The factor scores for each statement and factors extracted are presented 
in tables 2: a-d in the appendix. 
The Weaknesses Of Q Methodology 
The first criticism of Q is that inference to populations is unwise given the limited numbers 
of the person-sample which often accompanies the method 57 . This is undoubtedly true in the 
positivist sense; however, the case study approach adopted in this study does not require the 
ability to generalise to large populations. 
The second criticism of Q is that the sorting method violates the assumption of 
independence which is a feature of most statistical testing. The placing of one Q-statement 
does affect the placing of another. The method is after all concerned with ranking 
statements. However, this need not prove overly problematic for the researcher as long as 
the central question, as posed by Kerlinger is addressed: 
how serious is the violation of the assumption? Is it serious enough to invalidate the use of 
correlational and ANO VA [analysis of variance] procedures? 58(MY parentheses) 
Kerlinger59 responds to this question with the assertion that the violation can be countered 
by ensuring there are sufficient items in the Q sample, and when in doubt by raising the 
level of statistical significance required from pO. 05 to pO. 01. 
Researching Quality Activity And Stakeholding: Ethical Issues 
'knowledge ofman is not neutral in its import; it grants power over man as well 60 
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Friedrichs' comment highlights one of the essential dilemmas facing the researcher 
attempting to look at issues of quality in organisations: knowledge is not ultimately 
divorceable form the uses it is put to. As Smith points out. 
I 
... scientists are not interested in simply 
describing present reality but wish ultimately to 
predictfuture events. Science as a descriptive enterprise implies science as prediction. 
Prediction may lead to greater control, and control of other humans is not only a scientific 
decision. Control of other humans is also a moral or ethical decision. ' 61 
This assertion concentrates on two elements of control: control over the subjects under 
examination and control over the usage the research results are put to once in the public 
domain. These two areas raise a number of ethical dilemmas. 
First, it is possible to argue that even though manipulation of humans is not an explicit 
research strategy (as in experimental designs) this only disguises other ethical problems. 
Nagel elaborates: 
,... every branch of inquiry aimed at reliable general laws concerning empirical subject 
matter must employ a procedure that, if it is not strictly controlled experimentation, has the 
essential logicalfunctions of experimental enquiry 62 
The chosen methodology for this study combats Nagel's claims by deliberately adopting a 
qualitative approach to theory construction. But even though experimental logic does not 
apply in this case, the scientific logic of rigorousness and integrity in inquiry does. The 
hermeneutic approach calls for rigorous category development, coding, testing and re- 
testing of data, all of which can be considered 'scientific' in character. 
63, orm of Second, Jorgenson in relation to participant observation, suggests that as this f 
enquiry is effectively no different from the healthy interest that ordinary people take in other 
people's interactions, then the researcher has 'no more or less of an ethical obligation to the 
people encountered in the course of the research M. The obligations the researcher holds are 
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the same as any other participant in the research subject's life. Jorgenson uses this as a 
means of excusing the 'obligation to inform people of research intentions, or even to protect 
them from harmful consequences. This underestimates the dilemmas attached to the 
research strategy adopted. These dilemmas centre on four primary areas: 
the question of fully informing the research site 
the issues of reciprocity and use of results 
confidentiality 
the question of researcher impact on case-site 
Informing The Case-Study Sites 
NHS services are, theoretically at least, supposed to compete in a market situation based on 
different levels of cost, and more importantly (from the research point of view) quality. 
Consequently this meant that quality was a sensitive topic for Trust managers and clinicians. 
Some managers feared that the study, in being concerned with quality in their unit, could 
have negative effects on their local market position. From personal experience in the NHS it 
was clear that even one incidence of low-quality in a service can have significant 
ramifications in terms of negative media coverage and public perception. In response to 
these potential fears, and the ethical obligation not to wilfully han-n the organisations' 
standing in the local communities, a policy of honesty was deemed the most satisfactory 
approach. This was based on the argument that, as the primary research interest was in staff 
and user's perceptions and experiences of quality activity, there was little utility in seeking 
instances of poor quality. While instances of poor quality emerged, positive experiences and 
perceptions were just as much a feature in each case-site. The approach, based on this 
potential' balance' argument, was a primary feature of attempts to negotiate access based on 
an 'up-front' explanation of the research interest and questions. 
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Issues of Reciprocity and Use of Results 
Part of the research strategy involved the feeding-back of results to the case sites. This 
was primarily undertaken as an aid to validity enhancement as part of the methodology 
but was also undertaken in order that Trust managerial and clinical groups could use the 
data to add value to their planning, development and training around the issue of quality. 
I placed no restrictions on the use of the results and, likewise, none was placed on me. 
However, I did ask that anonymity be retained in the production of training materials and 
other information likely to be disseminated widely. This was respected by each of the 
Trusts. The global aim of this tactic was to avoid the phenomenon often exhibited in 
social research whereby subjects provide data for researchers, with only marginal or no 
benefits associated with their participation. On the whole the tactic was a useful one and 
one which was valued by the sites involved. 
Confidentiality 
This strategy raised problems of confidentiality. Atkin and Lunt point to the difficulties 
attached to rendering identities anonymous in health care settings: 
'Although pseudonyms offer someprotection, individuals can often be identified by their 
situations, particularly by readers with a knowledge of, and interest in, the locality. 65 
With this in mind it would have been unethical to assure people of complete anonymity and 
confidentiality across the organisational spectrum. Cases involving specific senior posts or 
medical specialities could easily have been narrowed down by people with insight into the 
organisation. Therefore, every effort was made to change names, titles and to subsume 
specific positions and specialities within umbrella categories. The site names were also 
given pseudonyms in an effort to maximise outside confidentiality. 
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Researcher Impact On The Research Site 
By observing, interviewing and exploring the shared subjectivity's of respondents the 
potential to affect the ways in which respondents perceived quality activity and, potentially, 
themselves, was always present. Atkin and Lunt draw attention to the specific problems of 
interviewing; but their arguments apply equally to other qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. In their view research is a consciousness raising exercise in which respondents 
are asked to think and talk about particular subjects which they may not have thought or 
talked about in such detail before. This can have the effect of making a respondent aware of 
how little he or she knows about the issue - in this case quality. Similarly, the respondent 
may become more aware of their relative positions within the dynamics of the organization, 
with potentially negative effects on the working relationships that existed before the 
research presence. Atkin and Lunt point to the need to become aware of such possibilities 
and the fact the ultimate benefit of research is to the researcher as means of diluting such 
researcher-based effects as a means of minimising such effects. 
Such recommendations, however, tell the researcher little about practical tactics that can be 
deployed. A degree of sensitivity and awareness of the potential effects of researching each 
research site was, of course, a feature of the strategy. As was the feeding-back of results to 
the Trusts. This ensured the ultimate research benefit did not rest solely with the researcher. 
Every effort was made to ensure that respondents were not knowingly made to feel 
undervalued or ignorant as a result of the methods employed. This was particularly so in the 
case of interviews, where the potential to 'lead' and influence the respondents was greatest. 
These values were promoted, in part, by the choice of a qualitative framework and data 
collection techniques. All of which rely on the skills of listening and observation on the part 
of the researcher for successful deployment. 
Conclusion 
The key to understanding social action is achieving a balance between two sets of 
competing analytic emphases: explanation versus understanding and holism versus 
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individualism. The focal points for research efforts to gain a purchase on each of these 
emphases are as was seen in earlier chapters, entirely relevant to the phenomenon of 
quality in the NHS. Specifically, in order for quality to be actualised in services it must 
negotiate, and is dependent upon, a complex matrix of systems, rational choices, cultures 
and subjectivities. It is worth enlarging on this point with an example of the rationale 
behind it. Quality can be considered as the end point or outcome of the application of 
systems such as Total Quality Management or Quality Assurance. Alone, however, these 
are insufficient; for if one chooses (if one is able) to not participate in these systems then 
the system will fail. One might choose not to participate (or conversely to marshall one's 
efforts) because the culture of the group, or groups, to which you belong to view such 
systems as unsynergistic with their own values. Conversely, the subjective feelings you 
have about the system being proposed, or indeed imposed, will impact on how you 
approach the social action required to achieve the system-goal of 'quality'. 
These arguments then form the basis for the research effort in this study. In order to 
examine these cells, or keys to analytic understanding, it is necessary for any 
methodology and its methods to be, in quality parlance, 'fit for the purposes' of analysis. 
Case study methodology and analysis offers the chance to gather in-depth, rich and 
contextualised data and to maintain a sense of academic rigour and focus. 
The argument (further developed by Chapter Five) has been that organisational 
ideologies in the form of professionalism, managerialism and consumerism are 
instrumental in shaping all four of the analytic 'cells' of systems, choice, culture and 
subjectivity in social action. To this end, stakeholder analysis offers the chance to remain 
sympathetic to the view of the self. Namely, the individual is cast in an active role within 
a constructionist and pluralist view of reality. Stakeholder analysis offers the chance to 
remain flexible in the data collection methods deployed and to gear the methods to the 
research questions as they emerge from the sites. 
The multi-method approach adopted is not without its problems; but with the study's 
design emphasis on the naturalistic and qualitative paradigms each of the methods used 
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complements each other. Participant observation provided insight into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives; interviews provided transcribed evidence of perceptions and the 
causal inferences made by individuals; and documents proved a rich source of 'official' 
group attitudes. Q methodology is all about eliciting shared subjectivities in a way which 
is sympathetic to many of the assumptions of qualitative research. It demonstrates 
structure and form in what can constitute plausible accounts of shared perceptions of 
quality activity between individual stakeholders. Although as indicated in Chapter Six 
these are not always in the forms expected. 
The design used is intended to generate theory which is both rich and firmly grounded in 
the contexts of the sites. In short a move away from theory generated in the abstract by 
conceptual specialists towards theory which is generated from empirical material and 
which can be readily interpreted by the stakeholders involved. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND FOR 
THE CASE SITES 
This chapter portrays the particular contexts of the individual NHS acute hospital 
Trusts involved in the study. It highlights those variables within particular sites which, 
while highly influential within specific sites, were not always so in others. Material is 
presented in the form of a series of four descriptive vignettes. The rationale for 
including such detailed information on each of the sites is that the Q-method results of 
Chapter Six and the results of the cross-case analysis presented in Chapter Seven have 
to be viewed in the individual contexts of each of the sites if readers are to reach 
informed decisions about the levels of generalisability of the thesis' findings. 
Towards Identifying The Stakeholders 
Given that stakeholder analysis is the key feature of the case study strategy, it was 
necessary to identify those individuals in the case sites with an interest or 'stake' in 
quality. Each of the Trusts used as case sites had a quality strategy in place. These 
ranged from the 9 page document available to the public (Castletown) to the internal 
one page document circulated internally in Marketown. In each of the Trusts the 
strategies tended to evolve incrementally rather than via great 'sea changes' in 
approach. There were nominal associations made between the quality and business 
strategies of the Trusts, but as shall be indicated in Chapter Seven the reality was 
something of a conceptual split between quality and business functions in the sites. 
The common feature in all the strategies was that corporate structures and processes 
had been, and were being, created under the banner of quality. Each strategy had an 
4 official' quality structure in place which represented the framework for the 
implementation of quality in services on a corporate-wide level. These ranged from 
the devolved, relatively autonomous Divisional Quality Teams of Fishtown, to the 
more centralised 'core' of Shiptown. 
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Coupled to these structures were specific initiatives such as Total Quality 
Management; Continuous Quality Improvement; and Consumer Fora. These 
represented the main mechanisms for promoting quality within specific services or 
clinical divisions of the Trusts. It is from these two elements of corporate strategy that 
stakeholders were initially identified. In each Trust initial stakeholders were those 
with a place in either the quality structures or the quality processes attached to that 
Trust. This chapter describes those structures and processes. 
As well as the stakeholders attached to the structures and processes in each site there 
were also other factors which affected the way in which quality and quality activity 
was perceived and operationalised in Trusts. Primarily these were to do with 
individual personalities; the interface between national/local party politics and local 
health services; and the localised historical legacies of pre-1990 service provision. 
Where such factors relate to the development and operationalisation of quality in 
Trusts then this is made clear. 
Quality Strategy, Structure And Process In Marketown 
Marketown has a population of approximately 300,000 people located in largely 
urban and suburban pockets within the Town's boundaries. The Trust serves this 
population and also smaller numbers of patients who travel from nearby rural areas. 
Coal mining was the main employer within its boundaries. Given the demise of the 
industry, poverty and higher than average male unemployment were associated with 
parts of the Town. There is a small Asian and Afro-Caribbean population within the 
town but little in the way of specific interventions within the Town's health services 
to deal with their particular needs. 
The Trust was a 'first-wave' modem unit with 750 beds and a smaller 165 bed unit 
attached which was mainly orthopaedic, 'cold' elective surgery, and elderly-care beds. 
This smaller unit was perceived by respondents in both sites as being something of a 
poor relation to the more acute and specialised hospital site. The two sites were about 
15 miles apart. The bulk of the data was collected in the main hospital site; primarily 
as most Trust activity was located there. The Trust had recently added a new privately 
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funded wing to its portfolio. This was very small (twelve beds) and didn't feature in 
the Trust's quality strategy. 
Access to the Trust was negotiated with the Chief Executive and the Matron in the 
first instance. After two explanatory visits access was granted with the proviso that no 
confidential or commercial information would be made available to either the local 
District Health Authority or Community Health Council. Free reign was given to 
speak to anyone in the Trust with the exception of senior medical or managerial staff. 
interviews with consultants and Trust Board Members were arranged through the 
Matron. The quality structure of Marketown is shown in fig 41: 
The Quality Processes: Marketown 
The Strategic Core: Quality Steering Group, Quality Improvement Teams And 
Quality Action Teams. 
The Trust was a pilot site for the Department of Health's Total Quality Management 
Initiative. This pilot status attracted funding (circa E50k annually) for two years, and 
half this amount again in the third year to fund the development of TQM in their site. 
Part of this development had been a year's training input from a firm of Management 
Consultants who specialised in the quality techniques and messages promoted by 
Philip Crosby2. Consequently, they had a well established TQM structure in place and 
several core activities which came under the TQM banner. These included: 
an executive-level quality steering group 
divisional quality improvement teams 
intra/inter directorate problem-solving quality action groups 
The Quality Steering Group (QSG) comprised all the executive directors of the Trust 
and had responsibility for setting strategy and operationalising the Trust's mission 
statement based on the statement: 'Treating People Better. The five principles they 
aligned themselves with were: 
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" encouraging evidence based clinical practice 
" encouraging partnership between patients and staff 
" providing a safe environment for staff and patients 
" listening to staff and patients and acting on this intelligence 
" maximising available resources to improve the lot of patients and staff 3 
This strategic group were supported by a full time TQM manager with responsibility 
for the day-day workings of the initiatives. He acted as the facilitator for projects, 
giving the benefit of his experience and knowledge on quality and organisational. 
change; as well as ensuring a sense of coherence with the corporate business strategy. 
This same manager was also a key link between the executive and their operational 
arms, the Quality Improvement Teams (QITs): these teams were located in clinical 
divisions and met monthly; ostensibly with the intention of developing and co- 
ordinating quality activity within the divisions, and problem-solving where necessary. 
In practice these meetings were primarily problem solving in character with a heavy 
concentration on general non-clinical issues such as laundry or catering facilities. 
Indeed, laundry and catering were themes in every QIT meeting attended, regardless 
of division. QITs were in turn supposed to generate problem solving teams to address 
the problems identified and feed back progress to the QIT. In practice, however, no 
evidence was encountered that such teams had been established in recent months 
other than in relation to laundry services. Even in these limited cases a 'team' 
generally comprised one or two specific individuals, primarily nurses, singled out to 
follow up an issue. 
Quality improvement teams rarely entered the clinical arena, despite their all 
encompassing remit. They were intended to be multi-disciplinary in their 
composition, but of the four monthly meetings attended only one member of the 
medical profession was present. This doctor was recruited from the 'staff-grade' 
structure and had a special interest in quality through his ongoing Masters of Business 
Administration degree. 
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The QITs did, however, have non-executive members of the Trust Board attached to 
them as active participants. It was clear from both the meetings attended and 
interviews with these Board Members that they were far from token placements in the 
teams. The Board member attached to Women's and Children's services in particular 
was vocal in expressing her opinion on the service's lack of suitability for a 
Chartermark application due to the fact that its bereavement services for parents of 
deceased babies were of a poor standard in relation to the work of other Trusts. Her 
voice alone on a team of twenty people prevented the application progressing. It was 
clear then that these 'lay' members, albeit from the relatively powerful ranks of the 
non-executive Trust Board, had the potential to influence such fora. 
Because this core structure and the associated TQM processes were limited in their 
clinical scope, alternative structures and processes were in place to handle those 
elements of the Trust's work which TQM missed; namely, quality in clinical work 
and meeting the quality demands of purchasers (especially the corporate purchasers in 
the form of Local Health Commissioners). 
Clinical Audit 
The clinical audit structure encompassed two separate audit processes: medical and 
clinical. At the time of the field work the Commission was not responsible for 
managing or funding medical audit. Funds were administered from Region, top-sliced 
from Health Authority allocations and left to the Trust to distribute. The purchasers 
therefore, bought the 'promise' of clinical audit rather than audit projects per se. 
However, the Trust was in the process of preparing for DHA-led audit funding and 
were just beginning to negotiate a likely Trust agenda for audit for the following 
financial year. 
The Chairman (sic. ) of the Clinical Audit Committee oversaw the allocation of funds 
for specific projects within the Trust. The audit agenda was therefore left to the Trust 
itself to dictate. There was a district-wide Medical Audit Advisory Group (MAAG) 
and the Health Commission had some say (via the Director of Public Health) in the 
Trust's audit agenda by virtue of the Chairman's involvement with this group. The 
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Local District Quality Network (see page 10 1) also influenced, to a degree, the audit 
agenda. Audit activity itself tended to be primarily uni-disciplinary (medicine or 
nursing) with process-led or clinical audit projects in their infancy. The Commission 
were keen to see more multi-disciplinary clinical audit conducted but conceded that 
the chairman had , in the past, been 'all things to all people' in order to secure a 
foothold within the Trust and to combat the initial hostility of some of the consultants. 
Consequently, the manager with responsibility for quality at the Commission felt that 
the Trust Audit Committee was now 'set in its ways with no real impetus for change' 
and that the District MAAG was 'like a medical school reunion' rather than any real 
mechanism for advice or scrutiny. 
The Trust participated in national audits led by the Royal College and backed by the 
DoH and had a small complement of three audit assistants, responsible for clerical 
tasks such as 'pulling notes', following up patients, and maximising response rates. 
Clinical or medical audit projects themselves were carried out by practitioners with no 
provisos other than to provide a brief, anonymous, report to the Audit Committee. 
Audit processes were linked into the quality strategy via the membership in the 
Quality Steering Group of the Audit Chairman (who held an executive position as 
Director of Clinical Audit). 
Business And Quality 
The link between quality and business centred on the use of contract quality 
standards. These standards were developed by the District Quality Network. A 
consortium of four corporate purchasers in Marketown's locale who set out to: 
'develop a consistent methodologyfor the setting and monitoring of quality standards 
for all the four purchasers4 
The standards were the basis for quality in contracting, although they didn't actually 
make it into contracts. They were seen as a useful lever by the Health Authority and a 
'bureaucratic nightmare' by the Executives with most to do with them in the Trust; 
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namely, the Matron. The quality standards were heavily influenced by the Patients 
Charter and required that the Trust: 
submit an annualposition statement to the Health Authority demonstrating 'a 
clear organisational commitment to quality, led by a designated officer, with plans 
for improving and monitoring quality including clinical audit and quality 
assurance plans'. 
submit amid year progress report... 'reporting on progress achieved during the 
first six months.... on certain standards (as specified in this document). ' 
5 submit quarterly returns on specified standards (the Patients Charter). 
The standards themselves were organised around the following principles and 
associated standards: 
Meeting People's Needs: 
9 Everyone having contact with the health services will be treated with courtesy and 
respectfor their dignity, privacy and cultural and religious needs. 
e People will receive care and treatment which is appropriate to their individual 
needs. People will be involved in decisions about the evaluation of their care and 
treatment. 
9 People will be given theopportunity to express their views on the service and care 
which they have received and have any complaints investigated. 
Standards of Care and Treatment: 
* The clinical care provided will be proven effectiveness and minimise risks to the 
patient. It will be in accordance with the best professional practice and be subject 
to regular audit. 
9 Continuity of care will be ensured through effective liaison with other care 
agencies. 
Accessibility of services 
9 Patients will be able to exercise and informed choice about the services available. 
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* Delivery ofservices will be organised in such a way as to minimise unnecessary 
delays and reduce patient anxiety. 
* Users of the service will be able to make appropriate use of thefacilities 
available. 
* Facilities used by patients and other visitors must be well maintained, clean, 
comfortable and safe. 
Meeting Staff Needs 
Providers will implement sound employment practices which promote staff 
weýfare, education and development. 6 
Additional standards specific to Marketown 7 covered areas such as: 
9 Patients charter standards 
e standards of nutrition 
9 medical audit 
the implementation of Care Programme Approach 
Manpower 
e Standards of Nutrition 
o Trust Annual Report 
Most standards concerned issues of process with no indication of the sanctions to be 
applied if the standards were not met. Evidence from talking to staff from the Health 
Authority and the Trust suggests there was little, if any, action taken if the standards 
were not attained. On the basis of most of the standards and their associated 
monitoring procedures it is easy to sympathise with those staff who saw the exercise 
as 'little more than a paper pushing exercise' (Divisional Manager). For example, the 
standard for individualised care planning highlighted below shows both the lack of 
clarity in the standard, and in the response proffered from the Trust in its Annual 
Position Statement. The responses from the Trust also demonstrate that, almost 
without exception, the standards with a clinical focus all refer to nursing and 
Professions Allied to Medicine (PAM) services. Medical professionals were almost 
exempt from the control mechanism such standards represent. 
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Standard: Careplanning will be developed on an interdisciplinary basis Reporting 
Requirement: report on plans developing care planning and its implementation and 
monitoring. 
Method and Frequency: Annualposition statement and details of anyplansfor 
action to improve quality in the year ahead. 
Trust Response: 
" Areas working towards interdisciplinary care plans. 
" Care plan audits ongoing in all areas 
" Nursing documentation recently undergone extensive review 
9 Patient held records being encouraged in the community 
e Care planning with patientlfamily and Primary Health Care team ongoing 
* Multi-professional referral meetings are held each week in Elderly Mental Health 
Directorate. 
A Trust wide initiative to develop collaborative care plans has commenced. For 
example Critical Care Pathways have been developed. (their emphasis/ 
Contracting itself involved contract negotiation teams from both the Trust and the 
Health Authority. The Trust team comprised the Directors of Nursing, Medical 
Services, Contracting and the appropriate Divisional Manager. There was a universal 
recognition that money and volume were the key variables in contracts and that 
quality was separated out into other mechanisms; namely, the quality standards 
system. 
The Internal Business Links: Internal Quality Standards 
Contract Quality standards were for Trust activity with external customers (corporate 
purchasers), but there were also standards for internal customers detailing the levels of 
quality expected between departments. The standards -manual (on its third edition) did 
not include either nursing or medical services; and of those departments that were 
included very few standards went beyond a very cursory level of specification. For 
example, in relation to pharmacy the only standard proffered was that: 
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The pharmacy will endeavour to ensure that Patient's Take-home medication is 
delivered to the ward within one working day of receipt ofprescription. 9 
The lack of coverage in the standards was aggravated by the fact that virtually 
everyone outside the quality management department had neither heard of the 
document or used it in relations with other departments. 
Consumer Consultation 
The Trust's 'official' consumer consultation processes revolved around four 
mechanisms: 
a Statutory visits from the CHC 
* The local Press 
a Complaints - and a patient representative role 
* Patient Satisfaction Surveys 
The CHC usually visited twice a year. These were to pre-arranged destinations and 
pre-set agendas and were accompanied and arranged by the Matron. Visits were 
acknowledged by both the Trust, and surprisingly, the CHC as ineffective. The focus 
for visits was usually on standards of hygiene, food and some time to talk to patients. 
The overall consensus, from both parties, was that visits were rushed, over-prepared 
and hindered by poor specialist knowledge on the part of the CHC. 
The links between the CHC and the Trust had been 'somewhat strained' (CHC Chief 
Officer ) since the Trust's formation in 1990. The explanations given by both sides 
revolved around a combination of party politics and conflicting personalities. The 
CHC officer made no secret of his staunch Labour sympathies, and did not disguise 
his dislike for what he saw as the 'desecration of local health services'. Similarly, one 
Executive at the Trust spoke of the CHC's 'loony left' leanings and the narrow 
minded nature of the Chief Officer in relation to new developments in the Trust. Some 
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managers also recognised that the Executive Board were perceived by many as 
willingly putting into practice a right wing agenda: 
'Some people see us as arch Tories.... but if that means agreeing with the ideas in the 
Reforms and the move to Trust status then I suppose they're right... I'm not ashamed 
to talkpolitics when it comes to health. '(Director of Contracting) 
There was personal animosity between the CHC Chief Officer and the Chief 
Executives of both the Trust and the local Health Authority. Several managers below 
the level of Executive spoke of managing to foster good relations with the CHC on an 
individual level but of being blocked by the attitudes of those above. 
The Trust had been the focus of local press scrutiny following a series of large 
compensation pay outs arising from medical negligence cases in its maternity services 
and the consequent birth of children with brain damage. While the Trust recognised 
the difficulties this posed in terms of public relations and commercial sensitivity, it 
had led to a far more effective relationship between the Trust and the Press. The 
matron spoke of reporters having a better understanding of the service and of the 
workings of the Trust and of using the Press to get messages to the public regarding 
the achievements of the Trust. Press enquiries were handled via the Chief Executive's 
office or the Matron. There was an information department within the Trust but this 
handled internal data such as consumer satisfaction results and Patient's Charter 
Monitoring Returns. 
The Trust's complaints procedures were largely dictated by the Statutory 
requirements of the Health Service Management Hospital Procedures Act 1985 and 
the subsequent Health Service Guidance and the Executive Letters from the NHSE. At 
the local level the Trust's structure was already compatible with the latest guidance 
from the DoHlo. Specifically, the Trust had appointed a Patients Representative to act 
as complaints manager and to brief the Chief Executive prior to his written responses. 
The Patients Representative was previously a senior nurse in the Trust and had had no 
formal training for the post. It was felt by the Matron that she would be a suitable 
appointment by virtue of her clinical background and longevity of service in the Trust. 
The Patient representative role in her own words included: 
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'Investigating the complaints and writing the responsesfor the ChiefExecutive, which 
he then signs, Its a bit of a rubber stamping exercise but then every other Trust had to 
do it like that ... therejust isn't timefor any other way. 
The post was also a key point of contact with the CHC and the District Health 
Authority. Both of these organisations had established local fora to establish 
consumer') s views and to feed these into the health service planning process at a local 
level. The Patient representative was invited to these fora, but again in her own words: 
'They Y re a waste of time ... no one talks about anything clinical, its all transport, 
bus 
routes and all those sort of things, which we can't do a lot about as a Trust. Plus its 
full of the elderly and all the usual complaints they make, visiting times, lifts not 
working etc. We already know about these things so these meetings don't really help 
us, though I do make an effort to attend'. 
Unfortunately, she did not attend either of the two CHC fora attended and no 
apologies were given; the CHC research officer could not remember the last one the 
Patient Representative attended. 
The final means of 'communicating' with consumers was through patient satisfaction 
surveys. These were divisionally focused and information fed back to divisional 
managers, the TQM manager, and Matron. These were generally developed 'in-house' 
and consisted of approximately 10- 15 questions such as (in relation to nursing): 
Did the Nursing Staffgiving you treatment tell you what her (sic. ) name was? 
Are you satisfied with the care and information you received? 
Did the nurse tell you why your treatment was necessary to you? 
" 
These mechanisms formed the primary means of assuring quality within the Trust's 
quality strategy and structure. There were other, smaller, isolated, initiatives in place 
within the Trust which people classedas 'quality' but these tended to be isolated, one- 
off, applications, and generally not publicised outside the directorate in which they 
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were taking place. These included the development of nursing standards and a patient 
discussion group in gynaecology; and the application of new technologies such as 
personal pain relief in midwifery. 
Fishtown 
Fishtown was one of two sites (the other being Shiptown) who shared the same 
corporate purchaser (District Health Authority). Although, as the chapter shows the 
two Trusts took very different approaches to the operationalisation of 'quality' in their 
service provision. The Trust was situated in a large conurbation in the North East of 
England and served a population of around 250,000 people. The area has pockets of 
residual and higher than average unemployment, poverty and poor housing. It was 
mostly urban in character with mainly heavy industry, supply and chemical 
companies acting as the main employers. There was also an emerging industrial sector 
based on the production of components for high technology consumer goods. This 
was as a result of inward foreign investment from a number of Far East and Asian 
companies. 
The Hospital was spread over two main sites: a relatively modem (15 years old) 
purpose-built unit on the outskirts of the Town, and an older (pre-2nd World War) site 
in the town centre. Some support and managerial functions were based in a Victorian 
building in another part of the Town centre. There were logistical problems attached 
to this arrangement as some clinical divisions were based in more than one site. For 
example, surgery had clinical areas in both sites and its divisional manager was based 
in the old workhouse site. The Trust was in the process of relocating to a single site in 
the new building while the fieldwork was being undertaken. 
Fishtown (and Castletown) were demonstration sites for Total Quality Management. 
Although, unlike Marketown, these were Regional initiatives and therefore attracted 
smaller levels of funding with no formal evaluations by external consultants. This was 
in contrast to the national initiatives who had been the subject of an evaluation 
research project based at Brunel University and funded by the DoH. This was in 1991 
and in Fishtown the initial impetus this represented had been carried through and 
many of the original components were still in place in 1995-6. 
108 
The Trust had a healthy relationship with its local CHC although there was little 
evidence of any involvement on the part of the CHC in Trust quality matters other 
than through the usual visits, consultation exercises and complaints procedures. In 
contrast to Marketown, however, both the Chief Executive and the Chief Officer of 
the CHC said that each had a direct line to each other if they needed to voice opinions 
and it was clear from their interviews that each thought highly of the other. 
The Chief Executive had a particularly strong interest in matters of quality; prior to 
the establishment of the Trust he had been a district general manager and personally 
set up initiatives such as patient perception groups and the initial TQM bid to Region 
Of all the Chief Executives interviewed his knowledge of quality activity in the Trust 
and the national picture was the most detailed. 
The main structures within which the quality strategy has to operate are represented in 
12 figure 5 
Quality Structure And Process: Fishtown 
The Executive Management Group And Divisional Quality Groups: The Core 
Of The Strategy 
At the core of Fishtown's quality strategy were the operations and functions of the 
Executive Management Group and the Divisional Quality Groups. These two groups 
were intended to co-ordinate and oversee quality in the Trust and the clinical divisions 
respectively. Their remit was broad but generally based on working towards Total 
Quality Management along the lines of the European Foundation for Quality 
Management Model 13 . 
The European Model for Total Quality Management (EFQM) is a model for 












'Customer satisfaction, people (employee) satisfaction and impact on society are 
achieved through leadership drivingpolicy and strategy, people management, 
resources andprocesses, leading ultimately to excellence in business results. 14 
The assessment 'scores' success according to criteria developed around the above 
principle. So for example, successful criteria for 'People Management' include: 
I T-T- 
h bw the involvement of everyone in continuous improvement is promoted andpeople 
are empowered to take appropriate action e. g. how: 
individuals and teams contribute to quality improvement 
in-house conferences and ceremonies are used to encourage involvement ofpeople 
in continuous improvement 
people are empowered to take action and how effectiveness is evaluated 
awareness and involvement ofpeople in Health and Safety issues is promoted'. 15 
The executive's role was as the operational arm of the Trust Board with responsibility 
for establishing long-term strategic aims on quality. At this level the issue of quality 
was primarily promoted by the Chief Executive. However, the development of quality 
activities within the Trust was primarily devolved down to the individual clinical 
divisions and Divisional Quality Groups. As one Quality Advisor explains: 
'We have two approaches: one is a corporate approach whereby the ChiefExecutive 
and the executive board and the non-executive board who makes all the long term 
strategic decisions on quality... Then below the Board level there is a management 
group which consists primarily of the directors plus chiefs ofservice who are 
cliniciansfor each of the divisions; and they supposedly make all the corporate 
decisions about the wayforward. But once those corporate decisions are made its 
really up to the Divisions to take those corporate decisions and translate them into 
things on a day-to-day level and in with their strategic plans as well. They have to 
satisfy the Board and the Management Group that their local strategyfits in with the 
overall philosophy .... erm some 
divisions are better than others it has to be said. ' 
ill 
The Divisional quality teams were supported in the implementation of quality 
initiatives by a team of Quality Advisors. Each of these had responsibility for a 
separate clinical area and also served as 'Patient Representatives' within the Trust. 
The Quality Advisors were, as their title suggests, just advisors; they were removed 
from the line managerial hierarchy and had no corporate power to help in achieving 
their aims. The Chief Executive felt this was necessary in order to prevent 'getting 
people's backs up'. As individuals they all came from a nursing background and were 
in middle managerial, or nurse-management, positions prior to the development of 
their role within the quality strategy. At the time of the fieldwork serious questions 
were being raised by members of the Executive Management Group as to the Quality 
Advisors functions, effectiveness and affordability. As the Director of Personnel and 
Organisational Development put it: 
'they're an expensive luxury we can perhaps do without. My medical colleagues often 
ask me what they do and sometimes its very difficulty to give them an honest and 
strai&forward reply. ' 
Clinical Audit 
Clinical audit in Fishtown, more than any other of the sites involved, was a separate 
and distinct element in the Trust's approach to quality. There was a clinical audit 
department which consisted of a full time clinical audit co-ordinator and a team of 
about 10 Part time assistants. Compared to the role of clinical audit assistants in other 
Sites such as Shiptown their role was purely clerical as opposed to providing advice 
on design and analysis. There was little co-ordination, or even communication, in a 
formal and structured way, between the 'core' quality structure of divisional quality 
teams and the Management Group and the clinical audit department. However, it was 
within clinical audit that most medical involvement was secured. There was a clinical 
audit committee chaired by a senior Consultant and, as in the other sites, negotiations 
with the main local purchaser regarding audit were conducted between two clinicians: 
the Trust Audit lead and the Director of Public Health at the Health Authority. 
112 
One of the Quality Advisors had responsibility for supporting the development of 
audit in the Divisions and linking it to the central approach to quality; but she felt 
generally excluded from the audit process and that the mechanisms for selecting and 
funding audit projects were separate from 'quality' in the Trust. This view was 
reinforced by the Clinical Audit Committee Chair who felt that: 
'the concept of quality in this Trust is erm ... wishy washy and not at all scientific 
Audit, means looking at problems scientifically and rigorously. The two are not 
compatible, no matter what the execs might think. 
The Quality Advisor's role in relation to audit was largely restricted to issues around 
the Patient's Charter and its monitoring. She led audits related to non-clinical topics 
such as name badges, privacy and dignity, and waiting times. 
Generally the agenda was decided 'in-house' and away from the purchaser-provider 
relationship and the local Medical Audit Advisory Group (MAAG). This was in 
contrast to Shiptown where the local MAAG was quite influential in the development 
of audit within the Trust. 
Business Quality 
The Trust, with Shiptown, was committed to assuring contract standards through a 
system of evaluating performance against a series of purchaser-led quality 
specifications. Known as the Standards Auditing System (SAS) these specifications 
were distinct from the contractual relationship per se but were intended to make 
comparison between providers easier when it came to re-negotiating contracts in the 
next business round. To this end, the format's for the two Trust's standards were the 
same with only the detail altered to reflect the particular contexts of the two settings. 
These standards concentrated almost entirely on the non-clinical and environmental 
aspects of services. Specifying requirements such as age appropriate magazines in 
waiting areas for outpatient clinics; name badges to be worn by staff, curtains in place 
around bed areas; and satisfaction of patients with food and cleanliness. 
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The assessments had initially been carried out by the purchaser; then a joint 
purchaser-provider team was developed; and now the process was devolved down to 
the provider alone by using SAS teams. Each team comprised one Quality Advisor 
with staff (usually nurses) drafted in to do the monitoring. Results were then fed back 
to a liaison manager at the Health Authority with responsibility for quality in the 
Trust. The Health Authority had the power to visit the Trust to satisfy themselves that 
standards were being evaluated accurately but no visits of this kind had taken place in 
the three years that the programme had been in place. 
Quality in contracts themselves was defined in terms of patient activity (volume) or 
cost and was widely acknowledged by managers on both sides of the purchaser- 
provider equation to be inadequate. Detailed specification were not a feature of the 
contractual business relationship; as one Trust manager commented: 
'ny complicate things with talk of quality when its been difficult enough to get the 
whole thing movingjust concentrating on cost and volume. They [the DHAJ aren't in 
a hurry to move on this one and neither are we ... its a kind of mutually agreeable 
stand-off'. 
The Support Structure And Quality Processes 
Business, clinical and core structures received support from, as previously stated, a 
team of four Quality Advisors. This team had recently been incorporated into the 
Organisational Development wing of the Human Resources division in an attempt to 
make the link between quality and the business strategy of the Trust more explicit and 
coherent. The primary processes occurring within this structure were around training. 
Organisational Development handled training for clinicians on management, audit and 
contracting, and a Quality Advisor ran a training programme for all Trust staff on 
'Total Quality Improvement' (TQI). 
The organisational development (OD) co-ordinator (she had eschewed the title of 
manager deliberately) acknowledged that clinical scepticism was a problem. She felt 
though that OD had always been seen in a supportive light by the clinical professions 
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and didn't have the problems of legitimacy that 'quality' had experienced. She put 
this down to the explicit links made between quality and the Chief Executive over the 
previous five years and the problems of being associated with something overtly 
managerial in tone. While broadly welcoming the absorption of the quality team into 
her remit (she now carried line managerial responsibility for them) she felt that 
significant changes would have to be made if the team's work was to progress 
properly; namely, they would have to make more of an effort to be seen as a support 
to the professions' way of doing things as opposed to a challenge and 'something else 
to give you a headache on the wards when you're just trying to get on with the job'. 
The TQI training programme was based on an activity-centred training day for staff 
where they were asked to complete an activity pack with questions such as: 
how wouldyou define TQP 
nat is the Trust'S definition? 
* The Trusts mission statement is: 
* In your currentjob you supply a service to internal and external customers, select 
one and identify what they expectfrom you. 16 
People were then encouraged to reflect on their situations; jobs and expectations and 
to develop a personal problem solving approach to work. The training was mainly 
attended by nursing and lower-level managerial staff. The Trainer conceded that while 
it had been possible to get a few consultants to come in the early days they hadn't 
managed to secure attendance on anything like the scale of the nursing staff. He 
attributed this to a combination of time constraints and arrogance on the part of some 
medical staff but also, and more significantly, to the format of the training pack which 
didn't reflect the: 
'different ways in which you have to approach quality issues with nurses and 
consultants or thefact that Doctors are higher up the social scale and what might 
workfor a staff nurse isn -t always appropriatefor a surgeon'. (Quality Advisor and 
TQI Trainer: Fishtown) 
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Each clinical directorate, manager, and Quality Advisor had IT support in relation to 
quality by virtue of the development of a series of computerised cost, volume and 
quality indicators available on a trust-wide network, However, the quality indicators 
were acknowledged to be limited in scope (re-admission rates and pressure sores in 
the surgical division) and, more importantly, were consistently out of date. At the time 
fieldwork was undertaken (July through September 1995) the indicators in most 
directorates were from January/February of the same year. Their usefulness was, 
therefore, questionable, particularly in terms of the responsiveness which installing 
the system was supposed to encourage. 
Consumer Consultation 
As in Marketown. the primary means of consultation were through a series of well 
defined procedures: 
" the complaints structure and patient representative function 
" patient satisfaction surveys 
" patient representative functions 
These formal procedures were supplemented by informal communications between 
the CHC Chief Officer and the Chief Executive and the Patient 
Representatives/Quality Advisors and the CHC Chief Officer - 
The complaints procedures were similar in content to Marketown, with four patient 
representatives instead of one, and a separate complaints manager. Patient 
Representatives acted as the first point of call for complaints made whilst patients 
were still in hospital and they passed information to the complaints manager. Patient 
Representatives also liased with the CHC Chief Officer in the preparation of 
complaints made once the patient was discharged or complaints made to the CHC 
directly. The Chief Officer, whilst less sceptical of the Patient Representative role 
than his contemporary in Marketown, was still unsure of the ethics of employing paid 
members of the Trust's staff to act on complainants behalf s: 
116 
'no matter how well meaning the people are, at the end of the day they are employees 
and that has to be explained to people making complaints and that there are 
alternatives. ' 
Patient satisfaction surveys came under the remit of a Quality Advisor and were 
contracted out to a private firm using a survey tool called 'My stay in Hospital'. This 
is a questionnaire used across the Region and based on standard questions such as: 
* How satisfied were you with the concern and care shown to You by nursing staff? 
(Scale 1-5) 
T-r- 
now satisfied were you with the doctors explanation ofyour treatment? (Scale - 
5)17 
The survey itself was conducted with a sample response rate of only forty seven 
percent (47%) and some of the analyses were statistically rather dubious given the 
size of the sample involved. This was something recognised by the Quality Advisor 
but not highlighted in the feedback to Divisional Managers or the Executive 
Management Group. 
CHC visits were conducted approximately twice a year and, as in Marketown, were 
pre-arranged and targeted clinical areas on a rolling basis. Again, both sides 
acknowledged the lack of utility in this arrangement; however, unlike Marketown, the 
Trust was keen to develop alternative ways of involving the CHC on a corporate level 
as opposed to individual divisions making their own arrangements. Although at the 
time this was little more than a statement of intent as no plans to change the visits 
system were being developed. 
Shiptown 
Shiptown shared its Health Authority with Fishtown; its population characteristics 
were very similar as they were located within five miles of each other. They were in 
direct competition with Fishtown for the contracts to deliver some services (major 
gynaecological surgery) and there was a recognition that over-provision was a feature 
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of both Trust's work. Rationalisation of its services and the commercial viability of 
others were a very real issue within the Trusts and were causing concern amongst 
staff - particularly nursing staff. 
Shiptown was a combined (community and acute) unit also providing mental health 
care services. It was primarily based in two large blocks on a single site. One block 
(mental health) was built in the early 70s and had major design faults. One example 
being a lack of adequate fire exits in some departments causing it to fail an annual 
Fire Service inspection. The more modem block was a combination of 70s and 80s 
design and was generally seen as the better serviced and more pleasant environment to 
work in. Some services, such as maternity, were in the process of moving over to the 
modem block. Such major changes were, in themselves, seen as aiding quality 
improvement by virtue of the fact that women wouldn't have to be wheeled between 
the two sites for investigations such as non-standard ultrasound scans and other 
radiological investigations. The Trust was formed in 1992 (second wave) and 
employed around 2,500 people. 
Despite sharing the same purchaser the two Trusts took very different approaches to 
the operationalisation of quality. Shiptown's emphasis was on a firm, centralised, 
quality strategy based around the workings of a Quality Core Group which fed into a 
Central Quality Committee; as opposed to the devolved decision making and 
objective setting of Fishtown. The overall structure is represented in fig 6 18 . 
Quality Structure And Process: Shiptown 
The Central Quality Structure: Central Quality Committee, Quality Core 
Group, Divisional Quality Leads And Quality Action Groups. 
The quality structure was at the heart of the Trust's quality strategy and incorporated 
the fora in which objectives were established, progress reviewed and decisions taken 
in relation to quality. The Central Quality Committee was made up of the Chief 
Executive, the Director of Nursing and Quality and the clinical audit lead for the 
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Trust. This clinical audit lead was a doctor who also ran the Central Audit Facility and 
was chairperson for the Trust Clinical Audit Committee. Their combined role was 
strategic involving the synchronisation of Trust quality activity and more general 
corporate quality strategy. However, at the time of the fieldwork the Trust was 
without a Chief Executive and this group was temporarily disbanded. The Quality 
Core Group met monthly and was made up of representatives from each of the clinical 
divisions, the complaints manager (known as the Patient Liaison Manager), the Public 
Relations Manager and the Director of Audit. The committee was chaired by the 
Director of Nursing and Quality. As the site was left they were just about to officially 
appoint the CHC Chief Officer to this committee in an effort to increase the 
involvement of the CHC in Trust quality matters. The core group's functions were, 
officially: 
t supporting, co-ordinating andplanning quality activity and receivingfeedbackftom 
within the Trust. ' 
19 
From analysis of the minutes of these meetings and from the meetings attended it was 
clear that the bulk of their work was co-ordination of the following: 
monitoring the purchaser quality specification audit process (SAS) 
Patients Charter monitoring 
Kings fund organisational audit (a form of hospital accreditation programme) 
Patient Satisfaction Surveys 
the production of a quality newsletter 
the Chartermark application procedure 
The group also had information passed to it on clinical audit (what was going on) and 
complaints (general trends). Although this was more in the form of feedback as 
opposed to active involvement in agenda setting. 
Action towards objectives set by the Core Group was secured by a series of Quality 
Action Teams in each division. They were intended to act as problem solving groups 
but membership was variable and a number of Divisional representatives on the 
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Quality Core Group felt the groups' turnover of staff was too rapid and that securing 
action suffered accordingly: 
finishing what we start is difficult, asfast as we recruit people they get tired of trying 
and leave - we are trying to secure a greater level of commitmentfrom people that 
volunteerfor the group'(Mental Health Divisional Manager). 
There was no formal model of Total Quality Management in place in Shiptown (as 
opposed to Marketown and Fishtown). The strategy was acknowledged as 'home 
grown'; a conscious decision on the part of the Trust, as they felt that management 
consultancy attached to Quality and the start up costs of getting initiatives off the 
ground were not paying dividends in other Trusts. The Director for Nursing and 
Quality also expressed a desire to secure a greater level of support for the concept of 
quality by allowing people within the Trust to take the ideas forward themselves as 
opposed to having outsiders providing the lead. 
Shiptown placed a heavy emphasis on techniques involving measurement of their 
activities. For example, they had invested much time and effort in carrying out the 
SAS audit system (with a full time SAS officer in post); they had undergone the initial 
assessment involved in Kinds Fund Organisational Audit and devised action plans for 
divisions based on this. They had submitted a Chartermark application for their Breast 
Screening Service and had encouraged a number of non-clinical areas to undergo 
BS5750/ISO 9000 accreditation. All of these involved some degree of conformity to 
pre-specified standards. This was a key difference in the approach of Shiptown to any 
of the other Trusts, who all undertook such activities, but without the degree of 
importance, or on the scale afforded by, Shiptown. 
Central Audit Structure 
The central audit structure was very well developed at Shiptown with a complement 
of four full time staff (three audit facilitators and a secretary); a SAS quality 
specification officer; and a part time Director who was also a radiologist. They 
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occupied a suite of offices and two of the facilitators had established a private training 
and consultancy business. 
More than any of the other sites there were large scale clinical audit projects in place 
and supported centrally. Medical and uni-disciplinary audit was still occurring but 
was supported by the same team and concerted efforts were being made to procure a 
multi-disciplinary team approach to auditing practice. Or as one Audit officer put it: 
'steeringpeople who come to you with a problem down a multi-disciplinary route. By 
the time they realise they've done it its too late to change. ' 
The Department was well funded and had maintained a very high quality database of 
projects and produced a detailed report on audit which was released into the public 
domain (as an adjunct to the Main Trust Report - which one had to request). 
The overriding message which emerged from interviews with clinicians and managers 
within the Trust was that the Central Audit Facility was a useful resource and one that 
had a high level of credibility within the organisation. All the staff were, in the eyes of 
others, of a high calibre and had high levels of research, audit and communication 
skills. The Director was aware of the status of the facility within the Trust and felt 
that: 
f whileforging closer links with the work of the Quality Core Group has been 
necessary, I need to ensure that all the work we have accomplished up until now is not 
undone by getting too close to something which has had its shaky moments with the 
consultants and senior management. ' 
Another member of the QCG felt that: 
'[Director of Central Audit] comes along [to QCG meetings] but you just know that 
his heart really isn't in it. He always leaves early, hejust does what he needs to do 
then disappears. You can't blame him though he has carved out a nice wee empirefor 
himseýf and had to work really hard to do it. ' 
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The central audit facility also collected large scale outcome data as part of the 
Regional Health Authority's 'Maryland Quality Indicator Project'. These are outcome 
indicators which enables comparisons with other hospitals. Indicators included: 
for in-patients: 
surgical wound infections 
* for out-patieuts/A&E 
o unplanned retums to the A&E within 
72 hours 
9 in-patient mortality Patients in the A&E dept more than 6 
hours 
s neonatal mortality * Cases where discrepancy between 
initial and final x-ray report required 
and adjustment in patient 
management 
9 peri-operative mortality 
* caesarean section rate 
patients who leave the A&E prior to 
completion of treatment 
Cancellation of treatment procedures 
on the day of procedure 
unplanned readmissions 
unplanned admissions following day 
case surgery 
9 unplanned returns to Special Care 
Unit 
unplanned returns to the operating 
room 
Business Quality 
As in Fishtown the purchaser quality specifications were monitored by a devolved 
audit process involving a specialist officer recruiting professionals (again it was 
nurses) to scrutinise particular areas of practice and to feed these results into the 
divisional business planning and contract negotiation processes. Again, like Fishtown, 
contracts themselves were defined mainly in terms of volume and cost with quality 
dealt with outside the main contracting process. Unlike its neighbour the Trust's 
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Quality lead (the Director for Nursing and Quality) generally felt the SAS process was 
worthwhile as an aid to measuring standards. Although this Trust, as previously 
mentioned, placed a greater emphasis on measurement generally than any of the 
others. 
The links between the work of the Quality Core Group and the business of the Trust 
were not great. The Divisional representatives on the QCG were drawn from the ranks 
of assistant divisional managers, or more commonly, the nurse-managerial hybrid 
posts such as nurse managers or clinical managers. Consequently there was a feeling 
from some of the representatives interviewed, that initiatives derived from the QCG 
were difficult to implement at divisional level because they had failed to gain the 
support of either senior clinicians, or as was more often the case, senior managers. 
Contract negotiations generally involved the people with least involvement in the 
quality activities of the Trust: the finance division, divisional managers and very 
occasionally, the Director for Nursing and Quality. There was no single person with 
overall responsibility for quality at the Health Authority; until November 1994 there 
had been a specialist quality department but it was felt to be an unnecessary drain on 
resources and so was now pushed down to individuals in the contracting department. 
Consumer Consultation 
The Trust's consultation structure in relation to the quality strategy focused on three 
processes and associated roles: 
The complaints process and patient liaison role 
Public Relations and a public relations manager 
e Involvement of the CHC with the QCG and CHC visits. 
The complaints structure was, as one would expect, broadly in line with DoH 
guidance. Where it differed from the other Trusts was in relation to its links with the 
central quality structure and in the role of the complaints manager, a post termed the 
Patient Liaison Manager. Complaints trends were routinely fed back to the core 
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quality structure of the QCG and the complaints manager was a routine part of its 
meetings. This was not the case in any other Trust. Moreover, the complaints officer 
role was more than administrative in that the manager's legal qualifications meant he 
also undertook preliminary work on routine cases involving litigation prior to 
involving the Trust's solicitors. He also made no secret of his dislike of the ten-n 
4patient liaison' and that he perceived his primary role as one of saving the Trust 
money through what he called 'the judicious application of complaints machinery'. 
Whereas in other Trusts the role of patient representative/liaison in complaints was 
generally seen as a quasi-advocacy function, pursuing the patients interests in a 
sometimes hostile organisational environment. The Shiptown Patient Liaison manager 
adopted a more business orientated view of the role. 
The Trust had a very smooth public relations department in place; an ex-journalist 
held a PR managers post and handled all press communications, publicity and public- 
domain output. She also developed an internal quality newsletter which was sent to all 
staff and available in the reception are of the main hospital site and its departments. 
She saw herself as an integral part of the quality strategy and that her appointment and 
its alliance with quality was a key difference from other local providers of health 
services. Whilst researching the site the PR manager was in the process of organising 
publicity as part of the Patients Charter initiative at the Department of Health. It was 
somewhat ironic, however, that on the day the results were published only two of the 
twelve members of the QCG were aware of the Trusts performance and there was 
universal acceptance of the Chair's comments that, while publicity would benefit the 
image of the Trust, the league tables were not seen as terribly important to the 
purchasers or the public at large and so were not worth dwelling on for too long. 
The CHC and the Trust, or more specifically the Director for Nursing and Quality, 
had a well established relationship and one that each were keen to foster. The CHC 
Chief Officer had previously been an employee at the main purchaser for the Trust 
and had been left somewhat disillusioned with the whole process of contracting and 
Purchaser-based bureaucracy. Consequently, he was well informed and sympathetic, 
to the claims of the Trust regarding the sometimes problematic nature of working with 
the Health Authority. At the time of leaving the fieldwork site the CHC Chief Officer 
was about to attend his first QCG meeting having previously been part of a Patient's 
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Charter Implementation Group within the Trust. This had been disbanded some three 
months before the research presence and was subsumed by the QCG. He saw his role 
within the Trust as interpreting and feeding back information received from people 
attending CHC community fora into the Trust's strategy in a form that would be 
listened to. Moreover, he wished to portray a realistic picture of Trust activity and 
efforts on quality to the public. He was keen to move away from what he saw as the 
traditional, combative, function of the CHC and to develop a model of CHC-Trust 
relations based on partnership and co-operation. This, he felt, would be more 
productive in the current service and policy climate. 
The CHC Chief Officer , in common with all the Chief Officer s interviewed, saw an 
extremely limited role for CHC visits to wards and departments. These still went ony 
'as some of the members like them'. but he was making a concerted effort to persuade 
the CHC that they should concentrate their efforts on other strategies for involvement 
in the work of the Trust. 
Castletown 
Castletown was a 770 bed acute hospital Trust spread over two sites: Castletown and 
Sheeptown (its more rural counterpart). This arrangement was due, in part, to the 
geographical size of the Trust's catchment area but was primarily attributable to the 
need to demonstrate 'viability' as part of its original application for transfer to Trust 
status. It provides a full range of the usual District Hospital services to a catchment 
area of approximately 750,000 people. 
The catchment area was very large and as a consequence was more diverse in its 
composition than in other Trusts. The Trust took patients from rural fanning 
communities, ex-mining communities and a medium-sized University city. Socio- 
economic differences between the various communities within the catchment area 
were marked; and some locations were sites for european, national and local moneys 
aimed at combating poverty and long tenn unemployment. The area had been heavily 
dependent on mining and steel for employment and many communities were left 
without significant employment opportunities following these industry's departures. 
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The large geographical size of the Trust's catchment area and the need to avoid 
unnecessary excess replication in the provision of services in the two sites meant that 
issues of access and transportation were a real issue for patients, their families, and 
service developers within the Trust. 
Castletown was built in the Second World War and was the larger of the two sites 
(428 beds). It provided general clinical services and was also the base for the Trust's 
management and support services. The Sheeptown site developed 'pragmatically' 
over a hundred year period with major building in the Second World War, 1970s and 
1980s. On top of general medical and surgical services, this site provided bums and 
plastic surgery units. It was the smaller of the sites (342 beds) and there was a general 
feeling amongst many staff that this was the 'poorer relation' of the two sites. This 
perception was compounded by the fact that Trust management posts were mainly 
based at the Castletown site and that a large scale rationalisation process was in place 
which was interpreted by many staff as simply a downsizing exercise and a precursor 
to the closure of Sheeptown as a provider of local health services. The interim 
rationalisation process was being undertaken prior to the opening of a new District 
General Hospital which was being funded under the Private Finance Initiative policy 
(PFI). Sheeptown was to be, in the words of the Chief Executive: 
,... reshaped into an active, dynamic local healthcare Jacilityfor the 21st century. 
The site had recently lost its accident and emergency facilities a process which many 
local people resented and which had involved the Community Health Council 
significantly. The Community Health Council had opposed the rationalisation plan but 
it was approved by the District and Regional Health Authorities regardless. 
The Quality structures in place are presented in fig 7 20 
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Quality Structure And Process: Castletown 
The Trust had been another Regional TQM site prior to its transformation to Trust 
status (like Fishtown). However, the term TQM and some of the initial 'commercial' 
terms and ideas were abandoned within two years. The Trust had decided to develop 
its own model of quality; this had at its core the views of service users and a much 
looser theme of 'Continuous Quality Improvement'. The Trust's strategy revolved 
around four key areas: communication; quality assurance; privacy and dignity and 
staff development. Each of the elements of the Trusts quality structure emphasised 
these themes to varying extents. 
The Central Structure: The Quality Steering Group (QSG); Quality Champions 
And The Quality Improvement Teams 
This structure represents the core of the strategy. The quality steering group consisted 
of the Director of Nursing and Quality (Chair), the Quality Manager, nominated 
representatives from each division and, just as the site was leff, the CHC Chief Officer 
. The function of this group was to assist in setting the quality agenda 
for each 
business year. The group was the top tier of the Trust quality hierarchy and 
consequently, because of the lack of senior executive involvement (apart from the 
Director of Nursing and Quality), there was a general acknowledgement amongst the 
members that quality did not always have the profile it merited at the highest 
management level. 
The strategic decisions of the group were put into practice via a network of 'Quality 
Champions' all based at ward or departmental level. These nurses and low-level 
managers were selected for training in theory and practice related to quality and used 
as the operational arm of the QSG. They were generally perceived as the 'high flyers' 
within the organisation. Some felt that this targeting was unfair, and to the detriment 
of those staff who might benefit from training input: 
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'its all very well targeting the highflyers, but they're already motivated and keen. Its 
the ones who aren't so aware of issues and maybe who aren't so visible that we need 
to concentrate on. They're the ones who need the training and involvement with the 
quality directorate. ' (Senior Nurse: Research) 
These 'Quality Champions' were also intended to co-ordinate the establishment of 
problem solving teams as required in their departments. The success of this policy 
was variable and whilst, in surgery for example, teams were established to look at 
issues such as infection rates, these rarely involved doctors. As a consequence these 
Action Groups had a strong nursing flavour and only limited spheres of interest; 
namely, those they could control such as non-medical work. 
This structure was supported by a full-time quality manager (with a learning disability 
nursing background) who organised training and oversaw the day-day operations of 
the quality strategy as a whole. He had no direct line-managerial power other than 
within his own directorate of quality. He therefore relied on the support of divisional 
colleagues and clinicians for achieving success in initiatives developed by the Quality 
Steering Group. 
The Training strategy, led by the Quality Manager, was based largely on a system 
termed 'Foundationsfor Quality' aimed at all staff and based on five areas: 
The introduction of 'quality tools'for use in the workplace 
An appreciation of the Patient's Charter and the Patient/carer view' 
Identification of Hard and Soft issues of quality 
An appreciation of internal and external customers 
An introduction to the quality approaches o successful commercial ýf 
organisations. 
21 
Whilst this training was intended to reach all staff it was mainly nurses, managers and 
ancillary staff who attended. There were no medical consultants in the 45% of staff 
(n=900) who attended this programme in the year up to June 1995. The Quality 
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Manager in charge of the programme put this down to the inability of the message 
being able to apply to everyone equally within the Trust. 
Interviewer: 7 notice in the strategy that you plan on holding specific sessionsfor 
clinical directors to 'explore and challenge their current contribution. Is getting the 
message across problematic then? ' 
Quality Manager: 'Yes, I think its a real issue and I hope that in the strategy we've 
reflected that. Like the Foundation for Quality Programme, in theory, wasfor every 
member ofstaff and I think we managed to get most of the members ofstaff through 
that. But most of the other stuff that we do is targeted. Its no goodputting a nursing 
assistant on the same training as a consultant - that isn't going to work in the 
majority of cases. Because they don't come to training involving others we've had to 
say 'Well do we not bother or do we lay something on speciallyfor them? 'y and that's 
the road we've gone down. So we've done some work on management of change with 
them and we will handle the complaints training like that - its the only option we 
really have. ' 
The Central Quality Structure also co-ordinated the application of a number of other 
activities relating to 'quality assurance'. 
BS5750 and the Charter Marks tems: this was restricted to catering services but YS 
there were plans to involve other non-clinical services. 
o PIER: this was a quality assurance system for individual wards and departments, 
led by a quality champion. It was based around establishing the principal functions 
of a ward, isolating the important components of these functions and setting up 
indicators of performance for them such as customer satisfaction. The results were 
fed back to the Quality Manager. 
0 Maryland Quality Indicators: as in Shiptown, the Trust had agreed to be part of 
this Regional initiative. 
9 The Patient Focused Approach: as in Fishtown the trust was re-designing some of 
its services to 'bring services closer to the patient and to greater meet the 
expectations of service users. ' (Trust Project Officer's Description). The Trust had 
appointed a Patient Focused Approach Co-ordinator (a nurse seconded from her 
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clinical area). At the time of fieldwork, however, she had only been in post two 
weeks. 
Critical Care Pathways: These were protocols for the 'guidance' of clinical 
episodes of care for specified patients. For example, those with a Croutine' 
myocardial infarction or recovering from a Total Hip Replacement. They were 
intended to be based on research evidence and used as the basis for care unless 
clinical needs made them unsuitable. They relied on all members of a clinical 
team to 'sign up' to the protocol for them to work and this invariably involved 
members of teams in their development. This project was also led by an ex-nurse. 
The Clinical Audit Structure 
The Trust had recently established a Clinical Audit Committee which had initially 
been chaired by a senior consultant and now the Director of Nursing and Quality. It 
was to: 
'bring together audit activity, develop multi-disciplinary audit and re-emphasise the 
benefits of team working. ' 22 
The links between quality and audit were through the Director of Nursing and 
Quality's place on both the Trust Audit Committee and the Quality Steering Group. 
Apart from this there were no formal links between the audit department and the 
central quality structure. There were two Audit Officers in post and a secretary but the 
team itself were still in their infancy compared to the well established department in 
Shiptown. As in all the Trusts, this was the component of the Trust's quality strategy 
that had secured most medical involvement. 
There was a CHC representative on the Trust's Clinical Audit Committee but the 
CHC Chief Officer felt the Trust representatives were not comfortable with their 
presence and each proposal tended to be 'couched in the particular language used by 
the group putting the audit bid in'. The Trust also maintained a low-profile within the 
local district wide audit support group. A number of Audit Managers from other 
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Trusts mentioned the lack of output from the Castletown site and the self-imposed 
marginalisation of the audit team from the rest of the Trust: 
'they're [the audit department]just a toolfor afew powerful consultants to pursue 
issues they are interested in. That wouldn't be so bad if they [the consultants] actually 
did the workfor themselves but they get their poor registrars to do it and then take all 
the credit. They really need to start again and be clear about where they stand within 
the Trust -for everyone orjustfor the consultants? ' (Audit Officer: neighbouring 
community Trust) 
This image of a medically-dominated, occupationally segregated, department was 
reinforced by the fact that the nurse manager with responsibility for Nursing Audit 
had no formal link with the mainstream clinical audit department and felt that it was: 
'like banging your head against a brick wall sometimes trying to get people to think 
as a team. ' 
The audit contract was negotiated with the local Health Authority and took the form 
of a fairly detailed and extensive set of projects. This was in contrast to the other 
Trusts who generally negotiated moneys based on a central core of audit topics and a 
block of money to be spent locally on projects as the Trust saw fit through scrutiny by 
the Clinical Audit. Committee. The projects were 'grouped' under broad headings: 
health of the Nation: e. g. smoking andpregnancy, review ofsterilisation 
Changing Childbirth: e. g. Named Midwife 
CEPOD: e. g. DVTprophylaxis 
Clinical effectivenessluse ofprotocols: Paediatric pain management 
Outcomes: Long term outcome of total hip replacement 
Royal college comparative audits: appropriateness of medical admissions 
23 
Patient satisfactionyacilities: e. g. Counselling ofRelatives in ITU 
Unusually for something paid for as part of a contractual relationship there were no 
indications as to the methods used to explore particular questions or the expected 
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outcomes of any scrutiny in the bid. So although the list was quite extensive there was 
room for interpretation on the part of the Trust. In common with other Trusts there 
was also no requirement for the results to be fed-back to the Health Authority in 
anything other than an anonymised format. 
Business Quality 
As with the other Trusts the main purchasing relationship had a system of quality 
standards attached. These were District-wide and applied to all providers from whom 
the local Health Commission purchased services. These were largely based around the 
standards and themes expressed in the Patient's Charter. They were not, however, 
afforded the same status (in terms of monitoring) as the Shiptown and Fishtown 
Trusts. In fact, no form of monitoring was in place, other than the obligatory Patients 
Charter quarterly returns. There was a feeling within the Trust that these standards 
were not important to the purchaser and several of them were either wholly 
unrealisable or so vague as to be 'open to severe interpretation' (Quality Manager: 
Castletown). For example, in relation to the reporting of 'quality initiatives' the 
provider was to simply: 
provide details of any initiatives which enhance the quality ofservice provision' 
In relation to the monitoring of contract quality specifications by the purchaser: 
( members and authorised officers of the purchaser shall have the right to visit any 
part of a Trustfor the purpose of monitoring contracts. Areas open to the public may 
be visited at any time and all other areas at short notice, by arrangement with the 
provider'24 . 
This last standard had, as far as anyone at the Trust or the Commission was aware, 
never been exercised. Monitoring was also hampered by the fact that no one at the 
Trust could identify who the person with responsibility for quality was at the Health 




The processes which occurred within this part of the Trust's strategy set Castletown 
apart from other sites in terms of its approach to quality. While the other sites paid lip .A 
service to the idea of listening to consumers through the use of surveys and CHC 
involvement with a central committee or two, Castletown had a number of explicit 
and dedicated mechanisms in place to gain the views of users with regard to the 
services provided: 
* Patient Satisfaction Surveys: analysed by ward or department and fed-back to the 
Quality Steering Group. The survey tool used was 'my stay in hospital' as it was 
in Fishtown and Shiptown. 
Patient Liaison Group: this group set up complaints monitoring and handling 
systems for the Trust and has CHC representation. 
41 Patientfora: these involved groups of service users who have been discharged 
taking part in a discussion about the service they received. These were organised, 
by individual departments or wards but could address Trust-wide issues such as 
provision for disabled users. Service areas examined included: 
Orthopaedic, out patients 
Audiology 
The Trusts disability provision 
A general surgical ward 
Materafty services 
* The Patients Council: this was just being established whilst fieldwork was 
undertaken in the Trust site and consisted of ex-Patient Fora members. This was 
chaired by the Director of Nursing and Quality and was charged with getting 
user) s views into Trust policy at the highest level. However as will be seen in 
Chapter Seven this was not necessarily how it operated. 
The Trust's Quality Manager or Director of Nursing often acted as facilitator at the 
fora which nurses, managers and doctors from each of the departments involved were 
invited to attend. However, of the two fora attended, and the inaugural meeting of the 
Patients Council, there was no medical presence or apologies given. 
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The CHC attended at least two of the patient fora that had been organised and both 
sides were generally approving of the other's approach to involvement. The CHC 
were keen to move away from the visiting system that was such a feature of the other 
Trusts and were actively seeking new ways of involving themselves in Trust activity. 
Because the rationalisation process had pitched both organisations on different sides 
of an issue, the CHC Chief Officer spoke of: 
... 
Ia healthy respect of the tactics of the Trust .. 
but generally I think they want to do 
the right things for patients. Even the closure, or rationalisation as they call it, we 
have to argue a casefor the localpeople because that's what they want, but we all 
know it makes sense to get a new site and betterfacilities. ' 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the case sites and outlined the main features of each 
Trust's quality strategy. These strategies can be thought of as a series of inter-linked 
(although sometimes tenuously) structures and processes, each designed with the 
explicit aim of operationalising, 'quality' in services. 
Marketown was characterised by a strong commitment to a formal model of TQM 
based around the ideas of Crosby and 'getting it right first time'. As well as an active 
central core structure and fairly acrimonious relations with its local CHC. 
Fishtown and Shiptown shared a common primary purchaser and yet were very 
different in their structures and processes. Both had a central structure but Shiptown 
was more uniform in the shape of the quality activity adopted by divisions. Shiptown 
it eschewed TQM in favour of a 'home grown' strategy that relied heavily on 
measurement and a strong (but relatively distinct) clinical audit department. 
Fishtown, on the other hand, was another (regional) TQM site and encouraged a more 
autonomous role for clinical divisions - as long as they met corporate goals. Their 
clinical audit function was medically dominatedand the Trust relied on a heavily 
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developed 'support' structure of advisors to push the issue of quality to the fore in 
divisional work. Both Trusts enjoyed good relationships with local CHCs but only 
Shiptown was making real efforts to bring the CHC into corporate business in any 
meaningful way. 
Castletown, was the most overtly consumer-focused of the four sites. The central 
strand of its approach to quality was a diverse range of consumer involvement fora; as 
opposed to the primarily survey-based techniques deployed by the other Trusts. These 
fora were now beginning to impact on the business of the Trust proper through their 
role in discussing issues relating to the design and operation of the new District 
Hospital and in the way the complaints system was designed and operated. They had 
originally adopted a TQM model but rapidly moved to another in-house design which, 
whilst using Total Quality ideas, was designed with more user (and professional) 
friendly terminology and techniques in mind. 
These structures and processes form the basis for the identification of stakeholders 
within each of the Trusts. It is these stakeholders and the common themes of 
consensus and conflict within and between them that form the basis of the next two 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: QUALITY - IN WHOSE INTERESTS? 
The introductory chapter highlighted the multi-dimensional and complex nature of the 
concept of quality. It also outlined the 'tribal' delineation at the level of services and 
the role of values in the social construction of quality. Chapter One showed how the 
concept of quality has played a significant role in the political battles within NHS 
services over the past 18 years. Many of these relate directly or indirectly to the 
process of managerialization and the recasting of power relations between NHS 
groups- 
This chapter seeks to unpack some of these links with reference to key analytical 
concepts such as power, interest and organisational culture. Taken together, these 
form a theoretical basis for empirical data collection and analysis. The chapter takes 
as its starting point the argument that in order to be implemented quality is actively 
operationalised at a variety of policy levels and in a variety of arenas in the NHS. The 
driving forces behind this operationalisation are not simply the policy messages from 
the 'top' of the NHS hierarchy, but also the values and interests of 'stakeholders' in 
NHS provider units. Quality has occupied a prominent place in the meta-policy 
agenda of managerialization. Which is itself concerned with redefining power 
relations and the consequent creation of winners and losers (see Chapter Two). 
Because of this, quality needs to be understood from within a framework which 
examines the relative inputs of power, the pursuit of interests and organisational 
culture as elements in the social action required to make quality 'real' in NHS 
services. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical starting point for further, 
empirically grounded, exploration and refinement. Yin' uses Christopher Columbus 
and his exploration of the 'new world' as an example of the need for such starting 
points: even when dealing with something of which very little was known Columbus 
needed to have reasons for the number of ships required; criteria for recognising that 
which he sought; and a rationale for the direction he would take. In short, even if his 
initial assumptions proved wrong he still required those initial assumptions. Providing 
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these initial assumptions regarding the operationalisation of quality at the level of 
NHS Trusts is the task of this chapter. 
The Structure Of The Chapter 
The chapter first proposes a model of policy implementation which posits 
organisations and the social actors within them, in an active role in interpreting and 
developing social policies. It then goes on to explore a variety of means of 
conceptualising 'the organisation' before outlining the common theme of 'interests' 
which dissect each of these conceptualisations. It shows how the interests of groups 
are inexorably linked to questions of power and organisational culture. The details of 
the organisational cultures likely to impact on the development of quality in services 
are then fleshed out with an outline of what an ideal-typical value stance on quality 
for professionals, managers and consumer-representatives might theoretically look 
like. 
A Starting Point: The Organisation And The Politics Of Policy 
Implementation 
The starting point for this exploration has to be what is already known about quality. 
Perhaps the most significant theme of the policy overview presented in Chapter Two 
is that responsibility for delivering technical quality (in the form of TQM, QA, CQI, 
quality specifications in contracting) is firmly at the level of individual providers. 
Delivering quality in the NHS is then an organisational responsibility. 
It has already been seen that policy documents have made use of the term quality as a 
kind of virtuous label with which to justify changes in NHS structure and process. 
Quality is simultaneously one of the end points of the NHS organisation and also 
constitutes one of the means by which it will be sought2. It is at the level of the 
provider organisation, however, that most individuals will experience 'quality' either 
as users of the service or as participants in its delivery. 
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The importance of an understanding of the organisation to policy implementation is 
highlighted by Elmore: 
'Concern about the implementation ofsocial programs stemsfrom the recognition 
thatpolicies cannot be understood in isolationfrom the means of their 
execution ... virtuallyall public policies are implemented by large public 
organisations, knowledge of organisations [must] become a critical component of 
policy analysis. We cannot say with much certainty what a policy is, or why it is not 
implemented, without knowing a great deal about how organ isations function ... The 
translation of an idea into action involves certain crucial simplifications. 
Organisations are simplifiers ... only 
by understanding how organisations work can we 
understand howpolicies are shaped in theprocess of implementation. 3 
Without organisations policy does not become action. Moreover, it is at the levels of 
provider organisations that quality is delivered. Quality initiatives are part and parcel 
of the mechanics of service delivery in the late 1990s. However, simply knowing that 
organisations play a crucial role in the implementation of social policies does not help 
the analyst seeking to examine what that role might be. 
Fulcher4outlines a policy implementation model which recognises both the role of the 
organisation in shaping policy but also allows for the complexities that present 
themselves in trying to make sense of that role(seefig 8). She posits the argument that 
policy implementation is made up of a variety of levels and arenas; levels constitute 
the stages at which policy is made rather than simply implemented; arenas (for there 
are multiple ones) constitute the fora in which issues are debated, struggles ensue and 
decisions made. This recognises the active role of individuals within the policy 
making process and does so in a way which recognises the plurality of interests 
present in most organisations and the policies enacted through them. In this way it 
encompasses some of the criticisms of the top down 5 approach to framing policy 
making. It recognises the essential role of those at the periphery of the policy making 
structure (or the core if you adopt a bottom up approach). Those who Lipsky terms 
C street level bureaucrats'. Their importance is summarised thus: 
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fig 8. - Examples of Policy Levels and Arenas in the NHS' 
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'... the residual discretion enjoyed by workers who interact with and make decisions 
about clients results in workers effectively 'Makingpolicy'. They effectively 'Make 
policy'not in the sense that they articulate care objectives or develop mechanisms to 
achieve these objectives. Rather, they make policy in the sense that aggregation of 
their separate discretionary and unsanctioned behaviour adds up to patterned agency 
behaviour overall. Y7 
According to this model, as policy progresses through the levels of the state it is 
adapted and shaped in various policy arenas; primarily organisations and the sub-units 
contained within them. Shaping occurs because organisations contain people, and 
people are not passive translators of policy; individuals pursue multiple and 
occasionally conflicting objectives. This is reflected in behaviour within the 
organisation themselves. The need to recognise this active role of organisations and 
the pluralistic nature of the interests which people may pursue within them is 
recognised by many commentators8 9. Harrison et al spell it out in relation to their 
study of General Management in the NHS: 
'It is central to this perspective [one that treats organisations as political systems] 
that individuals and groups within an organisation often have multiple and competing 
objectives and interests, and that their desire to defend these is an important 
determinant o behaviour. '10 ýf 
What both Harrison and Lipsky recognise is the importance of group social action in 
the work of organisations in implementing policy. This applies as much to quality as 
it would any other organisational process. Quality is frequently discussed in terms of 
group activity; for example, 'quality improvement teams', 'quality circles', and 
'quality committees'. How people interact with quality processes in terms of their 
participation says something about the meaning they attribute to it. Alternatively, this 
assertion can be restated as, the researcher can infer meaning from the ways in which 
individuals participate in quality activity. But how you arrive at that meaning depends 
on the conceptual lens through which you view the participation and the context in 
which it occurs; this is where organisational models prove most useful. 
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Conceptualising The Organisation 
Whilst organisations can be considered the 'simplifiers" 1 of policy in that they 
translate intent into action, this belittles the complicated nature of the entities 
themselves. This complexity is reflected in the literature concerning itself with 
conceptualising 'organisation'. As Elmore puts it 'the single most important feature of 
organisational theory is its conceptual anarchy' 12 . His approach to reconstituting this 
anarchy into a format with a degree of analytical utility is to tie together the disparate 
(but finite) strands of the literature. This is also an approach adopted by Reed13 and 
one which shall be adopted here. The aim in doing so is simply to introduce the 
models, in order to act as a starting points for the collection of empirical data and the 
generation of an inductively derived, but politically 'grounded', theory regarding 
patterns of participation in, and allegiances with, types of quality activity by social 
actors with a stake in NHS services. 
What outlining a variety of conceptualisations of the organisation achieves is a 
highlighting of the concepts which run through each account and which have to be 
addressed if a fuller understanding of the link between quality and NHS 
organisational. 'tribes' is to be appreciated. Words such as power, values, interests, 
culture and ideology need greater explanation in relation to quality than has been 
proffered thus far in the thesis; the notion of organisation provides one way of 
framing such an explanation. For now the aim is to see how these key concepts 
present themselves in models dealing with the transfon-nation of policy intent into 
organisational action. The various conceptualisations of organisations 14 are presented 
as a series of models. The main points are outlined and a 'thumbnail' explanation of 
NHS-tribal delineation around the actualisation of quality offered. 
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Organisations As Social Systems 
1. Organisations are social units directed to the achievement of collective goals or 
the fulfilment of institutional needs for the wider society or environment of which 
they are a constituent part. 
2. These externally derived goals/needs set the parameters within which the 
structural forrns that organisations exhibit must function; organisational structures 
must facilitate the realisation of collective goals/needs set by the environment if 
their longer term survival and viability as 'going concems' is to be secured. 
3. Structural forms appropriate to the goals/needs set by the environment establish a 
framework of interrelated roles that integrate organisational members into a 
coherent and relatively stable social unit. 
4. This set of roles imposes a pattern of behavioural and attitudinal expectations and 
norms to which individual members must display a minimum degree of obeisance. 
5. Organisationally determined demands for compliance are often perceived as 
constraining, to some extent or in some degree, by individual members and exist 
in a state of permanent tension with their preferred wants/expectations. 
6. The resulting tension between organisational demands and individualised needs is 
a perennial source of conflict in organised systems and generates endemic 
instability and disequilibrium within structural designs that have to be coped with 
or managed in some way or another if organisational survival and effectiveness 
are to be secured. 
7. The coping strategies undertaken by organisational management will, during the 
course of time, modify the organisations' relationship with the environment and 
the internal designs through which this relationship is mediated and developed. 
The tribal delineation around quality according to this model is a result of the 
disequilibrium and conflicts felt by individuals who share a sense of tension promoted 
by the imposition of structural forms which seek to pursue the policy 'goal' of quality. 
These forms (Quality Manager, Quality Circle Leader, TQM Facilitator) may conflict 
with the other roles which people pursue as part of the structure of other policy goals 
in place for organisations (skilled 'expert' clinician, budgetary controller or client 
advocate). 
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Organisations As Negotiated Orders 
1. Organisations are social units that are created, sustained and transformed through 
social interaction; they have no separate existence's as entities or structures 
independent of their grounding in social interaction. 
2. As socially constructed and negotiated phenomena, organisations are most 
ap ropriately conceptualised as emerging out of the ongoing interaction of rp 
participants; they constitute temporary arrangements or patterns arising out of the 
social interaction undertaken by social actors which are always open to 
modification, revision and change through their interventions. 
3. In so far as they are the products of negotiated interactions then they have 
temporal limits in the sense that they will be reviewed, re-evaluated, revised, 
revoked or renewed over time. 
4. The organisational relationships and order arising out of this negotiating process 
have to be worked at; the organisational bases and forms produced and reproduced 
through interaction have to be continually reconstituted. 
5. The more formalised and 'permanent' conventions, rules and relationships 
entailed in established structures set partial limits to, and some direction for, the 
process of negotiation; they provide the more stable elements of complex 
organisations as a general background against which foreground day-day 
negotiations can be set. 
6. These, more formalised, organisational. elements constitute a relatively fluid 
structure of power and control which constrains and facilitates political bargaining 
between organisational coalitions or 'stakeholders' over the allocation, 
distribution and utilisation of scarce resources, as well as shaping the 
C constituencies of interest' which crystallise around these bargaining relationships. 
The tribal split in quality according to this perspective would revolve around the role 
of quality as a new area in services and which is in the process of ongoing negotiation 
and reconstitution. The pre-existing conventions of roles such as professional, 
Manager or patient representative act to set limits and directions to the quality debate. 
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They also form the basis for the 'constituencies of interest' around the notion of 
quality in services. 
Organisations As Structures Of Power And Domination 
1. Instruments or mechanisms geared to the protection and advancement of dominant 
economic, political and social interests prevailing within the societies of which 
they are a part; in this respect, organisations are constituted by the macro- 
structures of power and control in which they are located. 
2. The structural arrangements and managerial practices typical of formal or 
complex organisations are determined by these wider configurations of 
domination; the latter also control the extent to which organisations reproduce the 
ideological and political constraints in which they are embedded. 
3. Within the context of institutionalised constraints set by dominant groups, specific 
organisational actors - such as professionals, managers, technicians ... clients and 
customers - struggle to control the ideas and techniques through which work is co- 
ordinated. 
4. This struggle for control generates endemic conflicts of interests and values within 
and between organisational actors over the way in which work is to be structured 
and the benefits derived from productive activity are to be distributed. 
5. The conflicts that are embedded in the very social structure and fabric of 
organisational life produce contradictions and tensions which have to be regulated 
by administrative. technologies and managerial practices of various kinds if co- 
ordinated productive activity - geared to the interests of dominant groups is to be 
sustained. 
6. These regulative technologies and practices are partially successful but usually 
give rise to problems of their own in terms of establishing new sources of 
potential power and control that are fought over by contending groups. 
7. This 'dialectic of control' - that is, the continually shifting balance of resources 
and power reproduced by the uneven struggle between dominant and subordinate 
groups to exercise some degree of control over the conditions through which 
organisational existence is secured - is the primary source of structural change 
within complex organisations; endemic conflict between contending power groups 
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over the conditions through which the most significant features of organisational 
life are reproduced is the underlying force that drives transformations - of varying 
magnitudes and scales - in structures and practices. 
Quality from this perspective is a product of interest groups struggling to gain control 
over an area which threatens to alter the structure and processes of NHS work. The 
central policy message appears as a means of reinforcing the discourse of 
managerialism so prominent in political ideology and action. Technical quality 
techniques such as TQM, or Quality Assurance represent 'regulative technologies' 
devised by managers to attempt to gain control over the tensions which the conflict 
generates. These are, in turn, the focus of more conflict as they represent sources of 
power which could be used against constituencies. 
Organisations As Symbolic Constructions 
I- Organisations are cultural artefacts that are produced, reproduced and transfonned 
through processes of symbolic construction, mediation and interpretation in which 
all members are routinely engaged; organisational reality is constructed, 
internalised sustained and changed through processes of cultural; creation and 
enactment. 
2. Organisational cultures are constituted through the generation of values, 
ideologies, rituals and ceremonies that express and make sense of participation 
within a collective enterprise. 
3. As shared constructions of collective values and symbols, organisational. cultures 
are shaped by and articulated through modes of thinking and conduct which 
embody and represent the collective experiences and meanings entailed in 
organisational membership. 
4. Organisational cultures simultaneously socialise individuals into institutional 
patterns of thinking and acting, and into alternative schemes of interpretation and 
C sense making' that diverge from the former. 
5. Organisational cultures, and the collective meanings which they frame, transmit 
and reframe schemes of interpretation; they are never uniform or monolithic in the 
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messages they communicate and their implications for social action; they consist 
of multiple rationalities and realities that overlap, interpenetrate and contradict 
each other. 
6. Organisational cultures simultaneously support and question dominant structures 
of meaning, power and control; they consist of loosely coupled systems of 
meaning and interpretation that can be accessed and mobilised by various groups 
for their own purposes within and outside the organisations. 
7. The degree of ýeffective control that managers can exert over the impact of 
symbolic creation, transmission and interpretation is inherently constrained by the 
complexity of these processes and by the fact that dominant cultures are usually 
internally contradictory; the 'recipes for action' which the latter convey need to be 
supplemented by auxiliary systems of meaning and action that dilute and fragment 
the behavioural injunctions that they entail. 
According to this perspective quality is a function of the shared values and 
experiences of different participants in the cultural arena of the organisation. These 
values act as the basis for perception of, and action on, quality. Quality, in turn, acts 
as the basis for the regeneration of the participants' shared values. So a professional 
will hold 'professional' views on quality, which lead them to design 'professional' 
ways of operationalising the concept, which in turn reinforce the value of 
professional' activity and status to those within the profession and outside it; the 
prime example here is medical audit. The profession designs it based on the 
assumption that only professionals can recognise quality. The results are made 
available only to other professionals which in turn ensures the continuing and special 
role of the professional in defining quality in their work. Elements of other cultures 
can be drawn into these frames of meaning as means of furthering their own structural 
interests. So the language and techniques of consumerism can be brought into the 
managerial and professional 'folds' as a strategy for reinforcing their values and 
cultures. So involving consumers in clinical audit is a logical cultural development 
but with very specific boundaries on what they can contribute; these boundaries do 
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not normally encompass technical clinical issues 
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Organisations As Social Practices 
1. Organisations are social practices geared to the assembly and integration of other 
social practices concerned with transfon-ning the conditions - both material and 
ideal - under which collective action is made possible. 
2. As practices geared to the assembly and integration of other practices, 
organisations are reproduced through the design and deployment of various 
administrative mechanisms by means of which managers attempt to realise 
effective regulation of and control over the performance of work. 
3. These administrative mechanisms of assembly, integration and control embody 
structural resources - such as hierarchies, information systems and rules - and 
require processual facilitators - such as ideologies, coalitions and cultures - for 
their effective reproduction and implementation so that conditions under which 
organised action becomes possible are established. 
4. Both the structural resources and processual facilitators necessary for 
organisational assembly and control become focal points for power struggles 
between contending groups to gain access to the authoritative mechanisms - 
through which 'organization' is accomplished - and the allocative outcomes that 
they produce. 
5. Power struggles to manage authoritative mechanisms and the allocative outcomes 
they produce form the underlying dynamic for change and transformation in the 
social practices through which organisations are created. 
6. This conflict dynamic has to be analysed in relation to the strategic choices made 
by specifiable groups of social actors and the decision making practices through 
which they are formulated and the action recipes through which they are 
undertaken. 
7. The modes of calculation, techniques for decision making, and means of action 
available to and utilised by organisational. agents as a basis for intervening in the 
course of events to maintain or change structures in their favour becomes central 
to an understanding of power struggles and the organisational outcomes they 
realise. 
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Quality from the social practice approach is an administrative mechanism used by 
management who wish to see the structural resources of NHS service delivery 
allocated in their favour. As an administrative mechanism it embodies pre-existing 
power relations (in the fon'n of hierarchies and rules) and also the ideologies, 
coalitions and cultures of the organisation (most of which are based around the roles 
of professional, manager and consumer representative. 
The Ingredients Of Organisational Action: Interests And Stakeholding 
What runs through all of these different conceptualisations of the organisation is the 
notion that individuals have an 'interest' in the organisation, its structures and 
processes. Consequently they have a 'stake' in these structures and processes, 
including the operationalisation of quality. Williamson offers a succinct and valuable 
definition of interests: 
'Interests are to do with advantage and detriment to individuals and to groups. 
Interests are difficult to define but are something in which a stake is held; a personal 
or group resource or means to protect or enhance a resource. Everyone has interests 
in resources like influence, power, time, money, knowledge, the way situations 
involving themselves are defined, how words are used about them and in a host of 
other material and immaterial things and in the relationships between them. Everyone 
has interests in. health care, in its accessibility, its quality in general, and its 
standards of treatment and care. "6 
People with interests in an organisation represent stakeholders in that organization. 
Stakeholders are of interest as their needs, wants, desires, perceptions and 
conceptualisations are frequently different 17 . It is the source of these 
differences 
which fon-n the starting point for this thesis. Namely, that participation in quality 
activity and your perceptions of that activity will depend on the broader values which 
people hold in services these in turn can be held as reference points in pursuit of their 
interests - and serve to help them achieve the meeting of those interests. 
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Synergy And Non-Synergy In Stakeholding 
Williamsons18 framework outlines the interplay between interests and people that hold 
them (stakeholders). The first split is between interests that are synergistic or non- 
synergistic. That is, interests which are compatible with other peoples or, conversely, 
are in conflict with others. So for example, the use of quality (at the colloquial level) 
in Trust marketing and public relations (such as publishing a list of quality 
improvements) is synergistic with both senior managers' and the local populations' 
interests. For the managers, quality serves to deflect potential criticism and attract 
referrals (as long as the purchasers acting on behalf of the local community believe 
the marketing 'spin'). For the local community audit gives a feeling of reassurance 
that their local provider is working towards such a virtuous ideal. A non-synergistic 
scenario would be one in which critical medical audit results for a group of urologists 
are made public. Whilst the public's interests might be met in ten-ns of information, 
the medical team's interests in maintaining the flow of referrals, and therefore 
surgical experience, might be detrimentally affected - the action threatens one groups 
interests. 
Dominance And Repression 
At the next level interests can be seen as either dominant or repressed. This refers to 
situations in which one group's interests regularly prevail over those of another group. 
For Williamson the example par excellence is the dominance of health care 
professions: 
'The health care Professions are long-established, strong and cohesive. In each 
Profession there is a basis of common knowledge andperception and an 
understanding of the interests that all members share ... 
In their relationships with 
those recipients [of care] and in their practice, professionals are largely seýf- 
regulating. All have exceptional power to define their patients 'situation and their 
interests. ' 19 
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Once dominance is established then the weaker party can be seen to be repressed. 
This doesn't mean that their interests however, will always go unmet. In simply 
providing care of an adequate standard both professional and consumer interests can 
be synergistic (even though the professionals have more power through the assets of 
being able to prescribe antibiotics, perform surgery or seek out sources of expertise). 
Consumers get to return to the previous level of health and the professional claims the 
social and financial rewards in meeting that need (and in the process meets his/her 
own interests) 
Oppression And Suppression 
The final distinction is between oppressed and suppressed interests; and those which 
are apparent and inapparant. Interests are oppressed when repressed interest holders 
clearly recognise their interests and are able to articulate them but are prevented from 
striving for them by dominant interest holders. For Williamson the struggle between 
midwifery and the breast-feeding lobby of the 1960s and 70s is an example of this 
20 type of conflict . In relation to quality the desire of CHCs to participate 
in medical 
audit in the early 90s and the consequent rejection by the Department of Health could 
also be flagged UP21. 
Suppressed interests occur when issues are managed by dominant interest holders in 
ways which ensure that individuals are not even aware that their interests are 
threatened. Secrecy is the best and most obvious example of a situation in which the 
interests of one party can be considered suppressed. In the context of this study the 
confidential nature of audit results and the lack of compulsion on teams to deliver 
anything more than reassurance that it is taking place can act to deny purchasers the 
opportunity to place contracts with another provider and improve the outcomes of 
care. Or the 'massaging' of agendas of meetings with consumers or their 
representatives by managers so that only non-clinical aspects are considered can also 
be considered along the same lines. 
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When interest-holders are repressed but the issue is synergistic with their interests 
Williamson distinguishes between apparent and inapparant interests. Apparent 
interests being those which repressed interest holders can see are being met. An 
example being the use of sterile gloves in aseptic areas - as long as the patient is 
conscious and aware then both parties know that their interests, with regard to 
avoiding infection are being met. Inapparant interests are those in which the repressed 
interest holder is unaware that their interests are being met. For example, the nurse 
who covers up an individual with Alzheimer's disease wandering naked in a hospital 
ward is meeting both the patients need for dignity and the nurse's interests in being 
seen to be compassionate. Even though the individual may never be aware of the 
intervention. This typology is represented diagramatically in Fig 9. 
Williamson's typology was based on the work of Alford who concerned himself with 
the issue of structural interests which are: 
'those interests which gain or losefrom theform of organisation of health services. ' 22 
The value of an approach based on a recognition of structural interests is 
demonstrated by HaM23 who makes the link between values and social action in 
arguing that the key issue (in relation to policy issues in the NHS) is: 
,... to develop mediatingftameworks to connect macro-theory with specific policy 
issues. One approach to this is through the examination of dominant value systems in 
particular policy areas and their influence on policy. More specifically, by analysing 
the operation ofprofessional ideologies in health services it may be possible to 
establish links between the way issues are defined and resources allocated, the nature 




apparent interests inapparent interests 
Figure 9: WilliamsOn'S Structural Interest Model24 
non-synergistic with repressed 
interests 
oppressed interests suppressed interests 
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An interest-based framework also holds the possibility of illuminating the delineated 
(and therefore conflicting) picture of quality that emerges from the literature. As 
Giddens highlights: 
'It is the concept of 'interest'. rather than that ofpower as such, which relates 
directly to conflict and solidarity. Ifpower and conflictfrequently go together, it is 
not because one logically implies the other, but because power is linked to the 
pursuance of interests, and men's interests mayfail to coincide. All I mean to say by 
this is that, while power is a feature of everyform of human interaction, division of 
interest is not. ' 25 
Obviously simply having a stake in quality is not enough to explain the tribal 
delineation put forward as the predominant feature of quality in the NHS. It is the 
pursuit of interests and how you utilise your stakehold that is of interest to the 
researcher seeking to examine the operationalisation of quality in services. Pursuing 
interests is dependent on two other factors in the emerging framework: power and 
ideology. 
Power 
Power acts as the organisational resource for people to draw on as part of their 
behaviour. If you wish to pursue your interests unfettered and in ways which you 
want to control, then you require power. Power can be defined in various ways and, 
like quality, is a heavily disputed concept. Essentially however all discussions of 
power refer to the transformative capability of individuals to alter the course of 
eventS26. Although it is the nature of this transformative capacity which distinguishes 
the views of different commentators on the subject. What is clear, however, is that 
power plays a significant role in human relations. As Weber's definition of power 
highlights: 
'[power is] the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of others. 
"' 
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It is possible to isolate two divisions in the concept of power: 
* power as an element of social action 
* power as feature of social relationships 
The Lukesian View: Power In Action 
The first of these perspectives is characterised by the typology offered by Lukes. For 
him there are three dimensions to power as social action: 
1. Situations of observable decision-making, focused on key issues over which there 
is overt conflict concerning the subjective interests of the individuals or groups 
involved. 
2. Situations of 'non-decision-making' in which only some potential issues become 
explicit, where there is covert as well as overt conflict concerning the subjective 
interests of individuals or groups; 
3. Situations in which the social agenda is established (that is, potential and explicit 
issues are created) in which there is actual (overt and covert) and also latent 
conflict over both objective and subjective interests of individuals or groups. 28 
The three dimensions of Lukes' typology are perhaps best illustrated with reference to 
some potential scenarios relating to the operationalisation of quality in NES services: 
scenario one: A Trust's quality manager asks a consultant to be a part of a Trust-wide 
quality committee. The consultant refuses saying that his clinical work comes first 
and that he has little interest in 'talking shops' run for management. Such an 
encounter can be seen to conform to Lukes' first dimension of overt conflict and 
emphasises the power of the consultant (and the relative lack of power of the quality 
manager). 
156 
scenario two: The consultant 'invites' the directorate manager to attend his firm's 
medical audit meetings for the last twenty minutes in order that the manager can help 
'in an administrative capacity' secure resources for the equipment they need to 
improve their clinical outcomes. The manager feels compelled to attend as 'something 
is better than nothing' but feels that he should really be insisting on attending the full 
meeting as he has responsibility for audit as a whole for the directorate; and anyway 
'this is par for the course of manager-medic relations in the Trust'. 
From Luke's second dimension it is clear that the consultant has left the manager little 
choice and has, through his actions, ensured that only certain issues will be made 
available to the manager. However, it is Lukes' third dimension that best addresses 
the analytical needs of the researcher. From this perspective it is clear that the actions 
of the consultant have contributed to the establishment of an agenda for future action 
that will conflict with the objective and subjective interests of the manager. Moreover, 
it is going to be increasingly difficult for the manager to combat the agenda as the 
format will remain even as medical staff come and go. Eventually it just becomes 
accepted by all parties as the status quo. 
This third dimension provides for a clearer distinction between coercion, influence 
and authority as forms of power. It emphasises the social nature of action through the 
recognition that there is power over others as well as power to (act) 29. Expressed in 
Lukes' own words: 
'The bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of individually chosen acts 
but also, more importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned 
behaviour ofgroups, andpractices of institutions, which may indeed be manifested by 
individuals' inaction 30 
Power Through Communication 
Lukes' social action view of power, in which power is exercised through action, is 
contrasted by the view of critical theorists such as HabermaS31 . For him power is seen 
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in the structuring of social relations through communication. He shows how 
communication can be directed towards the achievement of ends which aren't 
necessarily being communicated directly. Communication when used in this way 
becomes discourse. Discourse, in turn, shapes the rules and resources which actors 
can draw upon in their relations with others. Some discourses are more 'powerful' 
than others; for example, currently the discourse of 'work and contribution' is more 
dominant than the discourse of 'individual freedom and non-contribution [to society]'. 
Although of course, at different times in history these positions can alter. Hugman 
gives the example of how the power of professionals over patients is expressed 
through discourse based around the three elements of content, relations and roles. 
'Usually the content [of a meeting] is controlled by the professional, and even when 
the client is able to introduce topicsfor discussion the professional can avoid these 
either by ignoring them or by introducing those which he or she considers 
important ... this 
has a surface appearance such as in the use ofparticular words, tone 
of voice, and non-verbal expression, and also a structure in which the expectation of 
social roles (professional, client) serve to create 'Scripts'which, while not totally 
constraini . ng, establish the dimensions of normal communications. 32 
Exercising Power In Pursuit Of Quality 
Whilst power as capability is fascinating and omni-present in all interactions it is the 
exercising of power in the pursuit of interest that is of interest to this discussion. 
Handy distinguishes between power as a resource and power in its verbal form; for 
Handy the verbal usage of power is termed influence 33 . Influence 
in organisations is 
seen as having a variety of sources: 34 
Physical power: the power of superior force. Influence is exerted through physical 
force. Whilst obviously not a common feature of everyday organisational, life 
(save in prisons or mental hospitals) it does manifest itself in picket lines and mass 
demonstrations. 
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2. Resource power: influence is exerted through the possession of valued resources 
which are a) controlled and b) desired by others. Handy uses the example of the 
monopoly of labour supply and the power to award pay increases or status via 
symbols, as examples where resources are the basis of influence. 
3. Position power: This is the power that comes as a result of the role or position in 
the organization. The occupancy of a role entitles one to all the rights of that role 
in the organization; power resides in the position rather than the individual. For 
position power to be able to influence people the position has to be backed by the 
organisation and also be in possession of desired resources. So the quality manger 
who 'is out on a limb' and lacks either coercive powers or significant desired 
resources will have difficulty in influencing people towards his or her vision of 
desired social action. Importantly, position power gives control over certain 
invisible assets which assist in the ability to influence. These include: 
0 information 
0 the right of access to networks and committees (and also information) 
0 the right to organise: through organisation of work, environments and 
the flow of communication, individuals' behaviour can be influenced 
4. Expertpower: this power comes from being acknowledged as a source of 
expertise in a field. As such, and in contrast to the other types, it is bestowed upon 
the expert by those over whom it will be exercised. Anyone can claim to be an 
expert but if those claims are found to be fraudulent then this negates further 
attempts to claim expertise on the part of the individual. Expert power can be seen 
to be a particularly influential resources for professionals in services where 
progression within one's professional group and ones position in the organization 
(and hence position power) is often bound explicitly to levels of expertise. 
5. Personal power: is power derived from charisma or popularity. 
6. Negative power: this is not strictly speaking a conceptual distinction in its own 
right. It refers to the use of the above resources in ways which fall outside the 
agreed constituency or contrary to accepted practice: power used negatively. It is 
the power to stop things happening; for example, the personal assistant who 
wilfully screens out those messages to his/her boss from people in the 
organization he/she doesn't like. 
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Quality, as part of the broader process of managerialization is concerned with shifting 
35 the balance of power in organisations . Sometimes explicitly, as in the case of user 
involvement initiatives and the granting of apparent 'position power' to service users 
by giving them places on committees. Sometimes implicitly, as in the transition from 
medical to clinical audit and the diminution of 'expert power' that opening up one's 
professional actions to others for scrutiny might entail. 
This process inevitably involves winners and losers; to lose power, or to grant 
someone more power, is to reduce part of your ability to pursue your interests. In an 
organisational. context an example can be found in the publication of 'raw' audit 
results outside the immediate environs of the clinical team. The team's ability to 
disguise the complexity (or lack of it) of the role they are asked to fulfil, and the 
outcomes of their attempts to perform one or more parts of those roles has been 
diminished. This in turn breaks down the mystique of expert power, which in the NHS 
is linked to position power and the trappings of those positions such as salaries, 
prestige and organisational status. Quality is clearly then not just about 'quality'; if 
the development of quality threatens peoples' interests then the application of 
resources (power) to oppose or resist the concept is likely to be a feature of the 
process. 
This is something which appears to overlooked by most quality 'gurus' or at least the 
adapted versions of their theories 36 . There is an implicit assumption that the simple 
use (colloquial) of quality backed up by techniques which reinforce corporatism will 
be enough to influence even the most hardened cynic into a shared vision and 
meaning which might run counter to the values promoted by their role or broader 
stake in the organisation. Based on the delineated picture of quality in the NHS, one 
has to entertain the idea that quality is as much a focus for conflict as it consensus 
between groups. 
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Virtuous Reality: The Role Of Shared Values 
The theoretical stance that emerges thus far is that action by individuals and groups is 
meaningful and linked to the pursuance of interests. However, the ability of 
individuals to use behaviour to pursue interests, no matter how powerful they are, is 
also influenced by the values they hold and their links with people who hold similar 
values. This is essentially the basis of a social action approach to human interaction 
and behaviour. Degeling and Colebatch outline what such an approach means for the 
study of organisations and the processes that occur within them: 
'[in social action theory]Actors are... intentional beings who, in casting their own 
actions and interpreting and evaluating the actions of others, make use offrameworks 
of meaning which are socially and historically based, are (in part) institutionalised 
and, in many instances, are perceived by those involved as socialfacts. To the extent 
that particularframeworks of meaning are shared by numbers of actors andprovide a 
basisfor them to cohere, andpeople act in terms of these frameworks, their actions 
contribute to both the re-affirmation of theseframeworks and the maintenance of 
social (and hence organisational) structure. ' 37 
Frames of meaning can be expressed more clearly as sets of values or normative 
reference points for behaviour and relations; or as some commentators have classed 
them, organisational cultures. 
Organisational Culture 
It is in the notion of organisational culture (or organisational ideology as it is 
sometimes referred to) that the twin elements of social action, namely value 
frameworks and power, converge. From this perspective: 
I 
... the various 
dimensions of organisational structure andprocess (and the 
arrangements andpractices which give themform) can only be understood when they 
are examinedfrom the perceptions that participants hold of them, and 
how they act 
accordingly. 38 
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Organisational culture or ideology in this context can be simply expressed as a set of 
beliefs about the way to behave, about standards and values 39 . Handy prefers the term 
(organisational cultures' rather than 'organisational ideologies' but to all intents and 
purposes the two terms are interchangeable; besides, his work is a direct extension of 
Roger Harrison's 40 initial treatment of the latter. For this chapter both terms are used 
interchangeably. For Handy organisational culture: 
'... turns organisations into cohesive tribes with distinctly clannish feelings. The values 
and traditions of the tribe are reinforced by its private language, its catch phrases 
and its tales ofpast heroes and dramas. The way of life is enshrined in rituals ... not all 
cultures suit all purposes or people. Cultures arefounded and built over the years by 
the dominant groups in an organization. What suits them and the organization at one 
stage is not necessarily appropriatefor ever. " 
However, this conceptualisation of organisational culture can be criticised on a 
number of fronts; the most pertinent being that it is unlikely (as will be seen in the Q- 
results in Chapter Six) that such homogeneity in a complex organization such as an 
NHS provider Trust is likely to exist. Moreover, if more than one culture exists then it 
is logical to suggest that each will constitute a 'cohesive culture with clannish 
feelings'. From a more anthropological perspective it is possible to conceive that 
culture is simply an 'ideational system' which therefore allows for the possibility that 
beliefs and behaviours can diverge and that several different cultures can co-exist in 
an organization 42 . Like 
Harrison and colleagues, the thesis shall employ the notion of 
organisational culture to signify the systems of values, beliefs and ideas held by 
groups within NHS organisations. 
Pollitt uses the definition of organisational ideology proffered by Hartly as the basis 
for his examination of managerialism in public services: 
'The essential characteristics of ideology are, first, that it consists of values and beliefs 
or ideas about the state ofthe world and what it should be. Second, these cognitive and 
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affective elementsform aframework. In other words, ideology is not simply a set of 
attitudes, but consists ofsome kind of relatively systematic structuring (though the 
structuring may be psychological rather than logical. Third ideologies concern social 
groups and social arrangements - in other words, politics in its widest sense being 
concerned with the distribution and ordering ofresources. Fourth, an ideology is 
developed and maintained by social groups, and thus is a socially derived link between 
the individual and the group.... Fifth, ideology provides ajustificationfor behaviour. ' 43 
It is clear from such a definition that organisational culture provides a powerful 
reference point for social actors reflecting on their choices in relation to quality in the 
NHS. 
Identifying The Cultural Components Of Services 
It is clear that in order to progress beyond this point the chapter must begin to seek 
out those organisational cultures or 'frames of meaning' which actors draw on in 
making their choices to participate in quality activity in the NUS.; it is equally clear is 
that these frames of meaning must be: 
a socially and historically located 
* institutionalised 
e make up, or contribute to, some of the rules and resources which individuals can 
draw on as part of their role in social action. 
From the multiple typologies of quality put forward by analysts, those that are most 
useful and have the biggest ring of authenticity about them are those which are most 
heavily grounded in the political context of NHS services. Of these, it is Pollitt's 
distinction between medical, service and user's experienced quality which is most 
detailed and most readily backed up with empirical examples. Whilst taking issue 
with some of Pollitt's reasons for his distinctions (the notion of nursing as not being 
professional' enough to have their own approach to quality) he does make the 
essential link between participation in quality initiatives and the broader frames of 
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meaning that people in services draw upon. Explicitly Pollitt talks of the links to 
professionalism but also imply linkages to the ideologies of managerialism and 
consumeriSM. 44 
Professionalism And Quality 
There are a variety of approaches to defining the organisational culture of 
professionalism. Moreover, it is possible to see how quality could be used to further 
the values., and therefore interests, of those calling themselves 'professionals'. 
Professionalism can be approached from a variety of angles, two of the most prominent: 
the 'trait' and 'functionalist', will be explored here. 
The first trait identified by theorists such as Johnson45is homogeneity of outlook within 
a particular occupational community. This implied need for homogeneity in outlook 
could explain the need for the professions' use of consensus-based approaches to intra- 
professionally defined 'good' practice as a route to quality; an example being the national 
audit standards being developed in hospital orthodontic specialities. There are some 
problems, however, in viewing professionals as being entirely homogenous in the values 
between and within professionals. The distinction between medicine and other 
professional groups (or groups with claims to be professionS46 ) has been well 
documented47. In recent years nursing, in particular, has sought to emphasise its 
distinctive value-orientation as part of its claims to be a 'profession A8 .A ftirther 
criticism can be levelled at the nature of ideology itself One of the key features of 
professionalism is that adherents may 'dip' into the shared values or beliefs of the 




befirmly or weakly adhered to by particular individuals, Some 
elements may be rejected while the remainder of the ýackage'is, however inconsistently, 
still maintained. 49 
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The second trait of professionalism concerns the acquisition and development of 
specialised knowledge. Patrick and Scraxnblerýo suggest that knowledge is an essential 
component in the process of professional legitimacy. In order to safeguard professional 
legitimacy professionalisation involves producing, assessing and approving knowledge 
within the profession itself. This internal process of production, assessment and approval 
can be seen in the way medical audit has been used to promote 'quality' in the clinical 
care component of services. Audit's key features are that it should be professionally-led, 
confidential and conducted on terms which clinicians and professionals feel comfortable 
with. 
The third professional trait involves promoting a monopoly of practice in a particular 
area of work. This monopoly is primarily achieved by developing control mechanisms 
(such as professional registers) which are sanctioned by the state and complied with by 
employers who employ only those people whose names appear on the register. 
Proponents of medical/professional quality utilise similar tactics as means to promoting 
their particular brand of quality. The central assumption within medical audit that only 
professionals can assess the quality of other professional's work can be construed as an 
attempt to develop a monopoly of opinion regarding what constitutes quality in 
professional practice. The official sanctioning of professional monopoly of practice is 
also extended to the mechanisms which promote the idea of medical/professional 
quality. Workingfor Patients demonstrated that the Government conceded quality (of 
medical work) can only be reviewed by a doctor's peers and should be professionally 
led5l. Professionalism is about controlling work practices in specific occupational groups 
and -medical/professional quality is about controlling for 'good'practice in professional 
work. Friedson 52 points out that while professions are not always free to control the 
terms of their work, the are free to control the content of that work. Medical/professional 
quality represents an extension of this control into the field of defining the constitution of 
C quality' in this self-defined work. 
Parsons suggests that one of the key values attached to professionalism 
53 is the altruistic 
notion of the public service ethic, or the placing of clients' interests before the 
profession's. Harrison and Pollitt 54 question whether professionals really do work 
towards meeting patients' interests out of altruism, or whether autonomy and self 
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regulation are actually more useful in promoting the professions' interests. Certainly the 
mechanisms employed to promote 'professional' quality, such as audit and peer review, 
rely on the extension of principles of autonomy and self regulation in quality assurance. 
The principles of monoprofessional audit can be seen as a very effective means of 
professionals legitimating pre-existing practices and perpetuating the mystique attached 
to professional activities. This role is further enhanced, from the professions' point of 
view, by virtue of the fact that, outside of employing organisations and the Royal 
Colleges, the results of audit are generally only released in anonymous and edited 
formats. Larson shows that self definition of good practice by professions is nothing new 
and can be considered as one of the traits of professionalism: 
'a profession is, injact, allowed to define the very standards by which its superior 
confidence isjudged' t5 
5 
Whilst using the 'traits' of professionalism as a framework for analysis is useful there are 
some problems attached to this approach. First, the trait-based models take as a starting 
point the assumption that there are 'true' professions which exhibit all the essential 
elements. These ideal-typical models act as normative benchmarks for what ought to be. 
In this sense they move away from being models of description to ones of prescription. 
This prescriptive role is highlighted by Johnson 56 who points out that the preamble and 
rhetoric of professional codes of conduct bear remarkable similarities to the core 'traits' 
of professionalism identified by sociologists. 
Second, the ideal-typical approaches, with their emphasis on'lists' of core elements do 
not explain adequately how these elements relate to each other; for example, is the 
growth of a specialised knowledge base related to increased autonomy? Or are there 
other factors in play? 
Finally, Larson 57 points out that the ideal-typical approach to describing the ideology 
seldom takes into account the concrete historical and cultural conditions within which 
professionalism has developed. The development of professionalism in medicine and 
law, and the extension of the ideology into other groups, are indicative of the condition 
of modernity; the advance of science, cognitive rationality; and the progressive 
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differentiation and rationalisation of labour in industrial societies. What is not so clear is 
how robust the conditions for being counted as a 'profession' will be in the social 
context of the 'post-modem' world. New types of knowledge and new means of 
dissemination represent significant challenges to the 'mystique'-based, and opaque 
nature of professional technical practice and modes of thought5 8. 
In order to increase the validity of the central argument that professionalism and 
professional quality share values and complement each other it is necessary to examine 
the ways in which the two are linked. Moreover, this needs to be carried out from within 
a framework which recognises and responds to the criticisms outlined above. One such 
framework can be termed the functional approach to professionalism. This approach to 
examining professionalism stresses the perceived utility to society of being at the 
receiving end of professional activity. Barber59puts forward four attributes of 
professionalism which at first appear almost identical to the trait approach. However, the 
functionalist nature of these attributes becomes clear in his analysis of the reasons for the 
development and maintenance of such facets: namely, the exercise and retention of 
power. 
Knowledge, for Barber, provides a powerful control over society. Because of this it is 
vital that specialised knowledge be used in the community interest. Barber assw-nes that 
professionals will naturally act in this way because of their internalisation of the public 
service ethic and values. Along these lines, professionals are perceived as the only social 
group who fully understand the implications of their practice and knowledge: it is, 
therefore entirely logical that they should be the dominant force in the control of their 
practice. Because professionals control the application of skills and knowledge based on 
the promotion of public welfare, society rewards them for what Johnson terms their 
'highly valued occupational performance 
60 
. This analysis, 
however, can be criticised on 
two counts: first, the argument that only professionals understand the implications of 
their practice devalues the experience of being a consumer of health services. It can be 
argued that no one understands the implications of professional interventions better than 
the person actually experiencing those interventions. It is, after all, the patient who lives 
with the result of medical or nursing activity; whether that activity is good or bad. 
Second, the assumption that society rewards professionals because of highly valued 
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occupational performance neglects the role of power as a variable in service delivery and 
reward. The rewards for professionals, particularly medical professionals, are themselves 
partially created by the claims of professional groups who possess the power to secure 
outcomes based upon these claims. Certainly until recently the merit award system of 
financial and status based reward, while sanctioned by Government, was almost entirely 
controlled by the profession itself. Similarly pay claims for nurses and medical 
professionals are often justified with reference to their contribution to the welfare of the 
nation, and the implications (both politically and in terms of public health) of the 
withdrawal of their skills and knowledge. This style of argument is a feature of 
professional quality; a judgement of quality is made with reference to the claims of the 
group that the judgement applies to, and in the case of audit from their data and by their 
peers. 
Harrison and Pollitel highlight the issue of trust as a variable in the functional approach 
to the ideology of professionalism. They suggest that professionalism and the structures 
that have emerged to support it act as means of preventing abuse of the tTust that service 
users place in professionals, or the doctor-patient relationship. Professionals claim that to 
safeguard this trust two freedoms are necessary: the professional must be free from 
external interference when exercising his or her expert knowledge according to the 
patient's best interests; and the profession must be self regulatmg. This second freedom 
is perceived as necessary as only the profession possesses the necessary technical 
knowledge to prevent patients being exposed to 'charlatans and incompetent 
practitioners'. 
Professional quality and the mechanisms used to promote it act as means to promoting 
two functionalist ends. First, it safeguards standards of care and contributes to improving 
patients outcomes in services. This is the justification often held up by the professions as 
the reason for the format of confidential, non-punitive audit. 
Second, the professional view of quality reinforces professional values such as autonomy 
and self-regulation and contributes to the safeguarding of knowledge and skills; and 
therefore control, power and status. There is, therefore, a synergy (along Williamson's 
lines) between the community and profession's interests. Professionalism has also been 
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seen as one means of evading managerial control and supervision 62 and promoting a 
monopoly of specific skills which in turn contribute to high earnings and social status. 
Certainly the concept of a type of quality which only professionals can recognise and 
evaluate and which is linked to financial gain or access to resources, reinforces this 
value. %ichever stance is taken on the ideology of professionalism: traits based on 
ideal-types, or the functional utility to society of the characteristics of professional 
groups, the values identified by both analytical routes are reinforced by the professional 
approach to quality. 
Managerialism, Managers And Managerial Quality 
In line with the previous section it is first necessary to isolate those values beliefs or 
norms which collectively might constitute the ideology of Managerialism. In doing so it 
is useful to acknowledge the 'multi-layered' structure of the ideology. Pollitt suggests that 
Managerialism has both horizontal and vertical value structures: 
Macro-values: the level of ideology, deep assumptions and generalisation 
Micro-values: the middle layer where ideology meets specific theories, models 
and techniques. The ideological component plays a background contextual role 
here and is replaced by more technical elements of managing people and 
resources. 
0 Afinal layer: ideological influences appear minimal and widespread use is given 
to seemingly value neutral tools and technical artefacts such as performance 
indicators (for example, bed turnover rates, mortality/morbidity rates). The 
managerialist element enters in the ways in which these tools are deployed; the 
ways the data generated by them are used and the tool's position in broader 
models of management theory. 
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At the macro-level, or the level of tenets and generalised beliefs one can isolate several 
values which Managerialism and managerial quality share and mutually reinforce. First, 
is the value of management itself, the worth of management, both as a body of workers 
and as a feature of work is something which is very much a feature of managerialist 
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thought and concepts of managerial quality. The scientific and excellence approaches to 
quality have their roots in strands of managerialist thought: 
0 Scientific approaches: Taylorist or Fordist notions of organisational production 
which emphasise fragmentation of skills and the breaking down of tasks (de- 
skilling), with consequent separation of knowledge from work, can be seen in the 
promotion of universal and relative standards which concentrate on systematic 
assessment of specific service elements (such as BS5750 -'the kitemark'). Such 
quality standards view quality in a service as the sum of well delivered 
constituent parts rather than the whole. 
0 Excellence approaches: TQM, and the patient focused hospital, have at their core 
Post-Fordist notions of quality through cultural change, consurner orientation and 
'subtle' control mechanisms. 
Within each of these approaches to quality, management and managers are afforded the 
lead or principle agent role in promoting the concept of quality. 
Second, managerial quality and Managerialism both share a belief in the worth of 
explicit objectives or goals, a highly motivated workforce who work towards these goals 
with attention to detail, costs and a desire to reduce bureaucracy and red tape 64 . This 
picture of a motivated, cost-conscious, objectives-based, workforce is one which quality 
mechanisms such as TQM promote. TQM central tenets such as 'quality is free, 
responsibility lies with the individual for securing quality in interactions With internal 
and external customers; and defining self-objectives based on customer requirements, 
reinforce such values. 
Third, Managerialism espouses the virtues of 'good' management practice. The definition 
of which is commonly based on models of practice or examples derived from those 
companies that are successful in the private sector. Service quality models such as those 
based on Peters and Waterman's oft quoted, but seminal text, 'In Search ofExcellence 65 
reflects this belief in the worth of p6vate sector achievement and management practice. 
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Fourth, they both afford a negative valuation to the worth of 'politics' (as discussion, 
debate and consensus) in securing beneficial processes and outputs in services. Pollitt 
suggests that Managerialism perceives politics as inefficient, sectional and possibly 
irrelevant and conflictual66 . The shift in management style since 1983 then, approved 
and led by government, can be seen as a move away from allocating resources at 
organisational. level based on consensual agreement and discussion between doctors and 
managers and towards more rational allocation by managers with greater power to act 
independently. 
Quality and General Management, and by implication apolitical decision making, were 
linked at a governmental level. In terms of the power of the management tier in services 
this development represented a significant shift in their favour. As Day and Klein point 
out: 
'/general management was a]... movefrom a system that is based on the mobilisation of 
consent to one based on the management of conflict -from one that has conceded the 
right ofgroups to veto change to one that gives managers the right to override 
objections. 67 
The central role that quality occupies in general management means quality has played a 
part in the overriding of objections, and therefore the exercise of power. This role for 
quality in the changing power relations of the NHS is a point recognised by Clarke etal 
in their managerialization thesis 68 . They argue that quality, as a component of 
managerialization, is explicitly about control. The point here has been to show that 
quality and consensual orpolitical' decision making do not necessarily go hand in hand; 
even where quality techniques emphasise 'partnership' and 'team-work' there is usually 
a managerial hand at the helm. 
These values or beliefs are those derived from an analysis of management thought 
generally rather than specific models or frameworks for management action. It is this 
'middle-level' which is of most interest to a discussion of value differences between 
ideologies. This middle level theory involves the use of techniques and normative 
assumptions about the way the organisational world should be which are more specific 
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in nature. It is at this level that labels such as 'Fordist', 'Taylorist', 'neo-Taylorism' and 
'Post-Fordism' enter the discussion. The values attached to these models of management 
and managerial actionare replicated and reinforced in tools and techniques which focus 
on actualising the concept of service/managerial quality. Prior to exploring the ways in 
which notions of service/managerial quality fit into the ideological 'starting blocks' of 
Taylorism and Fordism it is useful to examine what is meant by these terms. 
Taylorism & Fordism: Commanding Quality 
The terms refer to the ideas and values of Taylor and Ford at the turn of the century in 
the United States. Their ideas constitute the ideological roots of 'scientific' approaches to 
achieving service quality - such as performance indicators and quality assurance. Their 
ideas are of direct relevance as some of the methods initiated by government and used at 
macro and micro policy levels on the premise that they would improve quality 
(Performance Indicators, management information systems, Resource Management) 
through the 1980s and now into the 1990s possessed, and retain, a distinct'Neo- 
Taylorist' character69. 
Taylor's theoretical base was undoubtedly positivist in character. His key assumption 
was that management could legitimately lay claims to being a science; with all the 
associated constants and laws that this label implies. It was this assumption which 
provided the basis for the school of 'scientific management'. The values attached to 
Taylorism are those of precision, measurement, waste-reduction, systematisation, and 
monitoring of activity. 
The means to achievement of these goals were the scientifically derived new rules of 
production which would involve specialisation and deskilling, analysis of task, task 
prescription based on that analysis, financial incentives for workers, and individualised 
work with responsibility for that work's standards. It is worth expanding on these points 
to gain a 'flavour' of Taylor's ideas in relation to the management function. 
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The techniques associated with the promotion of the'scientific' type of managerial 
quality clearly align themselves with middle-level Managenalism; of which Taylorism is 
one strand. Donabedi&S70 assumption that quality improvement in the processes of 
health care delivery can improve outcomes can be considered 'scientific' in its logic and 
'Taylorist' in its character. The managerialist-ideological heritage of the 'scientific' 
approach to quality has been well noted by a number of commentatorS71 72 but it is worth 
extending their observations further in order to provide a fuller examination of the links 
between the ideology of Managerialism and the concept of managerial quality. 
Tayloes original texts placed very little emphasis on the issue of effectiveness in relation 
to the management ftinction. The quantifiable nature of other variables in his analysis: 
efficiency, time, cost, method did not extended to product effectiveness; the criteria for 
which is largely left to managers discretion in the short to medium terms, and the market 
in the long term. This means that managers' values and perceptions directly influence the 
processes used; and therefore, using Taylor's own logic, the outcomes produced. Similar 
criticisms can be levelled at the managerial tools in use in the NHS. Quality assurance, 
management infonuation and Resource Management all depend on the assumption that 
'get the process right and the outcomes will look after themselves'. While these tools all 
pay great attention to those values associated with Taylorism such as measurement, cost 
and efficiency, it is only recently that they have begun to be linked to variables 
concerned with effectiveness in the form of clinical outcomes. Taylorism in its pure form 
was very much a creature of its historical context and the development of quality has 
reflected the changes in managerial thought over time. Most notably the transition to 
'Post-Fordist' models of management. Before examining the links between quality and 
Post-Fordism it is necessary to unpack the term Fordism. 
Fordism shares with Taylorism the normative stance that management needs to control 
the workforce by specifying what is to be done, how it is to done and in what quantity It 
is to be done. In this sense it, like Taylonsm is a 'command'model of manageMen 
e 3. 
Fordism. promotes the type of organisational culture which Hand 
4 refers to as arole 
culture' in which power and authority share the same boundaries. Authority in the 
orgalUsation is linked to hierarchical position. The role and power of experts or 
professionals is accepted within its allocated and well defined place: 'on tap 
but not on 
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top, 75 . This 'role culture' is seen as a result of, and a reinforcement for, the Fordist 
model's dominant hierarchical and self-contained organisational structure. Fordism 
places heavy emphasis on conformance to rules and procedures. These are developed 
within the context of the organisation's mass production aims which are relatively stable 
given the infrequent nature of any product/service changes and which are designed to 
reinforce the producer-driven nature of any product or service delivered. The model is 
associated with prominent 'career' employees, who have learned the necessary rules and 
procedures. Key management functions in this model are the fixing of effort levels, 
specification of work methods and ensuring workforce compliance 76 . 
The success of Fordism, Taylorism and other derivatives of the 'scientific' school of 
management lies, in part, in their place in history. Prior to the Second World War 
manufacturers were able to create new mass markets (as in the Ford Model 'T') and 
could afford to focus merely on satisfying demand through quantity of supply. Success 
in such a context could be measured against satisfying demand, control of costs and 
through economies of scale. Since the Second World War increased competition, 
international production and trade, coupled with an increasingly sophisticated and 
wealthy consumer population, have led to markets becoming saturated with goods and 
the recognition, on the part of manufacturers that simply increasing quantity as a means 
of satisfying consumers was not enough. Quality or 'excellence' began to figure in 
77 
manufacturer's plans and strategies for production 
Obviously welfare services have significant differences from the private industrial sector 
- ffie-fack of assembly lines and the dominant role and numbers of the 'professional', are 
just two. However, as Alazewski and Manthorpeý8 point out there were also many 
similarities between welfare provision before the advent of the new managerial styles 
and structures and the private industrial sector. These include the primary airn of 
delivering the maximum quantity of welfare to the maximum quantity of consumers and 
at the lowest cost; the provider-driven nature of the product; and the use of standard 
packages of services with little or no choice or ad ust: rnent for individual need. These 
similarities, while vital to understanding why 'Fordist' management was so attractive 
prior to the mid- 1 980s do not explain the need to shift to Post-Fordist structures and 
techniques in welfare services. 
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It has been seen in the review of the literature that two of the key influences in the rise of 
'quality'in NHS policy were the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s and the linking 
of ideas of 'managerialism' to the political goals at the centre of policy; particularly the 
rise of the New Right in Conservative Party politics. A Post-Fordist perspective shows 
that these are linked and that an emphasis on quality is part of this linkage 79 . These 
similarities and the shared influences between quality and Post-Fordism reinforce Pfeffer 
and Coote's assertion that the 'excellence' approach to managerial quality is a feature of 
the 'Post-Fordist' nature of welfare state restructuring and managementgo. 
Post-Fordism And Quality: A Question Of Culture 
Post-Fordism can be used to subsume a variety of 'middle-level' managerial approaches. 
Theories such as New Public Management and Public Service Orientation in welfare can 
all be viewed from within the loose perspective of Post-Fordism. The common thread 
which runs through all these is an emphasis on'quality' as an explicit managerial priority 
and as a feature, or outcome, of service delivery. 
Post-Fordist models of management promote organisational cultures which are seen as 
hybrids of Handy's role and task-type cultures8l. The task-type organisational culture is a 
direct contrast to the role culture described earlier as part of the Fordist command model. 
The task culture acknowledges expertise and thereby negates the 'deskilling' elements of 
Taylorist/Fordist scientific management. Power in this organisational. culture is spread 
amongst those individuals who are, 'positioned at the intersections of networks of 
specialist, task orientated groups 82 . These 
individuals might be experts or simply good 
'fixers'93 
. An example of such an 
individual in the NHS might be the clinical director, 
who does not necessarily occupy the top position in each medical 'firm' (that position is 
usually reserved for consultants or professors at the top of their professional hierarchies) 
but nethertheless controls resources, liases with other organisational teams, holds 
responsibility for resource decisions and generally straddles the arenas of management 
and medicine. The aim of creating such individuals is to spread power more widely and 
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facilitate the formation of a'tearn culture' in which collective organising is highly 
valued 84 . 
Post-Fordist organisational structures are typically decentralised and consist of 
specialised and local units bound together by contractual relationships. The workforce 
are encouraged to achieve results rather than merely conform to process specifications. 
Innovation, therefore, is not necessarily discouraged. Providers frequently change 
product or service design and are seen to be, or at least attempting to be, responsive to 
consumer wishes. Post-Fordist organisations employ a'coreof professionals or experts 
to Perform specialist functions and rely on short-term contract-based staff to fulfil other 
organisational tasks. In direct opposition to the scientific or Fordist model of 
management, managers are there to develop employee commitment, ensure output 
targets are met, and to develop and maintain close relations with other units and the 
centre 85 - to 'empower' rather than merely monitor and plan. 
It is clear that the 'excellence' approach to technical quality dovetails well with a Post- 
Fordist conceptualisation of the management function. This dovetailing has not been lost 
on commentators such as Pfeffer and Coote 86 who subtitle their analysis of the 
excellence approach 'the managerial approach' and make explicit their belief that the 
excellence approach to quality is a component of Post-Fordist managerial ideology. 
Cultural change along Post-Fordist lines invariably involves the reshaping of power 
relations, or at the very least the perceptions of those relations. Quality -appears as one of 
the means this reshaping has been pursued at the macro level. A point recognised by 
researchers from Bristol University who see quality as one means of changing the role 
and dominance of 'the professional' in serviceS87. At the organisational and specific 
(middle-level) managerial theory levels quality often appears as an end in its own right; 
quality as an organisational and personal goal as opposed to a route to new power 
structures. Certainly in each of the case sites used in this study quality was often 
discussed as an end-point in itself Its links to a broader agenda of challenging existing 
power relations were not a feature of the material used to promote the concept (although 
participants frequently recognised it as such). 
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Clearly quality in its managerialist guises of the scientific, economic and excellence 
approaches appears remarkably similar to the ideas and specific models of management 
expressed as Taylorism, Fordism and Post-Fordism. What is unusual is that all three 
approaches to quality are pursued simultaneously at policy levels with little or no 
apparent co-ordination. The approach to managerial quality in the NHS represents a 
reflection of the values of managerialism. generally rather than one all-consuming set of 
managerial ideas along the specific lines of Ford, Taylor, and the Post-Fordist Deming, 
and Peters and Waterman. The values promoted by techniques such as quality assurance, 
universal standard setting and statistical process control represent their 'scientific' 
managerialist ideological heritage; for example, cost, efficiency, compliance with rules 
and process based standards, and provider-led specification. Thenew wave'of quality 
techniques based around the excellence approach to quality similarly reflect the Post- 
Fordist, consumer-centred, ideas of New Public Management and Public Service 
Orientation; for example, consumer responsiveness, new and more subtle mechanisms of 
workforce control such as Resource Management and short term contracts, small, 
decentralised and accountable work units, and organisational goals as the basis for 
action. It is clear that the values promoted by managerialist ideas of quality are often 
different to those attached to the professional approaches to quality previously outlined. 
One example is provided by the explicit and monitored performance criteria involved in 
managerial quality mechanisms which completely counter the claims for autonomy 
promoted by professional approaches. Before going on to examine conflicts between 
these two ideologically influenced approaches to quality it is necessary to highlight the 
values attached to the final approach to quality in the 'tribal' typology: user's 
experienced or consumerist quality. 
Consumerism And The Notion Of Consumerist Quality 
The links and shared values between consumerism and consumerist quality differ from 
the other types of quality and their respective underlying ideologies in two important 
respects: first, consumerist quality is in some respects a much more non-native ideal-type 
than either the professional or managerial approaches. Actual micro-level mechanisms 
for promoting consumerist quality in organisations are (in contrast to the professional 
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and managerial approaches) often poorly developed. Consequently, the theoretical 
material put forward by analysts draws on non-native, rather than descriptive, data. 
Second, the language of consumerism and its values are often taken on board by 
professional and managerial groups as means of furthering their ends as opposed to 
consumers. This is not to say that consumer representative groups do not occasionally 
make use of managerial techniques and rhetoric; but their legitimacy in services does not 
come from doing so. The moral high ground in the NHS is in being seen to be 'doing the 
right thing' by your customers. From a perspective concerned with interests it is quite 
feasible for dominant stakeholders to synergistically meet both theirs and consumers 
needs (if only by repression or oppression of consumers interests). Despite this synergy 
consumer representatives tend not to be the dominant interest group in services. 
The Macro Picture 
At its most general level consumerism can be seen as consisting of five primary values 88 
Access: consumerists see the need for clear and explicit criteria as a feature of access to 
services. Because only in this way can decisions about access to services be questioned, 
If a potential customer knows what criteria apply for access to a service, for example, 
age or condition, then they can challenge decisions and argue for fairer, more equitable, 
rules. The other value promoted by consumerists in relation to access is the issue of 
accessibility. The rationale behind this promotion is to break down the perceived 
impenetrability of large, monolithic, public sector organisations and bureaucracies. It is 
sometimes confusing to know where to enter the system to gain advice or help other than 
through the conventional 'gatekeeper' route of General Practitioners. 
Choice: basic consumerist arguments value the provision of services in forms whicih 
enable the consumer to exercise a degree of choice between the available options. This 
has been a significant feature of policy rhetoric since the introduction of the quasi- 
market in health care. 
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Information: information is a valuable commodity, and as such, its use (and the disparity 
in availability between providers and consumers) is heavily contested by consumerists. 
For consumerists, consumers need information to enable them to make the best choices 
from the available options, to maximise the utility they gain from using them, or to gain 
a foothold in the running of public services. Information is seen by Potter 89as the key to 
conferring power to consumers. By providing information on factors such as standards 
attainment, rights, responsibilities, organisational structure, decisions made and the 
reasons why, she argues that consumers will affect change. 
Redress: the value of redress to consumers is perceived as lying in its ability to settle 
grievances quickly, simply and fairly. Redress procedures are also seen as providing a 
check on the activities of providers and as a mechanism for controlling quality (albeit 
retrospectively) by allowing management to identify and rectify problems of policy, 
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system or structure 
Representation: This is the belief that it is worthwhile representing the views of 
consumers and expressing these to decision makers at the crucial points in the policy and 
decision making systems. Commonly, at the level of the individual, this means some 
form of advocacy, either in the shape of a member of a formal advocacy organisation; a 
Community Health Council representative, or a solicitor. The unorganised nature of, and 
lack of resources attached to consumers of health services as a collective mean that 
group or community interests as a whole are represented by institutional bodies such as 
the Community Health Councils. Although the funding and other limitations attached to 
these bodies make their presence little more than cosmetic; particularly in the new 
'contract culture' of the NHS. 
The Links: Quality And Consumerism 
The links between consumerism and quality can be explicit. For example, between 
Potter's9l five basic principles of consumerism and Mcgrath's general conceptualisation 








MCGRATH'S CONSUMERIST QUALITY 
access 
choice 




McGrath's last two categories, empowerment and advocacy, roughly equate with Potter's 
notion of representation; although, obviously they mean much more to the end-user of 
services. At this most general level of discussion then it is clear that consumerist quality 
shares values with the broad ideology of consumerism. However, just as with 
professionalism and managerialism a degree of heterogeneity is present in the concept. 
The Middle Layer 
There are three sub-divisions to consumerism, each of which attaches slightly different 
weightings to the core values of infon-nation, access, choice, redress and representation. 
Equally, they all differ in the ways in which these values should be achieved and 
promoted in the context of services. These three models can be termed: 
1. Market-based consumerism 
2. User participation consumerism: which incorporates the sub-categories of: 
e community participation 
* democratic accountability 
partnership 
the radical approach 
The 'Market-PlaceModel 
This model of consumerism puts forward the opinion that a consumerist product is one 
which is based upon what consumers want and provided at a price that consumers find 
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acceptable 93 . As the title suggests it is dependent upon the structure of the market for its 
existence and market-based economic assumptions underpin the theory. By being able to 
choose between alternatives the consumer is seen as an active participant in raising 
quality and by exercising choice through their purchasing power they can directly 
influence service providers. Quality in this context is a product of the effects of the 
market. The dominant value in this approach is consumer choice. Put simply, market 
place consumerism posits the notion that if consumer choice is increased, in a setting 
which enables purchasing power, then product or service quality will be enhanced. 
Quality services within this approach will be those that attract the most customers based 
on the operations of the market. 
However, as Nocon points out, these two elements: choice and purchasing power, are 
currently a long way from conforming to the free market standard required (leaving the 
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private sector aside) . Patient choice in the NHS is mediated by third party 'gate 
keepers' such as General Practitioners (GPs), Social Service Departments and Health 
Authorities. Moreover, even if this structured mediation were not in place, consumers 
would have to assert themselves in the face of other competing interests, such as budget 
holders desires to avoid overspends. 
Even if it is accepted that consumers possess the faculties and willingness to choose they 
still require information relating to the effectiveness, quality and costs (opportunity, 
social and marginal) of each of the alternatives; information that is essentially inadequate 
within current service provision. The performance indicator system (post-Korner) has 
been shown to inadequately reflect the concerns of the consumer 95 , and is largely 
inaccessible to those outside the NHS. As has been seen already in the earlier literature 
review, clinical audit (a prime measure of effectiveness) is dependent on anonyrnity and 
secrecy for its success and professional co-operation. Such structural features of NHS 
quality do not constitute a recipe for successful infori-nation dissemination to consumers 
or their representatives. 
Despite its obvious theoretical flaws, which are largely attributable to the structural 
effects of the NHS quasi-markýet, the market-place model is immediately relevant to an 
examination of quality in services. This type of consumerism is manifest in services via 
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initiatives based around customer relations, service settings, and the manner in which 
services are provided: the 'charm school' approach to quality and consumeriSM96. This 
approach, whilst providing a pleasant service delivery context for the consumer, does not 
address more weighty issues such as rights to a particular service or standard, or the 
empowerment of the service user. 
The User-Participation Model 
This is a broad category for what are, in essence, three separate sub-models: - 
i) The community participation model. 
ii) The democratic accountability model based on notions of citizenship and caring. 
iii) The partnership approach to service planning, management and evaluation. 
THE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION MODEL. 
The ideal-type often used as the basis for exploring this model is the development of the 
Community Health Councils (CHCs). These arose out of governmental concern that the 
users and representatives of services were exerting too little influence on services - 
services which were becoming dominated by professionals, via their combined roles of 
97 
management and evaluation of services and service quality . They were formed 
principally to put forward local users' views to Health Authorities and act as the missing 
cog in the planning and evaluation processes of services. However, CHCs have been 
criticised on a number of fronts. Some of which were outlined in Chapter Two (see page 
45) and include their inability to bypass the views of organised pressure groups. 
Quality services along the lines of the community participation model are those services 
that respond to organised 'community' requests and allow effective user inputs into 
planning and evaluation. Quality is seen as being promoted by organised representation. 
Consequently, it is collective rather than individual satisfaction with services that 
dominates as the outcome of a 'quality' service. 
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THE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL. 
The democratic accountability approach to consumerism and consumerist quality has at 
its core the notion of the 'empowered' citizen, with commensurate rights to variables 
such as choice, redress and representation. These rights amount to levers which 
consumers can use to raise the quality of the services they receive to a level which they 
think they ought to have. The dominant values in this approach are equity (in access and 
opportunity) and meaningful representation - consumers actively shape decision making 
rather than just being heard. The model also values the idea of 'rights' to standards and 
participation in services. Quality in a service, according to the democratic accountability 
model is where equality in access and standards is achieved for all its customers; the key 
negative indicator being the lack of consumer recourse to their'rights'. It draws heavily 
on the notion of citizenship, and has been a central strand in governmental policy since 
the Conservative launch of the Citizens Charter. 
Citizenship, Rhodes 98 argues, has the advantage of providing an ethic for action due to 
its political heritage and established theoretical base; it is also thought to enhance the 
standing of an organisation and increase the motivation of its employees. Pollitt suggests 
that the concept of citizenship involves the promotion of equity, equal opportunities, 
representation and opportunities for participation". It is by no means clear that 
inequalities in these variables, which are being addressed as part of the current debate 
surrounding health service provision and quality, are being adequately remedied. It is 
hard to see how, given the structure of current provision and policy, the gaps between 
rhetoric and reality can be bridged in relation to equity, equal access, and the opportunity 
to participate. As has been shown in Chapter Four, representation (via CHCs) in many 
Trusts is limited and participation in services still in its infancy. 
Citizenship not only relates to the actualisation of these noble concepts in dealings with 
the state but also with the individual's relations with the organisations of the state. It is 
with this in mind, and the distancing of providers and purchasers from central 
government, that the Citizens' Charter was applied to health services in the form of the 
Patients Charter. The Charters promote quality, choice, standards and value as their 
main themes, and also the notion that citizens' rights can be equated with consumer 
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rights. This conflation can be considered misguided as the concept of active citizenship 
involves not only rights related to societal contribution via consumption, but also full 
contribution in the literal sense. In short, the empowerment of consumers to contribute 
via a framework of 'rights'with the provision for increased accountability which 
accompanies such a framework. However, any pressure that is applied to services or 
managers seems to be only done so in an informal manner. The Charter's vision of the 
citizen is that of a consumer with increased rights and expectations and not fully 
empowered citizens along classical linesloo. 
The concept of citizenship also lacks a recognition of the power asymmetries that can 
exist even when consumers are involved via representation on, or participation in, 
National Health Service committees. Hudson suggests that one of the key components of 
democratic accountability - the election of consumers or their representatives onto 
committees - could result in a role which is indirect and limited. This is due to the: 
'existi . ngpower relationships which do notfavour consumers or consumer groups and as 
such [the] considerable difficulties in involving users in systematic planning and 
managemen f. 101 
This involvement can be criticised along the lines that the distorting effects of unequal 
power relationships mean that such legitimisation cannot truly be seen as acting in 
consumers best interests. Such legitimisation techniques, with concepts of citizenship at 
their core, are also being adopted as means of making decisions and judgements 
regwTing the quality of care/service provision; with similar distortion of consequent 
action in dominant interest holders' favour. 
THE PARTNERSHIP APPROACH. 
This approach foregoes the political problems inherent to the concept of community 
participation via organised representatives and the conceptual 'minefield' of citizenship 
based rights. It emphasises the benefit of infort-nal collaboration between providers and 
users. It involves the medical profession, para-professions, and managerial sector 
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relinquishing some independence and users relinquishing some dependence' 02. MS 
approach to consumerism suffers similar problems to the democratic accountability 
model previously outlined; In that it neglects to account for the unwillingness of 
powerful agent groups to relinquish their respective power bases. Moreover, it fails to 
recognise the significant differences in knowledge and information between consumers 
and their professional or managerial counterparts in services. 
Consumerism along the lines of those organisations seen to be doing something as a 
response to consumer wants circumvents these difficulties somewhat. Hudson' 03 argues 
that much of the consumerist activity in services centres around 'hotel' matters, due not 
only to a narrow conception of the capabilities of the consumer, but also the unassailable 
power of the medical profession. This power means it is reluctant to lay itself open to 
what it considers uninformed and unfair comment. An example of this can be found in 
the lack of consumer involvement in medical audit and the proviso on the part of the 
profession that its co-operation will only be given if the process is confidential. 
One means of bypassing the resistance present when questioning managerial or 
professional power is by co-opting consumers into planning or evaluating services based 
around an intermediary concept - such as health service 'outcomes'. By allowing users or 
their representatives into outcome measurement and development processes one element 
of the 'quality' equation can be questioned using a quasi-objective concept. Yet measures 
can be developed which reflect consumer interests and go some way in re-dressing the 
inequalities involved. However, the ability to question power in this way arises only 
when the data is published and made available for comparison by consumers. A 
situation, which while improving, is still woefully inadequate. The involvement of 
consumers in the DoH Clinical Outcomes Group and the publication of selected 
Performance Indicators in 1997, are evidence of greater openness and participation, but 
there are still no consumers involved in the Clinical Standards Advisory Group, which 
suggests there is still some way to go. 
Winkler' 04 suggests that the problems of power disparity, which are still a fundamental 
block to consumerists' involvement in partnerships with providers, could be eased by 
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setting up institutional arrangements with the aim of empowering users. These 
arrangements have six key elements: 
9 User information: on service availability, delivery, accessibility and, above all, 
quality, compiled independently of NHS management. 
" Patient advocacy: by using an independent or quasi-independent advocate. 
" Clinical audits: with results available to user groups. 
" Improved complaints procedures 
" User participation in decision making 
" Collective accountability of user representatives: user representatives need to be 
accountable to and supported by a community group with research facilities. This 
would ensure that consumer representatives enter into partnership with management; 
as opposed to becoming part of that management. 105 
The values most heavily promoted by this approach to consumerism and consumerist 
quality are similar to the community participation and democratic accountability models. 
However, the partnership approach lacks the formal criteria for user involvement, 
representation, information or access which accompanies the other two models. This 
means that it relies on more powerful groups, namely doctors and managers -'allowing' 
consumers to play a part in planning and evaluating for quality. In effect, these powerful 
groups can control both the pace and nature of any changes along consumerist lines. This 
model is perhaps the least attractive to consumerists attempting to develop quality in 
services based on consumerist values as the agenda for evaluation remains with powerful 
groups. Any consumers allowed into the process, at either macro or micro policy levels, 
will be exposed to the full rigours of NHS power play amongst stakeholders. 
The Radical Approach 
This approach to consumerism rejects the notion that professionals and managers should 
lead the way towards consumerist services by'allowMg'the consumer into service 
planning, management and evaluation. It does this, not by pursuing the goal of consumer 
rights, but by challenging professionals' right to govern the service relationship by 
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replacing the old doctor-patient relationship with a model based upon an active, wise and 
selective consumer who doesn't automatically comply with all service directives or 
expectations of the patient. The overall aim being the consumerist tenet of greater 
egalitarianism in services' 06 . Haug and Lavin' 
07 put forward four reasons why the radical 
approach to services has arisen. 
Firstly, consumer's education levels have risen over time. The educated consumer is seen 
as being in a better position to question professional or managerial competence. As Wirt 
suggests: 
'while more education does not make everyone a critic, it does increase the chance that 
the myth ofprofessional omnipotencewill be questioned, particularly if the results are 
less than anticipated. 
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By education Haug and Levin do not simply refer to general education, but also the 
health specific field. The exposure of issues surrounding health and health care in the 
media, information leaflets, and self help groups, all serve to meet the demands of an 
educated consumer population. 
Secondly, there has been a growth in the number of para-professionals. These are quasi- 
professional groups who have shattered the mystique of medical practice by taking on 
(or being allowed to take on) tasks that traditionally were the preserve of physicians or 
surgeons. Examples in this country include the resurgence of independent midwifery 
practice, the development of specialist nurses, district nurse prescribing and the 
expansion of the role of the practice nurse. 
Thirdly, they put forward increased public belief in the efficacy of self-care as a 
precursor to increased consumerism; although the position of this variable is unclear as 
it could also, conceivably, be a result of greater consumerism in services. Self-care is, as 
Haug and Lavin point out, the dominant form of healing for the majority of the 
population but is limited in its applicability - i. e. the person with a broken wrist would be 
foolish to attempt to heal it themselves. However, in the case of long-term or chronic 
illness it is often the case that as service users grow used to their condition then so their 
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n 11. ability t0self-diagnose change and treat themselves improves as well. In this sense it is 
possible to view this 'learning' process as similar to the physician's key tools in effective 
diagnosis, namely knowledge and experience. 
Similarly, Haug and Lavin's final point concerned with the new medical ethics which 
have arisen out of the development of new technologies, is seen as levelling the playing 
field between doctor and patient; a point recognised by Watkins and colleagues' 09. The 
ethical dilemmas of technology related interventions such as whether to abort a foetus on 
the basis of amniocentesis, or whether to continue the interventions necessary for life 
support in someone with irreversible coma, are perceived as being accessible to the 
public and are often part of general media debate. As a result, some argue that because 
lay-value judgements are involved (such as the quality of life and the needs of relatives) 
the lay person is as well equipped as the professional to make decisions. Haug and Lavin 
do not suggest that lay people should be making these decisions but that by their 
realisation that they perhaps could, consumers become aware of the limits of medical 
authority and therefore question it. 
The dominant values in the radical approach to consumerist quality centre on the 
consumer's right to information, choice, access, redress and changes to services based on 
changes M the consumer body itself Quality is seen to exist in those services which 
recognise those change; for example, they adapt their provision to the level which 
matches the raised educational levels of the consumer collective. It is also seen as 
present in those services which are considered 'reflective' in the consumerist sense; i. e. 
they take time to consider challenges to their competence, methods and treatment of 
consumers. More importantly, they act on these challenges and alter their service 
processes accordingly. 
Conclusion 
Policy messages from 'the centre' concerning quality encourage the view that the 
concept is vague and open to interpretation' 10. However, despite this vagueness 
providers are expected to deliver on the quality front: they are expected to 
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operationalise the term. Consequently, quality is an organisationally-located 
phenomenon in terms of the ways in which people encounter it. 
Despite the conceptual anarchy associated with conceptualising the organisation, 
notions of power, values, culture and structure all constitute recurring themes in 
relation to questions of organisational action on quality. Moreover, there is 
insufficient empirically derived material in relation to quality in organisations to 
allow for any grounded statements of the possible explanatory utility of any one 
model. 
Despite this gap in the literature on quality, there are some constants which relate to 
all organisations and which impact upon quality just as they would upon any other 
organisational phenomenon. Taking this into account, this chapter has argued that the 
operationalisation of quality at the level of services must take into account the context 
in which it is located and the variables likely to impact on its development - namely 
power, group values (in the form of organisational ideology/culture) and the interests 
of the people drawing on these sets of shared values. 
The thesis has taken the idea that quality is socially constructed (first mooted in 
Chapter One) and shown that the conceptual split associated with Pollitt's original 
'tribal' typology of medical, service and user's experi . enced quality can be recast 
along the broader organisational. ideological lines of professionalism, managerialism 
and consumerism. So the typology now has more breadth and becomes - professional, 
managerial and consumerist quality. Along these lines then, a theoretical starting 
point for the chapters to come can be represented by the following broad statement: 
Quality as it manifests itseýf in NHS acute provider organisations is ajunction 
of the group valuesfound in services. These values are represented in the 
organisational cultures ofprofessionalism, managerialism and consumerism: 
organisational cultures which help define and shape the pursuit ofgroup 
interests. Moreover, because social action in the pursuit of interests is always 
mediated by power (i. e. your ability to pursue your interests and the ability of 
others to stop you) then the ' ureoperationalisation of quality along p 
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organ isational-cultural lines will be heavily influenced by the composition of 
stakeholder groups and their consequent position in the power relations of the 
unit. 
The tasks for the coming chapters are now clear. First, to explore the contention that 
groups do indeed hold 'tribal' perceptions of quality activity. Second, to explore the 
development of quality in organisations from within a framework which is sensitive 
to, and can account for, the power dynamics between groups which all organizations 
(however conceptualised) possess. Finally, to pull together the findings of these two 
explorations in an attempt to account for any patterns that may emerge. 
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CHAPTER SIX: VALUE-BASED STAKEHOLDING & QUALITY - 
THE RESULTS OF A Q-METHODOLOGICAL EXPLORATION. 
Chapter Three outlined the unique contribution of Q-methodology in helping to 
understand the structures and forms of what are referred to as 'shared subjectivities' 
between individuals. This chapter outlines what some of these 'shared subjectivities' 
or points of view look like in relation to quality activity. Specifically, it presents 14 
points of view which were defined by the significantly similar ways in which people 
sorted Q-statements which were all based around the same Q-sample theoretical 
matrix (see Chapter Three). The bases for the matrix were the theoretical points of 
conflict within the 'tribally' delineated view of quality activity presented thus far. 
The chapter shows how points of view emerged from people's Q-sorts which 
approximate to the consumerist, managerial and professional categorisations outlined 
thus far in the thesis. However, the chapter also shows that there are a number of 
factors (4) which do not easily fit this category. Moreover, the overall demographic 
composition of the groups defining each factor does not follow any obvious pattern; 
although there were some important exceptions in relation to 'managerial' and 
'professional' view points (Factor Two in Shiptown and Factor Five in Marketown). 
The findings are explained with reference to the concepts of organisational 
ideology/culture, interests and power outlined in Chapter Five. The argument is 
presented that as quality is a mechanism for the furthering of organisational-group 
interests then it is in group's interests to portray their stances on quality activity in the 
ways they do (as expressed through their Q-sorts). So the dominance of consumerist 
values in the Q-sorts of professionals and managers can be explained by the fact that 
it is in their interests to be seen as the 'guardians' of these values. 
This interest-based approach does not, however, take into account the disparity of 
power between and within the different groups in services and the ability of groups to 
control agendas, definitions and service action and to resist the cultural incursions of 
others in varying degrees. For these reasons it is argued that some of the 'anomalies' 
in patterns of allegiance can be explained partly by some group's efforts to shape the 
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culture of other groups. In particular the culture-management approach of TQM and 
the general managers who pursue it. 
The Theoretical Matrix: The Q-Samples 
In order to represent the factorial design of the 'global' theoretical matrix described in 
Chapter Three each site used quotes from stakeholders from within that site. This 
fulfilled two needs: 
* The need to 'ground' the Q-sorts of individuals in the language and situations of 
local services. 
9 The need to incorporate local contextual factors such as differing structures 
between sites (some clinical divisions in Fishtown. were classed as directorates in 
Marketown). 
Compiling a cross-site, standard, Q-sample would have entailed fundamentally 
altering the quotes used to represent points on the matrix; something which needed to 
be avoided if the principles of Q were to be maintained. 
Where 'raw' quotes from respondents involved expletivesor extensive gaps or 
repetition then a small amount of editing was carried out purely to enhance 
readability. The Q-sample construction was always sensitive to the need to retain the 
original sentiment of the person's verbatim response. The Q-samples from each of the 
sites are represented in the appendix (tables 2: a-d) along with the factor scores for 
each statement. These give the weighted average scores on each statement for each 
point of view expressed in the factor. 
What Factors (Shared Subjectivities) Emerged and Who Defined Them? 
In all, fourteen factors emerged across the four case sites: 
Marketown = five factors 
Shiptown = four factors 
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Castletown == three factors 
Fishtown = two factors 
Tables I: a-d in the appendix detail the composition of the groups who defined them 
and the strength (factor loading) of each person's association with the view expressed 
in the factor scores for each statement 
Towards Interpretation 
Factor interpretation can occur in two ways. First reference can be made to the 
demographic characteristics of the p-samples (the sorters) who define each factor. The 
demographic characteristic of interest for this part of the study was occupational role 
or grouping. Clearly, there appears to be strong primafacie case for arguing that there 
is little, if any, evidence of a substantive link between role in services (manager, 
professional, consumer representative) and the factors which emerged from the case 
sites. It follows then that one of the theoretical 'mainstays' pursued thus far in the 
thesis appears somewhat compromised by this finding. The chapter will show later 
how this picture may not be as indicative of organisational-cultural disharmony as it 
first appears. 
The second means by which factors can be interpreted is with reference to the factor 
scores associated with each factor. These are presented in the Appendix, Tables 2: a- 
d. Factor scores represent the emphasis which the groups defining a particular factor 
place on the various elements of the Q-sample's statements. It allows the researcher to 
gain a purchase on the shared forms of those perceptions of quality activity which 
people hold. Moreover, by establishing the standard error of the difference between 
scores in the emergent factors it can be seen how groups differ in their perceptions. 
When the factors are examined and the areas of divergence outlined then it becomes 
clear that people's responses have more than a passing resemblance to the 
organisational cultural elements of the 'tribal' typology of quality activity and 
association outlined thus far. Factors which represent that which might be labelled 
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consumenst, professional or managerial approaches to quality activity all appear to be 
represented in the ways in which people sorted the Q-sample statements. 
The Customer at the Forefront: The Consumerist Factors 
Factor one in Marketown, Fishtown, Factor two in Shiptown and Factors one and 
three in Castletown, all portray quality as something which should positively seek to 
pursue the consumer interest: 
'I think quality works best when words like choice, customer-power and voice in the 
system, actually mean something. Ifyou want to define quality you've got to start with 
those three in mind. '(Castletown factor one +4) 
People defining this perspective placed a strong emphasis on notions of choice: 
'Quality is all about givingpatients control and choices while in hospital - real 
control, notjust menus and colour televisions. Obviously there are limits but we could 
-7 .. do more than we do at the moment' (Fishtown +5) 
'Quality is about promoting access to services and choicefor patients in the service 
itse4f and even before they get to us so they can choose where best to go. ' (Marketown 
+5) 
As well as consumer choice, issues of greater control over the hospital experience for 
customers were also strongly represented and valued: 
'Personally I don't want some stroppy patient with no real knowledge of his or her 
medical needs controlling what counts as quality in what I dofor him. '(Marketown 
-5) 
'Quality and customer control of the health services they receive cannot be separated. 
Quality is all about giving customers choices and control over those choices in the 
hospital. '(Castletown factor one +5) 
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Information was seen by the people defining these factors as a key source of realising 
this control: 
'Information is the key to the whole quality strategy. Surveys, patientfora, and audit 
results should be the basis of the whole quality thing. '(Castletown factor one +5) 
'I can't honestly see how giving patients tons of information is going to help them 
question what we do ... not in the real world anyway. '(Marketown -5) 
The corollary of this pro-consumer interest stance was this factor's negatively 
valuation of the autonomy and power of professional groups in relation to elements of 
quality activity: 
'Its all very well letting and Drs and Nurses decide that their work is excellent or of 
good quality, but not everyone -patients included - is always happy to take their word 
for it. We need evidence. ' (Fishtown +4) 
'The only way to really ensure quality is to let the doctors and nurses on the wards set 
the quality standards. They are the only ones with the necessary knowledge and 
skills. '(Castletown factor one -4) 
For Castletown the two consumerist factors were differentiated along two distinct 
axes. The first was a sense of realism in relation to the furthering of consumer 
interests through current 'quasi-market' structures and processes and an associated 
emphasis on values such as choice: 
'All this emphasis on choice [as part of quality] does is raise patient's expectations 
unnecessarily. Its not always possible to meet those and so quality suffers. ' (factor 
one 0; factor three +5). 
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The second major split was in relation to the idea of management and quality activity. 
Those individuals aligning themselves with factor 3 took a decidedly anti-managerial 
stance within this factor: 
'Managers should be involved at every level, but especially in terms of deciding if a 
service is god enough. It's their necks that are on the line if the customers are let 
down. '(factor one + 1; factor three -4) 
t quality is pretty low down on most manager's agendas in the divisions. They have to 
worry about balancing the booksfirst andforemost and so there is an inevitable 
conflict between what they want and what they can achieve. '(factor one -3; factor 
three +4) 
The Pro-Professional Stance: Professionalism Valued 
The consumerist stance of the above factors was directly countered by those factors 
which appeared to value and stress the interests of the professionals involved in 
services. (Factor Five in Marketown, Factor Two in Castletown and Fishtown and 
Factor two in Shiptown. ) 
In many ways the factor represents the antithesis of the values expressed in the 
consumerist factors. The primary valuation was on the worth of professional traits of 
autonomy and self-regulation in quality activity: 
'Quality can be a good thing if, as professionals, its left to us to set the standards we 
arejudged by ... after all we're the one's with the specialist 
knowledge. ' (Marketown 
+5) 
tits important that we allow professional groups to keep control over the issue of 
quality if it is to benefit services in the long run. ' (Fishtown +5) 
196 
There was a distinct 'anti-managerialist' tone expressed in the factors in relation to 
the imposition of standards on professional work: 
'Management-set standards have an important role to play in raising hospital-based 
quality. Obviously professionals should be involved but they shouldn't have the whole 
say. ' (Marketown -5) 
Some Trust's factors went further and represented a much broader devaluation of 
management in relation to quality activity: 
'Putting management in charge of quality in the Trust hinders rather than helps. 
Peoplejust see it as a management thing' (Castletown +5) 
There was also a rejection of some of the managerially-initiated structures and 
processes associated with quality: 
'Having directorates and divisions means that managers and professionals work 
togetherfor quality and that has to be good. ' (Castletown -5) 
'The paperwork that we have to collate as a result of the purchaser interest in quality 
doesn't achieve anything in terms of the quality of clinical care. ' (Castletown +4) 
But this anti-managerial stance was not universal; and as a force for the reduction of 
conflict, quality activity was viewed positively by those subscribing to these factors: 
'Quality creates more headaches than it solves. It gets people's backs up and makes 
them worry unnecessarily about the way they work. It creates more aggravation 
between doctors, nurses and mangers than it cures. ' (Shiptown -5) - 
'Quality has done next to nothing as a means of improving the relationships between 
the clinical groups and especially management and professionals. Itsjust afocusfor 
more bickering over money. ' (Shiptown -4) 
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'Quality standards, forums and quality stuff like that arejust an excusefor consultant 
bashing. Quality causes more arguments than it solves. '(Castletown -4) 
Despite the factors' emphases on professional autonomy in relation to quality activity 
there was a pronounced rejection of many of the statements painting 'consumerist' 
issues of information provision and 'voice' in a negative light. But in each of the 
factor's there were boundaries to this enthusiasm: 
Y don't think there is any benefit to servicesfrom asking patients to constantly 
question what we do to them all the time. ' (Castletown -4) 
'I think there is a danger in letting non-professional groups take control of quality in 
services. You need the knowledge and skills that come with being a doctor or a nurse 
to really understand a service. ' (Castletown +4) 
'We call it the patientfocused approach but its not as i atients actually lead the rfp 
whole process, I think if we are to really give people what they want then it should be 
patients or consumers who take the lead. ' (Fishtown -4) 
'Its important that we allow professional groups to keep control over the issue of 
quality if it is to benefit services in the long run. ' (Fishtown +5) 
'Ifyou give patients detailed information on quality in the Trust, first they don't know 
how to use it and second, youjust askfor trouble with more complaints -just look at 
the Patients Charter and all the hassle you get with that. ' (Shiptown -4) 
'Quality in professional work is a professional issue. Its up to us to decide what 
quality in our work is'(Shiptown +4) 
The Managerialist Alternative 
The notion that professional groups should be largely self regulatory 
in quality 
activities is countered directly by Factor Two in Marketown. Of all the 
factors derived 
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from the case sites this was the only one which equates with a 'managerial' approach 
to quality as portrayed in the theoretical typology utilised thus far. The factor's 
strongest rejection was concemed with the issue of professional autonomy and 
leadership: 
'Quality is about leaving it to the health care professionals on the ground because 
they know how best thejob should be done' (-5) 
'Most health care professionals know good quality when they see it. Its part of being a 
professional that they already provide good quality care. '(-5) 
'Quality can be a good thing if, as professionals, its left to us to set the standard we 
arejudged by ... after all we are the ones with the specialist 
knowledge. '(-5) 
'Hospitals are about providing care and treatment, and its the professionals that do 
that isn't it .... so it should 
be professionals that drive the process of quality 
improvement in a trust. '(-5) 
I There was a strong positive valuation however for the idea that quality is best served 
through alliances and partnerships based around attaining a common culture: 
'Quality is about having a culture where everyone is linked together with a common 
aim of doing the right things at the right time by getting the processes right. '(+5) 
'Linking managers and professionals together in the Quality Improvement Teams in 
each directorate has gone a long way in promoting quality standards and attitudes 
that are sensitive to each directorate's priorities rather than those of the management 
executive. 
Given the rejection of professional autonomy and the valuation of shared cultures and 
Post-Fordist autonomous management units (clinical directorates) and techniques 
such as TQM-teams, the overall feeling of this factor is one in which an active 
management role in quality is seen as essential. This is reinforced by the weightings 
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attached to those statements which have, at their core, the degree of managerial 
intervention: 
'Quality is about meeting the customer )s requirements through a concentration on 
actively managing the processes of service delivery. ' (+5) 
'Management should deal with recalcitrant professionals, one skin nailed to the door 
in the name of quality would soon getpeople toplay along and take notice. '(+5) 
Interestingly, of all the factors that emerged from the case sites this was the only one 
which could most be seen to be relatively firmly defined along 'tribal' demographic 
lines, Of the fourteen people's Q-sorts which defined this perspective twelve were 
either general managers or nurse managers (there was also a nurse and a CHC 
member). This factor was also significantly (p<. 05) different to the other factors in 
relation to the question of complaints. This factor agreed with the statement which 
suggested that complaints as a feature of evaluation would: 
i ... encourage more complaintsfrom those difficult patients and theirfamilies. 
Consumers don't always know what they wantfrom services so using them to make 
judgements about themjust gives you a misleading picture. '(+ I factor two, -4 factors 
one, three, four, five) 
The'Middle Ground I 
Factors three and four in Marketown and Shiptown do not sit easily in the 
organisational-cultural categories used thus far as analytical reference points. Both 
these factors do not easily 'fit' into a tribal typology of quality. Each, however, 
differed significantly (+/- 4 points on the -5 through +5 scale) in a number of key 
areas and also in the general 'tone' of the factors. Factor three in Marketown and 
Factor four in Shiptown were generally quite negative in the perceptions of quality 
activity: 
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'Part of the reason that there are sojew doctors on-board in terms of quality is that 
the TQM thing and thepeople that run itjust lack credibility ... ifyou're not credible in 
the NHS and don't know what you're talking about then people won't respect you. 
(Marketown +5) 
'Quality has done next to nothing as a means of improving relationships between the 
clinical groups and especially management and professionals. Itsjust afocusfor 
more bickering over money. ' (Shiptown +4) 
The other two 'middle ground' factors in these sites were generally more positive: 
'Quality creates more headaches than it solves. It gets peoplesbacks up and makes 
them worry unnecessarily about the way they work. It creates more aggravation 
between doctors and nurses and managers than it cures. ' (Shiptown -4) 
'TQM and quality promotion generally has been a good thing in that its got people 
from different professional groups talking together and reduced all the conflicts that 
go on in clinical teams. '(Marketown +5) 
There is little, if any pattern, to the responses along ideal-typical 'tribal' lines. Each of 
the factors simultaneously stress apparently conflicting groups of values: 
Factor three in Marketown. simultaneously stresses the desirability of managerial 
leadership in quality issues and the normative value of professional self determination 
of work processes: 
'managers shouldn't have to waitfor professionals to come on board in relation to 
quality. I think a stronger managerial hand in the issue would be advantageous all 
round. '(+5) 
'Quality rests on solid measurable outcomes. The process behind those outcomes 
should be professionally determined; you can't have a good outcome with a crap 
process ... 
but the quality people don 't seem to realise that. ' (+5) 
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So Where Does This Leave 'Tribal' Quality? 
Obviously the results do not paint a straightforward picture of tribal delineation in 
relation to perceptions of quality activity. There appears to be aprimafacie case for 
arguing that at least some of the factors have the group members that one would 
expect in terms of the interests the factor apparently most favours; for example, the 
cmanagerial' factor in Shiptown, with its emphasis on strength for and through 
cmanagement' as a positive factor in organisational quality activity. Similarly, the 
lack of a managerial presence in the anti-managerial, consumerist factor of 
Castletown. But then again other perspectives appear to be defined by people who, if 
the factor was a basis for group action, would apparently harm their interests. This is 
particularly the case for the consumerist factors which all allude to a greater say in, 
and control over, services for patients as a desirable feature in quality activity. These 
factors obviously have consumer representatives aligned with them but also nurses 
and managers. Conversely, the 'professional' perspectives of Fishtown and Shiptown 
were all defined by the similarities of consumer representative's Q-sorts to their 
professional and managerial counterparts. The 'tribal' typology advanced thus far has 
(apparently) broken down at this point. However, closer inspection reveals this may 
not necessarily be the case. 
Going Back To Questions Of Organisational Ideology and Interests 
One of the fundamental underlying assumptions of Q-methodology is that people will 
always advance a point of view from a position of self reference'. The positions of 
self reference which infori-ned the Q-samples were the areas of interest-divergence 
associated with the interface between quality activity and the organisational 
cultures/ideologies of professionalism, managerialism and consumerism. What the 
results appear to suggest is that the dejacto association between being a professional 
by virtue of your professional role as a nurse in the organisation and an ideal-typical 
professional-tribal stance on quality activity does not exist. Moreover, the results also 
suggest that you are quite willing to relinquish position and expert power in favour of 
consumers. However, when the notion of organisational. ideology is unpacked it can 
be seen that ideology is not: 
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i some tightly definedpackage of items, each one of which will be clearly andfirmly 
held 
... Ideologies are much looser, messier and more contradictory creatures than 
that. They may befirmly or weakly adhered to byparticular individuals. Some 
elements may be rejected while the remainder of the ýpackage'is, however 
inconsistently maintained. '2 
Given these ideological characteristics it is quite reasonable to suggest that what the 
Q-results portray are the rejection and maintenance (albeit inconsistently) of 
ideologically influenced stances on quality activity. If it is accepted for a moment that 
the Q-sorts of groups do represent loose forms of 'tribal' quality stances then this 
inconsistency actually tells us something about those stances. Beckford 3 highlights the 
issue with the example of the almost infinite possible responses to the question, 'why 
are those people dancing? ' Two possible answers are put forward: the first, in a native 
American context, is 'to make rain'; and the second in a British ballroom, is 'to win 
the Come Dancing Golden Sequin Tango Award. ' Beckford's point is that these 
responses are given with reference to the credibility they will be afforded in the 
society in which they are located. What this means for the analyst is that: 
,... in both cases the accounts may be incorrect. The real motive of the actors in the 
first case might be to reinforce tribal mores, and in the second case the dancing 
couple may be trying to engage in surreptitious sexual dalliance. However ... there is 
no question that [the accounts] could only have been given in very different sorts of 
societies. The sociologist has learned something about the respective societies by 
discovering that these are what could count as an account in these societies. '4 
So from this perspective the accounts given by nurses and managers which seemingly 
portray their stance on quality as a consumerist one (i. e. they positively value 
'freedom of information', 'voice in the system for consumers', 'greater control over 
services' and other 'consumerist' messages) are provided because that is what could 
count as credible in their organisational cultures. This in turn suggests that some ideas 
are seen as more credible and appropriate than others. 
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If the proportion of variance explained by each of the factors is examined it can be 
seen that the 'consumerist' factors (factor one in Marketown and Fishtown; factor two 
in Shiptown; and factors one and three in Castletown) constitute the significant 
themes within the Q-sorts for each site: 
all figures are % Consumerist Professional Managerialist 'Middle, (Ground' 
Marketown 35.4 8 15.5 10.1 
Castletown 54.2 12 9.7 
Fishtown 43.3 21.7 
Shiptown 35.7 11.4 15.8 
Table 1: Proportion of Variance Between Q-Sorts Explained by Factors. 
Perhaps, this is not surprising; the idea of putting the patient's interests before one's 
own is central to the ethical codes of both nursing and medicine. Both nursing's code 
of conduct and medicine's Hippocratic oath - whilst expressed very differently - both 
have at their core the primacy of the individual: 
'[In broad terms nurses will] ... act in such a way as to safeguard the interests of 
individual patients and clients, serve the interests ofsociety, justifypublic trust and 
confidence, and uphold and enhance the good standing of the profession. 5 
'I willfollow that method of treatment which, according to my ability andjudgement, 
I considerfor the benefit of mypatients, and abstainfrom whatever is deleterious and 
mischievous... 6 
Moving beyond the ethical dimension, there is another argument that can be 
expressed as part of the rationale for the apparent strength of consumerist-type 
perspectives on quality activity. Namely, that consumerism represents some form of 
(. moral currency' in the current NHS. As the thesis showed in Chapters Two and Five, 
policy-makers since 1979 have made increasing recourse to the ideas and language of 
consumerism in their efforts to restructure the power relations of public services (via 
its incorporation in the process of managerialization). Success is measured partly by 
services progress towards consumerist goals of choice, voice, participation and 
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satisfaction. So from one perspective stakeholders in the NHS have a very simple 
incentive to be seen to 'be doing the right thing'. That is, apparently aligning 
themselves to a consumerist vision of services. 
Using the conceptual lens of structural interests outlined earlier it is in provider's 
interests to be seen to be aligning themselves to a consumerist vision of services. The 
question of interests in this regard is implicitly linked to power. However, the pursuit 
of interest always has the potential to create winners and losers and one must ask , in 
relation to that activity which labours under the banner of quality, who really gains 
the most: the providers or the consumers? 
The position of trust which the ethical commitment of individual professionals make, 
and the moral capital which they hold as guardians of the consumer interest, mean 
provider organisations and the professional groups within them gain much of their power 
by encouraging a sense of synergy between their interests and the consumer population. 
From the consumerist's perspective a service which purports to be incorporating within 
its quality strategy the release of infort-nation on services to community groups; choice 
for individuals, and formal more accessible means of redress, goes some way in meeting 
his or her value-based needs for these characteristics. However, the service also gains 
from this sense of synergy. More specifically the cultural groups within the services 
stand to gain from capturing the 'moral high ground'. 
In appearing to further the consumer interest, professional groups are offered the 
opportunity to reinforce their positions of expert and position power in services. Both 
these types of power (especially the tag of expert) depend, in part, upon the'granting'of 
the status by others - including consumers. The tag of expert is a powerful force in 
gaining societal status and once attained can assist greatly in the struggle to control the 
features of daily life in the organisation. As Abbott points out: 
'Ajurisdictional claim made before thepublic is generally a claimfor the 'legitimate 
control ofa particular kind ofwork. This control meansfirst andforemost a right to 
perform the work as a professional seesfit. Along with the right to perform the work as it 
wishes, a profession normally also claims the right to exclude other workers as deemed 
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necessary, to dominate public definitions of the tasks concerned, and indeed to impose 
professional definitions of the tasks on competing professions. Publicjurisdiction, in 
short, is a claim of both social and cultural authority. 7 
However, there is a sense in which if consumers are overly empowered with information 
and the means to challenge professional groups then the balance of power will swing in 
their favour and away from professionals. The task then for groups is to control the 
activities which lead to people having an interest and to suppress those which rruight 
challenge professional power. 
So the question now can be recast as'can the apparent dominance of consumerist ideas 
in the self-referent accounts of people's stances on quality activity be taken as 'real' in the 
sense that they will be the basis of action? The problem here is that the next chapter will 
argue (with reference to qualitative interview and observational material) that it cannot. 
The overriding picture in all of the sites was of structural boundaries to the attainment of 
consume-fist ideals. Exclusion from key meetings; the control of agendas by professional 
and managerial groups; blocking of information and subtle strategies of confusion and 
alienation in meetings were all features of the actualisation of quality in the sites studied. 
Power To Control The Cultural Incursion 
One explanation of the reasons why professionals and managers, who are the more 
powerful groups vis a vis consumers, in services might portray an alliance to cultural 
stances which may in the long term threaten their respective power bases 
is that their 
existing levels of power allow them to control the implementation of 
ideas derived from 
them. The apparent adoption of ideas from other cultures and absorption 
into one's own 
is not necessarily a tactic for the imminent demise of the culture; particularly 
if the 
cultural group doing the adopting is a powerful one. Pollitt highlights 
how ideas of 
managerialism have made incursions into professional work 
but may not necessarily 
threaten it: 
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'Doctors, teachers and social workers had their own practices, and their own 
professional cultures. Yhe prospect of 'outsiders'refining their goals, streamlining their 
professional decision procedures and inspecting their Yeedback'was not an 
overwhelmingly attractive one. If, however, specific borrowings could be kept under the 
control of the profession concerned, then that would be a different matter... ' 8 
The argument relates specifically to managerialism, but logic dictates (given that they 
both constitute ideologies) that the salient features could just as easily relate to the 
adoption of consumerist ideas into other group's cultures. Certainly their appears to be a 
degree of 'selectivity' in the factors; the middle-ground factors in particular appear to 
portray a'bounded' picture of meeting the consumer interest through quality activity. For 
example, in Marketown factor four strongly rejects the idea that infortnation on 'quality' 
given to outside groups constitutes a means for attacking provider groups: 
ID- . By giving information on quality to outside groups, like managers and the CHC we are 
just giving them a stick to beat us with' (-5) 
At the same time it equally strongly rejects the idea that audit results should be released 
to the same conununity: 
'We should release audit results to the community at large as an impetus to improving 
the quality of our services. ' (-5) 
Similarly in Shiptown factor one (the 'professional' factor) feels that audit and the 
confidentiality that accompanies it is the route of choice for promoting 'quality' in 
professional work: 
7 think audit within the profession is the most effective way ofpromoting quality within 
our work, people take notice and take part when they know its con dentiaL'(+5) if, 
Yet at the same time they accept that information on quality should be released to 
'customers'. There appears then to be a split between information on quality and 
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information relating to professional work gleamed from audit: 
'Managing information is management - therefore information is quality. I don't have a 
problem with giving information on the quality of our service to customers or with 
receiving information that helps us planfor quality changes. '(+4) 
Supporting The 'Opposition' 
Whilst it is easy to see, in the context of public services, why stakeholder-groups would 
express preferences for value-stances which portray them as actively promoting the 
consumer interest (proto-supporters in the parlance of Williarnson). What is not so clear 
is why consumers or managers would align themselves with a'pro-professional' 
viewpoint; or why nurses or consumer representatives would adopt pro-managerialist 
perspectives on quality activity. Obviously it would be difficult to see how aligning 
oneself to a value stance which appears to favour managerial or professional group- 
interests constitutes any form of increase in 'moral currency'. From within the current 
theoretical framework the conventional argument would be to suggest that it is because it 
is in their interests to do so. But how so? There are three plausible explanations: 
* That groups manage to control the degree to which the 'absorption' of messages 
from other organisational cultures impact upon the interests of their cultural group. 
* That the efforts of groups (particularly managerial groups) to change the cultures of 
other groups are having a degree of impact. 
* That cultural groups are not a homogeneous entity in terms of the power they 
possess; because groups are inherently heterogeneous then this degree of 'cultural 




The idea put forward in the last chapter that groups adopt just those messages they can 
retain some control over,, still holds water in this scenario. Whilst not constituting the 
'moral high ground' exposing one's cultural group to certain managerially-derived ideas 
may not be as big a threat as one might suspect. For example, accepting the need for 
critical scrutiny through something like 'transparent' measures of outcome which was 
the focus of one Q-statement, may not actually be as problematic as it sounds. If the 
measures of outcome themselves are professionally controlled then the potential to 
distort the process in one's interests is certainly present. There was evidence from some 
of the interviews conducted that outcome indicators were developed in services whose 
main criteria for selection was that they were simply eminently achievable. One surgical 
charge nurse in Castletown expresses the issues well: 
'Well its like the complaints thing isn't it. We had to come up withfour indicators of 
qualityfor the ward. We had to put in things like pressure sores but that was no problem 
because we don't have any or veryfew anyway because most of ourpatients are up and 
about in two or three days and then we ended up with re-admission rates, satisfaction 
surveys and complaints. But the surveys and the complaints ... well ifFM 
honest werejust 
a laugh ... we always 
have about 98% satisfied or very satisfied and hardly any 
complaints against the nurses really. Mostpeople arejust glad to get out. So no ... I can't 
say that the quality standards we had to agree to were that threateningfor us as a team. 
(Surgical Charge Nurse: Castletown) 
A Reflection Of The Impact Of Culture Management? 
Some of the managers (and a number of professionals and consumer representatives) in 
the case sites felt that the techniques of quality which they associated with 'management' 
such as Total Quality Management had exerted an impact on the cultures of other 
groups. Commonly, people suggested that progress had been slow but was now 
beginning to show signs of becoming, as one Business Manager in Fislitown. put it, 'part 
of the mainstream. of the clinicians' way of thinking about the Trust. ' 
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Having already established that the recasting of patients into 'consumers' is a central part 
of the managerialisation of welfare and that messages of customer 'choice', 'closeness' 
and 'sensitivity' are at the heart of the new 'Post-Fordist' schools of management, it 
comes as no surprise to recognise that it is seen as part of the management function itself 
to be seen to 'shape' the values of other cultural groups. As the gurus of the 'excellence' 
school of quality put it: 
C L"ý . E ven managementsjob becomes morefun . Instead of 
brain games in the sterile ivory 
tower, its shaping values and reinforcing through coaching and evangelism in thefield - 
with the worker and in support of the cherished product. "0 
If the power of groups (especially professional groups) includes the power to 'absorb' 
those elements that it can accommodate and use for its own ends, then any notions of 
managerial 'success' in preaching their version of quality can be questioned. However, 
it is clear that certain managerial 'messages' enjoyed the status of universal consensus 
within at least some of the sites. For example, was it a coincidence that in each of the 
factors in all three TQM sites quality activity was seen as needing to be 'corporate' in 
nature and based around ideas of common goals, aims and language? 
Quality is about having a culture where everybody is linked together with a common aim 
of doing the right thing at the right time by getting the processes right (Marketown +2, 
+5, +2, +5, +3). 
Quality needn't necessarily be afocusfor aggravation between nurses, doctors and 
managers. It can be used as a means ofgetting everyone talking the same language and 
moving towards common goals. (Castletown +4, +2, +3) 
Trying to manage professionals through quality techniques doesn't work. Yhey don't 
take it seriously and we [managers] speak a different language (Fishtown - 1, - 1) 
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A Question Of Power? 
One of the prominent findings of the qualitative interviews and observations 
conducted in the case sites was that nurses were far more 'managed' than medicine in 
respect of quality activity. It was nursing activity which was the primary focus of the 
clinical elements of quality activity rather than medical work, and it was nursing who 
lacked the ability to reject the imposition of quality ideas and techniques from other 
groups (especially management). This pattern is not new and a number of authors 
have recognised that 'quality' activity is far from all encompassing. In particular the 
word 'total' in Total Quality Management appears to be something of a misnomer 
given the power of the medical profession to opt out of involvement in the corporate 
totality of quality management 11 12 . The idea of medical staff opting out is something 
experienced in this study. In only two of the case sites could doctors be persuaded to 
take part in the Q-sorting exercises. This was despite a Chief Executive's letter 
backing the study and support from the heads of the respective quality hierarchies in 
each Trust - in three of them a Director of Nursing. 
Speaking of nursing and medicine as a homogenous entity - that of the profession - is 
perhaps misleading as there are a number of factors which make them very different; 
social status, salary and autonomy controlling work practices are just three. But it is 
the relative power to defend themselves from the involvement of managers in their 
4 professional' spheres of activity that most distinguishes them. For medicine, clinical 
freedom and professional autonomy are necessary for the execution of treatment itself 
and well established. For nurses, these values constitute the goal or end point of the 
9 professionalisation' project they are currently embarked upon 13 14 . 
This does not 
mean that doctors are not 'managed'; but refers instead to the differences in the 
models of management that nurses and doctors work within. Both senior nurses and 
doctors organise, monitor, and regulate the work of junior members of their respective 
professions; and they each organise patients. Finally, both groups organise and 
monitor the workings of each other. This is done formally in the ways in which 
medical staff organise admissions and treatment (which in turn impacts on care) and 
informally, in the ways in which nurses 'steer' doctors towards decisions they might 
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not have made otherwise . 
Medical management, however, is still predominantly a 
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medical matter. Nursing, meanwhile, is characterised by closer involvement in 
clinical work from general managers and a more defined managerial hierarchy within 
the profession itself with the presence of nurse managers and a more prescriptive code 
of conduct laid down by the profession's governing body. 
The differences then can be seen to relate, not just to the impact of management, but 
to the impact of general managers on the shape of the professional working day. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in relation to quality and specifically the question 
of professional models of audit. For medical audit the principles of peer review, 
confidentiality and educational purpose are paramount. But for nurses the idea of 
mono-professional audits have been characterised by factors which amount to a 
greater degree of linkage between management and the profession. As Harrison and 
Pollitt point out [within nursing audit systems ... ]: 
0 'There has been less concentration (though still some) on issues of membership of 
committees, rules of confidentiality, etc. and more on the exact, step-by-step 
procedures to befollowed in carrying out the audit. 
* The detailed products of nursing audit havefrequently been made available to 
management. 
much nurse quality assurance has been introduced and run b nurse managers Y 
rather than (as in the case of medical audit) by nominal ' eers'. p 
Some (not all) of the methods used make specific references to the need to consult 
patients and take heed of their views andpreferences. ' 16 
So in relation to the area of defining and evaluating 'quality' in professional work - 
which is the focus of audit - significant differences in the role of management 
between the two professional groups exist. Specifically, it would appear that nursing's 
power to resist managerial involvement in shaping the tone, design and uses of quality 
activities and the data they generate is lowere then that of medicine. 
However, differences between the professions also extend to the degree of 
homogeneity within the professions themselves. The professionalisation project of 
nursing has led to a situation in which the profession is being split into those who are 
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seen as more 'professional' than their peers. Current plans for specialist nurses to 
have their status as specialists recorded on the professional register are of concern to 
some commentators' 7. The introduction of Project 2000 has led to a sense within the 
profession that a highly trained 'elite' cadre of Registered Nurses is being created at 
the expense of those less well qualified'8. It is not clear what extent the management 
of this new 'elite' nurse will take and whether nursing as a whole will manage to 
'colonise' and consolidate its own new management strategies; or even extend them 
into the medical sphere through Clinical Director positions. But it is clear that to 
speak of the profession of nursing as a closely knit band of workers all united in 
similar values, ideology and levels of power is a little simplistic. 
It follows then that the apparent lack of uniformity in nurses shared subjectivities 
around quality activity may well be due to the lack of uniformity in the profession 
itself. Following this line of argument one would expect nurses to deliver different 
accounts, they are not wrong, or correct, or ideal-typical, 'professional' responses but 
they count as credible accounts in the context of a pluralistic view of the notion of the 
profession. 
Conclusion 
Q-method is undoubtedly a powerful technique for mapping the structure and form of 
shared subjectivities between individuals and within groups. However, what this 
chapter demonstrates is that a priori links between occupational role, organisational- 
ideology and stances on quality activity are not as clear cut as one might suppose, 
especially when derived from the literature alone. 
The factors (or self-referent stances) that emerged certainly have a 'flavour' of the 
viewpoints expected from social actors along the lines of the 'professional) 
'managerial' and 'consumerist' typology deployed thus far. However, the 
demographics of those groups who define these viewpoints mean that in one respect 
at least - the occupational composition - the thesis 
falls flat. 
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To reject the typology at this stage would be premature however; as indicated in 
previous chapters, the language, ideas and techniques of competing organisational 
ideologies are eminently capable of being used (and abused) by groups not 
immediately associated with the values they promote. A useful example here includes 
the incursion of managerial language and techniques into professional life: medical 
audit being the examplar used previously. But managerial-professional is not the only 
cross-boundary flow in place; consumerist language is part and parcel of both 
managerial and professional life. Moreover, even the language and claims associated 
with professional groups (such as greater autonomy) have emerged as a rallying call 
for the 'new wave' managers of the 1990s, in the form of claims for a 'right to be free 
to manage'. ' 9 
It should come as no surprise then that degrees of cultural &cross-pollination' exist in 
the accounts that people present through their Q-sorts. This chapter has argued that 
groups present accounts that count as credible within their cultural groups. This 
credibility is borne of groups' abilities to absorb and shape ideas and techniques 
which, whilst ostensibly a threat to their interests, can be used to further them. The 
example par excellence here is the idea of auditing one's professional practice; which 
whilst derived from the world of management, manages to retain the professional 
virtues of self-regulation and confidentiality. 
In as far as the messages seem to be 'getting through', then the claims of groups to be 
influencing the cultures of other groups are sustainable. However, this ability to 
influence groups is dependent in part on the power of the groups one is seeking to 
affect. The relative variability of nurses in respect of the factors may, according to this 
logic, represent their relative lack of power to prevent the ideas of other groups 
(particularly management) from influencing them. Moreover, nursing as a cultural 
group highlight the diversity attached to questions of cultural influence. Nursing in 
particular has a series of separate roles and sub-divisions; nursing can encompass the 
managerial role of nurse-management, yet at the same time the label includes nurse 
specialists: those at the forefront of nursing's professionalisation project and attempts 
to legitimate nursing's perception of its skills and knowledge as special and unique. 
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When viewed solely from a Q-statistical perspective the links between occupational 
groups, organisational culture and self referent stances on quality appear tenuous. 
With little in the way of conclusive evidence to steer the researcher towards rejecting 
or accepting any of the theoretical propositions developed thus far. It is at this point, 
however, that the strength of adopting a multi-method approach to data collection and 
analysis becomes clear. The qualitative data derived from Trust documentation, 
interview and observation all paint a far more delineated picture and one that is more 
firinly 'tribal' in its composition. This is the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: STAKEHOLDING AND QUALITY - THE RESULTS 
OF A CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
This chapter argues that occupational grouping alone is an inadequate framework for 
understanding the apparent differences in the perceptions and social action of groups around 
the issue of quality is services. It proposes an analytical framework based around four 
contingent types of 'stake' in quality; each seen as influential in shaping a person's approach 
to actualising quality in the case sites examined: 
occupational based group: i. e. nurses, doctors, managers and consumer 
representatives. 
the individual's position in Trust managerial, clinical and quality hierarchies. 
the individual's personal stake in an element of the Trusts' quality strategy. 
the individuals position in the local internal market: i. e. whether they were 
involved in the provision or purchasing of services or represented the users of 
those services. 
The chapter paints an overall picture of the issues associated with actualising quality: a 
picture characterised by variable degrees of conflict. The groups of stakeholders above 
comprise the participants in that conflict, but the primary research interest is the structure and 
composition of that conflict. The chapter shows how conflict between these groups was 
focused on eight key areas: 
preferences for actualisation 
defining quality 
evaluating quality 
information: its use and abuse 
the market and quality 
the structures of quality 
leading the process 
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Finally, the chapter shows that the structures and processes associated with quality in each 
Trust constitute both the settings for the conflict and one of the key outcomes of the processes 
of negotiation, control, conflict and concession associated with the concept in services. 
On Stakeholding And Differentiation 
'Organizations are not machines ... they are communities ofpeople and therefore behavejust 
like other communities. They compete amongst themselves for power and resources, there are 
differences of opinion and of values, conflicts ofpriorities and goals. There are those who 
want to change things and those who would willingly settlefor a quiet life. There are 
pressure groups and lobbies, cliques and cabals, rivalries and contests, clashes of 
personality and bonds of allegiances. ' I 
The terms stakeholder and differentiation are not used lightly. By using the term stakeholder 
the chapter acknowledges that NHS Trusts, like all complex organisations, have 
organisational groups present in them who have a stake, or vested interest, in organisational 
issues, technologies and techniques. These interests include the concept and application of 
quality in public services. The potential for competing interests in services (for example, 
between those of managers and professionals) means that the goals of such groups have the 
potential to be divergent. This internal goal diversity has been termed differentiation 
2; 
recognising and pulling together this differentiation is seen as one of the key functions of 
organisations 3. The examination of this differentiation is crucial to understanding the ability 
of quality, as the concept behind a distinct set of organisational techniques, to impact upon 
the work of the constituent parts of an NHS Trust's workforce. 
On The Structuring Of Stakeholders In Relation To Quality 
The study initially sought to explore the proposition that an individual's perception of quality 
activity would be heavily influenced by membership of one of the broad occupational groups 
in services. Consequently, initial sampling was on the basis of the occupational grouping of 
informants. However, it quickly became obvious that such a simplistic framework would 
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prove inadequate given the multidimensional nature of the struggles which individuals within 
the sites were describing. This does not mean that people made no reference to membership 
of an occupational group in describing conflicts and patterns of reaction to quality activity. 
Commonly, participants in these struggles made implicit or explicit reference to membership 
of a group as an influential factor in their reactions and views. This was an especially 
prominent feature of the transcripts proffered by professional stakeholders. For example, one 
senior nurse in Fishtown told how she and her colleagues in a surgical division had struggled 
to come to terms with managerial involvement in something which they felt had previously 
been a part of their clinical practice: 
'its not like we didn't care about quality before [the introduction of TQMprinciples into the 
Division]. Quality has always been an important part of being a nurse, you know doing the 
bestfor the patients and being accountable, but it did take us, as a group of Sisters, a long 
time to get our heads around the idea and what we had to do... Involving [the Quality 
Advisor] was our Divisional Manager's idea and one which we didn'tfancy atfirst... you 
know exposing all ourfaults to someone who wasn't a nurse and everything. But it was 
obvious pretty quickly that we didn't know what we were doing, so we didn't have a lot of 
choice. It wasn't easy though, there was a lot of worrying about it., 4 (Ward Sister: Fishtown) 
Initial analysis and coding of interview transcripts, reflective notes and aide memoirs taken 
from each site quickly established that organisational differences of opinion were 
characterised by a variety of groups- 
First, occupational stakeholder group. There was evidence to suggest that how one perceived 
and acted regarding the concept of quality was affected by the occupational group to which 
you belonged. This was as expected from the literature and the theoretical assumptions made 
prior to beginning the fieldwork. Groups such as doctors were heavily concentrated in the 
work of audit departments and had developed and maintained their medical audit structures 
which were separate from the clinical audit structures dominated by nurses and therapists. 
Similarly, there was a central band of quality activity which was heavily orientated towards 
ideas of quality assurance and quality management. This was sponsored by the central 
managerial structure of the Trusts and had little medical involvement. 
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Second, the position an individual occupied in the managerial and quality hierarchies within 
the Trust. Disputes around quality and quality activity also centred on the views and actions 
of groups of people located in the senior, middle and lower levels of the professional and 
managerial hierarchies. Accounts from the higher levels of the organisation (such as 
Directors of Quality and Chief Executives) tended to stress the organisational benefits of 
quality techniques and initiatives in terms of cultural change and improved organisational and 
user outcomes such as cost and user satisfaction. Whilst accounts of experiences of quality 
activity derived form the lower end of the organisational hierarchy saw quality as something 
which often was imposed from above and which exerted a negative effect on organisational 
outcomes such as staff morale and the sense of stability necessary to run a service. 
Third, within both of these groups there was a further split between those who had a direct 
stake in the success of elements of a Trust's quality strategy and those who experienced it 
simply as participants. The key example here is with regard to the struggles that the two 
Clinical Audit Directors (both doctors) in Marketown and Shiptown described in trying to 
persuade their medical colleagues to play a greater part in an organisational stance on chincal 
audit as opposed to a purely unitary strategy of medical audit. Commonly, the greater the 
individual's stake and level of contact with the strategy then generally the greater the levels 
of enthusiasm for the mechanisms in place. 
Finally, the local purchaser-provider split provided a powerful force in shaping people's 
perceptions and actions around quality. Some of the activity occurring in local markets did 
not fit comfortably with the ideas of competition, raised quality and efficiency encompassed 
in the spirit of the reforms. For example, one Purchaser had recently 'moth balled' its quality 
department; and all three purchasers expressed the view that while quality was important they 
were not in particularly strong positions to influence the concept at the provider end, despite a 
wish to do so. 
Essentially these groupings provided the participants in the organisational conflicts that 
surrounded quality and its actualisation in services. Conflict has been described by Coser as: 
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'A struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aims of 
the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralise, injure or 
eliminate their rivals " 
As the chapter progresses it will be seen that quality constitutes a domain par excellence for 
observing just such a struggle between groups. Moreover, that they sought to utilise claims to 
status, power, or scarce resources as part of this struggle was a dominant thread within the 
analysis. The idea of neutralising, injuring or eliminating rivals is something which might 
concern the reader at first glance;. however, in the context of the modem organisation, it can 
be argued that such terms are not as misplaced as they might first appear. The tactics may be 
more subtle and less overt than the language might suggest, but the end results, in an 
organisational context were analogous to these ends. 
What the chapter, indeed the thesis as a whole, represents, is a study in a disputed concept's 
application and the conflict-based nature of the social action that accompanies and defines it 
in the NHS. In order to develop this argument it is necessary to explore the boundaries of the 
struggles observed in the case sites and more specifically the conceptual areas they dispute. 
Preferences And Operational is ing Quality 
The immediate impression that strikes the researcher examining the make up of the different 
elements of each Trust's quality strategy is the grouping of people from similar occupations 
and with similar interests around particular techniques aimed at promoting quality. This was 
to prove a key finding as it was the political decisions made by groups in choosing or 
participating in techniques to promote quality which were to prove the key to defining the 
areas of greatest conflict between the groups of stakeholders in the Trusts. 
Of all the groups interviewed the one that had the firmest ideas of which approach was right 
for them (indeed there were no negative cases) were the medical consultants. They expressed 
clear preferences for existing methods of peer review and either mono-professional audit or 
clinical audit with clear boundaries on what should be examined: 
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The reasons why centred on: 
'The need to retain confidentiality '(Surgeon: Fishtown) 
'why not? Its clinical work it should be clinicians who review iff (Obstetrician: 
Fishtown) 
'It works well so why change it? ' (Surgeon: Castletown) 
Y t was developed by the profession so it works for the profession, other approaches don't 
do thejob as well. ' (Obstetrician: Shiptown) 
The initial theoretical typology suggested that members of occupational groups would 
express a preference for those techniques which best 'fitted' the organisational cultures with 
which they were associated; this was not the case, the interview data revealed a mixed picture 
of preferences regarding the best way to operationalise quality: 
Nurses who strongly favoured TQM because: 
'The way it is structured within the Trust means that divisions and directorates get more say 
over what gets done and how. Also because the doctors tend not to get involved there's more 
of afocus on nursing issues rather than themjust taking over .. 
don't get me wrong Id rather 
see them working with us, but it is nicefor a change. ' (Staff Nurse: Marketown) 
'EFQM is goodfor nurses because, as aframework, it recognises our contribution to patient 
care. You can't run a ward without nurses so its good to have a tool in place which notices us. 
We have our own ways ofdoing things and our own views, we're not mini doctors, we are 
separate and I think the EFQM sees that .. so on the whole I think its good. 
'(Staff Nurse: 
Fishtown) 
CHC Chairs and Chief Officers who favoured clinical audit: 
'Because no matter what we do they're never going to let us in on everything so its better to 
stick with something that actually has some impact on clinical care than go with this constant 
tinkering around on the margins. ' (CHC Chief Officer: Shiptown) 
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Perhaps most surprisingly, managers who favoured clinical audit for similar reasons: 
'I've triedfor the lastfive years to get them (the consultants) to take quality seriously but its 
like banging your headaga inst a brick wall. So I've reached the conclusion that I'm better 
off trying to encourage them to do audit and build up trust that way. Eventually I think they 
may allow me in to every meeting and to get at thefindings ... infact its already happening to 
an extent. But whichever way you look at it if they don't want to know they don't want to 
know and as it stands there's not a great deal I can do about it. ' (Divisional Manager: 
Marketown) 
From these accounts it is clear that the notion of interests has a role to play in understanding 
the informant's viewpoints. What each of these accounts shares is a recognition that in order 
to pursue one's interests sometimes it is necessary to accept techniques that may 'go against 
the grain' of the cultures to which they are associated. So for the nurse used as an example 
above, the idea that TQM assists in enhancing nursing's contribution to services and 
nursing's ability to control its work is a positive influence on her expressed preference. Not 
because the type of quality promoted by TQM (excellence) fits with her world view, but that 
TQM becomes the means to more important ends. 
However, interview was only part of the social action through which preference is expressed. 
Action relating to preference was best observed through the composition of key committees, 
working parties, and other fora relating to elements of the Trust's quality strategies. At this 
level the picture was far more easily discerned, and once again it was the notion of interests 
rather than because it fitted with the broader cultural group to which you belonged played a 
part which proved influential. 
A useful way of conceptualising the key arenas in each of the Trusts' quality strategies is by 
placing them at a number of levels and examining the composition of groups at each of these 
levels. 
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Observed Delineation In Participation 
The Level Of Quality Strategy Formation 
At the highest level of strategy formation, usually made up of Executive Directors (such as 
the Executive Management Group in Fishtown and the Central Quality Committee in 
Shiptown), then it was clear that all the major occupational stakeholder groups (from within 
the Trust) were represented - nurses, management and medicine. Purchaser and Consumer 
representation at this level was absent; the emphasis was on promoting the interests of the 
organisation as a whole and a common theme that emerged was that these could only be 
pursued by restricting the group to 'insiders: 
'the Central Quality Committee is where the real business is done. Its where we try and tie 
quality to the business plans and goals of the Trust its more about business than the nitty 
gritty of quality. We don't include [the purchaser] or the CHC because its where myseýf and 
the chief exec air our cock-ups and it can be sensitive stuff .. so it wouldn't 
do to let them in at 
that level. ' (Director of Nursing and Quality: Shiptown) 
The Overseers 
At the level of deciding which techniques were actually used to pursue broad Trust quality 
strategy the multi-disciplinary nature of the strategic committees begins to breakdown and 
managers and nurses begin to become the dominant players. It is at this level that consumer 
and purchaser representation becomes more of a feature of group composition. This tier was 
typified by the Quality Core Group in Shiptown, and the Quality Steering Group in 
Castletown. In the two groups in Castletown and Shiptown no medical personnel were on the 
membership lists other than (in the case of Shiptown) the Chair of the Clinical Audit 
Committee. Who was there as a link with clinical audit rather than as representative for the 
medical profession within the Trust. 
Audit structures could reasonably be included in this layer of each Trust's hierarchy. Each of 
the Trusts visited had both medical and clinical audit structures in place; and while purchaser, 
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sometimes CHC (as in Castletown), and multi-disciplinary involvement, was the norm for the 
Clinical Audit Committees, the same could not be said of their medical audit counterparts. In 
each of the Trusts the Medical Audit Committee was completely made up of doctors and the 
purchaser input (where it existed, in Shiptown and Fishtown) came in the fonn of the 
Director of Public Health - another clinician. Interestingly, despite being underrepresented in 
Clinical Audit Committees as a professional group, doctors chaired three of the four Clinical 
Audit Committees. When the reasons why were explored with informants there were a 
number of reasons put forward. All of which made implicit reference to the interests of their 
respective professions. 
Nurse Manager: Yhe consultants get moneyfor audit so its in their interests to make sure its 
spent on things that are relevant to them. The best wayfor them to do that is to keep the medical 
audit committee going. 
Int: Doesn't the Health Authority money get allocated to clinical audit? 
Nurse Manager: Its supposed to but in reality no. Clinical Audit are so weak that most of the 
money still goes on traditional audit projects. (Nurse Manager: Castletown) 
Most ofmy colleag-uesfeel the time is not yet tight to disband entirely the medical audit 
committee. It is well respected and achieves the aims it sets itsey"year after year. Ae clinical 
audit group are not at that stage yet. (Consultant and Medical Audit Committee member: 
Marketown) 
Int: Do youfeel that having a separate medical audit committee excludes other professional 
groups within the hospitalfrom participating in good quality audit? 
Consultant: Let me throw that back at you. I would argue that we don't exclude anyone. Nurses 
have hyacked the clinical audit agenda andyet are the least well equipped tojully exploit it. 
They get little analytic training asjuniors and they are too easilypersuaded by the arguments of 
the commission and managers. Ifanything nurses have excluded us as theyfear that we might 
take over. So no we don't exclude otherpeople. Wejustfeel it is an effective way of examining 
the quality of our work. (Consultant and medical audit committee member: Fishtown) 
On the basis of these structures, and the lack of desire in any of the Consultants interviewed 
to see 'their' audit facility disbanded, it would appear that the policy of promotion of clinical 
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audit was having only limited success in the clinical professions. Indeed, based on these four 
sites there is some justification for stating that clinical audit could just as easily be termed 
nursing and management audit. Medical Audit however, had remained virtually untouched. 
The consequence of this for many staff was a perception that nursing was the prime focus for 
audit (and accountability) and that medicine had escaped the scrutiny of a managerial eye 
once again: 
/CI I jee its all right talking about clinical audit and all that, but the reality is that our doctors 
have carried on just doing their own thing. Like we are all supposed to be looking at 
problems as a team but I can't remember the last one [doctor] who came to an audit 
meeting ... apartfrom maybe the odd house officer who gets sent because they have a project 
to do or something. ' (Staff Nurse: Marketown. ) 
This duality raises serious issues given that purchasers are supposed to be developing clinical 
audit as the sole model of audit in Trusts and funding projects accordingly. Examination of 
the Audit contracts signed with purchasers for last year reveals that all of the Trusts are still 
funding a sizeable proportion of mono-professional audit projects. In the case of Castletown 
this was 20% of the proposed projects to be funded by the local Health Authority 6. Interviews 
with Audit Leads also revealed that informal viremence was a commonplace feature of audit 
activity in at least one of the Trusts: 
'It's [viremence] something wejust have to do. Its a case ofspending it or losing it. I'm sure 
[the purchaser] knows that we have to keep supportingjust medical audit, but something is 
better than nothing. ' (Audit Co-ordinator: Castletown) 
The Level of Implementation 
At the level of implementing quality techniques the groups or projects were made up almost 
entirely of nurses or managers. Of the six Total Quality Improvement Team meetings 
attended in Marketown none of the participants were medical personnel. This was with the 
exception of one staff grade clinical assistant doing an MBA in a bid to improve the running 
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of his General Practice. He even suggested that he had been keenly interested in quality until 
he started attending the group. Comments from nurses and managers relating to this lack of 
involvement all drew upon a sense of 'difference' between what consultants perceived as 
important and the work of the groups: 
'They'rejust not interested in takingpart in the Quality Improvement Teams, I think most of 
them think its all about carparking and the wallpaper. ' (Physiotherapist leader and ex Quality 
Manager: Marketown) 
'The doctors used to come to the meetings in the beginning; out of curiosity more than anything 
else I think.. it didn't last long. One of myfriends, whose a consultant here, said it wasjust a 
'talking shop, and irrelevant to most of her colleagues. '(Sister: Marketown) 
From a consultant himself, the link between participation and the furthering of interests was 
more specific: 
'I've been to the odd meeting but to be honest I don't see what use they are or why they invite 
me. Ifthere were more resources on the table then it might be worthwhile but as it stands itsjust 
a way of introducing bloody silly ideas andpsycho-babble into what was quite a successful 
unit. ' (Consultant: Fishtown) 
In each of the sites there were a few consultants who had initially participated in 'core' 
quality activities but the participation appeared to be underpinned by the link to the 
possibility of increasing access to what they perceived as scarce resources. In Fishtown one 
Urologist seemed quite keen to be involved with EFQM (unlike her colleagues) but her 
conceptualisation, of the underlying aims and procedures attached to the EFQM framework 
were almost diametrically opposed to those of the manager who 'sold' the framework to her: 
'Yes I was involved in the quality ... erm, 
EFQM - is that right? - thing. Anything that increases 
the numbers of my nurses is worth listening to. The manftom quality seemed reasonable enough 
and ifl am brutallyfrank it doesn't really affect much ofwhat the girls actually do. Its what 
happening with the purchasers where the real effects will befelt. '(Consultant Urologist: 
Fishtown) 
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'Selling the idea to the consultants was the biggest challenge. Getting the message across that 
we had to change the way we do things and the ways in which patients move through the 
system... actually all they really seemed bothered with was whether or not it would cost money 
that would be taken awayftom patient care ... for thefirst time since we went Trust I think we are 
beginning to make real in-roads into the wards ... we are having a real impact. '(Quality 
Manager: Fishtown) 
Thus far this section has argued that one key to understanding participation is the ability of 
quality to ftirther what you perceive as your interests. However, this assumes that participation 
in quality is a voluntary exercise. Stakeholder accounts of what led them to participate in quality 
activity revealed that participation was tempered somewhat by the pressure applied by others. 
Personal Choice or Extraneous Influence? 
It was clear from interviews that the ability to exercise personal preference in relation to 
participating in quality was heavily mediated by the exercise of power. How you experienced 
this process, however, depended heavily on which occupational group you occupied and 
whether your sphere of influence was outside the immediate managerial hierarchy of the 
Trust. 
The Occupational Dimension 
For some nurses participation in quality seemed to be a result of the exercising of Lukes' third 
dimension of power. Many respondents classed participation in quality almost as an automatic 
prerequisite of their post and didn't appear to question whether or not it might conflict with their 
own ideas: 
'I don't think its that conscious. I mean you don't really think about it Ijoining a quality 
improvement team]. Itsjust something that comes along and everyone goes oh quality. I mean 
its like primary nursing and all that. It comes and goes ... itsflavour of the month now and gone 
next year. '(Staff nurse: Marketown) 
227 
'My predecessor she started the quality circle and it seemed a shame tojust get rid of it when I 
started .. although to be honest I didn't give it that much thought. '(Surgical Ward Sister: 
Shiptown) 
The more distinct line-managerial hierarchy of nursing meant that even where nurses did 
recognise a conflict with their own preferences the ability to 'opt out' of quality activity 
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promoted from above was not always present 
'Atfirst I didn't agree with the idea of doing more and more standardsfor everything. At my last 
unit we had this standards group and it wasjust a paperpushing exercise. No one really 
believed it did any good or listened to what they said. But my manager made it clear that I had 
no choice in the matter. ' (Ward Manager: Shiptown) 
In direct opposition to nursing, medical staff had established several strategies for resisting 
managerial imposition. The two most prominent seemed to be a policy of being seen to make an 
effort but disguising the real lack of enthusiasm; or in the case of one group of consultants in 
Shiptown, just refusing: 
'When theyfirst tried to get us to takepart in the [Total Quality] scheme we all nodded sagely 
and made the right noises. Then we went offand did our own thing anyway. Youjust don't have 
the time or the inclination to waste effort on these haý(Ibaked schemes. ' (Consultant Surgeon: 
Marketown) 
Int: So do you send anyone to the quality core group? 
Obstetrician: No 
Int: Were you asked? 
Obstetrician: Yes. But we politely declined and that was the end of that. 
Int: Didn't that rather get their backs up? 
Obstetrician: Well they were a bitpissed off. But in all honesty what were they going to do? 
It was clear from the interviews though that medical staff weren't above using coercion to 
promote those techniques which they endorsed: 
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'I've been pushed into loads ofauditprojects where you do the work and the consultant takes the 
credit. Its notjust here, all the hospitals I've trained in were like that. They call it delegating. ' 
(Surgical Registrar: Fishtown) 
Where you stood in the hierarchies of the occupational groups you were trying to influence was 
a significant factor in how you aligned yourself with an approach to quality and to what extent 
you could exert influence. Senior nurses and managers tended to express preferences for the 
6corel activities in each of the sites. Although this could be explained primarily through the fact 
that their respective occupational hierarchies were inexorably bound up in the hierarchies of the 
quality strategies and structures themselves. Senior nurses and managers formed the 
predominant groups at the levels of quality strategy formation and design. Given that each of 
these groups also had managerial lines of accountability stretching vertically it was easier for 
them to implement the vision of quality which they selected in the groups over which they had 
influence. Given that doctors were neither represented fully in these quality-hierarchical 
positions and that they also have managerial structures which are both flatter and which view 
colleagues as 'peers' rather than managers per se it is easy to see how direct imposition is that 
much more difficult for the 'core' groups. 
The 'Outsiders I 
The accounts of those groups of stakeholders from outside the immediate environments of the 
Trusts (the CHC members, officers and DHA representatives) were characterised by the 
prevalence of cynicism regarding the rationale behind the selection of quality activity 
undertaken by the Trusts: 
Everything the Trust has ever done has beenjust PR since they went Trust. '(Cbief Officer: 
Marketown CHQ 
'No I can't put my hand on my heart and say that I believe in the sincerity behind a lot of what 
the Trust do around quality. '(Chief Officer: Fishtown CHC) 
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It would be easy to assume the 'consumenst' approaches promoted by Trusts such as 
Castletown would enjoy the CHC's support. However, the evidence of interviews with the 
Chairwoman preclude any such conclusion: 
'Ifyou take the Patient's Council as an example then I think its a good thing having these 
sorts ofgroups in place. But I've been to groups where the agenda is totally dominated by the 
person leading it. So you have to have a healthy scepticism about you when you look at 
them. '(CHC Chair and National CHC spokesperson - Castletown) 
All the CHC Chief Officers, however, conceded that the new found 'consumerist' approaches 
being implemented in Trusts had their advantages; if only in that they represented a source of 
involvement: 
'I think the involvement that we do manage with the Trust is better than nothing. ' (Chief 
Officer: Marketown) 
'We don't have a lot to do with the Trust on a daily management basis. But what we do have 
encourages a broader dialogue and morefocused efforts on our part. '(Chief Officer: 
Fishtown) 
I D.. 
Dy inviting us onto the Quality Core Group it shows that they are making an effort. ' (Chief 
Officer: Shiptown) 
Representing the Community Interest? 
The area of Trust activity that most concerned CHC members interviewed was the 
development of the 'quasi advocacy' function for managers that accompanied many of the 
mangerially-inspired 'Total Quality' approaches selected by the Trusts. These were typified 
by the Patient Representative posts in Marketown and Fishtown. In each of the CHCs allied 
to these Trusts it was clear that this was seen as a potentially harmful development in the 
representation of patients/consumers within services: 
230 
'The Growth of these Patient Representatives is really worrying. Who do they really 
represent? '(CHC Research Officer: Marketown) 
The difficulties involved in persuading patients, and staff, of the legitimacy of their function 
within the organisation were also recognised by the Patient Representatives themselves: 
4 so I would say that sometimes its hard to please everyone. I know the Health Council think 
Iam ... what's the word .. erm a traitor or something. And sometimes its 
difficult to convince 
st aff I that you aren Yt out to get them. ' (Patient representative: Marketown. ) 
Although each representative was intended to be the 'patient's voice'within the system it was 
clear that at least two of the representatives interviewed did not see impartiality as a feature 
of their role: 
'No I don't think that I have any problem with who my loyalty is to. IfI am doing myjob right 
then Iplease the Trust ifI get good results with patients andfollowing up their complaints. 
But I make it clear at the start that I workfor the Trust and can't always be impartial. 
(Patient Representative: Fishtown) 
TM not impartial, no. How can I be? when the hospitalpays my salary. We talk about this as 
a group and it comes up every month at staff meetings. -Its something you 
have to be aware of 
and be clear about. ' (Patient Representative: Fishtown) 
The Executives behind the creation of these posts, however, at least in the accounts proffered 
to the researcher, were keen to stress this element of the role: 
Vejunded those posts on the basis that they wouldn't carryfavour. We want them to be 
impartial. Its vital, otherwise why bother. '(Director of Organisational Development: 
Fishtown) 
Each of the Executives were equally keen to suggest that the role of the CHC was not being 
diminished by the creation of such posts - just 'enhanced' or 'augmented' in order to make the 
: )Teater. Although, with the of the consumer Fora in impact of consumer opinion g- exception 
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Castletown, it was not clear how this was to be achieved other than through the monitoring of 
complaints, which is where most of the 'patient representation' seemed to be occurring. 
Proactive consumer-opinion gathering mechanisms which were qualitative in character, or 
which allowed consumers to set their own change-agenda, were not a strong element in any 
of the Representative's work plans. The informants painted a dismal picture of community 
participation in Trust activity: 
Quality Manager: 'We certainly had a erm a real attempt with a group ofsurgical patients er 
post experience survey. People who have been through the system and we wrote to them and 
erm the patients aboutfifty or sixty of them. We said would you mind coming along to a 
meeting where your views will be gone into in more detail and we got about twenty odd 
responses. 
Int: 'That's quite good isn't it? ' 
Quality Manager: 'It is quite good but the day itself was a disaster. You know the numbers 
trickled down. We tried to do all the things provided a cup of tea and sandwiches and so on 
and nobody turned up. It is a sad experience but maybe its not unnatural. People get through 
a health care experience and unless they wish to express something about a particular thing 
then they'll complain. ' 
Int: 'What about using the CHC? ' 
Quality Manager: 'We had every intention of involving them. There was an intention to share 
that information, from the groups I mean, with them ... erm 
but we didn't want to overawe the 
group that we got initially and we thought they might havefound the CHCpresence a bit 
threatening. '(Quality Manager: Marketown) 
Castletown's Quality Manager also acknowledged these difficulties but felt that: 
'The most important thing we learned was that ifyou are going to runfora like these then 
you have to do it right. Invest time and money in making them a success. We organised 
transport and confirmation as well as structuredJeedback and interpreters and stuff as well. 
They aren't a cheap option but wefind them very effective. '(Quality Manager: Castletown) 
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One perception which united people from different occupational groups, levels in the various 
quality and managerial hierarchies and those inside and outside the Trusts' workforce, was a 
recognition that the type of activities carried out as part of a Trust's quality strategy defined 
the values which one appeared to strive towards and which to all intents and purposes made 
up the definition of quality. 
The Struggle To Define A Disputed Concept 
Colloquial Quality And The Corporate Provider 
At a corporate or Trust-wide level, definitions of quality tended to be expressed in 'Mission 
Statements' and corporate slogans. Rarely did these speak in anything other than general 
terms on quality; for example, Castletown's approach to service provision was expressed as 
based on 'Partners in Quality Care; Marketown favoured 'Treating People Better; and 
Shiptown took a blunter approach in, 'To Be The Best Provider ofHealth Care In The Area. ' 
Each of these statements were accompanied by a set of aims for the service. In the case of 
Shiptown these included statements such as: 
'[we aim] to provide servicesfor our patients which they regard as being of high quality, 
accessible, effective and on time. ' 
Making The Intangible Tangible: Technical Quality 
At the level of quality initiatives and activities specific definitions of quality started to 
become more explicit. For example, the development of the EFQM model in Fishtown; the 
Total Quality Management exercise in Marketown and the Kings Fund Organisational Audit 
exercise in Shiptown were all defined with reference to formal statements; although these 
were still quite general: 
'Quality in our work can be thought of as conforming to explicit requirements. The 
organisation 's, the customer's and your own. ' 
7 
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'Customer Satisfaction, People Lemployee) SatisLaction and Impact on Society are achieved 
throuzh Leadership drivinz Policv and Stratg& PeQple Management, Resources and , -. 1 - C., - 
Processes, leading ultimately to excellence in Business Results ... each of these elements is a 
criterion that can be used to assess the organisation's progress towards Business Excellence. 
(their emphasiS)8 
Whilst these models had at their core a more explicit definition of quality, the definitions 
commonly only acted as reference points for the particular techniques and mechanisms taken 
up by individuals, or groups. 
It was at this level - of the Divisions and Clinical Directorates - that the composition of 
'quality'was the easiest to isolate. The broadness of the corporate Mission Statements and the 
general definitions of the formal models adopted were foregone in favour of particular 
criteria for success. These criteria commonly took the forin of goals or deadlines for action; 
for example, the Quality Core Group in Shiptown required each Division to have completed 
an 4action plan' based on the findings of the King's Fund Organisational Audit exercise. 
Quality in this case could be thought of as the level of progress towards the standards 
required. A number of respondents pointed out that such 'technique-led' definitions, whilst 
necessary, constituted operational, but incomplete, definitions of quality. They also raised the 
point that particular definitions of quality were promoted by the various approaches to quality 
in place in the sites: 
'IfI ask my staff to define quality I get aboutfifty different answers so in the end its easier to 
agree about a particular approach with the staff and use the definition that's built in to stuff 
like Kings Fund, S. A. S. or whatever. Of course there's always gaps andpeople can always 
take issue with the way we go. But on the whole itsjust easier and more realistic than trying 
to do it ourselvesfrom scratch. '(Medical Services Divisional Manager: Shiptown) 
'SAS. encourages a view of quality, you know, like everything has a standard. '(Ward 
Manager: Shiptown) 
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The Impact Of Officially Sanctioned Approaches On Definition 
Because each of the Trusts differed in the mechanisms used to operationalise quality it 
follows that definitions of quality implied by, or attached to, activities were also different in 
each site. For example, Fishtown and Marketown placed great store in Total Quality 
Management ideas, structures and activities. Therefore, definitions of quality which reflect 
this stance were evidenced in Trust literature and in the accounts of people closely involved 
with the strategic development of 'quality' in the sites. Conversely, in Shiptown the 
application of standards (SAS, Kings Fund, Clinical Audit, the Patients Charter) was at the 
forefront of strategy. Therefore, 'official' (as expressed in Trust literature and policy 
statements) definitions of quality tended to be based around the idea of fitness for purpose 
and the attainment of pre-defined standards. 
This phenomenon, however, was most evident in the case of Castletown, where patient focus 
groups, a Patient's Council and consumer representation in official steering groups and 
complaints committees was right at the heart of the quality management strategy. Here 
official definitions of quality took on an overtly consumerist flavour: 
You can sum up the Quality Directorate's definition ofquality as 'making peoplefeel special by 
doing the right thing at the right time and in conjunction with customers wherever possible. ' 
(Director of Nursing and Quality: Castletown) 
I think our view ofquality has a considerable impact. We try and have the courage to actual y 
listen to whatpatients say about the service and not ignore it We think that by acknowledging 
them and their right to have a say changes the staffs attitude of we 71 treat you how we want. Or 
we 71 decide what's best and the improvements. This is the basisfor all of our work around 
quality in the Trust. (Quality Manager: Castletown) 
'The aim of the 6patientfora is tojacilitate listening to patients/carers and to develop each 
aspect of our service in ways that reflect the wishes of the public. 09 
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Official Didn't Mean All Encompassing 
The official definitions of quality promoted by the specialist 'quality management' teams in 
each Trust were having to co-exist with those definitions reinforced by other strands of 
quality activity and which were led by groups other than central management: 
e TQM in Fishtown and Marketown coexisted with clinical and medical audit; 
purchaser standards; and CHC visits none of which 'fed' into the TQM system. 
e Standards-based approaches and multi-professional audit in Shiptown went on 
alongside directorate 'one-offs' which the centre were not aware of, such as quality 
circles in the mental health division. 
* In Castletown the heavily promoted and self-declared consumerist stance on patient 
involvement in policy implementation and development as part of a Trust approach to 
quality was in direct contrast to mono-professional medical audit, and managerially 
established contract quality standards. 
There was little or no co-ordination between the centrally-backed 'core' initiatives and those 
which took place away from the gaze of the quality management teams. In all the sites there 
was a distinction made between 'quality' as the core, officially-backed, mechanisms and 
techniques such as audit and complaints. The major distinction was expressed as the 
difference between that which was considered 'hard' and meaningful, which for the 
professions was the question of audit and professional standards. This was countered by the 
C soft' tag attached to quality as promoted by central management which was seen as 
concerned with elements of services which were not a direct professional concern. 
The Influence Of Contact With Quality Tools On The Individual? 
What emerged were patterns of common responses to the question of what quality meant to 
them? These patterns of responses could be grouped, not only by occupational classification 
(as was first hypothesised), but interestingly by the degree of contact with particular quality 
activities. Those people with the greatest stake in the various quality initiatives in place 
tended towards providing definitions which were commensurate with those definitions 
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underpinning the approach to quality. For example, this account from a Quality Advisor 
(manager) in Fishtown: 
IV- 
T or once I do reallyfeel an affinity with something that we've 'importedfrom outside the Trust. 
The European Model [EFQMI is something that I, personally, subscribe to. It mirrors a lot of 
my own thoughts on quality ... its a system, its got definite criteria, its about beingproactive and 
managingpeople and itplaces lots ofteight behind satisfying people inside and outside the 
Trust. '(Quality Advisor: Fishtown) 
Similarly from these two audit personnel in Castletown and Shiptown: 
7 suppose its a bit of a cliche to say quality is conforming to requirements orfitnessfor purpose 
but that's what I think it is ... yes 
being involved in audit has coloured the way I approach quality, 
I think it doesfor everyone who really believes in auditing practice... but without standards it 
just becomes meaningless. '(Audit Assistant: Castletown) 
V don't think I could do myjob ifI didn't think that what I was doing actually made a difference, 
and I think it does. I thinkpart of the reason that it has made a difference in this Trust is that my 
own opinion of quality is very much in line with the auditphilosophy anyway and so I invest a 
lot of time in the post. Quality is definitely a product of examining performance against 
standards that are already established either by one's peers or in other ways ... like research or 
locally. '(Audit Co-ordinator: Shiptown) 
The overall picture of individual accounts of quality however was a confused one. On an 
individual level people often made recourse to the 'colloquial' sense of quality: 
TM not sure you should be asking me how to define quality. I don't thinkyou can ... well not 
properly anyway. I kind of agree with all the de nitions that usually get blurted out, you 
know like first time every timeand all that. I mean they all have something to offer. '(Staff 
Nurse: Marketown) 
These were, unsurprisingly highly individuallsed and subjective; but what united all 
respondents was a recognition that there had to be some fonn of collective definition to work 
237 
towards in services; even if the groups involved were moving towards different goals. The 
coexistence of so many competing definitions of quality, and the apparent enigma that 
different quality activities in sites were often moving towards different conceptual 'ends', 
might be interpreted as problematic. This was an enigma not lost on one member of the 
Executive Board of Castletown: 
'Co-ordination has been the main problem, every tribe doing its own thing and lumping them 
together under quality. We'vejust appointed a PR and Communications Manager to help ensure 
that everyone is heading in the same direction. I think I'm beingjair when I say that in the past 
we haven't necessarily all been aimingfor the same goals... and that diversity when talking 
about quality is something ofan understatement. '(Chief Executive: Castletown) 
If the composition of the groups associated with the quality approaches in place is revisited 
then it becomes clear that, on a group level at least, different stakeholders were associated 
with different approaches to defining quality on a group level. But it was also clear that 
people somehow had to manage thedifficult. process of reconciling involvement in a group 
process and individual values and perceptions. 
The Power Of Broader Organisational Structure And Process 
Several people from the main stakeholder groups alluded to the essential conflict between 
personal perception and organisational. reality: namely, that in the face of organisational. 
pressure it was often difficult to use your own ideas of quality and sometimes it was easier to 
comply with existing systems: 
Ypersonally have nothing against the idea ofquality - sometimes I think some ofthe ideas like 
patient information leaflets in Gynae are quite a good idea. In the end though your idea of 
quality is what the consultant says it is. As an SHO your ideas don't really come into it ... youjust 
keep your head down and do thejob. We do have audits and so on but being a relativelyjunior 
member ofthefirm its hard to question your boss, especially when your nextjob depends on 
what he thinks ofyou. '(Serýior House Officer - Surgical Team: Fishtown) 
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'to be honest I haven't thought that hard about quality. I know that I don't always agree with 
what gets pushed on usfrom management but I can't realistically opt out on my own like. Maybe 
ifI was the Sister I wouldn't entertain some of the stuff that gets shoved down the line, but I'm 
not so Ijust get on with it. ' (Staff nurse: Marketown) 
This reaction was more common amongst staff at the lower end of occupational stakeholder 
groups (such as staff nurses, junior managers and junior doctors); and relates directly to the 
exercising of direct influence in promoting certain sorts of quality activities. As stakeholder 
accounts were drawn from further up the hierarchies in each of the Trusts it became clear that 
the aligning of official definitions to mechanisms or systems of quality was one means of 
achieving something workable from the sheer number of personal approaches to quality that 
had to be accommodated: 
,... haýf the time whether we develop an initiative within the Trust depends on the situation at 
the time. Like, we wanted to develop the CQI work that we had done ourselves a bitfUrther 
but it was obvious that it wasn't achieving everything it was supposed to and we were all 
going round in different circles ... each 
Division I mean. So the EFQMframework comes 
along and it wasjust something that we could use to put round all the stuff we were already 
doing. You've got to take into account whatpeople arefeeling on the wards and all EFQM 
did was give everyone something to get their teeth into .... something that we could all 
latch 
onto and understand. ' (Quality Advisor: Fishtown) 
Linked to this idea of making something workable from an infinite number of definitions, 
was the notion expressed by a number of those managers involved in directly introducing 
quality activity to professional groups that in order to secure any kind of success with a 
quality initiative it was important to be flexible and to respect people's ability to arrive at 
something workable amongst themselves: 
'Now I mean I can see that there are ... there are 
different things ... activities that the 
professional groups have been involved in and we've sort of been there supporting around 
those things. And what I think is encouraging erm is some of these things are starting to come 
together a bit more. ' 
[In what Sense? ] 
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'In some certain sense we've got the doctors erm taking the lead and taking ownershipfor 
medical audit. Now the reason that's happened is because its theirs... it belongs to them, they 
understand it. You have to respect that and use it as a startingpoint that's where 
organisational development is differentfrom the Quality Advisors ... we respect doctor's needs 
to develop things which mean something to themselves. '(Organisational Development 
Manager: Fishtown. ) 
Other managers, often not directly involved in the 'coalface' process of introducing change 
(Oir the possibility of change), recognised this feature of operational managerial life, and saw 
the imposition of definitions of quality as a necessary evil. Particularly if dominance of 
powerful (clinical) groups was to be avoided and corporate goals secured: 
f ... all the time you're 
having to balance ... say to yourself, 
'OK what am I trying to achieve and 
what can I achieve realistically in terms of quality'. Ifyou leave itjust to the sta ou end up Of Y 
tipping the scales toofar awayfrom what you are trying to achieve with the Quality Steering 
Group and the ChiefExec. So in the end you have to get people to sign up to something that 
you have done the legwork on just to get things done the way you want them... '(Director of 
Nursing and Quality: Castletown) 
7 thinkyes sometimes you do have to push things on groups within the hospital. Its how you 
do it that matters .... 
One thing we'vefound that works here is to leave the definition as broad 
as we can so thatpeople can set their agendas and ways of thinking about it ... we give them 
boundaries ifyou like and I suppose in reality these are more understood than used in 
meetings and reports. You can't do itfor everyone butforpeople like the Obs and Gynae 
team it was great because it left themfeeling as if they were the ones leading the thing. ' 
(Managerial Member of Quality Steering Group: Marketown) 
It was clear that techniques for influencing how groups perceived and defined quality were 
altered according to the levels of power of the group management was wishing to influence. 
The theme which recurred repeatedly in this respect was the link between quality and 
accountability. 
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Quality, Definition And Accountability 
The more powerful the stakeholder group (along occupational and hierarchical lines) the less 
explicit the definition of quality underpinning the mechanism for quality with which they 
were associated became. Moreover, the less explicit the criteria for quality the easier it was to 
avoid being held accountable for not having attained measurable quality standards. This was 
a factor not lost on one senior manager when talking of consultant colleagues in his division: 
'... Ipersonally don't think it'sfair to ask nurses to collect information on pressure sores as 
one way of measuring the quality of their work and then leaving the Doctors tojust do their 
own thing with medical audit.. but its horsesfor courses.... Maybe because of my nursing 
background -I was a staff nurse - I'm a bit biased. But now I have to manage this unit it 
always strikes me that you can never pin a consultant down because you never know exactly 
what it is that counts as a poor resultfor that group ofpatients ... gallbladders or whatever. 
Audit doesn't help .... exceptfor themselves. 
' (Divisional Manager, Surgery: Castletown) 
The linking of accountability to quality was also a key concern of the 'outsiders' in the sites: 
Aye that's the whole thing isn't it ... the crux ifyou 
like. Ifyou have to meet certain standards 
like in a driving test then its relatively easy to be held upforfailing those standards. That's 
why the Trust always balls'it up. They have these wishy washy things they call standards and 
that bloody logo ... 
have you seen it?.. and everyone ignores them or even if they don't nowt 
happens because the things are meaningless anyway ... just waffle. 
( CHC Chief Officer: 
Marketown) 
Accountability was at the heart of the issue of evaluation; for informants from all 
occupational groups quality activity was often felt to be meaningless without evaluation of 
some form, and yet there appeared to be remarkable divergence in peoples' interviews and 
what was observed at meetings. What differentiated groups was the style, form and level at 
which evaluation was undertaken. 
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Evaluating For Quality 
Evaluation of quality was generally observed at three levels within the Trusts: 
* The informal 
9 The formal 
9 The individual 
The Informal Level Of Evaluation 
Evaluation at this level commonly consisted of face-face discussion between stakeholders 
where the quality of the service was the focus but where little written output was produced. 
This level of evaluation was most commonly seen when the stakeholders involved tended to 
be located towards the top of the quality hierarchies of participating organisations (senior 
managers, Chief Officers, divisional managers [and above] or within professional 
occupational groups. For example, in this case between the 'outsider' CHC chief officer and a 
Trust clinician: 
'With surgery at the [hospital name] I have a spy in the camp ifyou like. Ifl get complaints I 
talk direct to him [consultant] about what's gone on. Its something we both understand and 
its a sort of a first step. Nine times out of ten I explain the patient's or relatives side and he 
fills me in on his angle and it stops there. '(CHC Chief Officer: Marketown) 
Sometimes these informal evaluations made up the sole component of a particular 
stakeholder group's approach to actualising quality. In these cases informal evaluation was 
both the process and the outcome of approaches to quality adopted by groups of peers. 
Change arose through informal pressure applied by the group itself; as these accounts from 
consultants illustrate: 
'... there arefive consultants here and we all get together ... 
I mean we name names in the 
confines of the meeting because its not written down and you get slagged off ifyou have a 
high infection rate and you have to go off and sort it... so we don't actually head hunt 
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although we often do know if its a list of consultants ABCDE you can often tell by the work 
pattern who it is and there's afair bit ofjoking goes on. You know, wash your hands before 
surgery and stuff like that. That's really the best way of changing things as a team its not 
formal but it does work. Actually come to think of it thats the only thing we do as a team. ' 
(Consultant Obstetrician: Shiptown) 
'Informal medical auditfor this department [urology] works well. As relaxed and there's only 
the other consultants there so we can speakfreely. Issues get aired and we manage to 
disseminate new developments and look at our work its not very scientific but it does work. 
We don't include others in the team like the nurses because wejeel that it would detractfrom 
what is, for us, a successful technique. '(Urologist: Fishtown) 
The Formal Level Of Evaluation 
In contrast to the informal level of evaluation, the formal level of evaluation was visible and 
usually a part of a much larger system or approach to operationalising quality; examples 
include: 
9 The clinical audit 'cycle' (of standard setting-evaluation-action-standard setting). 
9 The EFQM model based on time-series evaluation of the organisation. 
* SAS and purchaser standards based on evaluation of attaimnent of pre-set standards. 
Formal evaluation constituted the most visible form of scrutiny; visibility in this sense 
referring to the release of the results into the central Trust quality networkslo and the groups 
associated with this. In two of the Trusts the CHC formed part of this network and so 
consequently had some access to these results. With the exception of the SAS standards in 
Shiptown and Fishtown, purchasers did not usually have access to these forms of evaluations. 
The reasons given for this centred around evaluation's role in exposing service weakness and 
the commercial implications of this. 
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Despite the visibility of this forrn of evaluation it was widely acknowledged that this level of 
evaluation was, of the three kinds described here, often the least effective. A variety of 
explanations were proffered by stakeholders but the most common centred on formal 
evaluation being the least utilised form of data in decision making 
'Wejump through all the hoopsfor the Kings Fund and [the main purchaser] and SAS. In the 
end though quite often I resort to gutfeelings about a department and sometimes I'vefound 
that this is what people prefer ... my 
boss calls it ýassion not paper'managem en t. '(Divisional 
Manager: Shiptown) 
This formal type of evaluation often formed the 'official'basis for Trust-wide action and was 
consequently a cause of tension amongst the managerial stakeholders charged with 
transforming the results of evaluation into action and the professional staff of whom action 
was expected. An example of this was the Kings Fund accreditation programme undertaken 
in Shiptown. The primary tensions were structured along hierarchical lines. Those managers 
and senior clinicians (in this case nurses, as none of the medical staff spoken to were really 
aware of the process) focused on the fact that action as a result of the evaluation of services 
was based on consensus in order to accommodate the multiple interests and needs of staff 
groups in services. This was seen as weakening the strategic purpose of the evaluation and 
diluting the original goals of the organisation: 
'[the Kings Fund Scheme] ... wasn't without itsfaults ... the audit was 
basically sound but we've 
have had to water down the action plans to what is achievable rather than what we, as the 
Trust Board, want. Changing practice should be about leading and inspiring not endless 
concessions to the mobjust to get things done. '(Director of Nursing and Quality: Shiptown) 
This was contrasted by the views expressed more commonly by members of staff employed 
at ward level. Their reservations centred not on the consensual basis of the required action but 
on the inadequacy of the assessment in the first place. As one staff nurse explains: 
'They [the Kings Fund Team] were supposed to be herefor a week but I hardly ever saw 
them. Theyjust use to come with clipboards and ask afew questions ... mainlyfollowing up 
what we'd already answered in writing. I don't see how they can possibly capture the quality 
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of a ward in such a short space of time, or even what we do. And now we're supposed to have 
signed up to this action plan or whatever its called .. its no wonderpeople getfed up with it 
all. '(Staff Nurse: Shiptown) 
Formality as a Managerial Preserve 
Forinal evaluation was almost always instigated by those groups which were managerially 
dominated (the Executive Management group in Fishtown; the Quality Steering Group in 
Marketown and the Quality Core Group in Shiptown). Consequently, many staff felt 
evaluations focused solely, or primarily, on 'managerial issues' such as the systems in place 
for assuring quality; the numbers of staff on wards; the decor and infrastructure services such 
as engineering and catering. This was not necessarily viewed as a negative characteristic by 
the clinical groups and all parties involved appeared to have established an understanding 
whereby clinical-professional work boundaries were respected in formal evaluations by 
requiring adherence to very broad standards only. For SAS in Shiptown and Fishtown these 
included 'having individual plans of care in placefor patients' or 'clinical guidelines in place 
where appropriate'. 
Despite the widespread circulation of the results of these formal evaluations within the 'core' 
quality structures of the Trusts. There appeared to be little will on the part of external groups 
such as the CHCs to request information derived from this level of quality evaluations. This 
could be partly explained by the fact that requests for information from initiatives such as 
medical audit had been turned down in the past; or the information provided was expressed in 
fonnats which do not aid ready lay-interpretation. This is clearly demonstrated in the words 
of the CHC Chief Officer for Marketown: 
'Yes we do get a copy of the reportfrom their audit de artment but its no use to us... it says P 
nothing. We get afew graphs and some areas that we might be interested in are put down. 
But if we askfor the details they tell us it has to be confidential and that's it, end of story. 
Maybe with the new bloke they get in it might change. But [name of audit chairman] that's 
there now has had it stitched up for the last three years. ' (CHC Chief Officer: Marketown) 
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Better the Devil You Don't yet Know. Formal Evaluation and Professional Groups 
The formal mechanism for evaluating professional-clinical work were the processes of 
medical and clinical audit. The key difference between the more managerially focused formal 
evaluations involved in SAS, the Kings Fund, or EFQM, and the professionally-focused audit 
processes were that results of managerially-led evaluations were available for scrutiny by 
management within the Trust. Audit results, however, were kept away from those who were 
not directly involved in the audit process itself. In Marketown this included the Audit 
Committees and audit departments themselves. Each Trust produced an annual audit report 
detailing the nature and title of some of the projects undertaken; in none of these reports were 
results provided. Similarly there were no anonymised findings or an accompanying narrative 
which would give an overview of standards achieved. 
Reasons why this was the case generally centred around the need to protect an individual's or 
a service's identity in order to pursue the long term goal of professional involvement in 
quality and/or the move towards greater links between business and clinical work. Or as one 
Clinical Audit Facilitator expressed it: 
I you'd have to be bloody mad to even paint a picture of the results of last year's audits. The 
clinical staff would be up in arms, .-. 
The Commission don't really want to know and we'd 
lose contracts. Because ... well, quitefrankly ... some of the results were so 
bad. '(Clinical Audit 
Facilitator: Castletown). 
The link between monitoring the outcomes of professional activity and the business of 
contracting was an important one and most in evidence in Shiptown. Despite the wishes of 
the Director of Public Health, the Trust's Audit Chair and Executive Board the Trust's annual 
audit report revealed a less than enthusiastic response towards the linking of clinical outcome 
indicators to contracts as an element of the quality strategy (as desired by the purchasers): 
'In July 1994 the Central Audit Facility was invited to discussions with [the purchaser] to 
advise on the needfor clinical audit to support the clinical outcome indictors that would be 
in place on all contractsfrom April Ist. At the initial meeting a number ofpoints were raised 
in relation to the indicators: 
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it had to be specified that the indicators could not be used as direct measures of 
the quality ofservice 
the original list was written with a view to stimulate clinical staff to define their 
own outcome indicators and that by no means were the original indicators to be 
imposed on the unit 
The report goes on to acknowledge that indicators on contracts 'may not be as 
useful as expected'due to: 
... impracticalities in data collection 
... no responsefrom clinical staff involved with the indicators leaving [the 
purchaser] with no option than to use their indicatorsfor that service'(my 
emphasis)' 1 
At the time of leaving the site none of the contracts had firm clinical indicators in situ and 
there was a feeling amongst consultants (one of whom was a Clinical Director) interviewed 
that medical support would be difficult to secure for this 'particular tack' on the part of the 
purchaser. 
Audit, while certainly constituting a formal means of evaluation, was far removed from the 
public domain. Professional quality activity therefore remained firmly linked to forms of 
evaluation which emphasised the restriction of the audience to those professionals 
immediately linked to the service being audited. 
The Individual Level 
The third level of evaluation took place at an individual level. Several informants made 
reference to personal norms or criteria for quality in judging practice on a regular basis. Often 
they used language and phrases such as their'own ideas'; 'you know what's good quality'; 
I you don't need to do a questionnaire on everything to make a judgement or not of 
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something's quality'. The primary difference lay between those accounts of individuals with 
the power to effect change within the Trust and those with lesser levels of influence. Within 
those stakeholders who enjoyed line-managerial or senior clinical authority there were 
several accounts of how their personal perception, as the basis for evaluation of an 
individual's or service's performance, was often the most productive tool for change: 
'Its like I said before... I know what needs to be done and my own views on quality - believe it 
or not - do have a bearing on what happens in the rest of the Trust. IfI say to a nurse ... look 
my view is that your care is not good enough, she'd have to have a pretty strong argument to 
answer me back It really is about being that direct ... people respect that and, as long as its 
not every minute of the day, it carries a lot of weight. ' (Director of Nursing and Quality: 
Shiptown) 
Conversely, the accounts of people lower down the Trust hierarchy, whilst still recognising 
the worth of personal evaluations of perfonnance, were characterised by a pervasive sense of 
powerlessness and a certain degree of futility: 
'One thing I have noticed since doing thejob [of Quality Advisor] is that it was easier to get 
things done as a nurse manager. You could always say, ýou will do it like this'because you 
were in charge. Now though I don't have that sway and it's sometimes really hard to get 
people to do the right thing .. can you understand. It can be really annoying to 
do loads of 
work on something, like the patientfocused care project on ENT and then for them to just 
ignore it or twist what you're trying to do. ' (Quality Advisor: Fishtown) 
Interestingly the invisibility of infonnal evaluation results to others did not exclude or 
prevent 'outsiders' from using this level of evaluation as change agent in negotiations with 
the Trusts. 
Formality As A Tactic For Exclusion 
When CHC chief officers were interviewed they all felt that individual judgements, as the 
basis for communication with Chief Executives or Directors of Nursing, were key means of 
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communicating and effecting small-scale change (as was pointed out earlier). However, if 
larger scale change or something on a Trust-wide basis was required then recourse to formal 
evaluation results or data was almost always required. This was significant, as it was at this 
level that the 'outsiders' of the CHC and the Health Authorities played little part. As one 
CHC Chief Officer put it: 
'While I know I can ring up [the ChiefExecutive] whenever I want to and 171 always get his 
ear it only workedfor certain kinds o roblems ... stuffpicked up on visits or things brought to ýfp 
me by patients. If the same things keep cropping up again and again I'm always expected to 
have a survey or a research study to back it up ... we don't have the resources to be able to do 
itfor everything we want to do andyet we can't really get into the Trust decision making 
machinery as equal partners without it... its a bit of a catch 22 situation. (CHC Chief Officer: 
Fishtown) 
The pattern repeated itself in all the Trusts: formal evaluations which were managerially-led 
with some form of clinical support (usually nurses), were the basis of corporate changes to 
the quality strategy. CHCs and external consumer representatives were by and large excluded 
from these evaluations and so played little part in the selection or development of policy. 
Where CHCs were involved in changing or evaluating policy and practice from within the 
Trust (notably in Shiptown 12 and Castletown 13) there was still a feeling that the committees 
they were represented on were either 'rubber stamping exercises' or 'not really at the centre of 
the decision making process. Each of the two CHC officers involved in the two Trusts gave 
accounts of feeling somewhat alienated within committees and that much work was perceived 
as going on 'behind closed doors' or before people arrived to discuss the agenda. 
Castletown was unusual in this respect as it had built into a formal programme of evaluation a 
series of fora and a Patients Council; seemingly to combat this lack of direct input into 
corporate change from consumers themselves. However, when talking to some of the 
members of the Patients Council following the inaugural meeting there were still some rather 
cynical participants within the group: 
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'Yes I have been to these sorts of occasions before. It was last year on [name of ward]. It was 
ratherjolly but I'm rather reluctant to say that it has changed much. One always has a 
feeling that one is here to simply rubber stamp decisions that have already been made. My 
wife and I were invited though and we both feel we would like to help the hospital in any way 
we can; especially now we have a bit of time on our hands... I think I can s eakfor my wife p 
when I say that I hope we can discuss something other than car parking spaces at the next 
meeting. ' (Patients Council Member (and retired University Professor): Castletown). 
At this meeting the agenda was firmly established by the Trust prior to the meetings, and the 
'facilitator' (the Director of Nursing and Quality) was keen not to divert from this too widely. 
A number of participants made reference to clinical events which occurred during their own 
hospital stays and these were quickly fielded as 'not really appropriatefor thisforum' or 
'betterfitted in elsewhere at a later date'. Despite the assurances of the Director that the 
meetings would be a direct route to the Executive Board of the Trust there were no plans to 
produce either a report, goals for the group, or even a mechanism for feeding back to the 
Trust executive other than informally through the Director of Nursing and Quality. 
So even in this Trust, which undoubtedly was the most 'consumer-focused', an essential 
transformation occurred. The fora mechanism, which was marketed as a formal means of 
evaluation charged with providing a formal input to the quality-policy process, had its output 
mediated by an 'insider'. Moreover, the nature of its recommendations were changed to the 
less visible (and therefore less accountable) level of informal contact between executives. 
One CHC member from Castletown who was previously an administrator at a neighbouring 
hospital, whilst applauding the Trust's efforts, felt that it was the quality department 
themselves that were marginalised within the Trust. 
The Limitations Of Evaluation 
Managerial and clinical accounts revealed a distinction between quality activity and the core 
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care and treatment of the Trusts. A number of managers felt that while evaluating services 
often had an impact on quality activity, it was often restricted to this area and failed to 
influence clinical practices. There was a sense in which people did quality and did work but 
that the two were separate. As one Director of Nursing explains: 
'People always talk about doing quality. That's something we've tried to change here ... its as 
ifpeople see quality as somehow separatefrom nursingpractice as a whole. We have had to 
work really hard to try and get nurses, especially the sisters, to see quality andpractice as one 
and the same. I don't mean they don't do it, they do, but its hard to explain that I can't give 
pointsfor quality on its own. It means nothing if it's something separate. ' (Director of Nursing 
and Quality: Shiptown) 
This perception was reinforced by those clinical staff involved in operationalising quality in 
the 'front-line' of clinical practice: 
'A lot ofthe girls take part in SAS and the quality group but getting time awayjr'om the ward is 
difficult. A lot ofthe sisters don't see it as a proper part ofnursing... so you have to go after 
shifts or in your own time. ' (Staff Nurse: Fishtown) 
The product of evaluation is information; and information, as one manager in Marketown 
pointed out, 'is the currency of change'. The essential tensions between the accounts of 
influential group members around the issue of evaluation included how it should be carried out, 
what uses it should be put to, and who should have access to the results, all made recourse to the 
theme of infonnation. 
The Role And Use Of Information 
Information represented a significant component in meetings at all levels to do with 
actualising quality in the sites. Questions such as, 'how should we get this information to 
People? % 'what sort of information should we produce? '; and (in the case of Shiptown and 
the attainment of standards), 'how much do we want to tell peopleT formed the basis of 
contentious, and often lengthy, discussion between the representatives of various groups 
involved. 
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The infonnation produced by the Trusts in connection with quality fell into three broad 
categories: 
* That which was destined for the public domain (i. e. outside the Trusts' business5 
professional and quality structures). This included clinical audit reports and Patient 
Charter results. 
9 That which wasformally collected and controlled and remained within the confines of 
the Trust's business, professional and quality structures (i. e. internao. This included 
the results of SAS audits; the Kings Fund Accreditation survey results; and EFQM 
attaimnent data. 
9 That which was both internal and informally collected and used in the informal 
evaluations the earlier section of the chapter described. Examples here included the 
'hot line" which one CHC Chief Officer described in relation to his ability to discuss 
quality matters with the Chief Executive of his local Trust if he needed to (Fishtown). 
Public Domain 
Information destined for the public domain was in two main areas of Trust quality activity in 
all the sites: clinical audit and Patients Charter related initiatives. The formats in which the 
results of clinical audit were disseminated varied from the production of a very polished 
report from the Central Audit Facility in Shiptown, to the basic 'side of A4' detailing the 
projects in place in Fishtown, Castletown and Marketown. In each of the sites the report had 
to be requested as a separate source of information from the audit departments concerned. 
This meant that requests for information on audit from individuals or organisations rarely 
came from those outside the NHS or academic environments. As one Audit facilitator put it: 
i 
... well what's the point [ofproducing a glossy report] when the only people who read 
it are 
the audit people at the Commission. We send a copy to the CHC but they don't say anything 
about it and nobody else is that interested. We thought about sending a copy out with the 
annual report that information do, but at the end of the day there are better ways to spend 
our budget. ' (Audit Facilitator: Castletown) 
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Audit results were always anonymised and if referred to at all then only in the form of the 
changes introduced as a result. This was usually in the form of the clinical change 
recommended; guidelines adopted; or training need addressed. One Audit Chair even saw this 
anonymisation as forming one of the cornerstones of the audit function itself. 
'Making it confidential is vital, no one would take part if the results were not 
anonymised ... this is a key part of my role -persuading people that they can't be identified. I 
know its not what the Commission want but that's how its got to be. '(Audit Chain-nan: 
Marketown) 
The Patients Charter-based information was similarly anonymised and dealt with the results 
of scrutiny at departmental or directorate level. This scrutiny tended to be based around 
aspects such as waiting times, outpatient waiting, and provision of single sex wards. This 
fonn of information tended to be more accessible and generally placed in areas where 
patients, or potential patients, could get their hands on the material more easily. Examples of 
this form of information included annual Trust Reports; thequality newsletters in the main 
reception and outpatients areas in Shiptown; and the Quality Bulletins sent to staff to put in 
communal areas on the wards in Marketown. Each Trust also had some form of quality 
noticeboard in public areas somewhere within the Trust; although in one of the sites this was 
taken up by an advertisement for maternity photographs while in hospital. People associated 
with the quality strategy saw this sort of information as generally non-contentious and not 
that reliable. Occasionally the sentiment that the information was produced and collected out 
of statutory obligation as opposed to any sense of moral justness was expressed: 
'The Patients Charter material that we release is done because we have to, not necessarily 
because we want to. Its the mostpublicface of what we dofor quality but the least useful to 
us as managers. Its unreliable, out of date, and doesn't help as a means ofgettingpeople to 
change the way they do things clinically. '(Matron: Marketown) 
The lack of importance attached to most of this form of information can perhaps be gauged 
by the fact that, of the sixteen members of the Quality Core Group who attended the Quality 
Core Group Meeting the day the DOH Hospital League Tables were announced publicly, 
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only two were aware that they were either being launched that day, or that they were fifth 
nationally in terms of their rates of improvement for that year. This was despite having had 
advance notice from the Regional Health Authority. 
Internal (Formal) 
In contrast to this policy-driven approach, the release and production of internal-formal level 
of information was more hierarchically and mechanistically driven. The collection and 
dissemination (back to the Health Commission) of SAS material for instance was a 
prerequisite for the purchasers placing contracts with Shiptown and Fishtown. Similarly, 
where directorates undertook quality projects such as the PIER system in Castletown they 
were compelled by the Quality Managers involved to produce reports on the success of the 
proj ect. 
At the mechanistic level, systems such as EFQM were dependent on the formal evaluation of 
performance against standards for the implementation of the system itself. Similarly, the 
process of clinical or medical audit generated formally collected and analysed information. 
The difference between the soft 'managerial' information of EFQM and the 'harder' clinical 
information of audit was that audit results seldom if ever went beyond the professionals or 
multi-disciplinary teams involved. EFQM, PIER and the patient focused standards of 
Castletown, however, were fed back up the hierarchy of the quality structure to steering 
groups such as the QCG in Shiptown. Audit results did not routinely appear on the agenda for 
discussion of Clinical Audit Committees - they remained isolated within the teams carrying 
them out. Again emphasising the 'hard' and 'soft' distinction between the different methods. 
It was this intemal-formal. type of information that generated the most contention amongst 
staff and highlighted the strongest divisions between stakeholder groups. Many professionals 
within the Trusts, particularly at the lower levels of their particular hierarchies, expressed 
reservations and doubts about the worth, validity and intent behind collecting information 
which they perceived as 'managerial' or 'bureaucratic': 
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ICA 
SAS isjust bureaucratic paperpushing. We had no say whether we wanted to take part and 
it wasjust chucked at us. You don't get anyfeedback and its largely irrelevant to everyday 
nursing. ' (Staff Nurse: Shiptown) 
The Internal, Informal Level And Type Of Information 
Compared to the public domain and internal-formal types of information within the sites the 
internal- informal level of information gathering and exchange that went on was very difficult 
to establish as a researcher within a case-site. Most of the information exchange at this level 
took place behind 'closed doors' and away from either Trust public relations machinery or 
the formal 'straight j acket'(Nurse Manager: Marketown) of systems such as TQM. However, 
while rarely observing this in practice it was quoted as a significant component in 
stakeholder's accounts so often that there was little reason to doubt its existence. Especially 
as it occurred when interviewees were speaking of evaluation; the methods by which 
approaches were selected; and the lines of communication promoted by organisational 
structures. Although gathered internally this form of infonnation was often used in 
communications with outsiders such as the CHC when individuals wished to be 'off the 
record' in discussions on quality. This informal level of information was used within and 
between all stakeholder groups and took various forins. 
Amongst clinical staff, informal indicators of 'quality' included one's opinion of someone 
else's practice' 4; the number of third party concerns passed to you as someone who could 
influence-the organisation'5; or simply ones perception of other's perceptions of your 
performance: 
'The biggest influence on how I nurse? ... its what other people think of what you 
do I think - 
other nurses ... 
here we all get on and so we can say if we think someones doing something 
badly withoutfalling out. But I've worked at other hospitals where that would never happen. 
(Staff Nurse: Fishtown) 
This informal level of information, like the infon-nal forms of evaluation detailed earlier, was 
often perceived as some of the most useful data for use in processes of change within Trusts: 
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'On a day to day level most of my decisions about services and quality are made a bit on the 
hoof. You end up using snatched conversations in corridors because of the pressures of time 
now. It seems to work quite well though problems are sometimes clearer ifyou don't have 
time to think to long about them. '(Director of Nursing and Quality: Shiptown) 
This was linked to the fact that the informal level of information was used when other means 
of communicating opinion were deemed unsuitable: 
'Audit suits us a team as there are many issues youjust don't want spread around. Clinical 
practice is a touchy thing and can be misunderstood by people who aren't surgeons 
themselves. Whenflaws in technique orproblems with management occur the last thingyou 
want is to go blabbing about it. ' (Consultant Surgeon: Fishtown) 
'We are always beingpushed to deliver more and morefor less and less and so sometimes its 
handy to highlight the bad things that happen as it helps our chances, with money and staff 
and things ... 
but we also have to realise that we are in competition, in a way, with the other 
directorates and so we have to be seen to be delivering on quality ... so yes not everything gets 
said that should be said but that's how its got to be. Everyone knows the game and we all 
play it. My Divisional Manager knows when all is not well but we don't have to send memo's 
to each other about it... '(Nurse Manager: Marketown) 
Amongst the managers within the case sites it was also acknowledged that while informal 
forms of generating and communicating information on quality were not the most desirable 
from a Trust point of view it was often the only option: 
'It would be no good me asking the orthopods to monitor their clinical standards and give me 
the results on a routine basis. Theyjust wouldn't do it. They do the minimum to get by... 
Patients Charter and the contract specifications and that's it. Anything else would be pushing 
it. "at we do do here which is different to the rest of the Trust is speak to each other. I make 
it clear that I am here to support the consultants not have a go at them. So now I think they 
know they can bring issues to me and I can help. It works both ways too. If there's something 
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bothering me I can take it to them and we talk about it. Its Practical and effective so if it isn't 
broken why try andfix it? '(Orthopaedic Business Manager: Marketown) 
This form of communication was often driven by, and in turn reinforced through, alliances 
between individuals in different stakeholder groups. This was particularly the case when 
infon-nation had to pass to and from managers to clinicians and from consumer 
representatives to clinicians, and where collusion might be seen as inappropriate by one's 
peers: 
'I've worked with Stephen [Urologist] since I got myfirstjob in the old hospital and he was a 
Senior Registrar. I respect him and he respects me even if we don't always see eye to eye on 
everything. He's afriend as well as a work colleague ifyou like. Hes tipped me of afew 
times about warpartiesfrom the consultants ... 
for gods sake don't tell any of the other medics 
though. ' (Divisional Manager Surgery: Fishtown) 
'Some things you don't want thefull [Community Health] Council to know and so they're off 
the record between the consultant and me. A lot of what I deal with is sensitive and involves 
individuals who the Council members might know, or else its a bit complicatedfor some of 
them. '(CHC Chief Officer: Fishtown) 
To summarise the informal-internal form of information; it was far more alliance driven than 
the policy-driven public domain information in Trusts or the mechanistic or hierarchy-based 
information of the internal formal level. Information constituted a resource for groups which 
could'be used and manipulated by all groups in pursuit of discrete ends such as 'selling' a 
managerial tool such as EFQM to clinicians; making poor audit results appear bland and 
anonymous in order to safeguard status or contracts; or releasing select 'sifted' information to 
consumer groups in order to appear as if consultation is actively taking place. Information is 
the currency of quality and that which is most often referred to as the product of a teams 
efforts. 
Since the introduction of the internal market refon-ris of 1990 many of the members of the 
Trusts' management teams attested to the increased prominence of information as a requirement 
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for operating in the market itself, and it was the perceived impacts (positive and negative) on 
quality activity of the market which delineated many of its players. 
The Market And Quality 
The purchaser provider framework itself exerted a significant impact on the shape of each 
Trust's quality strategy. Each of the Trusts had in place a variety of mechanisms which were 
geared towards the needs of the 'market' and occasionally imposed as part of contractual 
requirements by purchasers themselves. For example: 
e In each of the Trusts contract quality standards formed a key part of contracting 
between business managers in the provider units and contracting departments at the 
purchasers. 
* Each Trust was required to feedback, in a variety of formats, the results of quality 
monitoring exercises (often conducted on a quarterly basis) to the purchasers. 
* In Fishtown and Shiptown the purchasers had developed and implemented purchaser- 
led standards and means of auditing these standards on a regular basis. 
The Insider Status Of Providers 
The question of purchaser influence in the development and application of quality at the 
provider end differed according to whether the stakeholder was an 'insider' (i. e. executive 
manager or clinician) or an 'outsider' (purchasing authority member, CHC member). The 
interviews with managers and clinicians who were relatively involved in each Trust's quality 
strategy revealed a desire to minimise the involvement of purchasers in the on-going 
development and implementation of the Trust's quality strategy. This need for minimisation 
arose from the apparent dissonance between what providers felt were 'reasonable' demands 
from a customer and the demands made by the Commissions themselves. 
'.. 
-they [the DHA] should have very tight outcome measures. And this is where I do struggle 
with the quality people at the DHA who seem to want lots of detail about the process. And I 
have to say to them, the problem is ifyou're not careful I spend longer chasing information 
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for you than actually managing the patch. because its easyfor them. I mean they don 't have 
the responsibilities of day-day management that do impinge on all sorts of little 
things.. . 
'(Matron: Marketown) 
The arguments justifying this provider stance were built around the idea that as they had been 
4playing the quality game' (as one Surgical Manager in Fishtown put it) longer than the 
purchaser their commitment to quality was proven. Moreover, many of the traditional reasons 
relating to the need for clinical (and more recently, managerial) freedom were deployed in 
relation to this new policy context. Namely, that purchasers needed to trust in the providers 
given their already substantive commitment - as evidenced by the efforts they expend in the 
name of quality. As this quote from one quality manager illustrates, the idea of Trust 
financial investment as an indicator of commitment was an attractive one for providers: 
'Our approach isfar more developed than the commission's. We started before them in 1990 
on quality and have put our money where our mouth is and got on with it ... they haven't. 
(Quality Manager: Castletown) 
Much of the dissatisfaction from the providers with the market per se in relation to quality 
stemmed from the perceived lack of synergy between purchaser and provider interests. There 
was a common feeling that structures of purchasing and provision, and the roles that were 
tied to them, fostered a lack of understanding of the other's role. Purchasing decisions were 
often seen as illogical or ineffective; and when they were viewed as effective, adjectives such 
as 'hard' and. 'cold' appeared in numerous accounts. There were relatively few vociferous 
objections raised to the idea of having purchasers as a customeTfor the services on offer; 
rather, the objections were with the customer's themselves. 
'flaughs/ 
... when wefirst started the training the peoplefrom the 
Crosby team kept talking 
about sandwichesfrom Marks and Spencer's and being able to change suppliers ifyou didn't 
like the product as the newface of the NHS and rubbish like that. The Commission are a bit 
like this except that you don't usually expect Marks and Spen cer's to change their 
sandwiches ha4(way through a mouthful and that's what they want to do with quality and 
contracts. They keep expecting us to change the service before they've had chance to really 
evaluate itfor next years contracting round '(Divisional Manager, Surgery: Marketown) 
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The conflicting roles which the market engendered were seen by many informants as 
intimately tied to the idea of quality activity. Local purchasing and provision forced players 
in local quality arenas to reflect on the interaction between the various roles which people 
were expected to occupy. The Audit Chair in Marketown, for example, was both a surgeon, 
the audit lead for the Trust, and a professional colleague of the Director of Public Health (the 
Health Commission's audit lead). This was a source of some resentment for the CHC Chief 
Officer who questioned his interests: 
'[the Audit Chair] he's all right he is as a doctor. But with audit he has to be all things to all 
men and its affected whatpeople think of him. He comes across as weak and not at all 
effective. Its not hisfault its because of the way its set up. He has to be a doctor and also 
answerfor the hospital to [the Director ofPublic Health]. Problem is they are big buddies at 
the Goýf Club; its too cosy. I think you know what I'm saying. ' (CHC Chief Officer: 
Marketown) 
Outside Control? 
Some managers attempted to reconcile the need for freedom with the new reality of having to 
appease customers through a strategy of gamesmanship. Indeed, several managers pointed to 
the fact that a significant element of the senior-managerial role within Trusts was in allowing 
purchasers to think they were exerting control over the service when in reality keeping a firm 
grasp oneself However, there was considerable desire on the part of purchasing managers 
interviewed that in the near future responsibility for quality should be devolved down to 
providers; thereby relinquishing some of the control mechanisms they had established around 
quality. The rationale for this was that the purchasing role was developing so successfully 
that devolution was a measure of their own success: 
'In the early days controls were necessary because none of us really knew what contracting 
was about. But as it gets more sophisticated we should be able to pass the batten on to the 
Providers a bit more. '(Nurse Advisor: Fishtown and Shiptown joint purchaser) 
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On the whole, however, this normative picture was tempered by the reality of having to be 
seen to be exerting pressure on recalcitrant providers. The position which emerged most 
strongly from interviews in all the case sites with purchasers was that the stake in the 
activities should, and in some cases could, be increased in the short term. Typical comments 
included these two quotes from purchaser quality-leads in Marketown and Castletown 
respectively: 
'We need to give more direction andpush things. We are the main purchaser and we should 
have more say in the shape of the services we want to purchase. I see more emphasis on 
making quality part of business; that means contracting; and that means us. '(Contract 
Negotiation Team Member Marketown Health Commission) 
Director of Contracting: As the largest purchaserfor the Trust wejeel a little excluded at the 
moment. 
Int: Could you say in what ways? 
Director of Contracting: Well I'M thinking of all the potential improvements we could have if 
we had a more ' roductive' relationship between ourselves and the Trusts. It would be nice p 
to have more sway, if only to get things done a bit quicker. Responsiveness is as important as 
planning and while we have the planning side sewn up the responsiveness angle is more 
difficult. Things take too long. '(Director of Contracting: Fishtown and Shiptown Health 
Authority) 
The major delineating factor that emerges from purchaser and provider accounts was that 
while the providers saw purchaser interest as control and interference, the purchasers were 
more likely to introduce phrases such as 'partnership', 'alliance' and 'co-operation' into 
responses. Interestingly, several lower level managers interviewed expressed a desire to see a 
stronger and more focused purchaser role in the quality activities of the Trust: 
'We should be looking atjoint ways of doing things.. they have their systems and we have 
ours and its inefficient. We are supposed to be looking at the same things and so it makes 
more sense to work together. '(Business Manager: Marketown) 
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Interviewees at both the provider and purchaser ends of the spectrum often recognised that 
there was a gap between what one purchasing manager tenned, 'the rhetoric of planning 
meetings'; and the day-to-day reality of trying to exert pressure on another organisation. 
Factors such as local personalities and 'knowing the enemy' were as influential in a local 
context as the policy guidance from the DoH: 
'Of course we all know each other. But after restructuring and them [Castletown] going 
Trust we are aware that we are now workingfor different companies ifyou like. Knowing 
your colleagues though does create problems as its hard to be business-like when the person 
you are dealing with was a workmateforfive years; especially when you're not happy about 
something or want a service changed in some way. We talk at the beginning of each year and 
we have this plan and that plan and such and such a way of dealing with contingencies but at 
the end of the day it comes down to how well you know who you're dealing with at the other 
end. The rule book tends to get thrown out about September usually. ' (Contracting Manager: 
Castletown) 
A Conceptual Objection? 
This desire to enhance their respective stakes in the quality dimension of service provision - 
was countered by a secondary division concerning the desirability of the market itself. 
Executives and senior managers on both sides of the purchaser-provider divide were quick, 
(despite criticising the mechanics of the market) to defend the idea and- to an extent - the 
achievements of the internal market. However, this degree of consensus got weaker the 
ftirther one went down the quality hierarchy: a hierarchical split which also had 
occupational/role-based dimensions to it. 
Of all the frameworks and structures that impacted upon service delivery the market was the 
most universally disputed along occupational/role-based lines. Below the level of executive 
management, interviews revealed a widespread body of opinion which saw the idea of the 
market as incompatible with quality. This incompatibility was broadly classified with 
reference to two areas: the experiential and the conceptual. 
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The first of these two areas saw people 'blaming' the market for the failures of quality 
initiatives in the past or for failures in services attributable to poor quality. This fonn of 
disagreement was more common in clinicians who had direct contact with the market 
mechanisms of contracting and/or business management. This extract from one Clinical 
Director's account of the quality-contracting interface in Shiptown highlights the 'practical' 
nature of objections: 
'Here it's the Quality Core Group and [the Directorfor Nursing and Quality] on one hand 
and on the other itsfinance, the Divisional Manager and [the DHA]. The two are definitely 
separate. I see both because they competefor my time but you have to concentratejust on 
contracting. You have to because mone is the bottom line at the moment. ' (Clinical Director: Y 
Obstetrics) 
Contracting was also blamed by one ENT surgeon in Marketown, for similar reasons: 
ITT- 
11 6w can contracts help quality when last year we lost part of our ENT service to 
Rotherham. How is that helping quality? They take money awayfrom the service which 
prevents us investing in quality this year. ' (ENT Consultant: Marketown) 
Nurses at or below Ward Manager/Sister level tended to frame these practical objections in 
terms of the effect that the internal market was having on quality in services. Contracting per 
se was not the key feature of these accounts; more often it was the perceived bureaucracy 
associated with new quality structures and processes. A number of these accounts were 
accompanied by statements from nurses describing their alienation from the contracting 
process and its links with quality. As this quote from a Sister in Shiptown highlights: 
'The whole thing since we went Trust and the purchasers and that has been just one load of 
bureaucracy after another. We also have to do a lot of things which aren't really nursing, 
like the Patients Charter returns. Its more management now at my level but at the same time 
we don't get a look in when it comes to business planning and the big stuff. '(Sister: Surgery: 
Shiptown) 
263 
Nurses tended not to have the same awareness of business issues that managers, and even 
consultants, demonstrated. Clues to this lack of awareness at the lower levels can be found in 
their descriptions of piecemeal information flow and a sense of being excluded from the 
business planning process: 
'When I was a staff nurse you had a much better grasp of what was going on the hospital. But 
now I think its much more difficultfor nurses to know whats happening. Ifind out and get in 
there because I make it my business but its very hardfor a new Sister to assert herseýf now I 
think. '(Ward Manager: Fishtown) 
Nurses had more in common with the CHCs in relation to their objections to the market in 
relation to quality - perhaps because in relation to the core business of contracting and 
monitoring they were effectively excluded. Along with the CHC their primary objection to 
the market was along conceptual lines. It wasn't just the mechanics of the market they 
objected to (although the CHCs all made reference to the difficulties in updating members on 
a constantly changing NHS) but the idea of the market itself It was at this level that the 
language of consumerism was so prominent: 
'They [the Trust] go on aboutfairness and treatingpeople better and choice. These are noble 
aims but you'd be hardpushed to see them in the Trust on a regular day-day level. The 
purchaser-provider thing hasn't worked here and I'M not sure its worked anywhere else 
either.. the whole idea of an NHS market downplays professional knowledge and skills and 
the people who suffer are the patients in the end. ' (CHC chief officer: Marketown) 
Irr- 
nuving purchasers isjust not right; patients aren't comfortable with the idea or the 
language orjust don't know owt. If they don't understand it how can we show quality. Its no 
good at the end of the day keep doing surveys and all that ... people want to 
know that their 
own treatment is going to be the best possible they're not bothered by what happens to 
everyone else. ' (Staff Nurse: Marketown) 
The CHCs involved, in each case, managed to link their general dislikes of the concept of a 
market and the practical experiences derived from 'observing itfrom a healthy distance' 
(CHC Research Officer: Marketown). 
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Extraneous Factors: Politics And Local Markets 
The CHCs' close links with local communities, their politics and agendas (which sometimes 
stretched further than the local NHS Trust) were clearly evident in relation to consumer 
representation in the local markets in which the Trusts operated. In Marketown the CHC 
Chief Officer felt he was being excluded from playing on the basis of his political beliefs; an 
observation that was reinforced by inter-views with the purchasers and the providers: 
'Itsjust politics. They [the Trust and the Health Authority] don't like some bits of-what I did 
when they went Trust with the Press and everything. So theyjust do the minimum. ' (CHC 
Chief Officer) 
'It comes downfrom the Trust. [the ChiefExecutive] and my boss arefriends and I think 
because on a personal level [the ChiefExecutive] and [the Chief Officer] don't get on, 
different background politically, then wejust get told not to bother the CHC as much as we 
maybe should. Ipersonally get on with [the Chief Officer] but my boss and he are not the 
best offriends'. (Nurse Advisor-Health Authority: Marketown) 
'[the Chief Officer] calls a spade a spade and is a bit of a loony lefty. Hes always been like 
that though itsjust his way. But he rubs people up the wrong way so the Trust don't have a 
lot to do with him if they can help it. '(Patient Representative: Marketown) 
At the level of organisational politics one purchaser felt that his local CHC Chief Officer was 
C vengeful' and had a vested interest in 'stuffing' the local Health Commission as a result of 
him being made redundant from a management position there. Again a view that was 
reinforced by an executive from the local NHS Trust: 
'Our CHC is a bit different because the guy that heads it up is an ex employee of ours. You 
do sometimes wonder if his intentions are completely honourable and that he isn'tjust out to 
stuff us up he comes across as vengeful sometimes in meetings. ' (Director of Public Health: 
Fishtown and Shiptown) 
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'[the CHC Chief Officer] is very good but I know the purchasers and he don't always see eye 
to eye. He used to work there you know? Maybe its coloured their view a bit. '(Director of 
Nursing and Quality: Shiptown) 
What each of these examples show is how extraneous variables such as national, party and 
inter-organisational politics can interfere with quasi-market mechanisms and the central 
4quality' activities that are developed locally within this. The operations of the market (like 
contracting and consumer consultation), while occasionally peripheral to the work of quality 
departments, provided one important link between the Trusts and the 'outside' worlds of the 
communities they served and the people who buy services on their behalf What the market 
refon-ns have enabled is the chance to develop new structures under the name of quality 
which aim to promote the values of the market. However, on the basis of the four case sites 
examined it is not entirely clear that the synergy between service and consumer interest 
which the reforms heralded in policy terms is best served by these emergent quality 
structures. 
The Role And Development Of Quality Structures 
Chapter Four has already described the complex quality structures in each of the Trusts. 
These structures each shared a common pattern; namely, a central core (commonly a steering 
group of some sort) 'fed' by supporting functions such as a TQM manager (Marketown) or 
Patient Representatives/Quality Advisors (Fishtown) and with formal. /infonnal. links to 
mechanisms such as clinical audit (Shiptown) or business planning (Marketown). It was 
within these structures that involvement of lay and professional consumer representatives was 
present. This took the form of committee membership (in Shiptown and Castletown) or 
Patient Councils/Fora (Castletown). 
Structural Separation of Quality from the Mainstream 
There were strong differences of opinion regarding the separation of quality structures from 
mainstream managerial and professional hierarchies. The marginal nature of these structures 
had the effect of denying the people within them any form of line managerial power. This 
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isolation was a source of some frustration to people with a direct stake in quality activity and 
upon which their posts (or elements of their posts) depended: 
Int: 'What kind of managerial sway does a Quality Advisor have?, 
Quality Advisor: 'Hardly any in reality. ' 
Int: 'Does that have an impact on thejob? ' 
Quality Advisor: 'Of course! Its veryfrustrating not having the old thing of being a line- 
manager tofall back on sometimes. Its difficult to getpeople to do things occasionally and it 
would be nice to have the organisational clout to compel people. But I think it makes you 
hone your person-skills more. You have to persuade and ca ole... that always works better 
anyway. Its notjust us though its quality generally. We're not yet at the stage where people 
think of it as part and parcel of everyday work. ' (Quality Advisor: Fishtown) 
However, those at the higher end of the mainstream managerial hierarchy appeared to view 
the development of 'separate' quality structures and roles carrying no line-managerial 
authority as a necessary part of a successful approach to quality: 
'You have to remember we're dealing with well educated andpowerful groups ofstaff You 
can'tjust wade in and tell them what to do. We built the Quality Advisor's roles up around 
this as a Board.. Its the reality. Ifyou want to change the culture you have to chip awayfrom 
the inside. ' (Chief Executive: Fishtown) 
The only Trust where day-day leadership was provided by a powerful line-managerial group 
was Fishtown. Their structure was headed by a central Executive Management Group. It 
would be easy to assume that this represented a degree of commitment to the idea of 
supporting quality. Indeed, this was how it was first described in interviews with the Quality 
Advisors and the Chief Executive. As interviews with managers became more 'relaxed' and 
the research presence in the site less of a novelty to the workforce, it emerged that leadership 
itself was pretty low down on the group's agenda. Devolution of development, 
implementation and evaluation to the Quality Advisors was the strategy employed. So even 
here the operational reality for those with a role dependent on the quality strategy was a 
separation of the managerial, professional and quality power structures in each site. 
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At the level of Clinical Divisions, Directorates and units, this structured devolution reinforced 
the effect of encouraging the perception that quality was separate from either clinical or 
managerial work; and that the only people who had an interest in making it work were the 
quality managers in each site. As this quote from a divisional manager highlights: 
'My problem with giving up my timefor quality initiatives is that the Division doesn't get any 
more money on the back of them they are not a core part of what we do. And as an individual 
the recognition you get doesn't really mean that much. Its not like you get prompted or a pay 
rise by being apart of thepatient-focused care group. '(Divisional Manager Surgery: 
Fishtown) 
Structural Limitations 
Compounding the separate nature of quality from line-managerial power structures in each of 
the sites the quality structures was the problem of coverage. It was clear from interviews and 
observation of meetings that a sizeable proportion of meaningful activity and communication 
took place outside the forinal confines of official quality committees or structures. This 
method of 'getting things done' was typified by the accounts of communication proffered by 
outsiders (for example, CHC Chief Officers or Purchasing Managers) and insiders such as 
Chief Executives or senior line managers. This 'informal' mode of communication, already 
mentioned in relation to evaluation, was a means of bypassing official quality structures 
perceived as weak: 
Int: 'Why not go to the quality management department? ' 
CHC Chief Officer: 'Because half the time you don't know who you Pre speaking to and what 
the have to do with the Trust. Its always changing. ' Marketown Y 
'I'M involved in two groups at the Trust to do with quality but its obvious that neither of them 
has the slightest impact on quality of care so its easier to go straight to the top and get things 
donefirst time. '(CHC Chief Officer: Shiptown) 
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Structuring Consumer Involvement 
The consumer interest in quality structures was promoted through the rhetoric of 'bottom up' 
nianagement ideas. How each Trust defined the bottom tier of the structure, however, is what 
differentiated each site. In Castletown the bottom of the organisation included the end-user of 
services and every effort was made to get their views directly onto the service agenda through 
a quality structure that emphasised partnership and consultation. Shiptown took a similar 
view but contented itself with the 'proxy' views of the local CHC. Marketown and Fishtown 
had made a conscious decision to exclude external consumer representatives from their 
quality structures. Ironically, these were also the two Total Quality Management sites: where 
the customer is king! Moreover, these were the sites with the most developed 'Patient 
Representative' roles. The reason's why these two sites chose not to pursue direct consumer 
representation in Trust-led activities centred firstly, on the perceived success of having 
'insiders' represent external consumer interests: 
'The patient representative role is more than enough. They have good links with the 
community and their ears close to ground about patient issues. ' (Director of Organisational 
Development: Fishtown) 
Secondly, past efforts at direct incorporation had failed due to the inadequacies of the local 
consumer body; and it was felt that the Trust "s efforts to be more consumerist would be 
threatened by encouraging consumer representation! 
'We thought about it [involving the CHC on quality committees] but their visits are not 
especially useful. We didn't want to repeat the same mistake with EFQM or the Patient 
Focused Hospital work we've invested too much energy and time. ' (Quality Advisor: 
Fishtown). 
The involvement of consumers in Castletown and Shiptown's quality structures was no 
panacea for community representation. The groups in which consumers were involved were 
made up primarily of professionals and managers. For example, the Quality Core Group in 
Shiptown and the Quality Steering Group in Castletown. Even in those sites where groups 
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were purposely set up to redress this imbalance such as the Patient's Council in Castletown 
the Chairs or 'facilitators' were usually managers. 
The CHCs in both sites felt glad to be involved but again the overriding feeling was that the 
quality structures were not the most influential fora with which to best effect change which 
met the needs of the communities involved: 
'There is [his emphasis] a serious sense ofpartnership between the [Community Health] 
Council and the Trust but you have to realise that these groups are not that effective in 
themselves. For example, while we get lots of nurses attending patients forums we hardly 
ever see a consultant and the problem with that is usually its that group who are responsible 
for most of the grumbles I have to listen to here in the office. So in terms of change I don't 
know if the way things are shaping up is the route we should be taking. '(CHC Chief Officer: 
Castletown) 
Protecting Quality: Defending the Quality Ramparts 
One theme that emerged from both provider and purchaser-based interviews was that direct 
stakeholders were extremely fearful of the demise of quality structures. In two of the case 
sites (Marketown and Fishtown) a process of restructuring had occurred in both their 
providers and corporate purchasers. Castletown's purchaser had also undergone some major 
rationalisation of its quality department in the two months before the fieldwork commenced. 
All the Trusts claimed that they were committed to quality. And Marketown was, in the 
words of the Matron, 'beefing up' its approach. In reality this seemed to mean explaining the 
Mission Statement to the staff and not making the quality manager redundant. Fishtown, on 
the other hand, was beginning to seriously question the viability of a team of four full-time 
Quality Advisors: 
'We can't carry onfundingfourfull timers without a demonstrable track record. A number of 
my colleagues are beginning to address alternatives to what is quite an expensive outlayfor 
the Trust. '(Organisational Development Manager: Fishtown) 
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Fishtown's purchaser had recently shed six posts created to promote quality and there was a 
real fear amongst the provider's quality staff that they were next: 
'You can 't put yourfinger on it, But you know... subtle changes in attitudes and stuff. I think 
the move towards Organisational Development is probably a bad thing because we have 
trodden on their toes in the past and [the Director] makes no bones about not liking our style 
down here. ' (Quality Advisor: Fishtown) 
One strategy deployed by Quality Managers was to make their post as 'substantive' as 
possible; primarily by taking on more mainstream managerial roles. In Castletown the fall- 
time quality manager realised that by combining his quality post with a 'proper' managerial 
function then even if the quality component was abandoned he would still have a place within 
the organisation: 
'To be honest it was the best thing that ever happened. When I look at other quality managers 
in other Trusts they are dropping likeflies. But here, I have two hats and they both are 
I. mportant. But asfar as the Trust goes, the business manager one is the one that really 
matters. ' (Quality Manager: Castletown) 
This option, however, was not open to specific projects created under the banner of quality: 
The Pathways to Care project in Castletown, and the Patient Focused Care project in 
Fishtown). Both the managers attached to these initiatives recognised the risks involved 16: 
'Yes it was risky leaving my ward and taking thisjob but I thought that it was worth it at the 
time. '(Pathways to Care proj ect manager: Castletown) 
'Personally I would have preferred a secondment but Finance and my manager said that it 
would be a long term commitment and the permanent contract would remain. Now though 
I'm not so sure with the money troubles and everything. I supposed that's the gamble you 
have to take. ' (Patient Focused Care Project Manager: Castletown) 
There was a very real sense within the Trust Quality Management at Executive level that if 
quality was to be achieved in any meaningful way then structures had to be incorporated into 
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the more powerful professional and managerial hierarchies. This view, however, was 
commonly only expressed by those executives or senior managers who had a direct stake in 
the success of the quality strategy, such as the Directors of Nursing and Quality in Shiptown 
and Castletown. Their contemporaries, especially in the field of medicine, took the stance that 
a degrýee of separation was desirable. This reinforced not just the message that quality should 
be separate from clinical work, but more specifically that clinical work should be separate 
from 'quality' in the form of management-led activities such as TQM: 
'Incorporation of the Quality Advisor's role, so that it becomes part of the hospital's 
managerial structure is not the answer. What is needed is to allow the mechanisms like audit, 
that are in place alreadyfor assuring the quality of our [medical] work to continue and 
flourish. It works at the momentprecisely because it is separatefrom all the bunkum that my 
colleagues in nursing and management keep throwing at each other. ' (Consultant Surgeon: 
Fishtown) 
One thread running through all of the contested areas examined thus far is the issue of 
leadership. The theme of leadership constantly emerged in segments of transcripts which had 
as their primary focus the question of definition or evaluation. 
The Question Of Leading Quality 
A number of accounts from interviewees placed leadership at the forefront of challenges 
facing managers and clinical leaders for the future: 
'-what has been lacking has been strong clinical leads to take thisforward. '(Divisional 
Manager: Marketown) 
'Here its all been reactive rather than thinking ahead If its going to make inroads then more 
of a sense of leadership is crucial. ' (Nurse Manager: Fishtown) . 
The need for strong and effective leadership was something that crossed hierarchical and 
occupational/role based boundaries. However, it was the nature of the desired leadership 
which acted as the delineating factor in people's accounts. The desirability of different 
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leaders was often explicitly tied to the notion of credibility. This linkage was strongest in 
interviews carried out with professional stakeholders who by and large saw the need for 
clinical credibility as an almost essential prerequisite for being involved in changing clinical 
practice: 
, LT- 
j., uw many people involved in quality have you met that are credible in the eyes of nurses. 
You have to have credibility ifyou want to influence nurses. ' (Divisional Manager: Shiptown) 
This was reinforced in those managerial accounts which suggested that by becoming more 
credible clinically they had begun to breach the bamers constructed by health professionals: 
'When Ifirst started offI didn't know what was going on. But as the years have gone by I've 
got better and Ifeel I can talk as an equal with most of the consultants here on some things 
like hernias or re-admission rates. But Christ I've had to work at it. ' (Divisional Manager: 
Surgery Fishtown) 
A CHC Chief Officer made a similar point: 
'Sitting on the Quality Core Group, my background at the purchasers has helped. I can 
comfortably listen to debates on clinical matters as long as they're not too technical. and I 
think that thefact that I can hold a conversation with people about the clinical stuffgets me 
some brownie points with afew of them at the Trust. '(CHC Chief Officer: Shiptown). 
Quality managers went further and all those interviewed felt that it was definitely to their 
advantage to have had professional backgrounds when dealing with professional groups. 
If The Hat Fits: Credibility Roles And Group Membership 
At the 'helm' of operational matters in each of the sites (with the exception of Fishtown) 
were senior nursing managers. One of these nurses felt that the quality batten had somehow 
come her way through a combination of clinical background and 'enough managerial sway 
to achieve things': the other two had inherited the responsibility upon taking up their posts. 
They all felt that the quality 'hat' fitted the Director of Nursing's remit quite well but mainly 
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from a practical point of view based on the historical association between quality and nursing 
involvement: 
'Nursing is thefurthest down the road in terms of standard setting and toolsfor quality its 
been part of nursing nowfor well overfifteen years so the others can learn a lotfrom our 
experience. ' (Matron: Marketown) 
These operational leads were commonly supported by a 'multidisciplinary group' but 
analysis of these group's compositions showed that only Marketown had any forrn of medical 
representation. Links between the operational leads of nursing and medical leaders were 
primarily through clinical/medical audit Chairpersons or informally as an additional topic of 
conversation at committees dealing with other topics such as contracts or complaints. The 
term multidisciplinary could justifiably be redefined as managerial/nursing; with just a hint of 
consumer representation in Shiptown; and a determined effort in Castletown. 
When the types of quality activity are analysed in terms of patterns of leadership in place 
within Trusts then the occupational demarcation becomes more pronounced. Clini ical audit 
was led by a medical consultant in three of the Trusts and in the fourth (Castletown) the 
Director of Nursing chaired the committee responsible for deciding priorities for audit and 
receiving results (where available). However, all the Trusts involved here had well 
developed, and separate, medical audit structures in place. 
The 'managerial' approaches of Continuous Quality Improvement (Fishtown), Total Quality 
Management (Marketown), Purchaser Quality Standards (all four sites) were all fronted by 
staff derived from management groups. However, when these techniques were actually 
implemented at the level of individual wards or units, it was nurses who comprised the bulk 
of the workforce. In none of the sites were medical staff directly involved in these initiatives. 
These patterns of participation and leadership, while interesting in themselves do not help 
cast any light on the question of the impact on the face of quality of such allegiances. Four 
Primary patterns presented themselves in the Trusts: 
9 The segregation of audit and managerial initiatives 
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" The disassociation between managerial and clinical components 
" The dissonance between managers and clinicians views of the managerial role 
"A narrowing of the focus of quality in any one approach 
Segregating Audit 
Separate medical and uniprofessional audit structures served to reinforce the view that the 
term audit had two distinct areas: the clinical which many perceived as 'watered down', and 
'the real stuff of medical/uniprofessional audit. One interview segment which acts as an 
exemplar for this sentiment was with a consultant obstetrician in Shiptown: 
'... the midwives will say to me 'come on Miss Hare we should be auditing practice together'. 
So Isay 'OK that'sfine by me what doyou want to examine? 'They usually come up with 
something like waiting times or changing childbirth related things. But in reality these are 
pretty pointless when what I am concerned with is complication ratesforforceps deliveries 
or infections post-Caesar... there's no way they're going to be privy to that. Actually that's 
notfair, the midwives probably could but the business managers who 'tag on', not a hope. 
I'm interested in the other stuff, but not that interested that I'm going to devote valuable time 
and energy on it they don't need my help withfinding out what women wantfrom our 
community midwives. ' (Consultant Obstetrician: Shiptown). 
Separating The Managerial From The Clinical 
This separation into the soft-multidisciplinary areas of clinical audit and the harder 'nitty 
grittY' of mono-professional medical or nursing audit was seen by some clinicians and 
managers as symptomatic of a broader respect for the boundaries attached to stakeholder 
roles in services. On the medical front, almost all the consultants interviewed felt that even 
where management were included in auditing practice it was not their place to attempt to 
directly impose changes on medical staff: 
'We let John [the Divisional Managerfor Surgery] attend on the understanding that he sees 
it as educational. We decide what guidelines and standards we will audit and adopt. He 
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understands that.. that's probably why he doesn't come that often. '(Consultant Surgeon: 
Fishtown) 
Managers for the most part appeared happy to play along with this perception: 
'Myjob is to manage I leave clinical standards to the clinicians. '(Divisional Manager - 
Surgery: Fishtown) 
'Its no good me telling them theirjob, but it works both ways too - they shouldn't tell me 
mine. Consultants seem to think its something of a one-way street sometimes. ' (Divisional 
Manager - Obstetrics: Marketown) 
That quality activity should seek to impact upon managerial and clinical components as 
separate arenas was seen as natural and logical by most professional groups. Bringing the two 
together under the guise of clinical audit was fine for examining 'big questions" such as 
referral patterns but would necessarily fail to get at the true picture of services as experienced 
by patients or clinicians: 
'Clinical audit talks about the patients view from the reception area through to surgery and 
all that'but in reality patients focus onjust one or two things they are unhappy with - usually 
some aspect of clinical care or something to do with the environment of the place like the 
food or visiting - by concentrating on trying to sort out everything we are wasting effort. 
Better to try and change lots ofsmall things then to spend a year talking about admission 
protocols and then do nothing about it or everyone ignoring it. '( Ward Sister: Castletown) 
The only group who wished to see the two disparate elements of clinical audit and quality 
pulled together through quality itself were managers. This did not necessarily mean that they 
wished to control clinicians directly; the issue that emerged most forcefully from the data was 
one of clinical involvement rather than leadership: 
'. - its not that I want to drag them [the consultants] 
kicking and screaming into line with the 
rest of the Region. They wouldn't let me and thats not myjob, but I would like to be involved 
and to see how I can improve what I dofOr them as a manager and someone who could make 
276 
their lives easier. Its very hard to get that message out though and its a shame because I think 
a lot of us [middle managersIfeel like that. '(Business Manager: Marketown) 
There was a sense in all the sites in which those managers with responsibility for quality who 
modelled themselves along the lines of the classical administrative-supportive (i. e. pre-1980s 
General Management) function were rewarded by a professional reaction which stressed 
terms such as 'helpful' , 'facilitating', a 'resource to be drawn upon' and 'they're when we 
ask them for advice'. Those accounts from managers which portrayed themselves in heavy 
handed or 'gladiatorial' tones met with a professional body of opinion, which related to the 
managers in question as 'interfering', 'wafflers instead of doers', or even (in the case of one 
Ward Sister in Marketown) 'bullshit merchants'. 
Consequently, when Quality Managers themselves were asked about their role and how they 
saw themselves the overall pattern was complicated. Almost all of them aligned themselves 
with the first view of a facilitative, supportive function to professionals; but at the same time 
felt that they had managerial incentives or pressure to 'deliver' and felt equal pressures to be 
strongly 'managerial'. As one Quality Advisor in Fishtown put it: 
7 can't manage ifIgo, in and start sayingyou will do this or you can't do that, I have to be 
seen as someone they can turn to if they need help or advice. That doesn't mean that I can't 
steer them in the direction the Trust wants them to go. Ijust can't let them know that I'm 
doing it like that. The problem is that I'm expected to manage along the conventional lines as 
well and to befirmer and more assertive with the staff on the wards. Its like Catch 22 ifI 
dictate then I can't manage them. But ifI don't dictate I'm seen as not managing by the 
boss-'(Quality Advisor: Fishtown). 
A Narrowing Of The Focus Of Quality 
The separation that existed between management and clinical components in quality activity 
led to a narrowing of the focus of quality at the operational level. This was particularly so in 
the case of nursing. Nursing was the predominant group involved in quality at the 'front-line' 
of the wards and units. Because Ward Managers and Sisters/Charge Nurses tended to be 
involved they had a fair degree of sway in terms of their ability to use line managerial 
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authority as a means of getting things done with more junior members of staff However, 
because of the conceptual split between the 'clinical' and the 'managerial' quality activity 
was often limited to a narrower focus than quality managers would have wished. 
A number of nurse accounts attest to the influence of traditional nurse-doctor power relations 
in reducing the ability of nurses to cajole doctors into complying with elements of the quality 
work on the wards that concerned them. A particular focus were the primary and named nurse 
systems in Castletown. In their developed forms the named nurse system means each patient 
has a nurse allocated to deal with all aspects of their stay in hospital and this nurse acts as the 
conduit through which information about the patient should flow. However, it became clear 
that some doctors were refusing to adapt to the new system: 
'The named nurse system that's to do with quality isn't it? ... the named nurse system we have 
here, that's a perfect example of the old Dr-nurse thing. We've been tryingfor two years to 
get the consultants to come andfind the patient's named nurse if they want to see the patient 
or if they've been talking to them. But usually theyjust go straight to the Sister and tell her. 
We've tried everything even getting the Sister to pass them back on, and its notjust them, 
even the Regs and the Senior Reg's do it. ' (Staff Nurse: Castletown). 
Linked to the failure of quality as a vehicle with which to redress the imbalances of the 
traditional doctor-nurse relationship of, there was some evidence to suggest that nurses were 
utilising the machinery of quality as a means of distancing themselves from what was seen as 
an unfavourable set of 'traditional' power relations. As one charge nurse explains: 
'We've tried to involve the consultants and sometimes we've had good results but we've 
realised that its too much like hard work. As nurses on this unit [orthopaedic], and as nurses 
generally, I think we're managing to become more professional in the way we do things so 
why should we involve the consultants in the quality work we do, if they don't involve us. I 
also think its a bit of a shift awayfrom the nurse image that the unit had before I got here. ' Y 
(Charge Nurse: Orthopaedics). 
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Consumers As Leaders? 
Much Trust documentation referred to services being 'customer-led' and explicit links 
between quality and the wishes or needs of patients or consumers. Consumer leadership, in 
practical terrns however, revolved primarily on gathering data relating to the wishes and 
desires of patients and potential patients. This data collection took place in three forms in all 
the Trusts: 
9 Quantitative surveys ofpatients and ex-patients: this was very common in all four Trusts 
and constituted the bulk of patient consultation in both Marketown and Fishtown. 
Consumer representation on Trust quality committees: these committees were seen as 
comparatively minor in status within the Trusts with the more major or 'powerful' 
committees associated with the business of contracting and executive management. Trust 
quality committees tended to be one level below this tier. 
Collection of qualitative information: through the use of patients themselves in the form 
of fora or, in the case of Castletown a Patient's Council. 
Consumer representation in the form of patient or CHC involvement in audit was not a 
feature in any of the Trusts. So, on the basis of this pattern, it would be fair to say that 
consumer input in Trust quality activity was primarily restricted to the managerial and 
consumerist domains of TQM, and initiatives such as the Patient's Council in Castletown. 
Professional quality activity then remained largely a question for professionals themselves. 
Even where consumers/patients were directly represented on committees or initiatives their 
views and contributions were commonly 'filtered' or mediated through the use of third 
parties or gatekeepers. In Fishtown and Marketown this was the role of the Patient 
Representatives; in Shiptown the Patient Liaison Manager and the CHC Chief Officer. This 
thirdparty role was a source of some conflict between groups, with the consumerist (CHC 
Chairs/Chief Officers) view being expressed by one CHC Chair as: 
,-- 
-the growth in these people who purport to represent 
the views of the people they [the 
Trust] treat is trulyfrightening. They control what gets putforward andfob offpeople who 
might have perfectly legitimate interests. Patients don't know which way to turn. The name 
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itseýf - Patient Representative - sounds more appealing to them than Community Health 
Council. Its a big talking pointfor some of us and one we have to address sooner rather than 
later. '(CHC Chair: Fishtown). 
The Trusts, and the Patient Representatives themselves saw their role as another form of 
advocacy for patients in the system: 
'Nat we do is express the views ofpeople we come into contact with on a daily basis and get 
them onto the agendas ofpeople that matter in the Trust. I know it worries the CHC butpart 
of the reason we came about at all was because, as a Trust, wejelt that the CHC weren't 
doing that ... they were ineffective and out of date. Its about using our experience and 
knowledge and getting things done. There's no hidden agenda ... its as simple as that. I really 
don't see what the difference is between us doing it and them [the CHCJ doing it as long as 
someone is (Quality Advisor/Patient Representative: Fishtown). 
Without exception all the Patient Representatives employed by Trusts stated that they had, at 
some point, questioned their allegiance, either to the patients they were representing, or to the 
Organisation that employed them. The importance of the organisation's stance on their role 
was the factor that divided them . In Marketown the Patient Representative measured 
her 
worth in the amount of money invested in the post and the fact that she had an office on the 
C executive corridor'. For her this meant the organisation took the business of representation 
seriously; and that meant unflinching presentation of patient views - even negative ones. 
Fishtown's Quality Advisors, on the other hand, had the tag of Patient Representative added 
to their J, ob titles after they had been doing the single job of Quality Advisor for up to five 
years. All the Quality Advisors expressed reservations about this element of their role and the 
lack of support they could draw on if they highlighted, with as much gusto, the bad side of 
services as well as the good: 
I ... sometimes you do get thefeeling that the Executive 
Management Group don't really give a 
toss what we say... I do worry about it yes, calling yourseýf a Patient Representative I think is 
supposed to give you an immediate affinity with the patient. To befrank though we get some 
right idiots coming through the door. ' (Quality Advisor: Fishtown). 
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Leadership in the main groups was problem-specific; if something was seen as a 'hard' 
clinical issue such as righting adverse clinical outcomes then it was down to the professionals 
concerned to select the appropriate leader in order for any chance of success: appropriate 
invariably meaning another senior professional. If the problem was hard in managerial terms 
then managers generally sought to make it a question of managerial leadership. If, however, 
the problem area was deemed 'softer', then leadership usually resided in the hands of nurse- 
management. It was in this area of 'soft' problems that claims of consumer sovereignty were 
brought to the fore. As one surgeon in Fishtown expressed it: 
I D., 
By all means let the punters into the 'touchyfeely stuff' but god help John [Divisional 
Business Manager] if he tries to push em down our throat at the divisional [business] 
meetings. ' 
Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn on the findings of qualitative data collection and analysis in all four 
case sites in order to reach its conclusions. These conclusions represent those analytical 
catagories which run through the implementation (and therefore operationalisation) of quality 
in the four sites examined. 
Analysis of the qualitative data paints a far more delineated picture of the social action and 
the perceptual ingredients which contribute to it. It has also shown how occupational 
grouping alone, whilst undoubtedly an influential dimension in shaping people's actions in 
relation to quality, cannot account for it entirely. It has been demonstrated that individuals 
have to equate action on quality not just with organisational-cultural, role-reinforced, beliefs 
of what it is to be a 'nurse' or a 'manager'; but also with factors which did not emerge in the 
analysis of quality in the theoretical literature. These 'extra' delineating factors which 
emerged included position in the Trusts' managerial and quality hierarchies; your status as an 
'insider' or 'outsider' within the Trusts' local markets; and whether or not your role within 
the Trust was dependent on the success of 'quality' for its continuing existence. These 
groupings represented the players in a game of quality which appeared heavily contested and 
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involved a series of constantly developing conflicts. These conflicts were characterised by 
negotiation, disagreement, consensus and divergance in a number of key areas. 
The primary split was with regard to the techniques for quality which groups aligned 
themselves with. This has important ramifications for shaping perceptions; as the techniques 
themselves were seen as powerful forces in helping clarify operational definitions of quality 
and how progress towards these definitions is evaluated. The techniques adopted by groups 
tended towards the generation of particular kinds of infort-nation which varied substantively 
according to quality approach. Medical audit generated rich and clinically-meaningful data, 
but was restricted to the mono-professional scrutiny from which it was generated. Quality 
Assurance surveys such as the Patients' Charter monitoring exercise generated data which 
was generally limited in its usefulness to services but which enjoyed widespread and public 
dissemination. The requirement to generate information was generally acknowledged to be 
part and parcel of the new, market-based, NHS. The market, or more specifically one's 
position within it, generally acted to define the stance you took on important factors such as 
information generation and use, as well as your status as an insider or outsider within the 
Trust. 
New structures had developed in services to accommodate the rise of quality as a service 
emphasis. However, the general picture was one of an alienated element of the organisation 
which was not fully accepted by any of the occupational groupings. The separation of quality 
from the mainstream of managerial and clinical work, and the limited role it offered 
consumer-representatives was the overriding picture in its development. Part of the impact of 
this seperation was a critical emphasis on having to prove oneself as credible as a leader in 
the eyes of the main stakeholder groups in services. Those that achieved this (such as the 
Clinical Audit Director in Shiptown) managed to shape empires which 'bucked' the trends of 
other sites. 
The complex nature of the groups which defined this picture of conflict was most arguably a 
result of the complex seperation of the 'stakes' people hold in services. Organisational 
cultures are complex entitities and the ideas of professionalism, managerialism and 
consumerism are only some of the ingrediants which contribute to them. Roles such as nurse, 
doctor, manager or CHC member undoubtedly draw on these but also have to reconcile less 
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easily mapped factors such as past experience, organisational personalities, and multiple roles 
such as manager-clinician and insider-Patient Representative. That levels of power and 
interest which impact on the shape of quality in organisations are so complex should not 
surprise the reader. What was a surprise to the researcher was how little recognition was paid 
to such complexity in the policies aimed at promoting implementation of this contested 
concept. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has explored the manifestation of quality in four NHS acute hospitals in 
Northern England. Specifically, it has examined the contested nature of the concept in 
its NHS and public service contexts; the role of organisational cultures in shaping 
quality's development in the NHS; the impact of factors such as power, organisational 
structure; structural interests and their sponsors. The exploration was undertaken 
within the organising principles of case-study methodology and made use of multiple 
methods of collecting data from both qualitative and quantitative paradigms. The 
blend of qualitative data collection and Q-methodologically-generated quantitative 
data was an innovative one and the lessons learned from this study may prove useful 
to researchers examining other socially-located phenomenon. It is the task of this 
chapter, however, to move beyond these general achievements and to detail more 
specific concluding thoughts, policy implications and recommendations. Specifically 
the thesis represents a structured argument with seven major elements; each element 
represented by a chapter within the thesis. 
Identifying Parameters for Quality 
Clearing Semantic Space 
First, the concept of quality is associated with what can be tenned 'conceptual 
slippage'; because of this it is necessary to detail the conceptual boundaries of quality. 
This was the task undertaken by Chapter One. Quality was shown to have both 
colloquial and technical dimensions; colloquial quality being that sense of quality 
readily used by the general public and yet which is inherently subjective and 
impossible to define. This colloquial sense has a place in the NHS and is commonly 
found as part of Trust and Commissioner's marketing strategies. In the thesis this 
usage is demonstrated by Castletown's slogan 'Partners for Quality'; it implies 
excellence as opposed to making it transparent. Obviously quality in this sense has 
only limited potential as the basis for corporate managerial action. Specifically, it is 
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difficult to see how something so subjective can act as a framework for groups of 
workers to work towards and within. Because of this limitation, quality has developed 
a technical sense in order that it become part of the corporate activity of service 
provision itself. Moreover, quality at service level has developed into a discrete area 
of activity in its own right. It has developed its own language, techniques and 
workforce - it has been operationalised. There are a variety of ways of making sense 
of the characteristics and consequences of this operationalisation. One way is to 
examine the nature of the techniques of quality and to enquire as to the values 
promoted by these (as commentators such as Pfeffer and Coote have done'). However, 
this analytic modus operandi inadequately addresses the social nature of the 
phenomenon of quality. Quality exists in a National Health Service populated by 
groups of workers bound by roles such as general managers, nurses and doctors, as 
well as consumers and their organised representatives. A useful way of articulating the 
flavour of these groups is as various 'tribes". When the characteristics of technical 
quality techniques are examined some of the most prominent features are the ways in 
which quality appears to be delineated along 'tribal' lines. Consequently a strong 
primafacie case can be made that certain types of quality activity appear to be 
favoured by different tribal groups. It is this initial primafacie argument which forms 
the theoretical 'jumping off point for the thesis. 
Placing Quality in its Policy Context 
The NHS does not operate in a value-free policy vacuum; one of the dominant policy 
backdrops for NHS service delivery over the past twenty years has been a process of 
managerialization'. This process has recast organisational structures and cultures 
within public services with the aim of transforming relationships of power, culture, 
control and accountability. Therefore, the second element of the thesis is the assertion 
that the rhetoric and techniques of quality are a key part of this broader process of 
managerialization. Governmentally-sponsored policy messages have increasingly 
made recourse to the language and techniques of quality as a policy goal for NHS 
service provision. Moreover, these messages cast the ideas, and occupational cadre, of 
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management in a central policy role. The structured ideas of this group, as far as can 
be isolated, contain a number of key positions: 
The desire for a new and explicit consumer orientation in public services. 
Alternative market-style service delivery structures (quasi-market) as the logical 
vehicle for delivering these new consumer-friendly services. 
9 Within the component parts of these quasi-markets (NHS Trusts, conimissioners 
and the Department of Health) an emphasis on flatter, devolved decision making 
structures aimed around the organising principles of responsiveness and 
efficiency. 
9 Flatter structures reinforced by flexible and mobile labour forces and systems of 
accountability which move away from the bureau-professional legacy of the past 
towards more transparent systems of performance indication and systems which 
pull together the fields of organisational human resource management and service 
delivery (for example, short-term renewable contracts and individual performance 
review). 
These ideas, and the operationalisation of them through the processes of 
managerialization, have made incursions into the realm of professional life. This is 
partly due to managers' abilities to increase their direct control of some professional 
groups (most notably nurses and therapists) through the application of techniques such 
as quality assurance and TQM. However, the apparent influence of managerial 
rhetoric and the apparent uptake of 'managerial' techniques such as quality assurance, 
can also be seen as part of a broader picture of professional reactivity to what it 
perceives as a challenge to its autonomy and power in the NHS. These assertions are 
based on an analysis of broad policy themes in the literature over the past twenty 
years, but the research challenge associated with this thesis was to explore these 
themes in the context of sound empirical data derived from the operational face of the 
NHS, i. e. individual provider Trusts. 
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Dealing With the Problematic of Researching Social Action. 
The third strand of the thesis was concerned with the methodological problematic 
associated with observing quality in practice, exploring the 'tribal' association Of 
organisational groups with differing types of quality activity, and how best to 
facilitate the theorising necessary to explain the evidence. The thesis outlines the 
essentially 'social' nature of quality; in that if quality is to be realised at all then it is 
dependent on the social action and agency of individuals and groups. With this in 
mind, the essential problematic can be posited as achieving an appropriate balance 
between the theoretical dimensions of holism, individualism, explanation and 
understanding. The thesis responded to this problematic by developing a multiple case 
site methodology using the organising principles of stakeholder analysis and between 
method triangulation as the essential components for data collection and analysis. 
Data was collected using a combined strategy of depth interviews, participant 
observation and Q-methodological statistical modelling. There were a number of 
reasons why the chosen methodology, albeit a complex one, was deemed the most 
appropriate means of exploration. First, the phenomenon of quality, with its social 
locus and poor empirical research-base, could safely be hypothesised as having 
multiple factors contributing to its use and development in organisations which were, 
as yet, unmapped and therefore could not be 'controlled' or foreseen; both of which 
would have been necessary for a quantitative or tightly structured qualitative 
approach. 
Second, the pluralistic nature of the NHS quality picture as observed in the literature 
lends itself naturally to a theoretical stance which emphasis the active role of 
individuals and groups within organisations. The thesis, in adopting the case site 
approach, and within this the principles of stakeholder analysis, aligned itself with a 
number of key philosophical propositions: 
* That reality is to some extent subjective; that is, different stakeholders will 
experience the nominally same phenomenon differently. 
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Situations are not necessarily manifestations of single purposes and plans, but may 
be created by the interaction of multiple purposes and multiple agendas for 
achieving them. 
The post-structuralist rather than structuralist view of the generation of behaviour; 
that is, much or all behaviour is the manifestation of cultural software internalised 
by social actors as opposed to the hardware of a basic structure of human 
personality acting as a fixed reality across people and over time. ' 
The third justification for the multi-method case site methodology adopted relates to 
the enhancement to construct validity which deploying more than one means of 
examining the nominally same phenomenon can offer. Moreover, in mixing the 
qualitative approaches of interview and observation with the statistical techniques of 
Q-methodology the researcher is afforded the opportunity to pursue deeper levels of 
knowledge and understanding regarding the concept being explored. The thesis used 
this 'complementary purposes model' to gather sufficient data to enable the researcher 
to theorise on the salient themes which emerged from the four case sites examined. 
Painting a Contextual Picture of the Case Sites 
Chapter Four provided the organisational-contextual backdrop for this theorising. 
Each of the four sites was very different in the ways in which they actualised quality 
and the structures, processes and stakeholders with which quality was expected to 
integrate. Marketown, was a large - 'first-wave' - NHS Trust with a strong political 
heritage and a senior managerial cadre overtly sympathetic to the Conservative 
governmental 'mission' of the N`HS refon-ns. It had attracted funding as a Total 
Quality Management pilot site and orientated its efforts around the theories of Philip 
Crosby. It placed responsibility for technical quality fin-nly in the hands of 
management and chose to formulate standards for activity which were transparent to 
both its internal and external customers (sic. ). However, unlike the Shiptown and 
Castletown sites these 'external customers' did not include local representative groups 
of 'professional consumers' such as the Community Health Council. Instead of the 
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CHC, Marketown chose to use lay members of the Non-Executive Trust Board as 
proxies for consumers and to employ a nurse as the consumer 'voice' in the system 
(through her role as the Patient Representative). The overall approach was one which 
favoured managerially-led structures and processes rather than professional efforts. 
Consequently, this site secured some of the lowest medical workforce involvement. 
Quality was devolved down to individual clinical divisions but with the central 
management structure maintaining close scrutiny and control via a full-time Quality 
Managerial Team and direct links to the Matron (Director of Quality). Professional 
quality activity was heavily polarised, with nursing being the primary clinical 'voice' 
in the centrally-sponsored quality activity of TQM and medicine choosing to pursue a 
separate policy of medically-led 'clinical' audit. 
This overtly managerial stance was mirrored by Fishtown. Marketown, were also 
committed to the ideas of Total Quality Management, although theirs was a more 
'down-home' framework grounded in a European context: the European Framework 
for Quality Management (EFQM). Again like Marketown, the Trust had been a pilot 
site for TQM (but on a regional level). What most characterised Fishtown was the 
degree of decentralisation in place. Clinical divisions within the site had almost 
complete autonomy to develop the characteristics of their approach to quality. With 
Post-Fordist structure and strategy a defining characteristic of the managerialization 
process in the public sector, Fishtown was the best exemplar of all the sites in terms of 
observing a 'classical' Post-Fordist attempt at organisational structuring for quality. 
This autonomy was granted in return for the achievement of corporate objectives. 
More than any other sites Fishtown had invested heavily on the creation of a support 
infrastructure in the form of four full-time 'Quality Advisors'. These were charged 
with the task of integrating managerial and clinical groups in the search for unified, 
corporate, progress towards a shared definition of quality. However, as in the other 
sites the medical world of clinical audit remained largely separate from the 
managerially-sponsored strategy of EFQM. Like Marketown, the Trust chose not to 
recruit lay members of the public, in either CHC or user-representative guises, into 
Trust quality activity. Instead, the Executive Management Group placed consumer 
representation in the hands of the Quality advisors. Unlike Marketown, the reasons 
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why were not overtly political; rather they simply felt no conceptual or moral 
compulsion to include 'outsiders' on a routine and formal basis. 
Shiptown shared its Health Authority with Fishtown, but the two were almost 
diametrically opposed in terms in terms of the structures and processes underpinning 
the actualisation of quality in the two sites. Shiptown adopted a far more hierarchical 
approach to the strategic planning and implementation of technical quality. The 
decentralisation of Fishtown was replaced by a central 'core' of groups; each of which 
defined the parameters of, and available resources for, quality within the Trust. The 
Trust had chosen not pursue the grail of Total Quality Management and instead had 
chosen a more inductive, developmental, process of organisational audits based 
heavily on notions of quality assurance and performance indication. The defining 
characteristic of Shiptown, however, was the relative lack of separation of its clinical 
audit structure from the rest of the Trust. The Trust had established a strong identity 
within the region revolving around its innovative use of the clinical audit process, and 
the audit department were a widely respected resource drawn upon by all clinical 
groups and strongly supported. However, despite the Audit Director's presence in the 
central quality structure it was clear that part of the reason for the successful 
integration of the audit and quality structures lay in his ability to distance himself 
from the work of the quality groups generally. 
Castletown, the fourth site examined, also rejected the Total Quality Management 
route to quality, although in their case this was as a result of experience rather than 
conceptual objection. Prior to Trust status being granted they had also been a regional 
pilot site for TQM. The experience, however, was not a happy one; with the 
widespread perception that the commercial tone of TQM rhetoric did not sit 
comfortably within the culture of the unit. As a result of this rejection the Trust had 
chosen to pursue a strategy which focussed strongly on the pivotal role of the 
consumer and on their choices being expressed in their own words and directly into 
the management system of the Trust. The primary manifestation of this strategy was 
in the form of patient/consumer fora within the Trust and facilitated by senior 
managers (usually with a nursing background). These fora, however, resulted in very 
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little formal output in the form of action to be taken by the Trust. Although consumer 
4voice' in relation to planned changes in the form of a new hospital site meant that of 
all the sites it was Castletown's consumers which came closest to representing the 
tempowered users' which were such a dominant feature of all the sites' quality 
rhetoric. None of the groups observed, however, were attended by medical staff or 
managers from the 'business' structures of the site. A number of consumer-attendees 
expressed reservations about the likely effectiveness of the fora as a strategy for 
realising their wishes. Not surprisingly, the local Community Health Council were the 
most supportive of all of the external representative bodies interviewed. There was a 
very real sense of partnership between Trust and CHC and this was reinforced in the 
active involvement of the Council in the Trust's central quality structure. 
The Role of Organisational Theory 
Each of the case sites represented a different cultural context with which to construct, 
test and modify theory relating to the delineated and structured pictures of quality 
evident in all four. In order to do this it was necessary to clear some further conceptual 
space around the key elements of the emerging theory. Chapter Five undertook this 
function and advanced a number of arguments dealing with the substantive 
components of the thesis. First, as conceptualisations of 'organisation' formed a 
central strand (albeit often an implicit one) of the theoretical foundations for quality 
adopted in each of the sites, the thesis explored the conceptual anarchy which is the 
dominant characteristic of theory relating to organisations. The thesis demonstrated 
that organisations can be variously conceptualised as social systems; negotiated 
orders; structures of power and domination; symbolic constructions; or social 
practices. What is clear, however, is that each body of knowledge is of limited utility 
to a discussion of quality in organisations. The heterogeneous nature of the debate 
meant that using the concept of 'organisation' as the basis for delineation around 
quality in Trusts would result in findings which would be too easily disputed and lack 
the depth of 'fit' necessary for a robust and valid attempt at explaining the empirical 
picture observed. Instead, it proved necessary to go beyond the 'organisation' as the 
basis for argument and to attempt to construct an analytic framework which utilised 
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those concepts common to each conceptualisation of organisation - namely, power 
structural interest and organisational culture. Chapter Five recognised that each 
individual has some form of 'stake' in Trust quality. This recognition can be recast as, 
6 each individual has interests relating to quality, its definition, operationalisation and 
its consequences'. These interests are shaped by the structures and power relations 
which characterise fon-nal organisation. The ability to suppress or oppress interests 
relies in part on the levels of power the individual (or their group) possesses in the 
organisation. However, the exercise of power is not random in nature it is influenced 
by social rules and resources (structures); and equally importantly, the sets of shared 
values which characterise social groups. Chapter Five showed how organisational 
cultures (or ideologies as they are sometimes expressed) are constructed by groups 
over years in organisations; and at the same time act as normative frameworks of 
meaning for people to utilise as justifications for behaviour. In NHS Trusts the 
organisational cultures most often identified by other commentators are those of 
professionalism, managerialism and consumerism. The theoretical links between 
manifestations of quality and these organisational. cultures are highlighted. For 
example, the ways in which professionals have adopted clinical audit as the model of 
choice for assuring quality amongst their constituency is shown to relate to the core 
'professional' values of relative autonomy in practice and self regulation. Similarly, 
the 'cultural' model of quality as expressed by ideas of Total Quality Management are 
shown to be closely linked to the theoretical framework of 'Post-Fordism'. A 
framework which has been hugely influential in shaping the values of managerialism 
over the past twenty years. These ideas form the theoretical framework for the 
analysis of the empirical data collected and can be summarised by the following 
paragraph: 
'Quality as it manifests itself in NHS acute provider organisations is a function of 
group valuesfound in services. These values are represented in the organisational 
cultures ofprofessionalism, managerialism and consumerism. Organisational 
cultures help define and shape the pursuit ofgroup interests. Moreover, because 
social action in the pursuit ofgroup interests is always mediated by power (i. e. your 
ability to pursue your interests and the ability of others to stop you) then the ' ure' p 
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operationalisation o quality along organ isational-cultural lines will be heavily ýf 
influenced by the composition ofstakeholder groups and their consequent position in 
the power relations of the unit. ' 
The Structure and Form of a Contested Concept in the NHS 
The above framework was deconstructed by Chapters Six and Seven. First, the results 
of the Q-methodological exploration made it apparent that assuming cultural 
allegiance on the basis of occupational grouping is somewhat misguided. The shared 
perceptions of participants in the Q-sorting exercise made it clear that professionals 
were just as likely to align themselves with groups of statements which placed 
consumer interests before their own and consumers were just as likely to value those 
statements which appeared to grant professionals carte blanche self-regulation and 
control over services. 
Whilst the sets of shared values (factors) that emerged undoubtedly represented the 
values one would expect from proponents of professionalism, managerialism or 
consumerism, the membership of the groups defining them discredited the idea that 
factors would be made up of homogenous constituencies of occupational stakeholders. 
Several explanations of these apparent 'anomalies' were advanced. 
First, the apparent dominance of consumerist perspectives (accounting for the range 
35.4% to 54.2% of variance in all four sites) were advanced from a position of 'self 
reference' in the Q-sorters. This means that even though apparent anti-consumerist 
values were promoted by observed behaviours in the Trusts, and these appear to 
negate the value stances expressed in the factors derived from the Q-sorts, the factors 
represent what could count as credible accounts in the cultural groups that define 
them. Consumerist messages formed a central strand in groups' attempts to forge a 
power base in each of the Trusts and as such it is perhaps not surprising that members 
of those groups felt the desire to sort the Q-samples in ways which emphasised 
consumerist approaches to quality activity. If this assertion is followed through to its 
logical conclusion, then consumerism, or more specifically a consumerist stance on 
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quality, becomes a form of moral currency to be used in power transactions and 
negotiations between stakeholders in NHS Trust activity. Moreover, the rhetorical 
links between quality and consumerist values can be seen as one means of promoting 
a sense of synergy between the structural interests of these stakeholder groups. 
The use of consumerism as the language of choice in Struggles to reconcile competing 
sets of structural interests within NHS Trusts, despite encouraging synergy, may not 
necessarily involve a requisite amount of symmetry between the parties involved. 
Specifically, given the qualitative picture outlined in Chapter Seven part of the 
attractiveness of consumerist language and expressions of value lie in the relative ease 
with which their operationalisation in services can be controlled by more powerful 
groups. Further evidence for this assertion could be found in the ways in which the 
overtly consumer-focussed agenda of the Castletown consumer fora were manipulated 
and controlled by the clinical-managerial groups present. To the extent that artificial 
boundaries were placed on consumer's abilities to raise issues. Whilst some of the 
service users present recognised the direct exercising of power and suppression of 
interests by a more powerful group, there was enough evidence in the data collected to 
lend credence to the argument that quality, like many other NHS technologies, has 
become a useful mechanism for a more covert form of interest suppression. When 
viewed along Lukesian' lines, quality has become a mechanism for aiding the 
exercising of power in ways in which service users fail to even be aware that their 
interests may be threatened or harmed. 
Of course the alternative explanation for the apparent prevalence of consumerist 
values amongst opinions on quality is that consumers, or more accurately, their 
representatives, are managing to fundamentally impact on the shared perceptions and 
ergo ideologies of professional and managerial groups. This argument, that the 
traditional ideological boundaries of organisational-cultural groups are becoming 
blurred, also retains a degree of elegance in relation to the apparent absorption of 
managerial ideas by professionals and the seemingly positive valuation of traditional 
C professional' values of autonomy and peer review by some managers in sorting the 
Q-samples. However, given the qualitative picture painted by Chapter Seven, and its 
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role as a means of contextualising the Q-findings, this hypothesis lacks sufficient 
explanatory power. Specifically, it fails to offer a purchase on the motives for such 
apparent cross-pollination and blurring of ideological components. 
The Q-methodological exploration of stances on quality activity managed to confirm 
the presence of several orthogonal, independent, factors. Each of these factors 
resemble points in the theoretical typology previously constructed portraying quality 
activity as segregated along the ideological categories of professionalism, 
managerialism and consumerism. However, at least one of the essential components 
of this typological theory does not 'fit' with the results. Specifically, the role-based 
adherents of these ideologies, clinical professionals, managers and consumer 
advocates, did not conform to some a priori hypothesis of homogeneity in their 
perspectives. Some potential reasons why are outlined above but perhaps the most 
convincing explanation lies in the characteristics of the methodology itself. Q, as a 
stand-alone methodology, generates accounts (factors) that could count as convincing 
amongst the people carrying out the Q-sort exercise. This would mean that if Q had 
been the only approach to the analysis of stakeholder perception and social action 
deployed in this study there would have been a theoretically significant gap in the 
knowledge generated. However, the multiple method triangulation, as one 
characteristic of the methodology adopted, enabled comparison of people's verbal 
accounts and individual/group action on quality with the Q-modelled perceptual map. 
Whilst making the analysis more complex due to the multiple sources of data it does 
add a degree robustness to the final analysis. 
Chapter Seven's qualitative analysis demonstrated that part of the reason that the Q- 
based exploration failed to fully confirm the initial, albeit tentative, hypotheses is that 
the primary characteristic of social action and group cohesion around the issue of 
quality in services was one of complexity. However, in offering a more complex, (or 
alternatively, richer) account the data promotes the detailed exploration of the 
apparent heterogeneity portrayed in the Q findings. 
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The qualitative accounts of individuals, coupled with observed periods of stakeholder 
activity taking place within the label of 'quality activity', demonstrated that four main 
variables proved influential in shaping an individual's contact with quality and the 
consequent views expressed and action observed. These variables or influencing 
factors defined the 'stake' that the individual possessed in respect of quality activity in 
each site. The members of the groups within these delineating categories became the 
4 stakeholder' groups associated with quality in the sites. 
First, in each of the sites there was evidence to suggest that the initial primafacie 
hypothesis advanced throughout the thesis had a degree of analytical utility. A 
person's occupational group appeared to be a strong force in shaping their 
participation and self-reported values on the issue of quality and its operationalised 
forms in services. In each of the Trusts there were common occupational patterns 
observed, usually revolving around the problematic nature of securing medical 
involvement in core, managerially-sponsored, quality activity. As a consequence of 
this lack of medical representation a peripheral (to the Trust management, not the 
doctors) strand of the Trusts' quality strategies had to be developed dealing with a 
'professional' form of quality. This strand conventionally took the form of clinical 
audit, which in each of the sites was still a primarily unidisciplinary entity and some 
way removed from the multidisciplinary ideal promoted by purchasers, the 
Department of Health and senior Trust managers. Nurses too fori-ned a significant 
strand of the audit component of Trust activity and when Trust managers made claims 
of uniting clinical audit and management-sponsored approaches such as standards- 
based monitoring, it was nurses that formed the constituency involved. This 
occupational demarcation applied with similar force to consumer-representative and 
managerial groups. Each group's level of contact with quality had a similar 'flavour' - 
whether the Trust subscribed to a Total Quality Management, in-house standard 
setting, or consumer-focussed basis for its strategy. Managers tended to align 
themselves with techniques which had at their core the "managerial' values of 
measurement, transparency, goal setting and objective achievement. Consumer- 
representatives were brought into those arenas which lacked the 'hard-issue' focus of 
, clinical work or managerially-controlled financial resources, and steered instead 
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towards those areas of Trust activity which the more powerful Trust groups felt were 
6suitable' for lay involvement: consumer-initiated complaints, the environment of care 
delivery in the form of decor, and issues such as the acceptability of various waiting 
time options or staff uniforms in outpatient departments. This occupational group 
factor had enough evidence in each of the sites to suggest that it could usefully offer 
the researcher a partial lever on understanding likely allegiances around quality. 
However, it quickly became clear that occupational grouping alone was not the only 
factor influencing the formation of stakeholder groups around the issue of quality. 
The second factor which acted to define an individuals relationship with quality in the 
Trusts was that of hierarchical position. In each of the sites the higher up the core 
managerial hierarchy an individual was, then the stronger their allegiance to the 
conceptualisation of quality promoted by the quality strategy of the Trust. In each of 
the sites the core managerial team from Chief Executive down to Divisional Managers 
were closely aligned to the strategy. It was at the level of decentralised divisions and 
clinical and managerial 'finns' within them that the major deviations from the 
(managerial' strategic vision of quality occurred. Stand alone initiatives developed 
amongst the managerial and nurse-managerial cabals which were then applied to the 
nursing workforce. Significantly, it was at this level that the major professional- 
managerial splits occurred. Uniprofessional audits were the primary (and most valued) 
form of quality activity amongst professionals at divisional level, and in only one case 
(Fishtown's Surgical Division) routinely involved a manager and then with limitations 
placed on their involvement. 
The third influential factor in defining allegiance was that of outsider versus insider 
status in the local health care market. There were limitations and boundaries on the 
degree to which outsiders such as purchasers or local community-representative 
organisations, were able to access the quality machinery of the Trusts. This finding 
explained those negative cases where consumer representatives were seen to play a 
central part in the quality strategy and its processes in Trusts. For example the 'Patient 
Representatives' in Fishtown and Marketown were involved in 'closed' areas such as 
professional audits and managerial standard setting. However, their involvement 
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could be seen as allowable due to their fundamental difference in status from the 
'outside' representative agencies of the CHC or service-user fora members. 
The stakeholder split was also centred on individuals' direct links with the official 
quality strategy (i. e. the approach sanctioned by Trust senior management). In each of 
the Trusts there were individuals with a direct reliance on the operationalisation of 
quality for their role in the organisation. The Quality Advisors/Patient Representatives 
in Fishtown, the Quality Manager in Marketown and the Quality Manager in 
Castletown were all examples of this new managerial 'cabal' in the NHS. 
Membership of this group was a powerful influence, as one might expect, on the value 
stance and associated action taken on quality. However, even amongst these groups 
there was a recognition that quality alone would not be sufficient to secure long-term 
credibility or a continuing role in the organisation. There was evidence that these 
individuals and groups sought to reinforce the links between quality and the 'bigger' 
concepts of 'consumerism' and 'business'. In Fishtown, Quality advisors (almost 
overnight) absorbed a patient representation function, a trend which featured in all the 
Trusts, albeit without the accompanying shift in job title. Whilst acknowledging the 
limitations of such responsibility there was also widespread recognition of the positive 
impact such a shift could have in ternis of their own continuing existence within the 
organisation. The rationale for the linking of quality to these twin sources of 
legitimacy in NHS Trusts could be seen from a variety of perspectives. 
One way of interpreting the alignment was due to the cultural alienation of those 
specifically charged with operationalising quality. Clinical professionals often 
perceived them as out of touch with 'their' reality and middle managers saw them as 
lacking in any real managerial role: i. e. they rarely had a budget or a distinct area of 
accountability. From this perspective the alignment of quality to the two categories of 
interests which are probably the most influential in the ideologies of professionalism 
(in the consumer interest) and managerialism (in the business interest) becomes an 
attempt to secure a sense of involvement with the groups most associated with these 
two organisational sets of values. This strategy appeared to be having only liMited 
success however; quality activity, and therefore the activities of the quality specialists, 
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were acknowledged by both direct stakeholders and the mainstream professional, 
consumer-representative and managerial groups as marginal to the core activity of the 
Trusts. 
If the above groups represent the primary stakeholder divisions and therefore the first 
dimension of the conflict that surrounds quality at the level of acute NHS Trusts, then 
the analytic categories surrounding the focus of group differences derived from 
interviews, observations and documentary analysis represented the second dimension. 
The study found that conflict surrounding quality focussed on eight key areas: 
The preferred means of operationalising quality 
How technical quality should be defined 
How technical quality should be evaluated 
The interaction between information and quality 
The interaction between the concept of 'the market' and quality 
The interaction between organisational. structures and quality 
Questions of leadership In relation to quality. 
It is possible to visualise the picture of the general findings of Chapter Seven along 
the lines of a two dimensional analytic matrix: along one axis lies the stakeholder 
categories and along the other lie the contested themes. It was not surprising then that 
this analytical matrix, which forms the basis of stakeholder analysis as an organising 
principle for research, yielded an overall picture which suggests that the points in the 
matrix were characterised by shared sets of structural interests. For example, those 
with a direct stake in the success of the quality strategy tended towards a fairly 
homogenous view of the worth of a structured approach to quality which depended on 
an active role for management. Similarly, it was not surprising given the 
encouragement of a local health care market that those with the biggest stake in 
relation to their 'insider' status felt the need to retain a sense of control over the shape, 
and constituency, of any evaluation of the quality of their service. 
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Power And Interest As Explanatory Factors 
Relative power was an important dimension in shaping the interest-constituencies in 
Trusts. This was especially so in the case of the medical profession. They were largely 
free to dominate attempts to shape the pursuit of interests in Trusts. They were able to 
define the focus of quality activity, and what constituted quality itself in the form of 
professionally-developed standards. Others were less able to influence this agenda: 
outsiders involved in community representation being the prime examples. For 
consumer representatives, a measure of oppression was clearly evident in their ability 
to pursue interests which reflected their values. Fora involving them were controlled, 
membership of influential committees limited, and the marginal nature of quality 
itself meant, that even where consumer representatives were involved their ability to 
impact on the business of the Trust was again restricted. 
There was evidence to suggest that quality acted as a mechanism for dominant groups 
to suppress the interests of others. Some nurses, for example, seemed unaware that 
some of the initiatives dressed in the clothes of quality, such as the Nursing Quality 
Index in Marketown had the potential to act as precursors to strategies which might 
harm their status or interests. As some commentators have highlighted', such 
techniques can act to facilitate standard packages of care and the explicit evaluation of 
nursing worth. 
What these characteristics show is the possibility that groups are defined on the basis 
of their relative power in services. What differentiates the stances and social action of 
the stakeholder constituencies identified was their ability to exercise power in pursuit 
of interests and the nature of any power they possessed. Certainly, all three of Lukes" 
dimensions of power were evidenced in the study and quality acted as the arena for 
the exercising of these dimensions. The uniting force of similar levels of position 
power in individuals can be seen in the hierarchical split in the accounts relating to 
quality in Chapter Seven. Similarly, common levels of expert power were a unifying 
force between groups, not just professional groups but also the 'experts' in their own 
spheres of operation: quality managers and consumer-representatives as well as 
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medical consultants and nurses. Just as vital, however, and harder to plan the research 
around, was the influence of personal power and charisma in shaping the direction and 
coverage of quality in services. Incompatible personalities, especially in Marketown 
within and between the CHC and the Trust, were seen to mitigate against even the 
most synergistic systems for marrying quality and good intentions. 
The exercising of this power invariably created winners and losers in the sites. A fact 
which most groups recognised; unfortunately, the strategies and policies developed at 
Trust level did not. People appeared to recognise the impact of organisational culture 
on the actions of their constituencies and the constituencies of others but were 
somehow unable to translate this recognition into sensitive organisational policy. 
Before, outlining the policy recommendations arising from the Thesis it is neccesary 
to highlight some methodological issues which arose during the and after the analysis. 
Some Methodological Reflections 
During the course of the study, the feeding-back of the results and dissemination of 
findings to peers and colleagues a number of methodological points arose which, if 
the study were conducted again, would be given serious consideration. 
First, there is the question of generalisability; the study was conducted across four 
acute Trust case sites in one NHS Region. Consequently, there is a sense in which the 
results are of limited use to policy makers (whether Regional, Trust or ward-based) in 
other areas. This is certainly true if one adopts a positivist stance on the question of 
research generalisability. However, the aim of the study was to explore the concept of 
quality and its operationalisation in NHS Trust settings. In doing so, the study has 
constructed an analytical framework firmly rooted in the organisational literature, and 
has collected empirical data as the basis for the deconstruction and reformulation of 
the original theoretical framework. It offers a conceptual approach to the exploration 
of quality which policy makers could usefully apply to their settings as a means of 
approaching the day-day management of quality. Based on this study, a managerial 
approach which emphasised likely stakeholder-group conflicts in the areas of quality 
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definition, evaluation, preference, structural support, information, the role of the local 
healthcare market, and leadership would have a degree of utility. Similarly the 
complementary analytic dimension, the nature of the stake which people are defined 
by, means that planners can incorporate likely conflictual boundaries and the nature of 
the structural interests represented within them into local policies. 
The Q-methodological aim of grounding statements in the language and contexts of 
each individual site which led to the application of four separate Q-samples might also 
be revisited in future work. Whilst the resulting factors gave a rich and contextualised 
picture it would have been methodologically useful to repeat the q-sorting exercise 
with a more limited, single, Q-sample across all four sites. This could be based on the 
detailed analysis of a preliminary pilot study. The resultant data would lose little in 
richness (the number of replications could be increased to adjust for peculiarities in 
dialect or context) and the end structure of the factors would have been simpler to 
interpret. Although without access to greater resources for fieldwork and printing this 
was impossible to achieve in the current study. 
Ideally, the study could have incorporated more fully the dimension of time into the 
analysis. Given more resources the processes of the social construction of quality in 
each of the sites could have been given increased depth by mapping them in 'real 
time' and relying less on reflection, self reported behaviour and limited observation. 
Every precaution was taken to cross reference where possible people's accounts with 
others who were involved but there is always the danger in studies of this kind that 
perception can re-write the reality of the situation in the absence of discursive 
counters. Feeding back the results of the analysis to players within the sites helped 
prevent this phenomenon, but a 'time-series' approach to the development of 
initiatives such as the Patient Fora in Castletown would have added value to the 
analysis. It is doubtful that the final picture would have changed significantly, but 
added depth could have been a characteristic of such an approach. Both of these 
methodological issues have been incorporated into a study of nurse's use of research 
evidence in clinical decision making'. This study will incorporate a single Q-sample 
and time series analysis of discrete elements of care within the research strategy. 
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Given the methodological weight attached to triangulation in the study it would have 
been advantageous to follow the logic of replication to its logical extreme and to 
attempt to 'validate' the analysis in a large-scale attitudinal exercise, probably a 
survey. Whilst theoretically possible, this had a two-fold dilemma associated with it. 
The first was the lack of adequate resources; the second, however, was less easy to 
reconcile and related to the mixing of qualitative and quantitative techniques. It can be 
argued that the study already mixes both paradigms via the incorporation of Q- 
methodological data in the analysis. However, as Chapters Three and Six showed, Q 
is sympathetic to both paradigms and works in harmony with the assumptions of both 
positivist and interpretative traditions. Moreover, the hypothetical framework 'tested' 
by both Q and the qualitative exploration was the same - albeit with slightly different 
techniques and starting points. Simply using an attitudinal survey to test theory, along 
conventional R-methodological statistical lines would have required a fundamentally 
different set of research hypotheses, i. e. ones that were already developed. At best this 
would have required a separate study and at the very least deserved a separate phase in 
this study with new sampling techniques and analytical boundaries. This was clearly 
beyond the scope of this study, representing, as it does, a starting point for the 
conceptual exploration of this contested concept. 
These methodological issues lead naturally to the establishment of future areas for 
research. In particular, the large scale utility-testing of the analysis on a larger, 
randomly selected, NHS population. There are other areas which the thesis has 
unlocked and deserve scrutiny some of which could usefully dovetail with the NHS 
Research and Development strategy aims of bringing the aims associated with clinical 
effectiveness to NHS organisation and management'. One urgent example would be a 
controlled study of models of Clinical Governance with the aim of gauging 
effectiveness in changing corporate and clinical behaviour and organisational 
outcomes. A second study, would be a quasi experimental approach to mechanisms of 
user incorporation in the Trust Board Sub-Committees as suggested by the latest NHS 
White Paper'o would also represent a timely and proactive area of scrutiny. 
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Quality: The Continuing Struggle to Marry Clinical and Corporate 
Governance 
The findings presented in this thesis have direct policy relevance. Quality, and its 
associated techniques and rhetoric, are once again on the ascendancy within NHS 
policy. The White Paper 'The New NHS: Modern Dependable"' places a renewed 
emphasis on quality and does so in more detail than any other document derived from 
the highest policy level in the NHS for some time. In its own words the aim of 
Governmental policy on the NHS is to: 
... shift thefocus onto quality of care so that excellence is guaranteed to allpatients, 
and quality becomes the drivingforcefor decision-making at every level of the 
service' (original emphasis)" 
The White Paper still relies heavily on the colloquial use of quality as a marketing 
tool, but more than any other recent policy document, begins to make the 
operationalisation of quality - its technical dimension - explicit. For example, for the 
first time there is a set of criteria, albeit vague ones, for what constitutes a desirable 
organisational approach to quality: 
a quality improvement processes (e. g. clinical audit) are in place and integrated 
with the quality programmefor the organisation as a whole. 
* leadership skills are developed at clinical team level 
* evidence basedpractice is in day-to-day use with the infrastructure to support it 
* goodpractice, ideas and innovations (which have been evaluated) are 
systematically disseminated within and outside the organisation 
* clinical risk reduction programmes of a high standard are in place 
* adverse events are detected, and openly investigated; and the lessons 
systematically learnedfrom complaints made by patients 
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* Problems ofpoor clinical performance are recognised at an early stage and dealt 
with to prevent harm to patients 
9 All professional development programmes reflect the principles of clinical 
governance 
9 The quality of data collected to monitor clinical care is itseýf ofa high Standard. 13 
In many ways the policy recommendations of the thesis are usurped somewhat by the 
broad thrust of the intentions associated with the 'New NHS'-based reforms. However, 
from a researcher's perspective this fact is encouraging as it adds weight to the 
validity of the main findings and analysis. 
Perhaps the most significant element of synergy between current policy on the NHS 
and the thesis is the potential for negating some of the effects of the 'insider-outsider' 
market-based stake in quality associated with the abandonment of the internal market 
itself. Although the basic, and continuing, idea of separating provision of services 
from the commissioning function still retains a degree of potential for tribalism. In 
theory at least the abandom-nent of the rhetoric and some of the bureaucratic 
machinery of the internal market should lead to a greater sense of synergy with regard 
to quality between those providing the services and those commissioning them. There 
was little doubt during the analysis that the market acted both as a primary means of 
defining one's stake in quality and also as a focus for quality-based conflict within 
and between other stakeholder groups. However, it remains to be seen whether a 
simple rhetorical shift and a more flexible conceptualisation of the mechanics of the 
commissioning-provision agenda will be sufficient to break down the barriers created 
around quality. 
One of the reasons why the barriers developed in the first place was the relative lack 
of power of those associated with operationalising quality. One of the key 
recommendations arising from this study has to be the positive allocation of resources 
to those individuals and groups with a direct stake in operationalising quality. 
Increasing the resources associated with quality explicitly, rather than a host of 
seemingly (at the 'shop floor' at least) rhetorically disjointed initiatives, some of 
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which have the term quality in and some of which don't (such as clinical audit), would 
have the effect of increasing the strength of the drive to operationalise this disputed 
concept. These resources, however, need not necessarily be financial. One of the most 
powerful resources managerial groups could draw on is an explicit framework of 
quality to draw on as a source of legitimacy and an ability to compel the disparate 
stakeholder groups to take a more unified approach to the concept. Gove=ental 
policy appears to go some way towards meeting both these recommendations. 
In relation to an explicit framework of quality which will aid corporate governance, 
the new 'National Service Frameworks"' appear to offer useful strategic means of 
breaking the current impasse between top-down vague policy messages of 'best 
practice' and the fragmentation encouraged by individual organisational innovation, 
or indeed stasis. The National Service Frameworks promise to incorporate: 
'the best-evidence of clinical and cost-effectiveness ... together with the views of users 
to establish a clear set ofpriorities against which local action can beframed ". 
The exact format of these frameworks remains to be established but on the basis of 
this study's exploration of quality they will need to establish reasonably explicit 
criteria if they are to avoid perpetuating the interpretation which has mitigated against 
a unifon-n approach to quality across Trusts; even where those sites share the same 
primary commissioner (as in Fishtown and Shiptown). This explicitness will also be 
required if the implicit Governmental policy of marrying the arenas of clinical and 
corporate governance" is to avoid favouring clinical (and therefore, professional) 
governance. Vagary and lack of prescription in the frameworks will only serve to give 
the upper hand in the control equation to clinical professional groups and a continuing 
ability to define their particular brand of quality.. 
The lack of power of managerial and consumer 'tribes' to effect change on 
professional social action around quality could be addressed by giving them the 
statutory instruments to encourage action. Again this recommendation is partly 
addressed by forthcoming legislation. With regard to the influence of managers on 
professional activity, Chief Executives are to be given ultimate responsibility for 
assuring the quality of the services provided by their NHS Trust". This shift 
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fundamentally alters the nature of the 'stake' or structural interest held by the Chief 
Executive role in relation to quality. The shift has the potential to compel Chief 
Executives to take quality seriously and gives them a personal stake in the 
operationalisation of the concept. Based on the two sites in which the Chief Executive 
was most closely associated with the work of the those charged with operationalising 
quality (Fishtown and Shiptown) there is some evidence that such an approach may 
go some way to achieving a greater sense of unity between managerial and clinical 
cabals. In both sites the Chief Executives were a powerful force in shaping the quality 
strategies and had managed to establish enclaves of professional-managerial co- 
operation (Shiptown had the central audit facility and Fishtown the collaborative 
efforts in Women's and Children's Services). 
However, a note of caution needs to be injected into this changing Chief Executive 
role and responsibility. The thesis' primary finding that social action on quality 
remains segregated according to role-based groupings and the ideological foundations 
that underpin them (although as has been seen this is far from the sole delineating 
factor) essentially means that any strategy adopted to unite groups should not 
reinforce the split between them or their self-defined spheres of activity. The new 
powers and responsibilities given to Chief Executives, whilst reflecting the need for 
senior managerial control over the concept, are tied to the need to devolve day to day 
operational responsibility to a clinically-controlled Trust-Board sub-committee as part 
of the Government's Clinical GovernanceI8 strategy. 
The rationale for this course of action is easy to discern, and the results of this study 
would reinforce it; namely, that by allowing clinicians to retain management of other 
clinicians with respect to quality then the chances of influencing clinical behaviour 
will be that much higher. Certainly, in Shiptown where a respected clinician led the 
central audit facility, changing practice was a real possibility through clinical 
leadership and a sense of 'separateness' from the managerial core of the Trust. 
Similarly, where professionals were associated with roles subordinate to the core 
general management of the Trust then their professional status appeared to whither 
and their peers commonly spoke of them in ways which implied some form of cultural 
exile on their part thereby assuming the mantle of cultural outsiders. A useful example 
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here is the Quality Management team at Fishtown which were neither accepted as 
'managers' by other managers or as professionals by the bulk of the professionals 
interviewed. 
One of the most significant policy recommendations to arise from the thesis relates to 
the role of consumers in services; ironically, this is also the area least recognised by 
Governmental thought on NHS reform. A key finding of the study was that in no 
Trust site could consumers (or their representatives) be seen to play a substantive part 
in the corporate or clinical governance of the Trust sites. Of course there were lay 
members on Non-Executive Trust Boards, but with the exception of Marketown these 
played little part in the representation of consumer interests at the operational 'coal 
face' of the sites. There was clearly potential for greater involvement as demonstrated 
by the structural ideal of the patient fora in Castletown and a great deal of positive 
rhetoric from both consumer representatives, clinicians and managers. However, a 
role in governance per se was absent. It would be a significant policy step forward if 
the plans for Board sub-committees associated with clinical governance included 
more of an emphasis on consumer membership; at the moment there is none. Clearly, 
a great deal of the information collected by consumer representatives in this study did 
not find their way onto the quality agendas of Trust managerial and clinical 
committees due to the lack of a structural entry point for the data. 
Conclusion 
This thesis represents a theoretical entry point for the further exploration of the 
contested concept of quality in public services. It has shown how the concept has 
technical and colloquial dimensions and that the two are not always compatible. The 
central analysis shows how the concept is delineated along occupational-ideological 
lines but in ways which are far from 'pure' and free from mediating variables. The 
thesis demonstrates that mediating variables such as power and structural interest are 
equally as, if not more so, important to policy makers seeking to balance corporate, 
clinical and user demands, than rational exhortations to individuals and groups to 
achieve simple notions of colloquial quality. Achieving a balance of corporate and 
clinical governance in respect of 'quality' will require policy solutions which achieve 
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a balance of top-down explicitness and bottom-up innovation. The ability to move 
beyond managers as the constituency of choice to take charge of quality is essential if 
clinical involvement is to be secured in a meaningful way. However, simply handing 
the reigns of the quality industry over to professionals is unsatisfactory if user-led 
structural interests are to be incorporated in ways which remain tangible and relevant 
to this constituency. 
Perhaps the time has come to develop a new language and suite of techniques to 
achieve the goals of quality and perhaps even to expel the term quality from the NHS 
rhetorical dictionary altogether. In an era which has seen the creation and subsequent 
partial abandonment of the language and structure of the healthcare market in less 
than 10 years then such a scenario in relation to quality is not unrealistic. The 
dismantling of the technical quality machinery in favour of the NHS concentrating on 
new ways of pursuing colloquial quality - that which we all know but cannot 
verbalise -might even be accompanied by an explicit recognition of structural interests 
in the policy development process itself. In this way the principles and processes of 
Clinical Governance may only represent a small step in an incremental policy shift 
towards a model which moves away from vague unitary solutions on quality towards 
an alternative, increasingly pluralistic, model of User-Govemance. 
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Appendix One: Factor Scores and Loadings for the Four Case 
Sites 
table I: a- Factor Loadings: Marketown 
table 1: b - Factor Loadings: Shiptown 
table I: c - Factor Loadings: Castletown 
table I: d - Factor Loadings: Fishtown 
table 2: a - Factor Scores: Marketown 
table 2: b - Factor Scores: Castletown 
table 2: c - Factor Scores: Fishtown 
table 2: d - Factor Scores: Shiptown 
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Table I: a Factor Loading Matrixfor Marketown 
role fac I fac2 fac3 fac4 fac5 
nurse 772 
manager 710 
nurse manager 660 319 303 
consumer rep 658 
nurse 649 
manager 605 
consumer rep 579 
consumer rep 558 
consumer rep 558 
consumer rep 548 
nurse 329 
nurse 320 
consumer rep 319 




manager 494 416 
nurse manager 320 




manager 446 485 
nurse 413 398 
manager 846 






factor I= consumerist 
factor 2= managerial 
factors 3&4 = middle 
ground 
factor 5 professional 
role fac I fac2 fac3 fac4 fac5 
nurse 809 
manager 328 590 -384 
manager 484 
nurse 352 455 415 
manager 
consumer rep 443 





nurse -438 675 
doctor 530 
doctor -324 521 
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Table 1: b Factor Loading Matrixfor Shiptown. 
role fac I fac2 fac3 fac4 
nurse 801 -372 
nurse 763 
nurse 640 353 
consumer rep 615 




consumer rep 576 
consumer rep 492 
manager 411 
manager 403 
nurse 753 353 
consumer rep 742 
nurse 628 
nurse 609 
nurse 473 594 
nurse 445 466 
consumer rep 441 
consumer rep 432 
consumer rep 431 
manager 396 
manager 383 
consumer rep -900 
nurse 473 534 














factor I professional 
factor 2 consumerist 
factors 3&4 middle grou-nd 
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Table I: c Factor Loading Matrix: Castletown 
role fac I fac2 fac3 
manager 901 
manager 810 
consumer rep 763 
manager 754 





consumer rep 610 
























consumer rep 873 
consumer rep 806 
nurse 757 
role fac I fac2 fac3 
nurse 747 
nurse 649 
nurse 373 396 
factor I- consumerist 
factor 2 -professional 
factor 3- consumenst 
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role fac I fac2 
consumer rep 814 
nurse 730 
consumer rep 709 399 







consumer rep 501 





nurse manager 936 
nurse manager 720 







factor I =consumerist 
factor 2 == professional 
Note that some individuals loaded significantly on more than one factor. Please also 
note that only the significant factor loadings are presented to promote ease of 
interpretation. So an example here is that Factor five in Marketown (the professional 
viewpoint) is best represented in the Q-sort of the nurse who loaded most significantly 
on that factor (factor loading of 749). Whereas the Q-sort of the manager who loaded 
significantly negatively on that factor (-384) best represents the antithesis of the point 
of view. 
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table 2: a - The Q-Sample And Factor Array Scores: Marketown. 
The Issue OfDefining Quality: 
Quality is about leaving it to the health care professionals on the 0 -5 00 -2 ground because they know how best thejob should be done.. 
Most health care professionals know good quality when they see it. Its +2 -5 0 +3 +3 
part of being a professional that they already provide good quality 
care.. 
Quality is about meeting the customer's requirements through a +2 +5 +2 0 +1 
concentration on actively managing the processes ofservice delivery 
Quality is about having a culture where everybody is linked together +3 +5 +2 +5 +3 
with a common aim of doing the right thing at the right time by getting 
the processes right 
Quality is about promoting access to services and choicefor patients +5 0 -1 0+I 
in the service itsetf; even before they get to us so they can choose 
where best to go.. 
Quality is all about responding to customers ... notiust in terms of +4 0 +2 +2 -2 
meetings but actually listening to them and adjusting what we do as a 
response ... its about giving people who use our services more power. 
Doctors consultations are often immeasurable in terms of quality. So a +1 -2 -2 +2 +4 
lot of the techniques to do with quality promotion aren't that 
appropriate 
National quality tools and techniques, like all thefuss over outcomes, -1 -1 000 
are of limited applicability to our local context. its quite easy to 
demonstrate that some of them are a load of tosh. 
Managers concentrate too much on getting people to subscribe to +2 -1 -4 -1 +3 
standard specifications or ways of thinking about quality. The problem 
is these don't reflect all the different groups involved in hospitals 
The problem with quality as customer satisfaction is that in the NHS 0 +3 -3 0 +1 
the customer isn't always right ... whether that's the patient, the 
GP, or 
the DHA. 
By involving consumers and groups like the CHC in defining what -3 0 +1 -4 +2 
quality is about in our service you just complicate the picture and then 
the important things get dropped 
Its all very well talking about involving consumers in developing and 
defining quality in services, but when it comes down to it getting them 
involved in any thing other than surveys is a waste of time ... they don't -4 
0 +1 0 +1 
want to know. 
EVA L UA TING FOR QUA LIYY 
Evaluation occupied a centralposition in people Is accounts of the quality process - as it does in the Trust's quality 
Professionals should use the standards of the colleges and +1 -3 
0 +1 -1 
statutory bodies as guidelinesfor quality. As long as the 
standards of the relevant royal colleges and professional bodies 
are upheld then the quality ofservice will be more than adequate 
for most people. 
Quality can be a good thing if as professionals, its left to us to set -1 -5 
0+1 +5 
the standards we arejudged by... after all, we're the one with the 
specialist knowledge 
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Although quality isn't always the easiest thing to measure, that 
shouldn't stop us looking at our care and attempting to measure 
the outcomes of that care. If we actually measure what we do then 
quality will rise 
You can only raise quality through active management scrutiny of 
the whole service, its processes and outcomes. Some people might 
not like that but its true. 
We should make more use ofpatients views in evaluating the 
quality of the care we provide ... notjust through surveys, but by 
involving them directly injudging what we do. 
Although relations with the CHC have improved over the past 18 
months Istill think we could, infact should, do more to involve 
them as representatives of the community in looking at what we do 
in terms of quality. 
Professionals resent the intrusion that TQM and all the other 
paraphernalia of quality makes on their ability to practice ... its not 
nice beingjudged all the time. 
Quality rests on solid, measurable outcomes. The process behind 
those outcomes should be professionally determined -You can't 
have a good outcome with a crap process ... but the quality people don't seem to realise that. 
Despite audit's role as part of the Trust's quality strategy there is no 
real desire on the part of management to actually use the 
information, its more a case ofproviding reassuring messages... 
Service standards haven't reall changed anything, first because y 
people are too nice to use them properly and second, because 
nursing and medicine haven't really 'bought in'to the idea on a 
Trust wide basis. 
Consumers don't always know what they wantfrom services so 
using them to makejudgements about themjust gives you a 
misleading picture.. 
Using complaints as a measure of quality is askingfor trouble ifyou 
provide the means to make complaining easier then youjust 
encourage more complaints form those'difficult patients and their 
families. Consumers don't always know what they wantfrom 
services so using them to makejudgements about themjust gives 
you a misleading picture.. 
HO W DO YO U GET THERE? THE PREFERRED RO UTE TO 
'QUALITY: 
Quality is enhanced by the use of audits restricted to each 
Professional group and which are confidential. Although I don't 
think they should be compulsory. 
Medical audit definitely raises professional standards in hospitals 
and is something that should be encouraged... provided it stays 
confidential. 
The best way to promote quality is through changing service 
cultures via tools such as Total Quality Management. I think that 
we've done that here to an extent and quality has gone up as a 
result. 
Management-set standards have an important role to play in 
raising hospital based quality, Obviously professionals should be 
involved but they shouldn't always have the whole say. 
316 








+2 -2 -1 +3 -1 
-1 -1 
+1 -4 +5 0 
0 +2 -1 -4 
0 -1 +4 0 
-3 +1 0 +1 
-4 +1 -4 -4 
-2 +1 +1 -1 
-1 +2 -4 +2 
+2 +3 -4 +3 











The best way to get to be 'good quality'in a hospital is by a 
combination ofgiving patients good information, allowing people 
more choice, and by us becoming a bit more accountablefor our 
action. Quality is still too provider dominated... we don't listen to 
patients nearly enough. 
If the users of our services were actually involved in making 
decisions about thefuture direction of those services then you 
mightfind that quality improves ... at least people willfeel part of 
any changes. 
All this corporate quality stuff is stupid. The best way to achieve 
quality in hospitals is to concentrate on audit. Audit that is 
confidential so people will take part. Peoplejust resent all this 
management stuff- 
TQMjUSt gets people's backs up. Nobody likes being told what 
they're doing is no good but they are better ways to go about it. 
Like the stuff that the Royal Colleges are doing ... professionals 
respect their techniques because its written by people who know 
what they are talking about. 
I wouldn't say that TQM has been a completefailure but based-on 
where we are now afterfive years I can't say that its worked 
either. 
I don't think trying to change the culture of the Trust through 
management is the right approach-but I'm not sure what else we 
can do. 
The problem with all the emphasis on consumer choice and 
involvement is that sometimes you can't offer it and then theyjust 
feel let down. 
I just don't think that offering everyone a massive choice offood, 
whether they get a mixed sex ward, or whether to get involved in 
decision making on the ward or not really matters, I don't think 
quality is really affected by these sort of things... 
ISSUES OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE: 
Devolving quality down to quality improvement teams in clinical 
directorates encourages better professional standards. 
The decentralised decision making that clinical directorates allow 
means that professionals can betterpromote quality provision of 
care. 
Linking managers and professionals together in the quality 
improvement teams in each directorate has gone a long way in 
promoting quality structures and attitudes that are sensitive to 
each directorate's priorities rather than those of the management 
executive. 
Directorate-based quality improvement teams reinforce links 
between quality, structure andflexibility in the services we 
provide. 
The broken down structure of the clinical directorates gives us 
much more opportunity to listen to consumers directly rather than 
waitfor the executive to tell us what people are thinking. 
We should use the ability to change the structure of wards and 
management organisation to get closer to people who use services 
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The quality improvement teams within the directorates haven't -2 -4 +3 +4 -3 really altered the way I think about quality or the way I do things 
forpatients. 
As a professional, its more important to me what my colleagues -3 -3 0 +2 -2 think rather than whether or nor what I'm doingfits with what the 
TQMpeople want me to do; because in reality, the QITs don't 
really have much say in our priorities as nurses. 
The problem with empowering individuals within the aims of each -2 -2 00 -1 directorate is that we have lost control to an extent. 
The directorate-based QITs maybe haven't been helped by +2 +2 -3 -2 +2 
centralised training. Because people go back to the wards after 
their quality awareness session, then that's it ... there's no real follow up. 
The clinical directorates and QITs haven't really done that much +1 0 -2 -2 -1 
regarding our ability to listen to consumers, and adapt what we do 
as a result, any better .. the reasons why go much deeper than that. 
I still think there is a massive gap between what the top want and +3 -2 0 -1 0 
what we can deliver in terms ofpatient choice and things like that. 
Its not all about money. Butjust making us more responsible 
through directorate-based QITs and TQM isn't the answer. 
INFORMA TION AND ITS USE. - 
We should release audit results to the community at large as an +4 0 +3 -5 +5 
impetus to improving the quality of our services. 
There is too much secrecy attached to information on professional +1 -1 +4 +1 0 
standards in the Trust-If it was more widely available then 
maybe people would pay more attention to them and standards 
would go up. 
Information about patient satisfaction, complaints and staff +4 00 +3 +4 
attainment ofstandardsforms the basis of a good quality 
management strategy and decisionsfor action. 
A picture ofpatients'views on services should be the foundation of +3 -2 +3 +2 -4 
all our quality activity as managers and as a way of taking groups 
forward around the issue of quality 
Quality is about meeting expectations - ours and theirs, the +5 +1 0 -4 +2 
patients. If we give patients all the information we have we 
Shouldn'tfeel bad about that. Its not up to us tojudge how little or 
how much they need to know. 
If we don't give patients information on care and services how can +4 +1 0+1 +1 
they question what we do ... and I think that quality will probably improve ifpatients are allowed to question the treatment and 
services we provide to them. 
I think we can give too much information to patients and relatives. -2 -2 00 +4 
They can be selective in what they listen to auditjust raises their 
expectation of what we can deliver unnecessarily. 
By giving information on quality to outside groups like the CHC we -1 -3 +1 -5 0 
arejust giving them a stick to beat us with. 
The quality of the information we can use to manage quality could 0 +1 +1 -2 0 
be better because at the moment its unwieldy and difficult to use in 
any meaningful way ... so quality suffers. 
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You can't manage people without good information and at the 0 -1 +1 -4 +1 
moment the information is nearly useless ... still I'm not sure that if 
the in rmation was any better it would be easier to manage f) 
everyone. 
We are in danger of offering people too much information. -5 0 -1 +4 +1 
Consumers don't know how to handle the information we give them, 
and I don't really think they want too much anyway. 
I can't honestly see how giving patients tons of information is going -5 +1 -3 +2 0 
to help them question what we do ... not in the real world anyway, 
WHA TABOUT LEADING THE PROCESS? 
Hospitals are about providing care and treatment, and its 0 -5 0 +2 +2 
professionals that do that isn't it... so it should be professionals that 
drive the process of quality improvement in a Trust. 
By giving nurses and doctors lead responsibilityfor developing +2 -3 -4 -2 -I 
quality in Trusts, people would be happier and quality would rise. 
Managers shouldn't have to wait for professionals to come on -4 +4 +5 +1 0 
board in relation to quality. I think a stronger managerial hand in 
the issue would be advantageous all round. 
Management should deal with recalcitrant professionals, one skin -3 +5 +3 -5 -3 
nailed to the door in the name of quality would soon get people to 
play along and take notice. 
Quality in any Trust or organisation should befirst andforemost +5 -10 -3 -4 
led by the people who use that Trust ... the customers. 
Professionals and managers should adjust how they do things in +3 -1 +1 -1 -5 
response to what patients tell them ... out of all the groups involved 
in services it should be patients who hold the most sway. 
The problem with quality is that it could lead to responsibilityfor -1 -3 -3 -2 +4 
leading the team on the ward being given to managers and 
outsiders rather than the people who know, like doctors and nurses. 
I don't like thefact that outsiders are telling my team members 0 -2 -5 -2 -1 
about the quality of the service we are providing. 
Part ofgood quality management is relinquishing control over the 0 +4 +2 -2 +1 
process. By that I mean we should let go a bit and leave it to others 
and maybe the chances of success would be a bit higher. 
Managemenijust respond to national priorities and objectives They -1 0 +2 -5 +3 
have their own little agendas and do little to actually raise quality. 
I don't think making patients and the CHC the people to lead -3 0 +1 +4 +2 
quality in the Trust is a realistic option. Its alright to talk about 
making providers less powerful but you need specialist knowledge 
about medicine and management to make quality control work. 
Patients should have a greater say in running quality in the Trust -1 +2 -1 +1 0 
but not at the expense ofpeople with more knowledge and skills. 
GOING To MARKET. QUALITYAND PURCHASING-PRO VISION. 
The purchaser provider split has definitely helped in raising quality +2 
000 -2 
in professional care. The contract quality specifications system 
helps me set objectivesfor my practice. 
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From a doctor's point of view thefact that the DHA have a say in 
the audit agenda is a good thing. At least what gets audited is 
based on what they actually require to make good quality 
purchasing decisions. 
Purchasers play an important role in setting and managing the 
quality specifications for a service and their influence should be 
strengthened. - 
Thefact that as managers we have a good rapport with our 
purchasers is important. It has to be, much of what we do around 
the area of quality is taken on Trust, Ipersonally think that's a good 
thing. 
Having purchasers andproviders has done a lot to help make 
choice easier and because the health authority and GPs are 
supposed to involve patients in decisions then probably quality has 
improved too. 
Quality visitsfrom the CHC and the DHA are probably more useful 
than contract specifications because it provides an opportunityfor 
us to meet themjace toface andfor us to listen to what they want as 
customers. 
Ourpurchasers don't really understand about quality, or what they 
wantfrom us, so they don't really alter the tings we do under the 
heading of quality... which is probably a good thing. 
Purchasers want all sorts of information on processes; information 
which we have to collect. I don't think that really helps because its 
time that could be spent at the bedside. 
Quality at the DHA is management driven with advisors pulled in 
generic roles when needed Its a case of if the capfits ... we need a 
greater awareness of the needfor technical knowledge. 
Patients Charter standards in the contracts are by and large 
inadequate but I'm not sure as managers we want any more ... they 
create a higher workload with dubious results. 
I can see how the purchaser-provider thing might help patients in 
getting a greater say in services but in reality I'm not sure that it 
will have much effect. 
The healthforums that the DHA and the CHC organise don't really 
achieve that much. All that happens is you get a lot of talk about 
whatjust a very vocal minority think is important. And it doesn't get 
fed back into what the DHA wantfrom us. 
QUALITYAND CONFLICT 
TOM. and quality promotion generally, has been a good thing in 
that its got peoplefrom different professional groups talking 
together and reduced all the conflicts that go on in clinical teams. 
QITs have helped me understand better the work of others in the 
Trust, so from that point of view I think quality is probably a good 
thing and I think that over time we have developed a kind of 
common view on what constitutes quality in our directorate. 
Quality serves to strengthen management's hand in dealing with 
staff and consumer groups who act as impediments in the process 
of changing our culture in the trust to one which is concerned with 
qualityfirst andforemost. 
+1 +1 +2 
+3 0 -2 
0 +1 0 
+3 -3 +1 
+3 -1 -1 
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Quality should be used in a positive way ... one which helps 
managers cope with the problems of dealing with the 'wild cards' 
in an organisation ... you know the ones who always think they 
always know best, 'their'patients and stu like that. fff 
Quality and quality systems should be a means of reconciling the 
differences between dissatisfied patients and the hospital. if we 
involve patients in setting standards and, providing they have 
enough information, then we can show that we met the required 
standard. 
By involving and listening to patients through things like health 
forums then there will be less disputes over quality, because they 
willfeel involved. 
Quality isjust another means ofpreventing people working 
together properly. People do it but they're hearts aren't really in it. 
Part of the reason that they're are sofew doctors on board in 
terms of quality is that the TQM thing and the people that run it 
just lack credibility ... ifyou're not credible in the NHS and don't know what you're talking about then people won't respect you. 
By establishing the QITs within directorates, objectives clash. 
Because they inevitably revolve around contracts and money is the 
prime mover rather than quality. 
I think a lot of clinicians think quality is a dirty word .. theyfeel 
that quality is about the wall paper and the car-parkingjacilities. 
Obviously, the TQM managers and the purchasers don't so 














By encouraging patients to question professionals and services all -5 -1 -1 -2 
the time all you're doing is encouraging distrust and a sense of 
conflict between us and them that wasn't there before. 
TQM and satisfaction surveys don't help the patient who is really -3 -3 +3 +4 
dissatisfied about his care. ltjust makes everyone really defensive 
so the quality suffers anyway. 
QUALIYY'CON7ROL'- THE PERCEIVED OCCUPA TIONAL CONTROL FUNCTION OF Q UALIYY IN SER VICES: 
I think the quality strategy of the Trust has given me more 
professionalfreedom to take control of the nature of the service I 
am delivering. 
People make afuss about 'the managers in the quality department' 
taking over our work. But I think generally we have managed to 
keep hold of afair degree of control over our practice and I think 





Quality is a means of management controlling what goes on in the 
Organisation in ways which meet organisational goals rather than 
personal or professional ones. After all, organisational goals and 
priorities encompass these anyway ... 
don't they? 
I think allowing managers to gain control over a service through a 
combined multi-disciplinary approach to quality will, in the end, 
bene t quality. V1, 
Quality systems should be used as a means of empowering 
patients, giving them more control over their experience of being 
in hospital. Obviously health care experiences differ according to 
how ill you are, but that doesn't mean that we can't at least try to 






















Nurses managers and doctors have too much power over what 
good quality is all about I think its time that patients and relatives 
had a say and we took a back seat ... let them steer the busfor a 
while and see if our results improve. 
Quality management isjust another way ofsaying management 
control ofprofessionals... 
Ijust feel that quality is just another stick to beat us with for 
management. 
I don't think quality is really helping in management efforts to work 
together with professionals, its perceived as management business 
and as something managerial. 
Direct control through using quality systems isn't always the best 
wayfor a manager to influence what a consultant does. 
Personally I don't particularly want some stroppy patient with no 
real knowledge of his condition or his medical needs controlling 
what counts as quality in what I dofor him. 
Giving patients choice and control overfood, admission times and 
stuff, yes ... but over how I operate on them or what I do as a skilled 
professional, no ... no way. Youjust can't run a service like that. 
0 -] +1 -1 -3 
-3 -4 -3 
-2 -3 
-2 +1 
0 0 +4 +2 0 
-5 -1 -1 +1 -2 
-1 -2 -4 -1 +3 
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table 2: b - The Q Sample And Factor Array: Castletown 
Defininition: 
facl fac2 
Professionals (nurses and doctors) know quality when they see it. That's 
why it should be left to them to define what it is. -4 0 
You've got to make quality, and the standards you expect, explicit ifyou are 
going to try and define it in the workplace. +2 +3 
I think quality works best when words like choice, customer-power, and 
voice in the system, actually mean something. Ifyou want to define quality +4 +1 
you've got to start with those three in mind 
A lot of what I do as a professional is unmeasurable along quality lines. 
Quality initiatives don't always recognt . se this and consequently a lot of 0 +3 
professionals see them as irrelevant. 
Part of the difficulty with quality in the Trust is that managers promote a 
view of quality that is `Managerialý This doesn't refelect the opinions of 0 +1 
other groups which arejust as valid. 
You can concentrate too much on involving consumers and patients in 
deciding what quality is in the Trust. Its easy toforget that what we are -2 -2 
here to do is to make people better and that's it. 
EVALUATING QUALITY: 
The only way to really ensure quality is to let the nurses and doctors on the 
wards set the quality standards. They are the only ones with the neccesary 
knowledge and skills -4 +I 
Managers should be involved at every level, but especially in'terms of 
deciding if a service is ofgood enough quality. It is their necks that are on 
the line if the customers get let down. +1 
The patientfora used in the Trust are an essential and notable means of 
listening to patients and using them to help evaluate quality in Trust 
performance +5 0 
Ifyou leave it to the professionals alone tojudge their work all you get is 
reassuring messages and a concentration on what is achievable rather than 
what the organisation needs. +1 
Managers concentrate too much on measuring andplanningfor stuff. Part 
of the problem with the NHS is that so much of what we do isn't that 
straightforward to measure or evaluatefor 'quality'like that. +2 
I'm not sure that most patients know what they want when they come into 
hospital. So to ask them tojudge the quality of our service is a bit dubious 















THE PREFERRED ROUTE TO QUALITY 
Properly conducted confidential internal audits which are limited to 
professional colleagues and exclude management are the best way to ensure 
quality in professional work. 
We've got to address real issues of ward culture, and the ways in which 
professionals practice if we are to make any more progress on quality as a 
management team. 
The best way to actually move towards quality in the Trust? -I think its about 
giving the people who use the services more say and a stake in those services. 
Notjust lip service but proper control over the service where possible. 
What we do is quality; we recognise that. All the quality initiatives do is cloud 
the issue. The best way to pursue quality is to leave the professionals to get on 
with it. 
The patientforums are ok as far as they go. But as a manager I don't get that 
much out of them. Wefind that surveys are a more useful exercise in providing a 
base-line of opinionfor developing quality. 
All this emphasis on choice [as part of quality] does is raise patient's 
expectations unnecessarily. Its not always possible to meet those and so quality 
s uffe rs - 
ORGANISA TIONAL STR UCTURE. - 
Obviously working on two sites is problematic, butfrom a professional 
point of view, directorates allow us moreflexibility andfteedom in terms of 
quality and the work of the quality champions. 
Having directorates and divisions means that managers and professionals 
work togetherfor quality and that has to be good. 
Working in directorates and divisions means that we can organisefora and 
listen to patients more effectively than we could before. So in that respect 
making the divisions has helped quality. 
Professionals care most about what other professionals think. The quality 
champions stuff is important but not at the expense of what colleagues think 
about the quality ofyour work. 
Having quality champions based in each directorate is unfair - They get 
singled outfor training and get seen as high flyers - It doesn't 
help the idea 
of each directorate 'owning'their quality. 
The problem with divisions and divisional quality initiatives is that good 























INFORMA TION AND ITS USE. - 
You can tell people too much. Audit allows us to scrutinise practice but to 
keep the results in house. That means that quality goes up but not at the 
expense of trust between professional colleagues. 
Information is the key to the whole quality strategy. Surveys, patientfora 
and audit results should be the basis of the whole quality thing. 
I think a key part of quality is about information. Proper stuff notjust 
patients charter rights, but how we actually do in relation to them. And also 
proper information about the outcomes of different wards - how can people 
choose when they don't have that information. 
I'm not entirely comfortable giving more information on the quality of our 
work to patients/carers. They don't have the knowledge and skills that come 
with being a doctor or a nurse to really understand a service. 
Its a bit of ajoke talking about information-based management as a way of 
promoting quality. The sorts of stuff we collect is so limited that it really 
isn't that easy to use it as a way of improving quality. 
Patients don't want any more information on the quality of the service we 
provide; itjust makes them unnecessarily concerned 
LEADING THE PROCESS: 
Nurses and doctors provide thefront-end care so it is entirely logical that 
they should lead quality in the Trust. 
There comes a time when you have to say enough is enough with nurses, 
doctors and quality, and say ývou ARE going to do it like this'- its part of 
being a manager. 
I think we have the right structure in place, with the CHC, the patients 
council and theforums; what we need to do now is make them the means by 
which the wholeprocess is led 
I think there is a danger in letting non-professional groups take control of 
quality in services. You need the knowledge and skills that come with being 
a doctor or a nurse to really understand a service. 
Putting management in charge of qualitY in the Trust hinders rather than 
helps, Peoplejust see it as another management thing. 
Patients don't want to take control of health care services as a part of a 
quality strategy. They want to come in get better and go home. Taking part 
infora and interviews isn't on their list ofpriorities. 


























The health commission by and large leave quality and audit to the Trust to 
sort out. Personally I think that! y a good thing as they don't have the 
knowledge to scrutinise practice properly and so quality in the market is 
used effectively. 
I think its important to maintain good links with the purchasers and to 
include them in designing and evaluating quality in the Trust. They are an 
essential part of making quality work in the market - one of the customers if 
you like. 
I think the purchaser-provider thing probably does help quality, in that Gps 
who are in touch with theirpatients have more of a say in the quality of 
services. If it isn't right they can get on the phone and get things changed. 
The paperwork that we have to collate as a result of the purchaser's 
interest in quality doesn't achieve anything in terms of quality of clinical 
care. 
The purchaser-provider market is just one lot of managers at the Trust 
talking to another lot at the Commission. Its all about money and nothing to 
do with quality. 
Having purchasers has done absolutely nothing in terms of qualityfrom the 
patient's viewpoint. Its all donefor them rather than with them - choice is 
non-existent. 
QUALITY-BASED CONFLICT- 
Clinical audit helps bring professional groups together. 
It gets people talking a common language and reduces the tensions you can 
get when doctors and nurses get together. 
Quality needn't necessarily be afocusfor aggravation between nurses, 
doctors and managers. It can be used as a means ofgetting everyone 
talking the same language and moving towards common goals. 
The quality strategy means more people complain, because theyfeel able 
to, but more people are satisfied with the outcome of the investigation of 
complaints; because -we make a point of actually listening and doing 
something about them. 
Quality standards, forums and quality stuff like that arejust an excusefor 
'consultant bashing, quality causes more arguments than it solves. 
Quality is pretty low down on most managers agendas in the divisions. 
They have to worry about balancing the books first andforemost and so 
there is an inevitable conflict between what they want and what they can 
achieve. 
I don't think there is any benefit in asking patients to constantly question 



























The emphasis on audit and quality has meant that nurses and doctors have 
been able to retain a fair amount of control in our practice. Its designed not 
to threaten us too much and that's a good thing. 
Managers need to concentrate on using quality as a means of encouraging 
a Trust-wide vision of quality. Its not enoughjust to leave it to small 
pockets ofprofessionals in each directorate. 
The whole point of quality is to try and make patients take more control 
over their health care. All our efforts should be in ttying to get people to 
take more control - and that means letting go of some of our power as a 
Trust. 
All this emphasis on quality isjust an extension of the managerial reforms 
of the 1980s. Itsjust a wayfor managers to encroach into professional life 
and ways of working. 
Quality isn't about managers 'controlling'professionals. Its more subtle 
than that. Its about empowering them so that they do what you want of their 
own accord. 
Quality isjust another means of getting consumerist ideas on the agenda. 
But it rubs people up the wrong way. Nobody likes being told how to do 
something by someone who hasn't aclue about what its like to be a nurse or 
a doctor, or even a managerfor that matter. 
table 2x The Q-Sample And Factor Array: Fishtown 
Defining Quality: 
Its the consultants who decide what constitutes quality in medical work and this 
generally works well peoplefeel accountable. 
It's vital that measurement and definitions of quality go hand in hand. The key to a 
definition of quality in a service is one in which performance can be measured and 
indicators developed. 
The only people who have any really legitimate claim to be able to define what counts 
as a quality service are the people who actually receive it. 
Quality is too important to be left to the medics to decide. We all have a stake in the 
service and we all getjust as much flak when it goes sour. 
Managers completely miss the point when they try and define quality. They 
concentrate too much on textbooks and ýgurus'andpqperwork and stuff. 





























E VA L UA TING Q UA LITY. - 
Its not up to managers to decide whether what we do as professionals is of a good +5 
enough quality. Our royal college standards and those we set locally do that already. 
Judging quality is all about how we perform over time and in relation to our own 
measurement criteria and those set by our customers. +4 0 
It is vital that we increase the role ofpatients and the community injudging the 
quality of our services and notjust by asking them tofill in another questionnaire. 
+3 +2 
Its all very well letting Drs and nurses decide that their work is excellent or ofgood 
quality, but not every one, patients included, is always happy to take their wordfor 
it ... we need evidence. +4 -2 
The indicators that the purchasers and ourselves use are so crude that measuring 
quality is a little meaningless. 
getting patients involved in deciding if what we do is quality is a dangerous game. 
What are we going to be able to do about it if they say our service is crap? 
THE PREFERRED ROUTE TO QUALITY. - 
-1 
-5 -3 
Medical audit provides a good vehiclefor evaluating quality ... it works because it has -1 +3 
credibililyfrom a professional point of view. 
The best way of moving towards quality is through the model we are piloting here - 
the EFQM and patientfocused approaches. These provide aframeworkfor action and +2 +1 
some kind of logical structure. 
I would like to see patientsforums or councils establishedfor each division andfor 
these to have a real say in the development and evaluation of initiatives to do with +2 0 
quality. 
Clinical audit in any real sense is too limited in scope, there has to be areas which are -3 
restricted to each profession because only they have the prerequisite knowledge to 
participate - so audit by Drs and nurses alone is a good thing and should continue. 
Quality advisors are supposed to be management's way ofgetting quality in to the 
Trust. But no-one knows what they do exactly. 00 
I don't know that patientsforums and things like that actually do that much. My 
experience at otherplaces is thatpeople get bogged down on the minutiae of ward -3 -2 
routine rather than seeing the biggerpicture. 
STR UCTURJNG FOR Q UALIYT. - 
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7he divisions and directorates are usefulfrom a professional point of view as it is +1 
possible to make decisions which impact on quality without having to refer everything back to the trust constantly. 
Having quality advisors outside the divisions has its advantages, For one, it doesn't 
get everyo 
, 
ne's backs up all the time, because we don't have the power to say ýou will 
do this', because we aren't part of the line management hierarchy. Sometimes you get 
more done by advising as opposed to ordering. 
The ways in which the hospital is structured is confusingfor patients. Notjust the 
physical layout but also the management and divisional Structures, they don't know 
what everyone does - like the quality advisors. Thefirst step towards a really quality 
service should be reviewing those structures. 
I think having divisions and directorates is just another means ofgetting 'competition' 
and efficiency into our work. It will do little to raise quality as communication 
between the divisions is made more difficult. 
I'm not sure that being part of a division has raised the quality of my workfrom where 
it was before. Injact in some ways it has made management more difficult because of 
the pressureform above abd below that didn't seem so acute in the old structure. 
As someone involved in the Trust as an outsider, Ifind it very difficult to go straight to 
the person I need to speak to. If Igo to the quality advisors they aren't part of any 
single division so its difficult to get accurate, hard, information. 
THE ROLE AND USE OF INFORMA TION. 
I don't see that making our audit results common knowledge within the trust would 
necessarily harm us as a group ofprofessionals, because by and large they are 
OK .. and where we aren't we try and put things right. 
The key to a quality service is easy access to credible, up-to-date information on cost, 
volume and quality at all levels of the organisation. 
We give out patient information leaflets to do with health promotion and stuff, but I 
would like to see greater patient access to management andprofessional information 
like standards and the cost, volume, quality data we track. 
We concentrate too much on getting information and statistics on quality and telling 
people about them. I don't know if it is all neccesary - we would be better off caring 
forpeople. 
Management information is only as good as the uses it is put to. And apartfrom 
waiting list times there doesn't seem too much of a will to really challenge people on 
the basis of the results we collate. 
The patient satisfaction stuff we turn out as indicators of our success in raising quality 
are pretty meaningless and more than a little superficial. 
























There is a needfor clinicians and other professionals to take the lead on decisions on 0 +2 
quality policies and developments carried out under the banner of quality in the Trust 
as a-waans of increasing participation amongst doctors. 
Because managers have a grasp of the theory behind quality systems then naturally it 
should be managers that lead the process. -3 -3 
We call it the ýpatientfbcused approach'but its not as ifpatients actually lead the 
whole process. I think if we are to really give people what they want then it should be 
patients or consumers who take the lead. +5 -4 
The quality advisors as quality leads arejust a resource to be used - but a very 
expensive resource. I'm not sure that theirfunction could continue like thisfor long. 
-2 Quality is supposed to be evetyone's business but managers seem to make it more 
theirs than anyone else's, We do the work as health professionals and they take the 
credit. -3 0 
Itsjust not practical to make patients and the generalpublic the people who should 
directly lead the quality strategy in the Trust. 
-1 -1 
GOING TO MARKET 
Yes quality in some aspects of my work as a health professional is unmeasurable. But +1 +I 
the purchaser-provider market isn't that much of a problem as there is no great desire 
on the part of the purchasers to measure it. So in that respect the reforms are 
probably quite goodfor quality. 
The purchaser's monitoring tools like SAS serve a useful role as it is important that we 
demonstrate the quality of our services in ways which are comparable with our 00 
competitors. 
Because patients can (theoretically at least) choose between us and someone elsefor +2 +3 
their care, then the market is probably a good thingfrom the patient's point of view. 
Because we need to increase our levels of quality to meet their expectations. 
Contracts, SAS and all the data that purchasers want isjust bureaucracy. jundholders 
prefer to talk on a personal level and in my view that is more effective and will do 00 
more to raise quality. 
SAS and contract specifications are OK as far as they go but no one ever lost a 
contract through not meeting a minor quality specification. Itsjust not a priorityfor 
the purchaser or us. 0 -2 
Its a good thing, choice for patients. However, when the choice is here or the other 
local hospital then the idea doesn't look so attractive; particularly when the only 
information people have is the waiting list times. 0 +1 
QUALITYAND CONFLICT' 
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The patientfocused quality approach has helped to get everyonefocused on one 
framework and has reduced conflicts between groups by giving us a shared visionfor 
thefuture. 
Formal quality models like EFQM and the training that goes with it act as a way of 0 
pulling everyone into the organisation's view of quality and notiust going off down 
their own little blind alleys. 
I think that as patients get used to being given choice and information and stuff and +1 
as we promote ourselves better in terms of the quality of what we do then complaints 
will actually go down and so will the us and them syndrome between the trust and the 
CHC 
Quality and all the training and meetings that accompany the idea takes people off the 
wards - people we can ill afford to lose - and so it is a constant source of aggravation 
between nurses and managers. 
People arejust burnt out with the whole quality thing. TQM then TQI then CQI; the 0 
troops havejust had enough. Its a source of tension rather than multi-disciplinary 
cooperation. 
The new emphasis on quality has done nothing to increase the voice ofpatients within 
the system. Alright you've got the charter but it hasn't made that much difference to -2 
the way in which people approach the customers or the outcomes of disputes. 
QUALITY CONTROL: THE CONTROL FUNCTION OF QUALITY ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Its important that we allow professional groups to keep control over the issue of 
quality if its to benefit services in the long run. -4 
Quality has always offered management more say in the ways that teams, including 
nurses and other professionals, do their work and I think that's a good thing in terms +2 
of quality, 
Quality is all about giving patients control and choices while in hospital. Real control +5 
- notjust menus and colour televisions, obviously there are limits but we could 
do 
more than we do at the moment. 
Its all very well talking about empowerment andpatientfocus and other management 
speak; but in the end quality is about outside groups controlling what we do as health -2 
professionals. 
Trying to manage professionals through quality techniques doesn't work. They don't 
lake it seriously and we [managers] talk a different language. 
I don't think we should give more control to patients anj consumers. They seem pretty 
satisfied with their lot at present, so why change it. A lf)u do is devalue the work of -5 














table 2: d The Factor Scores and Q-Sample. - Shiptown 
DEFINING QUALITY 
quality in professional work is a professional issue. Its up to us to 
decide what 'quality'in our work is. 
quality means managers doing the right thing by their customers. Its 
about getting it rightfirst time every time. 
involving patients more in issues of quality other than through surveys 
is something that we've thought about. Its a good thing but in reality I 
think its difficult to achieve. That shouldn't stop us trying though. 





+3 +1 0 +5 
thefact that we, as health care professionals, don't always know how 
the things we do actually work means that quality initiatives like SAS 
address only a tiny bit of the equation. All in all there bit of a waste of 
time. 
The type of definition of quality which underpins SAS and the work of 0 
the Quality Core Group isn't clear. What are they trying to achieve? If 
you don't make it explicit how can you expect people to work towards 
their aims and objectives. 
I never see the CHC and they don't know what we do here really, so 0 
why should they tell me what quality in my work is about. 
E VA L UA TING Q UA LITY. - 
without the knowledge you gain as being part of a profession you can't +2 
possibly evaluate the quality of a profession's work. 
management should take time to look at the outputs of the services they +5 
manage its the outcomes of a service that should be the cornerstone of 
any evaluation of quality. 
we've got a CHC member on the quality core group now and I think 0 
that is very important in terms ofgetting consumers views on the 
agenda and in looking at what we do in the name of quality. 
Trust quality initiatives like SAS and standards and stuffjust prevent -2 
me getting on with my work, it definitely means you take less risks 
because your always being watched, and yet its the risky stuff that 
sometimes gives the best results. 
Just what type of quality is it that SAS and stuff like the Kings Fund are -2 
trying to evaluate. They seem to spend a lot of time on stuff like 
wallpaper, clocks and magazines and not a lot on the culture of the 
unit. 
Asking patients to judge the quality ofsurgerY Say is like asking me to 
judge the quality of rocket science -I wouldn't have a clue. 
PREFERRED ROUTE: 
I think audit within the profession is the most effective way of 
promoting quality within our work, people take notice and take part 





















the divisional restructuring, S. A. S. audits, quality specs and standards 0 +2 -2 -3 in contracts and all that, have helped to change the culture of the 
place. People are genuinely interested in quality issues at ground level. 
we live in a democratic society why should hospitals be any different. +1 +4 -3 -3 Quality is about involving patients and customers at every level, where 
practical, and that means them judging professional and managerial 
ability. 
professional audit is credible because the people doing it share similar -1 -3 +5 +2 knowledge and experience - they're credible -all the 'initiatives' like 
Kings Fund do is get in the way. 
The quality strategy we seem to have here is a bit 'wishy washy'. What 0-1 +4 +2 
we need is a moreformalframework like TQM and some ofthe 
techniques they use in other units like 'the patientfocused hospital'. As 
things stand at the moment no one knows all the activity that's going on 
so it doesn't really work. 
Offering patients choice and listening to complaints and stuff can only -10-1 +4 
go sofar in the Trust. It doesn't really get to the nitty gritty of care so it 
just gives the illusion of quality and that doesn't help. 
ORGANISATIONAL STR UCTURE. - 
The divisional structures allowfor more professional autonomy in +1 +1 0 
decision making and that's got to be good in terms of quality. 
the quality core group and quality lead system provides a way of +1 +3 
combatting the isolation that divisions and directorates sometimesfeel 
in the current structure, I think its reasonably effective. 
Sometimes its necessary to examine the structure of wards and +3 0 +5 0 
departments to see if we can get closer to our customers. Notjust 
bricks and mortar but things like how the staff are organised and does 
this stop patients actually seeing their doctor or nurse when the want y 
to. 
divisional quality leads and the quality core group have very little to do +1 -2 +1 +3 
with the quality of my work. What my colleagues think has more impact 
than these. 
The divisional structurejust means that no-one knows what the other is -1 0 -2 0 
doing. So sharing best practice and sun like goes out of the window. 
The creation of divisions and making people 'quality leads'has done -3 0 +1 0 
nothing to improve the power ofpatients or carers in the system. 
THE ROLE AND USE OF INFORMATION: 
Giving information to outside groups like the CHC in theform of audit 0 +2 +4 -1 
results would be good PR and act as an incentive to improve our work. 
managing information is management - therefore, information is +4 +10 +5 
quality. I don't have a problem with giving information on the quality 
of our service to our customers or with receiving information that helps 
us Plan for quality changes 
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Its all very well encouraging patients to question what we do in the 0 
name of quality, but they can't very well do it unless we give them the 
information-tools to make use of. 
ifyou give patients detailed information on quality in the Trust, first -4 
they don't know how to use it and second you just askfor trouble with 
more complaints -just look at the Patient's Charter and all the hassle 
you get with that. 
Most of the information we get on quality, from a managerial point of 
view, is pretty useless. It doesn't make it easier to manage, itjust acts 
as a smokescreen for the real issues 
People don't always want to know loads of stuff on the quality of the +2 
services we deliver. Would you really want to know the average 








LEA DING TTIE PRO CESS. - 
Nurses and doctors provide the hands-on, direct, care in the Trust and +3 
as such it should be up to them to direct the quality process in the 
hospital as a way of raising standards of care. 
within the NHS its managers who take the rapfor qualityfailures so it -2 
should be managers who lead the process in Trusts. 
quality should be led by patients and potential patientsfirst and -3 
foremost. They deserve to be represented effectively on the committees 
that steer quality issues, including the various audit and professional 
committees. 
Qualityjust means managers and busy bodies interfering in the work 













Leaving quality to be lead by managers has resulted in a poorer quality -1 
of service. 
At the moment we only give the illusion ofgiving patients a bigger say 
in how things get done. That's not always wrong though because they 
don't always know. 
GOING TO MARKET 
The purchasers don't really SAS audit professional stuff so it doesn't 
really have much of an impact on our work. Personally I think that's a 
good thing its up to us to decide how best to meet contract quality 
Specs. 
-1 
Contracts and quality specifications play a vital role in our quality -1 +3 +2 
strategy and as such their influence should be extended to affect hands 
On care more. 
I think the link between consumer involvement and the work that the +2 +4 -2 
CHC are doing with neigh bourh oodforums is vital. If they can get 
users views onto the purchasing agenda then this will 
be reflected in 




S. A -S isjust a purchaser 'hoop'that we have to jump through. No one -3 
cares ifyou don't have teenage magazines and stuff in the waiting 
room, its not like you lose a contract because of it, is it? 
How can the purchasýer-provider thing help quality when they take +1 
resources away rather than inject them when a service is seen as poor 
quality. It doesn't help the service or the patients. 
It doesn't matter to us that the CHC organise community or 0 
neighbourhoodforums or whatever because the Trust isn't really 
affected by what they say anyway. Mainly because our purchaser 
doesn't include any of that stuff in contracts, its all about money. 
CONFLICT 
quality initiatives act as a means ofpulling all the groups involved in +2 
the delivery of care together, it reduces all the professional politics that 
used to go on at ground level. 
as a manager, quality acts as a kind of resource which I can draw upon +I 
as a means of reducing some of the tension that surrounds political 
issues such as how I allocate my divisional budget. 
linking complaints and complaints feedback into our quality strategy, 0 
and involving consumers in things like the quality core group means 
less dissatisfied patients and a better sense of involvement - all this 
means less aggro from stroppy consumers and groups. 
Quality creates more headaches than it solves. It gets peoples backs up -5 
and makes them worry unnecessarily about the way they work. It 
creates more aggravation between doctors nurses and managers than it 
cures. 
Quality has done next to nothing as a means of improving relationships -4 
between the clinical groups and especially management and 
professionals. Itsjust afocusfor more bickering over money. 
Nurses and doctors genuinely do want to do the right thing by people. -4 
All quality initiatives do is encourage the cynical minority to cause 
trouble that wouldn't be there otherwise. 
CONTROL: 
from a professional Point of view I think the nature of quality +3 
management within the Trust enables me to keep my professional 
freedom of control over my work. 
Roy Lilley wasn't completely wrong when he said about questioning 
0 
where your loyalties lay with the profession or with the organisation. 
If 
we are to achieve quality in any meaningful way then managers have to 
take control over the whole issue in Trusts. 
quality and customer control of the health service they receive cannot 
be separated. Quality is all about giving customers choices and control 
over those choices in the hospital. 
Quality, if we are not careful, just means taking control of 
how we do -3 




























Part of the problem is that peoplejust see quality as a means ofpushy -1 -3 +1 +3 
managers muscling in on their little empires. And in some cases they're 
not too far off the mark. 
Its unrealistic to expect patients to control the quality of the care we +2 -5 -3 0 
give them, basically because most of themjust want to come in and go 
out as quickly as possible. Quality is pretty low down on their lists. 
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